- James D. Durso is the Managing Director of Corsair LLC. In 2013 to 2015, he was the Chief Executive Officer of AKM C... moreJames D. Durso is the Managing Director of Corsair LLC. In 2013 to 2015, he was the Chief Executive Officer of AKM Consulting, a provider of business development and international project management services in Central and Southwest Asia to U.S. clients in a variety of industries including telecommunications, homeland security, and defense. Since 2013, he has mentored graduate students at The George Washington University, Elliot School of International Affairs.
From 2006 to 2013, he was Senior Advisor to the International Stability Operations Association, a trade association for the peace and stability industry. In 2011, Mr Durso was a professional staff member at the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, where he reviewed the $100 billion logistics contracting effort of the coalition forces in Southwest Asia. The scope of the review included the LOGCAP contracts for base life support for the major and minor bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, and contracts for subsistence, fuel, maintenance, and in-theatre transport.
At Corsair, he advised the world’s leading air cargo operator on investment in transportation infrastructure in Uzbekistan, and co-wrote an analysis of Kazakhstan’s transport sector and with recommendations for its development in the wake of the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. He also analyzed the implications of Israel’s discovery of offshore natural gas deposits and advised a client on best courses of action to reduce physical and political risk.
From 2007 to 2008, Mr. Durso was Senior Logistics Consultant at Gulf Capital, Ltd where he provided due diligence for investors in the security sector. From 2004 to 2007, he was the founding editor of Iraq Reconstruction News, which focused on the reconstruction and economic reintegration of Iraq. In 2004 – 2006, he was a Member of the Board of Managers of Ocean Tomo Government Services, LLC, an intellectual capital merchant bank created to service public sector intellectual property concerns.
Mr. Durso was a professional staff member at the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission where he reviewed U.S. Department of Defense supply chain management; realignments of the U.S. Transportation Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the military services’ criminal investigative agencies; and chemical-biological defense and medical research, development and acquisition. In 2004, he was the Transportation Policy Advisor at the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq where he transitioned security responsibility at Baghdad International Airport from a private security contractor to the Government of Iraq, co-led a successful effort to suppress attacks by shoulder-fired missiles against Coalition and commercial aircraft, and developed responses to insurgent threats to Iraq’s critical infrastructure.
Previously, Mr. Durso was the Vice-President, United Marine Technology, Inc., formed to design and market a special operations craft to replace the Navy’s MK V SOC. He was also Director of Government Markets at Synthesis Partners LLC, an open-source intelligence provider to business and government. At ERIM International’s Automotive and Transportation Center, he was the Manager, Washington, D.C. Operations, and led business development efforts with the Department of Energy and U.S. Army.
Mr. Durso served as a U.S. Navy officer for 20 years. His overseas postings were in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He served afloat as Supply Officer of the submarines USS SKATE (SSN 578) and USS GURNARD (SSN 662).
Mr. Durso has authored op-eds on defense and foreign affairs that have appeared in Forbes, Real Clear Defense, Real Clear World, Defense News, Fox News Opinion, Defense One, The Hill, The Diplomat, Zero Hedge, Second Line of Defense, OilPrice.com, The National Interest, and The American Spectator.
Mr. Durso has a Master of Science in Systems Management from the University of Southern California, and a Bachelor of Arts (With Distinction) in Arts and Sciences from the Pennsylvania State University.edit
List of op-eds and articles, mostly on U.S. national defense and foreign policy, Central Asia, Caucasus, Middle East, China.
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Summary briefing of the work of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
Research Interests:
The Congress established the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) to ensure the integrity of the base closure and realignment process. As directed by law, the Commission will provide an objective, non-partisan, and... more
The Congress established the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) to ensure the integrity of the base closure and realignment process. As directed by law, the Commission will provide an objective, non-partisan, and independent review and analysis of the list of military installation recommendations issued by the Department of Defense (DoD) on May 13, 2005. The recommendations provided by DoD are extremely complex and interrelated and will require in-depth analysis and careful attention to detail. The Commission will follow a fair, open, and equitable process, as set forth by statute. The Commission's mission is to assess whether the DoD recommendations substantially deviated from the Congressional criteria used to evaluate each military base. While giving priority to the criteria of military value, the Commission will also take into account the human impact of the base closures and will consider the possible economic, environmental, and other effects on the surrounding communities. Volume 2 contains Appendices A-T and the Index by State and the Index by Recommendation
Research Interests:
The Congress established the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) to ensure the integrity of the base closure and realignment process. As directed by law, the Commission will provide an objective, non-partisan, and... more
The Congress established the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) to ensure the integrity of the base closure and realignment process. As directed by law, the Commission will provide an objective, non-partisan, and independent review and analysis of the list of military installation recommendations issued by the Department of Defense (DoD) on May 13, 2005. The recommendations provided by DoD are extremely complex and interrelated and will require in-depth analysis and careful attention to detail. The Commission will follow a fair, open, and equitable process, as set forth by statute. The Commission's mission is to assess whether the DoD recommendations substantially deviated from the Congressional criteria used to evaluate each military base. While giving priority to the criteria of military value, the Commission will also take into account the human impact of the base closures and will consider the possible economic, environmental, and other effects on the surrounding communities. Volume 1 contains the Executive Summary and Chapters 1-4
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Final report of Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), an independent, bipartisan legislative commission established to study wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Created in Section 841 of the National Defense Authorization Act... more
Final report of Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), an independent, bipartisan legislative commission established to study wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Created in Section 841 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, this eight-member Commission is mandated by Congress to study federal agency contracting for the reconstruction, logistical support of coalition forces, and the performance of security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan submitted "At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan" to Congress on June 10, 2009, describing its operations to that date, identifying areas for research,... more
The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan submitted "At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan" to Congress on June 10, 2009, describing its operations to that date, identifying areas for research, and flagging eight "issues of immediate concern" for lawmakers to consider.
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Billions of U.S. taxpayers’ dollars will be wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan if the host nation governments cannot take over the operation, maintenance, and security of efforts undertaken to reconstruct, stabilize, and develop those... more
Billions of U.S. taxpayers’ dollars will be wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan if the host nation governments cannot take over the operation, maintenance, and security of efforts undertaken to reconstruct,
stabilize, and develop those countries.
Potential waste from unsustainable projects exceeds $11 billion for just one program in Afghanistan, facilities construction for the national security forces. The total risk from all contracts in both Iraq and Afghanistan could be much higher.
In many cases, the opportunity to avoid or mitigate waste from sustainment failure has already passed. In other cases, there is
still time to act. But time is growing short.
Without prompt and decisive action, the biggest waste in Iraq and Afghanistan may be yet to come.
We recommend:
1. Officials at the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development examine both completed and current projects for risk of sustainment failure
and pursue all reasonable strategies to mitigate risks.
2. Officials ensure that any new requirements and acquisition strategies regarding contingency contracts for projects or services to be handed over to a host nation include a detailed assessment of
host nations’ ability and will to meet the out-year costs essential for long-term
success.
3. Officials take appropriate action to
cancel or redesign projects or programs
that have little or no realistic prospect for
achieving sustainability.
stabilize, and develop those countries.
Potential waste from unsustainable projects exceeds $11 billion for just one program in Afghanistan, facilities construction for the national security forces. The total risk from all contracts in both Iraq and Afghanistan could be much higher.
In many cases, the opportunity to avoid or mitigate waste from sustainment failure has already passed. In other cases, there is
still time to act. But time is growing short.
Without prompt and decisive action, the biggest waste in Iraq and Afghanistan may be yet to come.
We recommend:
1. Officials at the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development examine both completed and current projects for risk of sustainment failure
and pursue all reasonable strategies to mitigate risks.
2. Officials ensure that any new requirements and acquisition strategies regarding contingency contracts for projects or services to be handed over to a host nation include a detailed assessment of
host nations’ ability and will to meet the out-year costs essential for long-term
success.
3. Officials take appropriate action to
cancel or redesign projects or programs
that have little or no realistic prospect for
achieving sustainability.
Research Interests:
The United States faces a unique and critical period in Iraq. Securing the hard-won gains of nearly eight years of struggle that have cost more than 4,000 American service members’ lives depends on sustaining a large and effective... more
The United States faces a unique and critical period in Iraq. Securing the hard-won gains of nearly eight years of struggle that have cost more than 4,000 American service members’ lives depends on sustaining a large and effective diplomatic footprint once the U.S. military completes its agreed-upon withdrawal by December 31, 2011. Doing so requires that the State Department expand its presence
while taking on many large tasks now performed by the U.S. military, until the host government has stabilized enough to provide customary levels of support and security.
State’s Iraq mission after 2011 will require using thousands more contractors. Yet State is short of needed funding and program-management staff. Very little time remains for State to develop requirements, conduct negotiations, and award competitive contracts for work that must begin at once. Inadequate support risks waste of funds and failure for U.S. policy objectives in Iraq and the region.
We recommend:
1. Congress ensure adequate funding to sustain State Department operations in critical areas of Iraq, including its greatly increased needs for operational contract support.
2. The Department of State expand its organic capability to meet heightened needs for acquisition personnel, contract management, and contractor oversight.
3. The Secretaries of State and Defense extend and intensify their collaborative planning for the transition, including executing an agreement to establish a single, senior-level coordinator and
decision-maker to guide progress and promptly address major issues whose resolution may exceed the authorities of departmental working groups.
while taking on many large tasks now performed by the U.S. military, until the host government has stabilized enough to provide customary levels of support and security.
State’s Iraq mission after 2011 will require using thousands more contractors. Yet State is short of needed funding and program-management staff. Very little time remains for State to develop requirements, conduct negotiations, and award competitive contracts for work that must begin at once. Inadequate support risks waste of funds and failure for U.S. policy objectives in Iraq and the region.
We recommend:
1. Congress ensure adequate funding to sustain State Department operations in critical areas of Iraq, including its greatly increased needs for operational contract support.
2. The Department of State expand its organic capability to meet heightened needs for acquisition personnel, contract management, and contractor oversight.
3. The Secretaries of State and Defense extend and intensify their collaborative planning for the transition, including executing an agreement to establish a single, senior-level coordinator and
decision-maker to guide progress and promptly address major issues whose resolution may exceed the authorities of departmental working groups.
Research Interests:
Current planning for transitioning vital functions in Iraq from the Department of Defense to the Department of State is not adequate for effective coordination of billions of dollars in new contracting, and risks both financial waste and... more
Current planning for transitioning vital functions in Iraq from the Department of Defense to the Department of State is not adequate for effective coordination of billions of dollars in new contracting, and risks both financial waste and undermining U.S. policy objectives.
The Commission recommends:
1. The Departments of Defense and State accelerate, intensify, and better integrate their joint planning for the transition in Iraq.
2. All levels of Defense and State immediately initiate and complete
planning with the Government of Iraq to address critical security
functions now performed by Defense.
3. State use, on a reimbursable basis, DoD’s LOGCAP IV contract.
4. Congress immediately provide additional resources to State to
support its increased contracting costs and personnel needs.
The Commission recommends:
1. The Departments of Defense and State accelerate, intensify, and better integrate their joint planning for the transition in Iraq.
2. All levels of Defense and State immediately initiate and complete
planning with the Government of Iraq to address critical security
functions now performed by Defense.
3. State use, on a reimbursable basis, DoD’s LOGCAP IV contract.
4. Congress immediately provide additional resources to State to
support its increased contracting costs and personnel needs.
Research Interests:
The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan issued its second Special Report, "Lowest-priced security not good enough for war-zone embassies," to urge that Congress change a statutory restriction on the State... more
The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan issued its second Special Report, "Lowest-priced security not good enough for war-zone embassies," to urge that Congress change a statutory restriction on the State Department's ability to choose security contractors for its Foreign Service buildings based on any considerations other than lowest price and technical acceptability. The Commission believes that the unintended consequences of the mandate were illustrated in poor contract performance and widely publicized misconduct by guards for the embassy in Kabul. The State Department is on record saying contractor performance endangered the embassy and its personnel. The report urges allowing use of the "best-value" standard for evaluating contract offers.
Research Interests:
On August 11, 2009, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan conducted a hearing to obtain testimony from government officials and contractors on the adequacy of contractor business systems. The Commission learned... more
On August 11, 2009, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan conducted a hearing to obtain testimony from government officials and contractors on the adequacy of contractor business systems. The Commission learned that unreliable data from business systems produced billions of dollars in contingency-contract costs that government auditors often could not verify. The government’s ability to detect contract cost errors and material misstatements is seriously impeded by contractors’ inadequate internal controls over their business systems. Further, the two primary government agencies involved, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), are not effectively working together to protect government interests.
The Commission recommends: (1) Department of Defense (DoD) needs to ensure that government speaks with one voice to contractors; (2) DoD needs to improve government accountability by rapidly resolving agency conflicts on business systems; (3) DCAA needs to expand its audit reports to go beyond rendering a pass/fail opinion; (4) DCMA needs to develop an effective process that includes aggressive compliance enforcement; and (5) DCAA and DCMA need to request additional resources and prioritize contingency-contractor oversight workload.
The Commission recommends: (1) Department of Defense (DoD) needs to ensure that government speaks with one voice to contractors; (2) DoD needs to improve government accountability by rapidly resolving agency conflicts on business systems; (3) DCAA needs to expand its audit reports to go beyond rendering a pass/fail opinion; (4) DCMA needs to develop an effective process that includes aggressive compliance enforcement; and (5) DCAA and DCMA need to request additional resources and prioritize contingency-contractor oversight workload.