Socratic Irony

Plato is known as the theorist of universal ideas, yet he writes dialogues about particular situations; he is known as the philosopher who wishes to expel the poets, yet he writes philosophical dramas; he is known as the seeker of unchanging truth, yet he seems to argue for the appropriateness and necessity of the ‘noble lie’ in his greatest work, Republic. This study is an attempt to harmonize the contradictions between these different portraits of Plato through an analysis of the drama of Republic. The concept of truth is given special attention: how it is defined and in what way Plato’s Socrates pursues it.

What emerges from the dialogue is a distinction between factual and moral truth; moral truth, or truth in the soul, is less a matter of statements than of virtues. The ‘noble lie’ is not only compatible with moral truth, but even encourages it; rather than being an instrument of political control, it is a poetic device which Socrates uses to foster the love of justice in his interlocutors against tyrannical passions. The arguments for the expulsion of the poets are ironic and highly qualified; while they alert readers to the possible dangers of poetry, they reach out towards a reconciliation of poets and philosophers. The account of children’s education in Book II-III presents the arts as no less than indispensable.

Lastly, a brief response is given to a question raised in the dialogue: whether a god would ever appear in a form other than divine, i.e. in disguise. This seems impossible when the attributes of divinity are considered in isolation, but it is argued to be at least possible, desirable and ethically irreproachable when the needs and follies of humanity are taken into account.

The phrase ”Socratic irony”, which is principally used with reference to Socrates` philosophical method, is one of the biggest unsolved puzzles of Greek philosophy. Since the beginning of its occurrence, this type of irony has been a fertile ground for the abuse of exegetical tradition. But, despite the mysteries that surrounds the image of Socratic dissembling, it seems that the questioning technique of Socrates had a valuable influence on the entire Western thought. In this paper I discuss some types of comprehending and interpreting the specific irony that Socrates used in his provocative discussions. In this way, the present study starts with the analysis of the mistaken interpretation of the Sophists and continues with an inquiry of understanding how the concept of irony evolved from Antiquity to Friedrich Nietzsche. At the same time I will reveal the ethical issues involved in using the complex Socratic irony.

This article aims to illuminate Hegel’s characterization of Antigone as «the eternal irony of the community», which notably appears in his 'Phenomenology of Spirit'. Thanks to a comparison with other kinds of irony that are present in Hegel’s thought (i.e. Socratic irony, on the one hand, and Romantic irony, on the other), I will identify and describe the particular version of irony that defines Sophocles’ character. Antigone’s irony, I will argue, certainly belongs to antiquity, in some ways even more than Socratic irony; however, at the same time, Antigone’s irony exhibits some elements that place it at the very beginning of the path that culminates in the constitution of modernity.

In the 'Euthyphro', Socrates claims that, if he were to acquire knowledge of piety, he would have grounds for requesting acquittal on charges of impiety. This paper examines why Socrates thinks that gaining such knowledge is reasonable grounds for acquittal. It offers and decides between two readings: the first, is that Socrates is innocent of impiety and will use knowledge of piety to prove that this is the case, and the second, is that Socrates believes that knowledge of piety will make him pious henceforth (intellectualism) and that instruction in piety is a suitable punishment for any past impiety of which he may have been guilty. It suggests that Socrates is best understood as endorsing a functional definition of punishment in this dialogue, according to which whatsoever reforms a wrongdoer constitutes punishment for their wrongdoing, and argues that this speaks in favour of Penner and Rowe’s understanding of Socrates’ views on punishment, and against those of Brickhouse and Smith.

This article addresses the earliest uses of these words (Aristophanes, Plato) through analysis of their occurences in the texts. To be εἴρων is not, in the earliest meaning, to be "one who says less than he thinks", and εἰρωνεία is not "ignorance purposely affected" (as in the Liddell and Scott definitions of the words).  The word εἴρων indicates the one who manipulates his listener and entangles him.  This leads to a new etymology in which εἴρων derives from εἴρω, to tie, to tie up.

This paper is concerned with the phenomenon of humour and the question about its place in Plato’s "Charmides". The first part provides a short summary of the dialogue, with particular reference to the narrative structure and the literary and dramatic dimensions of this work. In the second part of the paper, using the methodological framework based on the “taxonomy of wit” proposed by D.L. Long and A.C. Graesser (1988), examples of Socratic’ wit are provided to illustrate selected functions of humour in "Charmides"; particular attention is paid to the prologue and to the myth about the Thracian magical incantation (epōidḗ) which Socrates has learned from physician and priest of Zalmoxis. In view of Socratic considerations about the human cognitive limits and the transmissibility of philosophy and knowledge, some forms of Socrates’ humour acquire an anti-dogmatic character; humour in "Charmides" is an expression of the philosophical inquiry and practice which involves knowing and accepting our limits of knowledge.

This paper approaches the twisted philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche considering
the interpretation of Peter Sloterdijk, who asserts in his Critique of Cynical Reason that the
philosopher from Basel is in fact a Neo-„Cynical” thinker. For instance, the „Eternal
Recurrence of the Same” is one of Nietzsche’s most subversive thoughts that reflects a
description of a resurgence of „kynical” motives. Though often overlooked, we must say that
Nietzsche himself occasionally practiced Cynicism as a strategy of survival. We know that he
lived modestly and had no fixed abode, wandering from city to city with all his notes and just
a few books. Because Nietzsche rejected not only the Academic style, but the citizenship in
any one country just as much as Diogenes had protested against Plato’s philosophy and had
declared himself a „citizen of the world”, we can affirm that he was a true cosmopolitan,
namely a modern Cynical philosopher. That is why, before his mental breakdown, he
ostentatiously stylized his fight against Western metaphysics, Christianity and Christian
morality into Cynicism. Thus, I emphasize that „the transvaluation of all values” is an
unfinished project about the virtues of Neo-cynical wisdom. Besides, his basic concepts – „the
Overman”, „the Eternal Recurrence of the Same”, „the Will to Power” – are nothing more
than metaphors for „the love of fate” or for the acceptance of the idea of Becoming.

“Just as philosophy begins with doubt, so also a life that may be called human begins with irony” (Kierkegaard The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, pg.6, thesis XV) What has proportion to do with humor or irony? And what do either of these have to do with being human? Jokes, laughter, and funniness connote excess, exaggeration, incongruity, dissonance, etc., the opposite of proportion--balance, symmetry, Aristotle’s golden mean. Yet, The Philosopher maintains, the wit has found the ideal moderate position between the deficient boor who seems constitutionally incapable of laughing, and the excessive buffoon who doesn’t know how to laugh at the right time, in the right way, or for the right reasons--buffoonish laughter is indiscriminate. The title, paraphrasing Hume, is consistent with Kierkegaard’s valorization of irony, as philosophical doubt and the confusion induced through Socratic Irony both call for a special sort of proportion: ontological proportion. Put simply, one ought to proportion one’s being, as well as others’, as though along a shifting spectrum rather than essentially and hierarchically. The latter fosters a serious attitude that takes polarities as the rule with no exceptions; black or white, good or evil, with us or against us, one of us or one of them, always seeking the ideal of purity. We see this disproportion in authoritarians who manifestly lack a sense of humor--Hitler’s joke courts, Turkey’s president Erdoğan attempting legal punishment against a comedian who mocked him, and Trump’s thin-skinned inability to laugh at his own expense, a monumental character flaw for the most powerful person in the world. Their views are serious, rigid, closed, and dogmatic about themselves, others, and for each of them excepting Trump, the presumed absolute nature of values--Trump’s unironic pretense toward any value is merely a means to service his own absolute end, himself. The playfully ironic person can cope with reality, with ambiguity and, borrowing from Maria Lugones, “ontological confusion,” the not-fully-settled identity.

In his preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein states that the question of nonsense has to do with drawing the limits of language. Nonsensical expressions go beyond the limits of meaningful language and reside “on the other side” of what can be said. Yet, at the end of the book he declares that his own propositions are, strictly speaking, nonsensical. The present paper aims at analyzing early Wittgenstein’s self-refuting strategy as a mode of transcending the limits of language, comparing his concept of “nonsense” (Unsinn) with Kierkegaard’s view of indirect communication and Socratic irony.

The elenchus (gr. ἔλεγχος, literally “argument of disproof”, “refutation”, “cross-examining”) is the core of the Socratic method represented by Plato in his early dialogues. This enquiring technique, employed by Socrates to question his interlocutors about the nature or definition of ethical concepts, is the object of a never-ending scholarly debate, concerning especially its primary purpose: is it a positive method, leading to knowledge, or is it rather a negative method, aiming exclusively at refuting the interlocutor’s belief? This paper, through the analysis of some key passages in Plato’s early dialogues, focuses on the structural features of the elenchus in order to understand how the elenctic refutation is developed, why Socrates chooses a dialectical method often ending in aporia, and whether the Socratic method can be considered, not merely an instrument aiming at the recognition of one’s ignorance, but primarily a positive search for knowledge.