Iakovos Vasiliou

This paper argues that Plato's engagement with Anaxagoras in the Phaedo is more extensive than exclusive concentration on "Socrates' Autobiography" would suggest.  Plato takes Anaxagoras' notions of Nous, separation, and mixture and refashions them for his own ends, particularly to describe the proper role of an individual's mind or soul in effecting a separation of her soul from her body.  It is argued that the post-mortem incorporeality of the soul is, according to the Phaedo, a contingent matter depending on how one has lived one's life and not a simple metaphysical fact about the nature of soul. The paper provides detailed readings of "Socrates' Defense", the "Cyclical Argument", and the "Affinity Argument" in support of these claims.

Given the prodigious amount of scholarship on Platonic love, this article explores a different question: the nature of Plato's love for Socrates as expressed in two dialogues, the Symposium and Phaedo, in which Plato depicts Socrates as surrounded by his lovers and disciples. By paying attention to the "outer frames" of the dialogues, that is, the relationship between the text and the reader, it is argued that Plato's love for Socrates is displayed not only in his loving depiction of Socrates but also in Plato's doing philosophy through the character of Socrates; Plato thereby shows what genuine love for Socrates would be like. Moreover, contrasted with the words and actions of other characters in these dialogues, Plato shows himself to be not just one among many of Socrates' lovers, but in fact the best.

This paper investigates the extent to which ancient philosophers hold positions similar to contemporary epistemological disjunctivism.  It argues that there are some a priori reasons to think that ancient philosophers might be amenable to the disjunctivist position, even if their motivations for holding such a position may be quite different from that of contemporary philosophers.  The body of the paper focuses on the Stoics and their notion of the "cataleptic impression" as a criterion of truth. It compares the Stoic arguments against their Academic skeptical opponents with contemporary epistemological disjunctivism, particularly as it is developed in the work of John McDowell.

I begin by describing certain central features of a prominent Anglophone approach to Platonic virtue over the last few decades. I then present an alternative way of thinking about virtue in Plato that shifts central concern away from moral psychology and questions about virtue's relationship to happiness. The approach I defend focuses on virtue, both as a supreme aim of a person's actions and as something whose nature needs to be determined.