Ronnie Nataatmadja

Legislative incumbent turnover rates are an important indicator for the quality of a democracy. Low turnover rates may indicate the presence of oligarchic structures while high turnover rates may be a sign of political instability. Yet, there is little research on incumbent turnover in new democracies. This article will suggest ways to address this gap in the literature by looking at Indonesia. The country is not only the third largest democracy in the world but also a relatively new democracy that has only conducted four elections since 1998. The lack of studies on incumbent turnover in new democracies is mirrored in the literature on Indonesia. The vast scholarship on democratization in Indonesia that has emerged over the past twenty years has yet to harness the insights to be gained from examining legislative incumbent turnover rates. The goal of this article is twofold. One, to present for the first time a systematic and comprehensive account of incumbent turnover rates in Indonesia across all election cycles since 1998. Two, to sketch an agenda for future research on incumbent turnover in Indonesia and other new democracies and facilitate such research by making publicly available an original dataset on incumbent turnover in Indonesia.

In recent years, a sizeable literature on subnational authoritarian regimes in democracies has emerged. In some countries local authoritarian enclaves have persisted despite the democratization of politics at the national level. Even more intriguing, new subnational authoritarian regimes have emerged in the context of national level democratization. Finally, scholars have noted that there is considerable variance in subnational authoritarian regime durability between and within countries. This article will examine why subnational authoritarian regimes have not emerged in Indonesia. Arguably, the difficulties of subnational elites to concentrate control over local economies; the high economic autonomy of voters; and the rigid institutional framework of Indonesia’s decentralized unitary state have inhibited the rise of durable subnational authoritarian regimes in the world’s third largest democracy. One of the first studies on subnational authoritarian regimes in a decentralized unitary state, the article engages and informs the broader literature on subnational authoritarian regimes.

The article compares the political trajectories of authoritarian diasporas in Indonesia and the Philippines, namely the subset of former regime officials that disperse across the electoral space after a regime transition. The main finding is that after the Suharto and Marcos dictatorships collapsed in 1998 and 1986 respectively, Indonesia's authoritarian successor party (ASP) fared better than the ASP in the Philippines. However, the authoritarian diaspora did better in the Philippines than in Indonesia. Engaging with existing scholarship on authoritarian successor parties and authoritarian diasporas, the article argues that the two variables shaping defection calculi are the prevailing levels of party institutionalization of both the authoritarian successor party and alternative parties as well as the type of reversionary clientelistic network available to elites in post-transition politics.

The new Indonesian president, Joko Widodo (''Jokowi''), has faced formidable challenges on a number of fronts in his first year in office. Although Jokowi has managed to roll out his pet projects for the poor, management of competing partisan and personal interests as well as the economy and religious conflict continues to be a challenge. Overall, the new government's contribution to democratic reforms has been modest thus far.