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Erik Odegard
  • Leiden, Zuid-Holland, Netherlands
The fall of the Dutch colony in Brazil in 1654 sparked a period of upheaval and change for the colony's Sephardic Jewish community. Brazil had been a place of unprecedented liberties for the Jewish community there, and over the coming... more
The fall of the Dutch colony in Brazil in 1654 sparked a period of upheaval and change for the colony's Sephardic Jewish community. Brazil had been a place of unprecedented liberties for the Jewish community there, and over the coming quarter century, the former inhabitants of the colony would search for a "new Brazil" and opportunities to create spaces for organized Jewish life in Atlantic colonies. Brazil had also seen Jewish family migration, and included in the exodus from Brazil and the subsequent resettling were Jewish women. Though their role is difficult to grasp through the colonial records, metropolitan sources allow for a more detailed understanding of the role of Jewish women in the Dutch Republic in pursuit of compensation for possessions and real estate lost in Brazil.
In 1777, the American commissioners in Paris, Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane, con-tracted with French naval captain Jacques Boux to design two frigates for theRevolutionary cause. The design was thefirst of a new concept of very large... more
In 1777, the American commissioners in Paris, Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane, con-tracted with French naval captain Jacques Boux to design two frigates for theRevolutionary cause. The design was thefirst of a new concept of very large frigates,able to outgun anything they could not outrun. The ships were to be built at a privateyard in Amsterdam. One of these vessels, laid down asL’Indien, would ultimately servethe American cause in the South Carolina State Navy under the nameSouth  Carolina.This article examines the Dutch period of the two ships built at the yard of ArieStaats in Amsterdam in 1777–1781. Despite the attention given toSouth  Carolinainthe historiography, the Dutch sources have not yet been studied. The case ofL’IndienandTijger, her sister ship, illustrates the continuing importance of private contractorsto navies in the late eighteenth century.
From 1630 until its fall in 1654, the Dutch West India Company maintained a colony in northeastern Brazil where it tried to profit from the cultivation of sugar using enslaved African labor. Count Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen served as... more
From 1630 until its fall in 1654, the Dutch West India Company maintained a colony in northeastern Brazil where it tried to profit from the cultivation of sugar using enslaved African labor. Count Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen served as this colony’s governor-general from 1636 until 1644, this being the most heavily studied period of the colony’s existence. But the role of Johan Maurits in the transatlantic slave trade and enslavement in Brazil is poorly covered by research, with some historians recently arguing that there is ‘no proof’ of any personal involvement. This article presents a clear argument for the personal involvement of Johan Maurits in the slave trade and shows his involvement in slave-smuggling. Understanding the social relations between the count, his court and the Luso-Brazilian elite is in fact simply impossible without bringing in the trade and smuggling of enslaved Africans.
Chartered companies provided one solution for the problems posed by long-distance trade in the early modern world. Accordingly, these organisations have been studied exhaustively. Yet the field is by no means depleted, as the books... more
Chartered companies provided one solution for the problems posed by long-distance trade in the early modern world. Accordingly, these organisations have been studied exhaustively. Yet the field is by no means depleted, as the books reviewed here attest. These six books cover questions ranging from whether the chartered companies acted as real business organisations or rather as appendages of state power, the relations between companies and states, the institutional development of the corporate form, and the nature of some of these companies as "company-states." In addition, two edited volumes deal with specific aspects of the chartered companies and with noncorporate forms of merchant organisation. The works raise new questions and engage in ongoing debates. The review also raises a number of issues which could be addressed in future research, including the dominance of the East India Companies in our understanding of the corporate form as a whole.
This article examines the issue of private investment in the seventeenth-century Dutch colony in Brazil. For the first time, new archival discoveries allow for a reconstruction of the size of private investment in the colony, as well as a... more
This article examines the issue of private investment in the seventeenth-century Dutch colony in Brazil. For the first time, new archival discoveries allow for a reconstruction of the size of private investment in the colony, as well as a breakdown into distinct investment activities. The article argues that private investment was an absolute necessity for the West India Company in the hope of making its colony successful, as it could not provide the required funds by itself. Private individuals claimed to have invested over eleven million guilders in the colony, nearly one-anda-half times the WIC's original capitalization. A number of case studies elaborate the overall figures presented and show that Dutch investors did indeed move into sugar cultivation and even moved into agricultural property development. Presenting these data and sources will, it is posited, allow for a fuller picture of the role of former inhabitants of Dutch Brazil in the development of plantation systems in the wider Caribbean from the mid-1640s onwards.
Out now with Brill! This book is based on my PhD thesis, but there are some major changes, including more sources. Lobby your University Library to add it to their collection. If they do, you can get a print on-demand paperback for €25.... more
Out now with Brill! This book is based on my PhD thesis, but there are some major changes, including more sources. Lobby your University Library to add it to their collection. If they do, you can get a print on-demand paperback for €25.

Book abstract:
How did individuals advance to the highest ranks in the Dutch colonial administrations? And how, once appointed, was this rank retained? To answer these questions, this book explores the careers of Dutch colonial governors in the 17th century with a focus on two case-studies: Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, governor of Dutch Brazil (1636-1644) and Rijcklo f Volckertsz van Goens, Governor-General in Batavia in the 1670s.
Dutch port records are a valuable source to study the development of shipping in the Indian Ocean in the eighteenth century, especially the important but elusive local short-sea trades. This article presents data from the Dutch port... more
Dutch port records are a valuable source to study the development of shipping in the Indian Ocean in the eighteenth century, especially the important but elusive local short-sea trades. This article presents data from the Dutch port records of Cochin (Kochi) and Bimilipatnam (Bheemunipatnam).
When the Dutch Republic and Habsburg Spain went to war again in 1621, the Dutch were confronted by a well-run campaign against its trade and fisheries mainly operating out of Dunkirk. This chapter studies how the Dutch Republic responded... more
When the Dutch Republic and Habsburg Spain went to war again in 1621, the Dutch were confronted by a well-run campaign against its trade and fisheries mainly operating out of Dunkirk. This chapter studies how the Dutch Republic responded to this threat. It argues that consistent efforts were made to outsource protection of trade and fisheries to those groups which profited from it. Rather than centralising decision-making and monopolise violence at sea, the Dutch state devolved responsibility to lower levels of government, corporations and chartered companies, and private firms. These ships were mainly uses for convoy duty. This chapter argues that this devolution was instrumental in protecting Dutch commerce and provided ships to the fleet in crises such as the Battle of the Downs as well. But from the middle of the seventeenth century this system would deteriorate and more tasks would be taken up by the admiralties themselves.
The port of Cochin on the Malabar Coast of India had always been a centre of shipbuilding. After the Dutch conquest in the port in 1663, the Dutch East India Company (VOC), too, established a shipyard there. At this yard, the VOC... more
The port of Cochin on the Malabar Coast of India had always been a centre of shipbuilding. After the Dutch conquest in the port in 1663, the Dutch East India Company (VOC), too, established a shipyard there. At this yard, the VOC experimented with building ocean-going ships until the management of the company decreed that these were to be built solely in the Dutch Republic itself. During the first half of the eighteenth century, the yard focused on the repair of passing Indiamen and the construction of smaller vessels for use in and between the VOC commands in Malabar, Coromandel, Bengal and Sri Lanka. For most of the vessels built during the 1720s and 1730s, detailed accounts exist, allowing for a reconstruction of the costs of the various shipbuilding materials in Malabar, as well as the relative cost of labour. From the 1750s onwards, operations at the yard again become more difficult to discern. Likely, the relative decline of the VOC’s presence in Malabar caused a reduction in ...
Agents overseas. The principal-agent problem in early modern Dutch chartered companies Could early modern chartered companies effectively ensure that their agents overseas were working in the best interests of the firm rather than in... more
Agents overseas. The principal-agent problem in early modern Dutch chartered companies

Could early modern chartered companies effectively ensure that their agents overseas were working in the best interests of the firm rather than in their own personal interests? This principal-agent problem has been the topic of a number of important studies in early modern economic history. This article contributes to the debate by elaborating on two case-studies from the two large Dutch chartered trading companies, the East- and the West India Companies (VOC and WIC respectively). Exploration of the careers of two individuals within these companies shows that supervision – and indeed career-making – was frequently a matter of unwritten rules and codes of conduct. While formal written rules might be found lacking, control could still be exerted through patronage or family ties. But this presented the companies with other challenges as well. In studying principal-agent problems, researchers in economic history need to be aware of informal mechanisms of control as well as formal ones.
This article examines the decision-making process for a new fort which the Dutch West India Company proposed to build near Takoradi in present-day Ghana in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. By closely following the process of... more
This article examines the decision-making process for a new fort which the Dutch West India Company proposed to build near Takoradi in present-day Ghana in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. By closely following the process of design, evaluation, and redesign of the fort, this article argues that the WIC was institutionally incapable of coordinating and carrying out such a complex project. The original design for the new fort was made in 1774 by Johan Frederik Trenks, a Silesian-born engineer who, as it turned out, was not current with modern design practices and used Dutch examples from the first half of the seventeenth century. The design was sent to the Netherlands for evaluation and returned with scathing criticism. The long, drawn-out process of design, evaluation, and redesign of what was after all a relatively small fort show the institutional paralysis of the WIC in the years leading up to the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–84). Though the fort would never be complet...
in theory at least – the conversion of currencies can be done with some degree of consistency. However, the introduction in the seventeenth century of the debased real de vellón makes such conversion exercises difficult. Did Navarrese... more
in theory at least – the conversion of currencies can be done with some degree of consistency. However, the introduction in the seventeenth century of the debased real de vellón makes such conversion exercises difficult. Did Navarrese coinage retain its original value? Did it move along together with the changes in the Castilian currencies? Or did it follow a different path entirely? There are reasonable suspicions and no certainties about this subject. So far it is something still unknown. Moreover, things become somewhat more complicated when we return to the sources. Since 1730, at least, and in 1750 in particular, the way the data are displayed in the ledger books of the Monastery of Irache/Iratxe makes it difficult to calculate prices, because purchases appeared alternatively in Navarrese and Castilian weights and currencies, sometimes even in the same entry. In the years after 1750, purchases were commonly accounted in Castilian vellón currency, which makes it easier to calculate equivalence in grams of silver per kilogram. If those years serve as reference points, then Grafe’s series would overvalue the cost of the kilogram of saltcod, sometimes by as much as fifty percent. While not conclusive, evidence points to a series which, as far as levels are concerned, would be closer to those mentioned above for the neighbouring Basque provinces than for the one estimated by the author. Finally, if the prices considered did not incorporate local taxes, even in cases when and where they hypothetically existed (though they were most likely free of taxes for reasons already given), and if the effect of those internal boundaries in terms of final prices was negligible as the author herself recognizes in the case of Navarrese trade, and if the reason for the strange performance by the series for Seville and the one attributed to Pamplona is more related to issues involving metrological or monetary conversions – that is, if the empirical building collapses – then what remains of her view of an Early Modern Spanish economy constrained by an alleged strong jurisdictional fragmentation? I do not know. While she is likely to be correct with respect to some of the issues reviewed here, for the same reasons, she may not be correct in others. What does seem clear is that if Regina Grafe wants to prove her thesis empirically, then she must consider other possibilities. What she characterizes as the “beauty” of cod appears to be no more than a brilliant disguise. Nearly twenty-five years ago, D.C.M. Platt warned that “poor numbers are bad not only in themselves but because, more damagingly, they encourage unreliable conclusions.” These are words that apply here.
Unlike the French and English India, the Dutch East India Company did not shift to recruiting predominantly Indian soldier personnel for service in India, sepoys, from the 1740s onwards. Although Dutch Company (VOC) remained much more... more
Unlike the French and English India, the Dutch East India Company did not shift to recruiting predominantly Indian soldier personnel for service in India, sepoys, from the 1740s onwards. Although Dutch Company (VOC) remained much more reliant on European recruitment, it did in fact also recruit sepoys in India. These soldiers remain little noted in the sources and the historical record. This article will explain why the VOC did not follow the French and English lead. The VOC's late acceptance of sepoys as full-time soldiers meant it could not effectively compete with either French or English companies in India.
Could Early Modern Dutch chartered companies effectively monitor and control the bahaviour of their employees? This article takes on the issue of the principal-agent problem in long-distance trade, adding to the debate on the efficacy of... more
Could Early Modern Dutch chartered companies effectively monitor and control the bahaviour of their employees? This article takes on the issue of the principal-agent problem in long-distance trade, adding to the debate on the efficacy of employee monitoring in Early Modern chartered companies. Informal, rather than contractually stipulated, mechanisms were more important in the Dutch case that is mentioned in the existing scholarship on the problem which is heavily oriented to English cases.
This is the final proof of an article published in the Rijksmuseum Bulletin in september 2020. The article focuses on the oldest model in the museum's collection, a 44-gunned ship with the inscribed date '1648'. I ask the question whether... more
This is the final proof of an article published in the Rijksmuseum Bulletin in september 2020. The article focuses on the oldest model in the museum's collection, a 44-gunned ship with the inscribed date '1648'. I ask the question whether it is indeed possible that this is a ship of one of the urban 'directies' as posited in the literature.
A contribution to a special issue of the Marineblad, the journal of the Dutch association of navy officers. My contribution (pages 8-12) focusses on the Dutch raid on the Medway in June 1667, as seen through the Dutch sources. The whole... more
A contribution to a special issue of the Marineblad, the journal of the Dutch association of navy officers. My contribution (pages 8-12) focusses on the Dutch raid on the Medway in June 1667, as seen through the Dutch sources. The whole issue is also available at the site of the Marineblad: https://www.kvmo.nl/marineblad/marineblad-algemeen/item/625-juni-2017.html
The Dutch West India Company (WIC), founded in 1621, was, in the words of the States General, "disbanded and destroyed" in September 1674 due to bankruptcy. In its stead, a second West India Company was founded, with a charter largely... more
The Dutch West India Company (WIC), founded in 1621, was, in the words of the States General, "disbanded and destroyed" in September 1674 due to bankruptcy. In its stead, a second West India Company was founded, with a charter largely taken over from the first. This article explores how the dissolution of the first company and the conflicting interests of stockholders, bondholders, and company directors were managed. As it turns out, the old company was not actually liquidated; instead, its assets were simply handed over to the successor company, while an intricate financial construction was devised to take care of the debt burden and to capitalize the new company. The reasons for this unusual arrangement must be sought in the company's great political, and particularly geopolit-ical, importance. Since the Dutch state was unwilling and unable to handle colonial gov-ernance and defence itself, it needed a placeholder in the form of a chartered company. However, the bankruptcy of the WIC, coming at the time it did, had major consequences for the shape of the Dutch Atlantic of the eighteenth century.
Contrary to what is sometimes thought, the Dutch East India Company did build ships in Asia, including some large vessels. One such shipyard was the yard in Cochin on India's Malabar Coast (present-day Kerala) since it captured the town... more
Contrary to what is sometimes thought, the Dutch East India Company did build ships in Asia, including some large vessels. One such shipyard was the yard in Cochin on India's Malabar Coast (present-day Kerala) since it captured the town in 1663. This article explores production at this shipyard, focusing especially on the first decades of the eighteenth century, for which good financial records exist.
This article examines the decision-making process for a new fort which the Dutch West India Company proposed to build near Takoradi in present-day Ghana in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. By closely following the process of... more
This article examines the decision-making process for a new fort which the Dutch West India Company proposed to build near Takoradi in present-day Ghana in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. By closely following the process of design, evaluation , and redesign of the fort, this article argues that the WIC was institutionally incapable of coordinating and carrying out such a complex project. The original design for the new fort was made in 1774 by Johan Frederik Trenks, a Silesian-born engineer who, as it turned out, was not current with modern design practices and used Dutch examples from the first half of the seventeenth century. The design was sent to the Netherlands for evaluation and returned with scathing criticism. The long, drawn-out process of design, evaluation, and redesign of what was after all a relatively small fort show the institutional paralysis of the WIC in the years leading up to the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84). Though the fort would never be completed, construction did begin shortly before the war. The conflict, followed shortly thereafter by the dissolution of the WIC, meant the project would never be completed.
This is a paper I will present at the 'Historikertag' in Linz, Asutria, this upcoming September. There are still some rough edges, but I will edit in the coming months and make it suitable for publication in a journal.
Research Interests:
Disclaimer: This is the first version of an article later published by the IJMH, find the published version here: http://ijh.sagepub.com/content/26/4/669.abstract In February 1665, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) agreed to equip... more
Disclaimer: This is the first version of an article later published by the IJMH, find the published version here: http://ijh.sagepub.com/content/26/4/669.abstract

In February 1665, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) agreed to equip twenty ships for the Dutch fleet, six of which were specifically named Indiamen. This paper will focus on this episode as the culmination of twenty-five years of VOC involvement in the Republic’s  wars in Europe. During this period the VOC acted at times as a sixth admiralty board. This paper will argue that the ships that the VOC provided in 1665 should not be seen as armed merchantmen, but rather as a distinct type of warship. Drawing on fleet lists and armament figures, the case is made that the VOC provided important support for the fleet. In addition, it is argued that the VOC followed the technical changes in Dutch warship design in this period. The inability to cope with the risk of battlefleet strategy, not technical changes, forced the VOC out of its role as sixth admiralty.
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Paper presented at the Urban History Conference in Lisbon in September 2014, in the session 'Imagined and imagining cities'
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Hoofdstuk over Nederlands-Brazilië in De slavernij in Oost en West: het Amsterdam-onderzoek
Chapter six in the the edited volume 'De slavernij in Oost en West'. I study the use of specially-built ships for the trade in people by the Dutch East India Company. Although most of the VOC's slave trade took place on general-purpose... more
Chapter six in the the edited volume 'De slavernij in Oost en West'. I study the use of specially-built ships for the trade in people by the Dutch East India Company. Although most of the VOC's slave trade took place on general-purpose Indiamen and cargo vessels, at several points in its history did the Company use or plan to use specifically-built vessels for the slave trade. In so doing, it consciously tried to use the knowledge and experience gained in the Atlantic slave trade.
This chapter studies the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century in Asia. How did the East India Companies participate in hostilities and what was the effect of the Anglo-Dutch wars for the local polities? The great strength of the... more
This chapter studies the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century in Asia. How did the East India Companies participate in hostilities and what was the effect of the Anglo-Dutch wars for the local polities? The great strength of the Dutch company in these conflicts was that it was able to muster forces in Asia itself, rather than being dependent on reinforcements from Europe. T
This chapter seeks to highlight an episode within the history of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) from a new perspective. The Dutch company, often called «the first multinational company in the world», is most often studied from the... more
This chapter seeks to highlight an episode within the history of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) from a new perspective. The Dutch company, often called «the first multinational company in the world», is most often studied from the perspective of business history, history of trade or maritime history. However, Philip Stern, in his recent The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India, introduces a new perspective to study the Early Modern commercial companies. Instead of seeing the various chartered companies as filling «state-like» functions, he argues we should see them as states in their own right 1. Stern argues that the English East India Company, acted as a state in Asia and viewed itself as such even as early as the seventeenth century. Rather than seeing the company as a commercial entity that also fulfills some «state-like» roles, the company was a state. This state, moreover, was not constituted solely by the charter granted in England, but also by the privileges received from sovereigns in Asia, as well as the rights it had acquired in specific locations due to purchase, lease, or conquest. This has a number of important consequences for the study of the company. In the first place, we should approach the company as an organization with a political life of its own, independent from that of the mother country. In the second place, this means that we may study the companies from a political perspective, rather than from a purely commercial one. This will also allow scholars to study ideological conflicts within company
C. Antunes, E. Odegard, and J. van den Tol, 'The networks of Dutch Brazil: rise, entanglement and fall of a colonial dream', in: C. Antunes and J. Gommans (eds), Exploring the Dutch Empire: Agents, Networks and Institutions, 1600-2000... more
C. Antunes, E. Odegard, and J. van den Tol, 'The networks of Dutch Brazil: rise, entanglement and fall of a colonial dream', in: C. Antunes and J. Gommans (eds), Exploring the Dutch Empire: Agents, Networks and Institutions, 1600-2000 (Bloomsbury: London/New York, 2015) 77-94.

This chapter investigates the entangled role of trade networks, power networks, and lobby networks in the rise and fall of Dutch Brazil (1630-1654).

The Dutch arrival, conquest and quick exit in Brazilian history deserves attention beyond the tale of conquest and loss in the disputes between two rival empires in the exchanges of colonial expansion. This chapter raises and answers three specific questions. In the first place, what were the reasons that the conquest of Brazil was faced with support from certain groups within Dutch society? We will argue that support for the Brazilian conquest was rooted in the imagery of Brazil as a profitable colony, allied with deeply rooted interests guided by the sugar and the brazilwood economies and markets that are better understood when looking at the business networks involved in the South Atlantic–Lisbon–Amsterdam trade.
Notwithstanding the economic interests in the conquest of Dutch Brazil, the political establishment in the Republic seems to have failed to meet the needs of the colony for which it is pertinent to inquire about the reasons why the lobby efforts of businessmen established in the Republic, as well as local politicians/administrators in Dutch Brazil, convinced of the viability of the colony, were unable to convince the WIC and the States General to defend the survival of the settlement. The reasons for this failure, we argue, are contained in Republican politics and games of power, rather than in colonial policymaking. We focus here on the disputes on governance of the colony, showing that the differing visions of company, generality and colonists often worked at cross purposes and prevented a stable plan for governance from being implemented. Indeed, differing visions within the WIC prevented a stable system of colonial administration from being implemented.
The third question, directly connected with the first two, inquires about the way in which different groups in Dutch Brazil did lobby in the Republic, the routes they chose and the options they contemplated. These groups, we will show, represented separate trans-Atlantic networks of influence that were forced to unite in search of common goals, mostly regarding the prosperity and survival of the colony. Regardless of their efforts, lobby for Dutch Brazil met with utter failure.
Ultimately, this chapter will argue that the lack of entanglement and goal-sharing by business networks in the Dutch Republic, administrators in Dutch Brazil and Republican politicians sealed the end of the largest colony of settlement under Dutch administration before the mid-eighteenth century.
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From 1667 until 1672 the States of Zeeland maintained a colony on the island of Tobago as part of its larger colonial holdings in present-day Suriname and Guyana. Though this period on the Dutch colonial history of Tobago is perhaps less... more
From 1667 until 1672 the States of Zeeland maintained a colony on the island of Tobago as part of its larger colonial holdings in present-day Suriname and Guyana. Though this period on the Dutch colonial history of Tobago is perhaps less well known than the preceding Lampsins colony or the subsequent period which featured the Battles of Rockly Bay in 1677, the letters in the archives of the States of Zeeland make it perhaps the best documented of the Dutch colonies on the island.

This is a first draft version of my transcriptions of the letters received from Tobago (there are still a few to go!) which I plan to translate and which would form part II of a larger source publication of Dutch sources on Tobago, with part I covering the De Moor and Lampsins patroonships, part III the Benckes fleet and part IV the post-1677 Dutch plans for Tobago (until the mid-18th C.). I will shortly post a document with the first translations of some of the documents.
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This is a first draft of a book proposal for a corporate history of the first Dutch West India Company. I think there is a real lack of a good in-depth monograph on the WIC which articulates the links between Company leadership,... more
This is a first draft of a book proposal for a corporate history of the first Dutch West India Company. I think there is a real lack of a good in-depth monograph on the WIC which articulates the links between Company leadership, employees, the Dutch state, rivals and allies in the Atlantic, and the colonists and subject populations (including the enslaved). So I though I would write that book. My question is whether there are any large aspects of the WIC as a corporate entity that I am missing in this setup, and whether the proposed structure would work. I am interested to hear your feedback!
If I publish this as part of my VENI-output, I will need to submit it to a publisher which does open-access books, but I likely will have NWO-funding to make it so. Suggestions for publishers are also welcome!
A work in progress. Sometimes you read a book and it really sets you thinking. After reading Thomas Heinrich's excellent "Warship Builders: An Industrial History of U.S. Naval Shipbuilding, 1922-1940", I wondered how a minor navy... more
A work in progress. Sometimes you read a book and it really sets you thinking. After reading Thomas Heinrich's excellent "Warship Builders: An Industrial History of U.S. Naval Shipbuilding, 1922-1940", I wondered how a minor navy organizes its shipbuilding process in such a way that it can build nearly all its combatants on domestic yards, despite the small volume of orders and the apparent lack of yard specialisation? So this graph presents a first view of the total volume of naval building in tons, and the division over the major shipyards.
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Not a paper so much as an image this time. These drawings depict the quarter galleries of the frigate L'Indien, built by Arie Staats en Co. in Amsterdam in 1778-1780. Later renamed South Carolina, this was the largest warship to fly... more
Not a paper so much as an image this time. These drawings depict the quarter galleries of the frigate L'Indien, built by Arie Staats en Co. in Amsterdam in 1778-1780. Later renamed South Carolina, this was the largest warship to fly American colors in the revolutionary war. I came across this image when looking for late 18th C. drawings of Dutch Indiamen. There are good sources for the contracting and building of the ship in various Dutch archives, so this is something I am working out in a decent article. If you have any suggestions for places to submit an article on the building and export of warships in the late 18th C. Dutch Republic, do let me know!
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A draft of an idea to work out in a book proposal. Why did the WIC fail? This draft explores the idea that it is the very constitution of the WIC that precipitates its failure. The collapse and failure of the WIC can shed important light... more
A draft of an idea to work out in a book proposal. Why did the WIC fail? This draft explores the idea that it is the very constitution of the WIC that precipitates its failure. The collapse and failure of the WIC can shed important light on the limitations of ideas of corporate statehood and sovereignty in the Early Modern period. If we can conceive of the EIC and the VOC as company states (following Stern's use of the term), can we see the WIC as company state? Based on the idea presented here, I would say we cannot, since the WIC never does succeed in developing an autonomous internal political life distinct from that of the Dutch Republic. I'll continue to tinker with this idea in the coming months and years.
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This is the draft of a paper I presented at the ESHCC conference in Valencia in 2016. I would still like to work this out into an article, but - as we all know - ideas are easy, finding the time to work it out is not. There is recent... more
This is the draft of a paper I presented at the ESHCC conference in Valencia in 2016. I would still like to work this out into an article, but - as we all know - ideas are easy, finding the time to work it out is not. There is recent literature as well as some more conceptual work that needs to be referenced still. Coming from studying these phenomena in the career of Van Goens on Ceylon and in India, I also need to brush up on my Batavia-centric literature. The role of women in smuggling rings inside the VOC and spanning the devide between company and the outside world is fascinating and I hope to work this out into a proper article soon(ish).
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On June 6th, 2019, the Mauritshuis museum will organize the symposium 'Revisiting Dutch Brazil'. For more information and registration (free of charge), please check:... more
On June 6th, 2019, the Mauritshuis museum will organize the symposium 'Revisiting Dutch Brazil'. For more information and registration (free of charge), please check: https://www.mauritshuis.nl/en/explore/restoration-and-research/symposium-revisiting-dutch-brazil/
Out now with Walburg Pers (in Dutch)! My book on the history of Dutch Brazil during the tenure of Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen. Order the book at your local bookstore or via... more
Out now with Walburg Pers (in Dutch)! My book on the history of Dutch Brazil during the tenure of Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen. Order the book at your local bookstore or via https://www.walburgpers.nl/nl/book/9789462498822/graaf-en-gouverneur
Coming later this month with Brill, my book based on my PhD thesis on governorship in the Dutch colonial world in the 17th century! How did individuals advance to the highest ranks in the Dutch colonial administrations? And how, once... more
Coming later this month with Brill, my book based on my PhD thesis on governorship in the Dutch colonial world in the 17th century!

How did individuals advance to the highest ranks in the Dutch colonial administrations? And how, once appointed, was this rank retained? To answer these questions, this book explores the careers of Dutch colonial governors in the 17th century with a focus on two case-studies: Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, governor of Dutch Brazil (1636-1644) and Rijckloff Volckertsz van Goens, Governor-General in Batavia in the 1670s.

By comparing a Western (Atlantic, WIC) and an Eastern (Asian, VOC) example, this book shows how networks sustaining career-making differed in the various parts of the empire: the West India Company was much more involved in domestic political debates, and this led to a closer integration of political patronage networks, while the East India Company was better able to follow an independent course. The book shows that to understand the inner workings of the Dutch India companies, we need to understand the lives of those who turned the empire into their career.
I'm excited to announce the publication of my book (in Dutch) on the tenure of Johan Maurits in Brazil with Walburg Pers in May 2022! Preorder is available through the link.
Here are three chapters from the latest proof version of my book "The Company Fortress". Order the book with Leiden University Press (https://www.lup.nl/product/the-company-fortress/) or Chicago University Press... more
Here are three chapters from the latest proof version of my book "The Company Fortress". Order the book with Leiden University Press (https://www.lup.nl/product/the-company-fortress/) or Chicago University Press (https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/C/bo69302854.html)