Naval Warfare

Kriege und moderne militärische Konflikte bergen das wirkmächtige Potential den Verlauf der Geschichte in einer derart gestauchten chronologischen Abfolge der Geschehnisse zu verändern, die es für Gesellschaften schwer macht, sie in ihrer Gesamtheit und ihren überaus komplexen Konsequenzen zu fassen. Mindestens ebenso schwierig ist es für kleinere sozialen Entitäten, die blutigen, schockierenden, traumatischen und tieftraurigen persönlichen Erfahrungen, die ein Krieg mit sich bringt, zu begreifen. Dennoch sind die Assoziationen, die mit dem historischen Ereignis und der Erfahrung Krieg einhergehen, vielfältiger und facettenreicher, als man zunächst annehmen könnte. Wie das Kriegsgeschehen und sein mittelbares sowie unmittelbares Nachspiel erlebt werden, ist abhängig davon, aus welcher Perspektive man einen Krieg und seinen Ausgang erlebt. Welche Motive ein Staat, eine Nation oder eine Gesellschaft gehabt hat, die Krieg führte, mit welchem Ergebnis dieser Krieg zu einem Ende kam und welche kollektiven oder auch persönlichen Erfahrungen mit ebendiesem Kriegsende verbunden waren, spielt daher die maßgebliche Rolle, wenn man über die Rezeptionsgeschichte und die Erinnerungskultur einer Nation an einen Krieg spricht und sich dieser Problematik mithilfe eines kunsthistorischen, archäologischen, architektonischen oder auch soziologischen Zugangs nähert.

1. The changing character of naval battle in history When one looks across the spectrum of world naval history, the nature and character of major naval battles have changed dramatically over time. These changes have tended to punctuate and divide long periods in history during which the basic concept of naval battles remained largely the same. The key periods are traditionally seen as the age of galley warfare that characterized classical naval history; the line of battle from the mid-seventeenth century to the early 19 th century; the age of naval warfare under steam power in the mid-to late 19 th century; the age of air and submarine combat in the first half of the twentieth century; and, most recently, the age of the missile, space, and cyber warfare dating from the latter half of the twentieth century into the present. Each of these periods in naval history has typically been characterized by a dominant type of warship which is closely associated in its design with the new emerging weapons and weapon-systems of the era 1. As that lists suggests, the periods of characteristic naval battles have tended to become relatively shorter and shorter in the modern period as naval warfare reflects the ever quickening pace of technological innovation since the Industrial Revolution. At the same time, however, one must note that the characteristically dominant type of battle in a specific period does not necessarily exclude the earlier forms, but may occur alongside them. For example, the galley that typified ancient warfare was used in the Baltic, North America, and the Mediterranean well into the eighteenth century. Similarly, the tactic of " Crossing the T " that became so famous in the battles between ships-of-the-line in the eighteenth century was used by the American battleship force that engaged the Japanese in Surigao Strait in October 1944. There can be a variety of reasons why there is overlap between eras. These include the continued use of particular weapons, tactics, and technologies across periods, even when they are no longer the

The Indo-Pacific region stretches from the eastern Indian Ocean shores of Africa and West Asia to the littoral countries of the western Pacific. The region constitutes the ‘maritime underbelly’ of Asia, and is the fastest growing region in the world; and in a few decades, is likely to witness what may be referred to as ‘Renaissance 2.0’. The region is, therefore, ripe with enormous opportunities, not only for regional countries, but also for the rest of the global community. And yet, the region is beset with equally colossal security risks that emanate from inter alia the rise of China - that is not satisfied with ‘status quo’ in the global order including established international law and norms; strategic rivalries and the attendant security dilemma and arms race; issues of governance including maritime jurisdictions; the proliferation of malevolent non-state actors involved in maritime crimes and terrorism; and so on. The book is a collation of commentaries that analyse the trends with regard to the geopolitical and maritime security environment, along with the naval developments, in the Indo-Pacific in the past half-decade or so.

Though Odysseus’ tales to Eumaios and Aninoos in Odyssey 14.199–359 and 17.417–44, respectively, are presented as fictional tales within Homer’s larger myth, some elements have striking analogs in Late Bronze–Early Iron Age reality.

This article examines these portions of the hero’s false ainoi within their fictive context for the purpose of identifying and evaluating those elements. Particular focus is given to Odysseus’ declaration that he led nine successful maritime raids prior to the Trojan War; to his twice–described ill–fated assault on Egypt; and to his claim not only to have been spared in the wake of that Egyptian raid, but to have spent a subsequent seven years in the land of the pharaohs, during which he gathered great wealth.

Through a comparative examination of literary and archaeological evidence from the Late Bronze–Early Iron transition in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is shown that these aspects of Odysseus’ stories are not only reflective of the historical reality surrounding the time in which the epic is set, but that Odysseus’ fictive experience is remarkably similar to that of one specific member of the ‘Sea Peoples’ groups best known from 19th and 20th dynasty Egyptian records: the ‘Sherden of the Sea.’

The Syrian war will allow Russia to recover its naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Russian Navy will have more facilities at the same time that the Chinese Navy will appear in this scenario. This new situation will give us a new world order; this period we call "Tens Calm". Something similar happened after Bismarck Era, the period called "Armed Peace" (1890-1914), when the global balance was broken. This pre-war environment in the media could have been avoided. Russia today tries to recover its old deployment in the Mediterranean to become a global power.

The King's Two Bodies- Reflexion on the Symbolic of Power

Among the so-called Mari Prophetic Letters, one interesting text (ARM X 10) reports a cheerful vision of the king's return. The king, as usual, is acclaimed by the soldiers, in a formal exhibition of loyalty. Incidebtly, the scene occurs on two larges boats blocking the river course. The narrative also mentions several insigna embedded within the military acclamations. Since the symbolic character of the omen is highly significant, I discuss the account through interpretative ethnography.

The appearance on Russian TV stations Channel One and NTV of the plans for a nuclear torpedo/unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) has prompted much interest among observers.  Among other aspects, its probably salted warhead attracted much attention, the addition of Cobalt-59 ensuring long-lasting radiation designed to render a wide area uninhabitable for years. The July 1948 Baker test in Bikini Atoll illustrated the effects of a shallow underwater explosion. Missile defence experts have noted how, in line with Russian commentary, the system seems to be designed to bypass Western progress in this field. There’s another significant aspect of the possible construction of this weapon: its impact on the international law of the sea.

From this perspective, there are at least three issues that need to be discussed: whether a submarine carrying nuclear torpedoes may carry out innocent passage through another country’s territorial waters, the 1971 treaty banning nuclear weapons on the seabed, and whether a coastal state may restrict the presence of submarines carrying nuclear torpedoes in its EEZ. This paper examines the three.

In a new Joint Studies Paper, I explore sea, land and air operational concepts appropriate to fighting near-to-medium term future AI-enabled wars. With much of the underlying narrow AI technology already developed in the commercial sector, this is less of a speculative exercise than might be assumed. Moreover, the contemporary AI’s general-purpose nature means its initial employment will be within existing operational level constructs, not wholly new ones. Here, the focus is the sea domain. The operational concepts mooted are simply meant to stimulate thought about the future and how to prepare for it.

The article describes the problems of polish military forces in the context of a relatively new type of threat, commonly described as "hybrid warfare". The first step of the analysis is a description of such threat, based on data gathered by polish and foreign analytical centers. The next step is a presentation of the current state of polish military forces-in terms of doctrine, organization, training and materiel (e .g. equipment). This kind of data analysis offers relevant information about defense capabilities that the polish armed forces have and those which they lack. These capabilities are then compared to the challenges posed by hybrid warfare, thus providing insights on potential new capabilities which should be acquired as well as those which are unnecessary in the context of hybrid war .

Книга посвящена истории становления российского военно-морского флота при Петре I и приурочена к открытию выставки «Как царь Петр море полюбил», которая прошла в МГОМЗ с 25 мая по 10 сентября 2017 г.
The book was published for the exhibition “How did tsar Peter love in the sea” that was in Kolomenskoe Museum (25/05-10/09) and was devoted to history of the Russian Navy in the age of Peter the Great.

Wstęp Mirosław J. Leszka, Kirił Marinow................................................... 1

I
Konstantynopolitańskie porty IV–XII w. [Constantinopolitan harbours in the 4th–12th centuries] Mirosław J. Leszka......... 5

II
Wszystkie okręty cesarza. Rozważania nad stanem rzymskiej marynarki wojennej za panowania cesarza Maurycjusza (582–602) [All ships of the emperor: Roman Navy during the reign of emperor Maurice (582–602)] Łukasz Różycki........................................................................................... 17

III
Konstantynopolitańska eskadra cesarska w dobie panowania Komnenów (1081–1185) [Constantinopolitan squadron in the era of imperial reign of Comnenian dynasty (1081–1185)]
Marcin Böhm....................................................................................... 47

IV
Wygnani biskupi Konstantynopola w późnej starożytności i ich kontakty ze stolicą nad Bosforem [The Exiled Bishops of Constantinople from the Fourth to the Late Sixth Century] Rafał Kosiński................63

V
Chazarowie w Konstantynopolu (VII–XI w.) [The Khazars in Constantinople] Jarosław Dudek …........ 79

VI
Miejsce portu w fabule dwunastowiecznego romansu bizantyńskiego [The port in the plot of the twelfth-century Byzantine romance] Anna Kotłowska . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

VII
Winieta Konstantynopola na mapie z Ebstorf [Vignette of Constantinople on the Ebstorf Map] Piotr Kochanek……………………. . . 113

VIII
Hodegon – z rozważań nad pierwotną lokalizacją konstantynopolitańskiego sanktuarium [The Hodegon. Considerations on the location of the Hodegetria sanctuary in Constantinople]
Piotr Łukasz Grotowski . ……………………………. . . . . 137

IX
Pogańskie prywatne uroczystości kommemoratywne w okresie wczesnobizantyńskim [Pagan Private Commemorative Rites in the Early Byzantine Period] Ireneusz Milewski . . . .  . ……………... . . . . . . . . . 215

Aneks [Annex]
Itinerarium Stefana z Nowogrodu z opisem konstantynopolitańskiego portu Kontoskalion (1348/1349). Przekład i opracowanie [The Itinerary of Stephen of Novgorod: Containing a Description of Kontoskalion Harbour in Constantinople (1348/1349).] Zofia Brzozowska .. . . . . . 227

Summary. . . . . . . ………………………………………. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Wykaz skrótów [List of Abbreviations]. …. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

Bibliografia [Bibliography]……… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

Źródła [Sources]. . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

Opracowania [Secondary Literature]..  . ……. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

Indeks osobowy [Index]. ……………. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

Indeks nazw geograficznych i etnicznych [Index of geographical and ethnical names]. . …. . . . . . . . . 328

Indeks nazw konstantynopolitańskich [Index of Constantinopolitan names]….. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

Russia and NATO still have significant military strength, albeit much reduced since the Cold War. The US also plans to improve its military presence in the Arctic in the future. According to Russian experts, the constant presence of the US nuclear submarine fleet and deploying sea-based missile defence systems that are being actively developed by the Americans will create opportunities in the Arctic to intercept Russian ballistic missiles and deliver a pre-emptive strike. But, as Stephanie Pezard puts it, “Russia is deploying capabilities that can defend a region it deems highly strategic, but could also, in theory, be employed for other purposes—for instance, locking Norway (a NATO member) behind an anti-access/area denial ‘bubble’”. Understanding Russia’s economic weaknesses, Moscow is concerned that the West (mainly) and other powers plan to deprive Russia of the Northern Sea Route and the economic resources of the Arctic. And to prevent such an outcome, Russia is strengthening its military presence in the region as a tool of détente.

In absence of a major war at sea, today's naval leaders can use insights gained from war gaming operational problems.  At the U.S. Naval War College, recent war games about command and control have provided a collective experience for maritime leaders to draw upon in the event of any future warfare at sea.

Voici le texte de ma présentation faite à Boulogne sur Mer en novembre 2019. Or cette question ouverte m'a conduit à m'interroger si je ne devais pas poursuivre les investigations pour en faire un article. Je vous remercie d'avance pour votre aide et remarques.

Here is the text of my presentation made in Boulogne sur Mer in November 2019. However, this open question led me to wonder if I should not continue the investigations to make an article. Thank you in advance for your help and remarks.

Aquí está el texto de mi presentación realizada en Boulogne sur Mer en noviembre de 2019. Sin embargo, esta pregunta abierta me llevó a preguntarme si no debería continuar las investigaciones para hacer un artículo. Gracias de antemano por su ayuda y comentarios.

Hier is de tekst van mijn presentatie gemaakt in Boulogne sur Mer in november 2019. Deze open vraag bracht me echter tot de vraag of ik niet door moest gaan met het onderzoek om een artikel te maken. Ik dank voor uw hulp en opmerkingen.

Ecco il testo della mia presentazione fatta a Boulogne sur Mer nel novembre 2019. Tuttavia, questa domanda aperta mi ha portato a chiedermi se non avrei dovuto continuare le indagini per fare un articolo. Grazie in anticipo per l'aiuto e le osservazioni.

"Los choques entre Irán y Estados Unidos durante los años 80 en el Golfo Pérsico llevó a las autoridades iraníes a sacar desiguales conclusiones sobre el empleo de tácticas navales convencionales y no convencionales. Mientras que la armada iraní fue derrotada en sus enfrentamientos con la V Flota de Estados Unidos, las acciones de los Guardianes de la Revolución ("pasdarán") lograron causar interrupciones del tráfico marítimo en la zona.

A partir de aquellas experiencias, Irán ha desarrollado tácticas y medios para el desarrollo de la guerra naval asimétrica en el Estrecho de Ormuz."

Marine insurance made a significant contribution to British success in her wars of the long eighteenth century. As both a defensive and offensive weapon, it allowed British sea-borne trade to continue, and foiled French designs to destroy the English economy. Underwriters were instrumental in ensuring that merchant convoys were protected by naval escorts, and that capture-and-ransom was preferred by enemy privateers to the seizure of prizes. Parliamentary legislation used marine insurance to encourage private adventures to support the war effort, despite the relatively small size of the navy in comparison to the merchant fleet.

UK military involvement in Libya during 2011 was successful at the operational level, fought in a manner Sir Julian Corbett would have immediately recognised as being typically British. Operational success was based upon the successful integration of UK air and sea assets. As a time, scope and geographically limited operation based on air and sea integration as part of an existing alliance framework (NATO), UK participation in the
2011 Libya operation seems likely to help set the course for British defence in the short-term. Sea based forces were crucial to ensure sea control as an enabler for projecting force ashore from the sea through TLAM and NGS and carrier based aviation. They also enforced a UN arms embargo on the Libyan regime while allowing supplies to reach the Libyan rebel forces.

Expedition to positive identify the shipwreck of the Italian Regia Marina battleship Regina Margherita, sunk 11th November 1916 by the German minelayer submarine  UC 14 off the harbour of Valona (Albania). The expedition received the appointment and patronage of the Ministero degli Affari Esteri della Repubblica Italiana, Italian Embassy in Tirana and Italian Consulate in Valona.

During the 18th and the early years of the 19th century, the small waterside village of West Itchenor acquired some importance as a shipbuilding centre.  The work of shipbuilding was not a constant process, the village having developed a particular niche in the construction of warships during periods of conflict.  It was, at such times, that the government’s own dockyards were so overburdened, that new construction work was contracted out to merchants in possession of suitable facilities.

This chapter considers the sinking of Japanese hellships carrying prisoners of war such as the Montevideo Maru and Rakuyo Maru within the wider context of the global war. It discusses international law, efforts by the Red Cross to protect prisoners transported by sea, and the ramifications for POWs - of all sides, in the Atlantic and the Pacific - of the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Second World War.

The cannon or the naval gun was first installed on ships about seven hundred years ago. Since then, the gun as an instrument of naval warfare has undergone numerous evolutionary changes catalysed by various technological innovations, which resulted in the gun being the main armament in the naval arsenal until 1960s, when the missile displaced it. Improvements in gun technology gradually expanded the naval battle space arena from a few tens of yards in the age of the sail to around eighteen thousand yards with the introduction of big guns in the dreadnought era of WW I and subsequently to around forty thousand yards by the end of WW II.
The end of the Second World War saw the demise of the big guns and a paradigm shift from the big gunships concept to power projection by aircraft carriers and missile armed cruisers and destroyers.
This transformation of the naval gun over the centuries, from its humble beginnings as a small cannon before the age of the sail to the gigantic 18.1 inch gun on the Yamato, was accomplished due to the fascinating amalgamation of science, technology and human endeavour and makes a captivating study.

By the latter half of 1942, the High Command of the German U-Boats (BdU) realised that the “sinking results’’ of the North Atlantic had decreased immensely. The successes of the Allied anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic precluded the successful employment of the German submarines in said waters. It was realised that the “sinking potential” of the Cape Town - Freetown convoy route, in terms of tonnage, had increased exponentially by the latter half of 1942. This sudden increase was a direct result of the successful German submarine operations in the North Atlantic during 1939-1942. The first German submarine offensive in South African waters during 1942, Operation Eisbär, was aimed at striking a devastating blow to shipping off the South African coast. By the end of December 1942 an estimated 310 864 tons of shipping had been sunk through Operation Eisbär alone. The success of Operation Eisbär led to a further two German submarine offensives being launched by the BdU in South African waters during the remainder of the Second World War, with a number of opportunistic attacks also made by submarines travelling to the Far East. This paper deals with the German Submarine Offensives off the South African Coast between1942 and 1945. It focusses on three key aspects of the maritime war off the South African coast: the maritime threat perception, the Axis maritime strategy in these waters, and the resulting
U-boat offensives.

This article takes look at the development and innovation in the U.S. Navy during world war II and builds an argument to support the fact that the destruction of a major part of the US
battle fleet at Pearl Harbour did not initiate a straight forward substitution of battleships for aircraft carriers, but what actually transpired was an innovation in naval thinking that created a brand new doctrine of engagement that evolved into the modern fleet of today without an outright rejection of the past. Instead what we see is a mixture of innovation
and adaptation that ends in the production of an effective fighting task force to combat the necessities of the times.

Vom 4. bis 14. July 2014 fand eine Survey Expedition in Wilhelm Gustlof wrack statt, es war ein nazi-Kreuzerschiff von K.d.F. das wurde ein Kaserneschiff vom Kriegsmarine und am 30. Januar 1945 wurde vom sowietischen U Boot S-13 gesunken. Wilhelm Gustloff Wrack ist eine Erinnerung vor der grossen Seetragoedie der Geschichte und liegt in internazionale Wasser vor der Kuesten dem heutigen Poland, zwischen dem Stolpe-Bank und der danischen Insel Bornholm.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfBtFVfWYNM

Not a paper so much as an image this time. These drawings depict the quarter galleries of the frigate L'Indien, built by Arie Staats en Co. in Amsterdam in 1778-1780. Later renamed South Carolina, this was the largest warship to fly American colors in the revolutionary war. I came across this image when looking for late 18th C. drawings of Dutch Indiamen. There are good sources for the contracting and building of the ship in various Dutch archives, so this is something I am working out in a decent article. If you have any suggestions for places to submit an article on the building and export of warships in the late 18th C. Dutch Republic, do let me know!

""En Filipo II y el Arte de la Guerra tendremos la oportunidad de conocer en profundidad a uno de los más grandes reyes de la antigua Macedonia. Gracias a su habilidad como estratega, diplomático, político y soldado, heredó un reino pobre, débil y acosado por innumerables enemigos y lo transformó en el más poderoso de toda Grecia.

A lo largo de sus páginas podremos conocer la historia del reino Macedonio, desde sus orígenes míticos hasta la formación de un imperio, de la mano del que, a la postre, se convertiría en el padre del mítico Alejandro Magno y en el forjador de un nuevo ejército que cambiaria el devenir de la guerra en la Antigüedad. Filipo II fue el creador de la falange macedonia, formación que se demostraría como inigualable en el campo de batalla y que reportaría incontables victorias sobre poderosos enemigos, como los ilirios, los tesalios, los tracios, los beocios o los atenienses. Pero no sólo eso, logró integrar en el campo de batalla a la infantería y a la caballería para emplearlos en nuevas formaciones tácticas: armó a sus soldados con las míticas sarissas y apreció como pocos las posibilidades militares que la maquinaria de guerra podía proporcionarle, siendo el mecenas de numerosos avances en este campo. Soñó con conquistar el Imperio persa, cuando ya había logrado lo que nadie antes fue capaz: el control de Grecia.

Sólo la muerte le arrebató esa hazaña, pero sentó las bases de lo que más tarde conseguiría su propio hijo. Su figura levantó tanto odios como pasiones; se le conocía como mujeriego y bebedor, pero también por su habilidad para la oratoria, por sus astucia, determinación y valor. Siempre luchó en primera línea junto a sus soldados y nunca permitió que éstos le llamaran rey, sino solo "General".