Iakovos Vasiliou

This monograph offers a novel interpretation of Plato's ethics with a focus on the concept of virtue rather than eudaimonia. It argues that central to the argument of the "early" and "middle" dialogues is a distinction between aiming at virtue as the supreme end of action and determining, metaphysically and epistemologically, what virtue is.  It includes detailed readings of the Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, and Republic and addresses issues including Socrates's Disavowal of Knowledge, the Priority of Definition, the role of the "what is F?" question, the relationship between virtuous action and virtuous character, Thrasymachus's challenge to the value of justice, the restated challenge by Glaucon and Adeimantus, the significance of the educational program in the Republic, the unity of the Republic, and the role of Platonic Forms. It argues that there is much more continuity of thought throughout the "early" and "middle" dialogues than commentators have traditionally thought.

This volume presents a history of the concept of moral motivation.  The contributors are eminent scholars in the history of philosophy, covering Plato, Aristotle, later Peripatetic philosophy, medieval philosophy, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte and Hegel, and the consequentialist tradition.  The study of moral motivation examines why and how morals motivate a subject's action, and how those motivations may constitute a genuinely ethical act.  The book shows the complexity of the historical treatment of moral motivation and, moreover, how intertwined moral motivation is with central aspects of ethical theory.

This paper argues that Plato's engagement with Anaxagoras in the Phaedo is more extensive than exclusive concentration on "Socrates' Autobiography" would suggest.  Plato takes Anaxagoras' notions of Nous, separation, and mixture and refashions them for his own ends, particularly to describe the proper role of an individual's mind or soul in effecting a separation of her soul from her body.  It is argued that the post-mortem incorporeality of the soul is, according to the Phaedo, a contingent matter depending on how one has lived one's life and not a simple metaphysical fact about the nature of soul. The paper provides detailed readings of "Socrates' Defense", the "Cyclical Argument", and the "Affinity Argument" in support of these claims.

Given the prodigious amount of scholarship on Platonic love, this article explores a different question: the nature of Plato's love for Socrates as expressed in two dialogues, the Symposium and Phaedo, in which Plato depicts Socrates as surrounded by his lovers and disciples. By paying attention to the "outer frames" of the dialogues, that is, the relationship between the text and the reader, it is argued that Plato's love for Socrates is displayed not only in his loving depiction of Socrates but also in Plato's doing philosophy through the character of Socrates; Plato thereby shows what genuine love for Socrates would be like. Moreover, contrasted with the words and actions of other characters in these dialogues, Plato shows himself to be not just one among many of Socrates' lovers, but in fact the best.

This paper investigates the extent to which ancient philosophers hold positions similar to contemporary epistemological disjunctivism.  It argues that there are some a priori reasons to think that ancient philosophers might be amenable to the disjunctivist position, even if their motivations for holding such a position may be quite different from that of contemporary philosophers.  The body of the paper focuses on the Stoics and their notion of the "cataleptic impression" as a criterion of truth. It compares the Stoic arguments against their Academic skeptical opponents with contemporary epistemological disjunctivism, particularly as it is developed in the work of John McDowell.

I begin by describing certain central features of a prominent Anglophone approach to Platonic virtue over the last few decades. I then present an alternative way of thinking about virtue in Plato that shifts central concern away from moral psychology and questions about virtue's relationship to happiness. The approach I defend focuses on virtue, both as a supreme aim of a person's actions and as something whose nature needs to be determined.