Both causal and non-causal action theories take the justification relation to be a non-causal, purely conceptual or logical relation between reasons and action. According to causal theorists, intentional action has to satisfy, besides the... more
Both causal and non-causal action theories take the justification relation to be a non-causal, purely conceptual or logical relation between reasons and action. According to causal theorists, intentional action has to satisfy, besides the justification condition, an additional and independent causal condition. In this paper it is held, however, that justification is already a causal concept, so that there is no need to resort to an independent causal requirement in order to understand the concept of intentional action. This causal view of justification and intentional action does not face either the problem of wayward causal chains which infects orthodox causal theories or the threat of epiphenomenalism of mental properties.
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... Horaires d'ouverture du magasin: Du mardi au vendredi, de 09h30 à 18h30 sans interruption Le Samedi, de 10h00 à 18h00 ... who have contributed to recent debates in the philosophy of action, including Anscombe, Churchland, Harman,... more
... Horaires d'ouverture du magasin: Du mardi au vendredi, de 09h30 à 18h30 sans interruption Le Samedi, de 10h00 à 18h00 ... who have contributed to recent debates in the philosophy of action, including Anscombe, Churchland, Harman, Hornsby, Goldman and O'Shaughnessy. ...
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Review of E. Villanueva (ed.), Naturalism and Normativity, Atascadero, Ridgeview, 199
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Précis of El libre albedrío. Un estudio filosófico En este libro nos hemos planteado varios objetivos. En primer lugar, ofrecer al lector una guía o mapa que le oriente en el complejo territorio del debate sobre el libre albedrío. En... more
Précis of El libre albedrío. Un estudio filosófico En este libro nos hemos planteado varios objetivos. En primer lugar, ofrecer al lector una guía o mapa que le oriente en el complejo territorio del debate sobre el libre albedrío. En segundo lugar, abogar por una determinada concepción del libre albedrío, a saber, el libertarismo, frente a otras posibles, en especial el compatibilismo. En tercer lugar, defender la existencia del libre albedrío frente a diversos desafíos, de tipos también diversos, que la ponen en cuestión.
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This paper is intended to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (pap)against two recent putative counterexamples to it, inspired by the one that HarryFrankfurt designed forty years ago. The first three sections provide a... more
This paper is intended to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (pap)against two recent putative counterexamples to it, inspired by the one that HarryFrankfurt designed forty years ago. The first three sections provide a summary of the state of the art. In the remaining sections, the counterexamples to pap o Widerker's ("Brain-Malfunction-W") and Pereboom's ("Tax Evasion") are successively presented and discussed. We hold that both examples breach at least one otwo conditions that are required in order to refute pap, namely, (1) that the agent is morally responsible for his/her decision and (2) that s/he lacks any morally significant ("robust") alternatives to it. Regarding (1), the examples face several problems concerning the "reasons-responsiveness" of the agent's mechanism of deliberation and decision making, which throws doubts upon his/her moral responsibility. Regarding (2), we try to show that the respective age...
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My main aim in this paper is to improve and give further support to a defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt cases which I put forward in some previous work. In the present paper I concentrate on a... more
My main aim in this paper is to improve and give further support to a defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt cases which I put forward in some previous work. In the present paper I concentrate on a recent and famous Frankfurt case, Derk Pereboom’s “Tax Evasion”. After presenting the essentials of my defense of PAP and applying it to this case, I go on to consider several objections that have been (or might be) raised against it and argue that they don’t succeed. I conclude by pointing out that my criticism of Pereboom’s example suggests a general strategy against other actual or possible Frankfurt cases.
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En su articulo de 2000, Hookway pretende argumentar que el principio de justificacion inferencial de Fumerton no tiene las consecuencias escepticas que Fumerton observa en el. Nosotros consideramos que Hookway esta en lo cierto cuando... more
En su articulo de 2000, Hookway pretende argumentar que el principio de justificacion inferencial de Fumerton no tiene las consecuencias escepticas que Fumerton observa en el. Nosotros consideramos que Hookway esta en lo cierto cuando mantiene esto. Sin embargo, despues de hacer algunos comentarios acerca de sus principales consideraciones a favor de esta tesis, desarrollaremos una linea argumentativa independiente que refuerce esa misma conclusion.
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My main aim in this paper is to improve and give further support to a defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt cases which I put forward in some previous work. In the present paper I concentrate on a... more
My main aim in this paper is to improve and give further support to a defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt cases which I put forward in some previous work. In the present paper I concentrate on a recent and famous Frankfurt case, Derk Pereboom’s “Tax Evasion”. After presenting the essentials of my defense of PAP and applying it to this case, I go on to consider several objections that have been (or might be) raised against it and argue that they don’t succeed. I conclude by pointing out that my criticism of Pereboom’s example suggests a general strategy against other actual or possible Frankfurt cases.
El objetivo del presente trabajo es defender el Principio de posibilidades alternativas (PPA) frente a dos recientes supuestos contraejemplos a este, inspirados en el que diseno, hace ya cuarenta anos, Harry Frankfurt. Las tres primeras... more
El objetivo del presente trabajo es defender el Principio de posibilidades alternativas (PPA) frente a dos recientes supuestos contraejemplos a este, inspirados en el que diseno, hace ya cuarenta anos, Harry Frankfurt. Las tres primeras secciones resumen el estado de la cuestion. A partir de la cuarta, se presentan y discuten, sucesivamente, los contraejemplos al PPA de Widerker (“Disfuncion cerebral-W”) y de Pereboom (“Evasion de impuestos”). Sostenemos que ambos ejemplos violan al menos una de dos condiciones necesarias para refutar el PPA: (1) que el agente sea moralmente responsable de su decision y (2) que carezca de alternativas moralmente significativas (“robustas”) a esta. Con respecto a (1), los ejemplos presentan distintos problemas en relacion con la “capacidad de respuesta a razones” del mecanismo de deliberacion y decision del agente, lo que cuestiona su responsabilidad moral. Con respecto a (2), tratamos de mostrar que los agentes, en los casos respectivos, tienen a su...
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In his paper “Individualism and Descartes”, William Ferraiolo puts into question the widely accepted interpretation of Descartes as an individualist about mental content. In this paper, I intend to defend this interpretation of Descartes’... more
In his paper “Individualism and Descartes”, William Ferraiolo puts into question the widely accepted interpretation of Descartes as an individualist about mental content. In this paper, I intend to defend this interpretation of Descartes’ thinking against Ferraiolo’s objections. I shall hold, firstly, that attributing to Descartes an individualist doctrine is not historically misguided. Secondly, I will try to show that Descartes’ endorsement of anti-individualism would lead either to depriving sceptical hypotheses of their force or to rejecting the epistemological privilege of the first person. And, thirdly, I shall try to show that Ferraiolo’s objections to the individualistic interpretation rest on two important errors: a misapprehension of the argumentative order of the Meditations and a confusion between the notions of causal and constitutive dependence of content on the external environment.
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Las consideraciones antiescepticas desarrolladas por Davidson, como las de Putnam, tienen un caracter trascendental: parten de hechos que el esceptico ha de aceptar y tratan de mostrar que tales hechos no lo serian si las hipotesis... more
Las consideraciones antiescepticas desarrolladas por Davidson, como las de Putnam, tienen un caracter trascendental: parten de hechos que el esceptico ha de aceptar y tratan de mostrar que tales hechos no lo serian si las hipotesis escepticas fuesen verdaderas. Es dudoso que dichas consideraciones consigan realmente su objetivo. Sin embargo, no creo que Davidson estuviera realmente interesado en una refutacion detallada del escepticismo. Su interes se centra mas bien en el contexto del que surge: la imagen cartesiana de las relaciones entre subjetividad, intersubjetividad y objetividad. Y el verdadero valor de las reflexiones antiescepticas de Davidson reside en la imagen alternativa que las inspira, a cuya luz el escepticismo deja de verse como un problema urgente e interesante.
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... Special thanks are due to Christopher Hookway, who was responsible for my research and wellbeing during my stay and helped me at several times with his comments and advice about some parts of the manuscript. I am also grateful to... more
... Special thanks are due to Christopher Hookway, who was responsible for my research and wellbeing during my stay and helped me at several times with his comments and advice about some parts of the manuscript. I am also grateful to Stephen Laurence for inviting me to ...
The articles included in this monographic section on epistemology are elaborations of papers previously submitted, accepted and presented in the IV Conference of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (Sociedad Española de Filosofía... more
The articles included in this monographic section on epistemology are elaborations of papers previously submitted, accepted and presented in the IV Conference of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica, SEFA), which took place ...
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In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and... more
In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further an...
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Reason and Causation in Davidson's Theory of Action Explanation
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According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for something she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt held that PAP was false on the basis of examples... more
According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for something she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt held that PAP was false on the basis of examples ("Frankfurt cases") in which a counterfactual, and unactivated, device ensures that the agent will decide and do what she actually decides and does on her own, if she shows some sign that she is going to decide and do something else. Problems with these cases have led some thinkers to design examples in which the counterfactual factor is replaced by a device that actually blocks alternative possibilities. I argue that, even if these cases did not illicitly assume determinism, they are not successful against PAP anyway, for they violate a plausible condition on moral responsibility that Fischer has called "reasons-responsiveness".
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In this paper I deal with Richard Moran’s account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some... more
In this paper I deal with Richard Moran’s account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which they would arise out of a view of agents too strongly dependent on the will.
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ABSTRACT This paper is intended to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (pap)against two recent putative counterexamples to it, inspired by the one that HarryFrankfurt designed forty years ago. The first three sections... more
ABSTRACT This paper is intended to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (pap)against two recent putative counterexamples to it, inspired by the one that HarryFrankfurt designed forty years ago. The first three sections provide a summary of the state of the art. In the remaining sections, the counterexamples to pap o Widerker’s (“Brain-Malfunction-W”) and Pereboom’s (“Tax Evasion”) are successively presented and discussed. We hold that both examples breach at least one otwo conditions that are required in order to refute pap, namely, (1) that the agent is morally responsible for his/her decision and (2) that s/he lacks any morally significant (“robust”) alternatives to it. Regarding (1), the examples face several problems concerning the “reasons-responsiveness” of the agent’s mechanism of deliberation and decision making, which throws doubts upon his/her moral responsibility. Regarding (2), we try to show that the respective agents have robust alternatives within their reach. We conclude, then, that pap is not refuted by these examples.
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Research Interests: Scepticism and Coherence
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In his paper "Individualism and Descartes," William Ferraiolo puts into question the widely accepted interpretation of Descartes as an individualist about mental content. In this paper, I intend to defend this interpretation of... more
In his paper "Individualism and Descartes," William Ferraiolo puts into question the widely accepted interpretation of Descartes as an individualist about mental content. In this paper, I intend to defend this interpretation of Descartes's thinking against Ferraiolo's objections. I shall hold, firstly, that attributing to Descartes an individualist doctrine is not historically misguided. Secondly, I will try to show that Descartes's endorsement of anti-individualism would lead either to depriving sceptical hypotheses of their force or to rejecting the epistemological privilege of the first person. And, thirdly, I shall try to show that Ferraiolo's objections to the individualistic interpretation rest on two important errors: a misapprehension of the argumentative order of the Mediations and a confusion between the notions of causal and constitutive dependence of content on the external environment.