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Bryon Greenwald

    Bryon Greenwald

    The Depression-era Bonus March on Washington by World War I veterans resulted from a lame congressional attempt to provide them a pension. In 1924, over President Calvin Coolidge's veto, Congress passed the World War Veterans Act that... more
    The Depression-era Bonus March on Washington by World War I veterans resulted from a lame congressional attempt to provide them a pension. In 1924, over President Calvin Coolidge's veto, Congress passed the World War Veterans Act that gave each veteran an "adjusted compensation certificate." The certificates amounted to endowment life insurance redeemable in 1945. Congress "adjusted" the value of each certificate based on the length of time each man had spent in service during World War I. On redemption, the average benefit equaled about $1,000.(1) Veterans who returned to civilian life found their economic well-being shattered a decade later by the Great Depression's harsh economic conditions. As unemployment soared to 25 percent by 1932 and banks failed by the hundreds, veterans and millions of other Americans were soon out of work, out of money and struggling to survive.2 In 1931, Congress moved to alleviate some of the veterans' suffering. Over President Herbert Hoover's veto, Congress passed an amendment to the Veterans Act of 1924 and authorized veterans to borrow up to half the value of their adjusted compensation certificate. In early 1925, Texas Congressman Wright Patman proposed a bill that would have authorized immediate payment of the balance of the bonus to veterans. Hoover opposed the bill, fearing that if he gave in to the veterans movement, other organizations' similar demands would eventually break the Federal Treasury. Hoover believed that giving money to the veterans would encourage social welfare advocates, who he felt were seeking to demolish any remaining "barriers of self reliance and self support in our people."3 Despite Hoover's opposition, the House passed the measure and sent it to the Senate for a vote. To influence the ongoing congressional debate, thousands of veterans journeyed to Washington from all over the country during the spring and early summer of 1932. Unemployed cannery worker Walter W Waters and a small group of Oregon veterans began the movement and initiated what would become the national Bonus March. Press coverage of the Oregonians' plight soon brought like-minded, unemployed veterans to Washington from all over the country, usually traveling free of charge, thanks to sympathetic freight and passenger train operators. By mid-July, estimates numbered the force at 20,000 men.4 Some men and their families camped in hastily erected shanties and lean-tos in abandoned and partially demolished buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue. The largest "town"-Camp Marks-was just across the Anacostia River. The camp's name honored the kindly commander of the neighboring 11th Precinct, Police Captain S.J. Marks. The Participants Of the four major groups participating in the Bonus March, the Bonus Expeditionary Force (BEF) was the largest. The BEF, led by Waters, was a disciplined, organized, lawabiding group of veterans assembled from across the country. The BEF kept order within its ranks and even published a weekly newspaper, The BEF News. BEF members had not traveled to Washington to break laws or foment unrest; they simply wanted to petition Congress for relief from the Depression's ef fects. Although largely noncommunist, the BEF did have a few Communist Party members. Their small but vocal presence eventually created a negative image and heavily influenced Hoover's and Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur's opinions. In late June, after the Senate defeated Patman's Bonus Bill, Waters added to the BEF's negative image when he openly hinted at creating a militant socialist force called the "Khaki Shirts" to fight against the "sordid scheme of special privilege."5 MacArthur was suspicious of the BEF's motives. His suspicion came from his visceral hatred of communism, which had been bolstered by a series of incidents initiated by radical groups dating to the 1919-1920 Red Scare. Although the violence that rocked America during the Red Scare had subsided with time and growing economic prosperity, the Depression reawakened the fear of radical movements. …
    Page 1. UNDERSTANDING CHANGE: AN INTELLECTUAL AND PRACTICAL STUDY OF MILITARY INNOVATION US ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND THE BATTLE FOR LEGITIMACY, 1917-1945 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements ...
    : The U.S. Joint Forces Command works the critical command and control seams of joint warfighting where all Services have concerns but none has a compelling reason to do anything about them. Due to a lack of preplanned, mandatory... more
    : The U.S. Joint Forces Command works the critical command and control seams of joint warfighting where all Services have concerns but none has a compelling reason to do anything about them. Due to a lack of preplanned, mandatory interoperability, there are significant challenges in executing command and control (C2) of joint forces. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has provided solutions to some of these problems in the past and has recently reorganized its Joint Capability Development Directorate (J-8) to focus even more on integration, interoperability, and development of joint C2 capabilities. This article outlines some root causes of the joint interoperability problem, highlights contributions made by USJFCOM to enhance joint interoperability and integration, and describes the organization and function of the reorganized J-8. Historically, the Services-Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps-have been responsible for designing, procuring, fielding, and sustaining their o...
    The Depression-era Bonus March on Washington by World War I veterans resulted from a lame congressional attempt to provide them a pension. In 1924, over President Calvin Coolidge's veto, Congress passed the World War Veterans Act that... more
    The Depression-era Bonus March on Washington by World War I veterans resulted from a lame congressional attempt to provide them a pension. In 1924, over President Calvin Coolidge's veto, Congress passed the World War Veterans Act that gave each veteran an "adjusted compensation certificate." The certificates amounted to endowment life insurance redeemable in 1945. Congress "adjusted" the value of each certificate based on the length of time each man had spent in service during World War I. On redemption, the average benefit equaled about $1,000.(1) Veterans who returned to civilian life found their economic well-being shattered a decade later by the Great Depression's harsh economic conditions. As unemployment soared to 25 percent by 1932 and banks failed by the hundreds, veterans and millions of other Americans were soon out of work, out of money and struggling to survive.2 In 1931, Congress moved to alleviate some of the veterans' suffering. Over Pr...
    Page 1. UNDERSTANDING CHANGE: AN INTELLECTUAL AND PRACTICAL STUDY OF MILITARY INNOVATION US ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND THE BATTLE FOR LEGITIMACY, 1917-1945 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements ...
    Page 1. UNDERSTANDING CHANGE: AN INTELLECTUAL AND PRACTICAL STUDY OF MILITARY INNOVATION US ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND THE BATTLE FOR LEGITIMACY, 1917-1945 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements ...
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    ABSTRACT
    This article highlights and critiques the June 1944 Allied Invasion of Normandy (Operation Overlord) with a focus on the operational level of war, joint warfighting, and innovation.
    This article examines the adaptation undertaken by the AEF in developing a way to counter the threat from attacking German aircraft in World War I.
    This article offers graduate students and general readers a guide to reading and gaining contemporary insight from Donald Kagan's Thucydides: The Reinvention of History
    A study of innovation and combat adaptation that argues against mono-causal change in military affairs and instead suggests that such change occurs from several directions and forces simultaneously.