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    Michael Wohlgemuth

    ion“ which seeks to identify common traits of different phenomena, Eucken was convinced
    Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche, räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen der unter
    Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche, räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen der unter
    Discourse theorists such as Habermas tend to disregard the communicative character and discoursive power of market processes and at the same time overrate the ability of political deliberation to discover and implement social problem... more
    Discourse theorists such as Habermas tend to disregard the communicative character and discoursive power of market processes and at the same time overrate the ability of political deliberation to discover and implement social problem solutions. Mainstream economists have little to contribute to this debate since they regard both economic and political “markets” as simple instruments for the aggregation of given preferences. Hayek and other “Austrian” market process theorists, however, provide a rich theory that highlights the role of competition as a process of discovery, persuasion, experimentation and opinion formation. I use this analytical framework in order to show first that real market processes in many respects correspond to most ambitious claims of ideal deliberation such as “domination-free discourse” or “the unforced force of the better argument”. Next, I confront the deliberative ideal with predicaments of real political discourse, stressing opportunity costs (rational i...
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    Es soll zunächst (in Teil 2) eine allgemeine, evolutorische Wettbewerbstheorie präsentiert werden, die in der Lage ist, den Prozeß der Hervorbringung und Selektion von Neuerungen systematisch zu analysieren. Diese Theorie soll weiters... more
    Es soll zunächst (in Teil 2) eine allgemeine, evolutorische Wettbewerbstheorie präsentiert werden, die in der Lage ist, den Prozeß der Hervorbringung und Selektion von Neuerungen systematisch zu analysieren. Diese Theorie soll weiters erlauben (in Teil 3), wichtige Parallelen, aber auch systembedingte Unterschiede zwischen ökonomischen und politischen Wettbewerbsprozessen erkennbar werden zu lassen. Auch wenn Arenen kollektiven Handelns hinsichtlich der Generierung, wettbewerblichen Auswahl und selbstverantwortlichen Erprobung neuer, ?fortschrittlicher? Sozialtechnologien weniger Aussichten bieten werden als ökonomische Wettbewerbsprozesse, ist hieraus nicht schlicht auf ?Politikversagen? zu schließen. Der relevante Vergleich sollte auch im Politischen sein, wie es um die Fortschrittlichkeit einer Gesellschaft stünde, wenn Wettbewerb zwischen Problemlösungshypothesen künstlich reduziert würde. Vor diesem Hintergrund läßt sich auch aus ökonomischer Sicht ein Plädoyer für Demokratie, ...
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    Our aim is to address some elementary aspects of the innate trade-off between both classical liberal requirements for an adequate order of rules: (a) effectiveness in the sense of the rules' congruence with a given order of... more
    Our aim is to address some elementary aspects of the innate trade-off between both classical liberal requirements for an adequate order of rules: (a) effectiveness in the sense of the rules' congruence with a given order of (economic) actions and (b) legitimacy in the sense of the rules? congruence with the given social-cultural conditions of (political) consent. In the following part 2, we review Hayek's own account of the requirements of a liberal international order of rules, finding several arguments that help to further illustrate the above-mentioned trade-off. But we will hardly find Hayek relate his legal and political philosophy of "universalisability" to assessments of international governance. Therefore, we have to go back to Hayek's accounts of universalisable rules of just conduct in part 3 in order to prepare our account of such rules' globalisability. In part 4 we address the generality norm as a constitutional principle for the governance...
    Hayek's view of democracy as a process of forming opinion is taken as a starting point for inquiring into issues largely neglected by Public Choice and Constitutional Economics. In an Austrian perspective, fallible individual... more
    Hayek's view of democracy as a process of forming opinion is taken as a starting point for inquiring into issues largely neglected by Public Choice and Constitutional Economics. In an Austrian perspective, fallible individual knowledge, political entrepreneurs and dissenting minorities attain a distinctive role in the process of political competition. Based on the observation that political opinions consist of preferences
    In the paper “Entry Barriers in Politics, or: Why Politics, Like Natural Monopoly, Is Not Organised as an Ongoing Market-Process,” an analytical framework for dealing with processes of political competition is presented. The idea goes... more
    In the paper “Entry Barriers in Politics, or: Why Politics, Like Natural Monopoly, Is Not Organised as an Ongoing Market-Process,” an analytical framework for dealing with processes of political competition is presented. The idea goes back to Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly. To this, basic insights of New Institutional Economics and Austrian Ecomomics are added. It
    ZusammenfassungDie ordnungspolitischen Leistungen der Europäischen Integration der letzten 50 Jahre sind wechselhaft und widersprüchlich. Vor dem Hintergrund von Hayeks optimistischer Vision einer freiwilligen Integration unter dem... more
    ZusammenfassungDie ordnungspolitischen Leistungen der Europäischen Integration der letzten 50 Jahre sind wechselhaft und widersprüchlich. Vor dem Hintergrund von Hayeks optimistischer Vision einer freiwilligen Integration unter dem Vorzeichen universalisierbarer Freiheitsgewährungen und Erhards Befürchtungen vor einem Europäischen Interventionsstaat diskutiere ich theoretische Gründe, die den gemischten empirischen Befund erklären können. Hayeks Optimismus läßt sich polit-ökonomisch vor allem unter Ver weis auf die Logik des Stimmentauschs und die Eigeninteressen Europäischer Organe relativieren. Erhards Pessimismus wiederum kann durch gewollte oder ungewollte Selbstbindung der Vertragsparteien sowie eine durchaus oft ordnungspolitisch weitreichende Interpretation der Verträge durch EuGH und Kommission in wichtigen Teilen widerlegt werden. Die weitere Entwicklung Europäischer Ordnungspolitik dürfte von den Reibungen zwischen Vertiefung (Harmonisierung, Zentralisierung) und Erweiteru...
    In this paper I portray "neo-liberalism" in its original conceptual meaning as opposed to the generic term of depreciation as which it is commonly used. I identify fair competition and the denial of all privilege as the major... more
    In this paper I portray "neo-liberalism" in its original conceptual meaning as opposed to the generic term of depreciation as which it is commonly used. I identify fair competition and the denial of all privilege as the major concerns of original neo-liberals. Ethical merit for competition might, at first sight, be based on only two principles: individual natural rights (equal liberty) and socially desirable outcomes ("unintended altruism"). It was the neo-liberal idea to put fairness-norms or universally applicable rules of just behaviour between an unqualified "input-based" ethics and an unqualified "output-based" ethical consequentialism. The enforcement of such rules is a major obligation of the state. Today, the European Union assumes the role of "guardian" of competition. In a certain, but limited sense, neo-liberalism, correctly understood, can be argued to be the one founding "European Social Model". However, beyond...
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    ABSTRACT At first sight and in terms of explicit references, the relationship between Hayek and the early Freiburg School seems to have been one of mutually benign neglect. It took several decades before the “Hayekian challenge” was fully... more
    ABSTRACT At first sight and in terms of explicit references, the relationship between Hayek and the early Freiburg School seems to have been one of mutually benign neglect. It took several decades before the “Hayekian challenge” was fully understood in Freiburg; in a way one could even argue that the challenge arrived in Freiburg only with Hayek himself in 1962. This delay can mostly be explained by different foci of attention. Hayek’s evolutionary economics and his classical-liberal social philosophy centers around the problem of private, dispersed knowledge. The (early) Freiburg School’s economics and its ordo-liberal social philosophy centers around the problem of private, concentrated power. This difference of perspective has consequences and can partly be explained by the different intellectual sources the proponents were drawing upon, and the different political struggles they were engaged in.
    Der Beitrag liefert einen Maßstab für Ordnungspolitik, der als Ideal für Wirtschaftspolitik zumindest unter liberalen Ökonomen, vielleicht aber auch unter Europas Bürgern, prinzipielle Zustimmung finden könnte. Im Kern geht es um eine... more
    Der Beitrag liefert einen Maßstab für Ordnungspolitik, der als Ideal für Wirtschaftspolitik zumindest unter liberalen Ökonomen, vielleicht aber auch unter Europas Bürgern, prinzipielle Zustimmung finden könnte. Im Kern geht es um eine privilegienfreie funktionsfähige und menschenwürdige Ordnung einer Marktwirtschaft mit unverfälschtem Wettbewerb. Zu Beginn werden im ersten Schritt zunächst zwei konträre Erwartungen an einen wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenschluss in Europa verglichen: Die frühe optimistische Vision des liberalen Denkers Friedrich von Hayek und die zeitnäher skeptische Position des liberalen Politikers Ludwig Erhard. Beide tragen jeweils gute ordnungspolitische Gründe vor; doch beide haben sich, rückblickend, ein wenig getäuscht. Diese ambivalente historische Entwicklung einer Europäischen Ordnungspolitik wird im zweiten Schritt grob anhand der Verträge von Rom (1957) bis zum Reformvertrags-Mandat von Brüssel (2007) skizziert. Ordnungspolitische Verfehlungen werden an...
    Strategies of flexible integration and enlargement of the
    2. Deliberative democracy as a political ideal 3. The market process as “domination-free discourse” a. regulated exchange of information, critical testing of proposals: markets as argumentative networks
    ... For example, there are good reasons to distinguish between a Freiburg and a Cologne mode of (ordo) liberal thought (see also Sally 1996 p. 248 ff.; Vanberg 1988 pp. 20 ff.). ... The relation between Hayek and constitutional economics... more
    ... For example, there are good reasons to distinguish between a Freiburg and a Cologne mode of (ordo) liberal thought (see also Sally 1996 p. 248 ff.; Vanberg 1988 pp. 20 ff.). ... The relation between Hayek and constitutional economics is analysed eg by VANBERG 216 Page 231. ...
    ohn E. Roemer, a leading socialist economist, has recently proclaimed a “Future for Socialism” (Roemer 1994). His book is advertised as being “measured, highly accessible, and most of all compelling.” I have come to the opposite... more
    ohn E. Roemer, a leading socialist economist, has recently proclaimed a “Future for Socialism” (Roemer 1994). His book is advertised as being “measured, highly accessible, and most of all compelling.” I have come to the opposite conclusions. Roemer’s most provocative assertion is his claim to have found “ways of reformulating the concept of market socialism in response to the Hayekian critique” (2). In his attempt to convince central planners as well as communitarians in the socialist camp of the virtues of the market, Roemer indeed goes a long way in accepting the objections that Friedrich A. Hayek and others put forward during the calculation debate of the 1930s. It is helpful to recall the debate on socialist economics from the early warnings of Ludwig von Mises and Hayek to the later analyses of Yugoslav and Hungarian market socialism by Svetozar Pejovich or János Kornai. These critiques form the background of what Roemer calls the “fifth generation” of market-socialist proposal...
    Uber Vor- und Nachteile, Chancen und Gefahren direkter Demokratie wird in diesem Band sowohl theoretisch als auch empirisch ausfuhrlich debattiert. Hier soll der theoretischen Debatte wenig Grundsatzlich-Abstraktes hinzugefugt werden.... more
    Uber Vor- und Nachteile, Chancen und Gefahren direkter Demokratie wird in diesem Band sowohl theoretisch als auch empirisch ausfuhrlich debattiert. Hier soll der theoretischen Debatte wenig Grundsatzlich-Abstraktes hinzugefugt werden. Stattdessen wird ein Fallbeispiel prasentiert fur ein Land, in dem direkt-demokratische Beteiligungsmoglichkeiten so weit ausgebaut sind wie in kaum einem anderen Land der Welt.
    For the first time the EU has reached not just a stopping point, but a possible turning point. The Brexit decision has only made this more evident. Using the current crisis for a ‘great leap forward’ towards ever closer ‘political union’... more
    For the first time the EU has reached not just a stopping point, but a possible turning point. The Brexit decision has only made this more evident. Using the current crisis for a ‘great leap forward’ towards ever closer ‘political union’ hardly seems realistic, even in the absence of the notorious British opposition. Even the member states that are most ardently calling for a ‘political union’ do not agree on what that should actually mean. Using the examples of France and Germany and their seemingly identical calls for a ‘fiscal union’ of the eurozone, this article shows that the two countries have contrasting interpretations of what such a union should do, and how. Both the French ideal of a voluntarist ‘economic government’ of the eurozone and the German model of a rules-based ‘economic constitution’ would require substantial changes to the EU treaties, for which there is no real hope of democratic consent. The legitimacy challenge has thus become both more urgent and more diffic...
    There is not and has never been one liberal conception of the market economy and the state. In fact, the term “liberal” has received connotations that, especially in the United States but also, for example, in France, still support the... more
    There is not and has never been one liberal conception of the market economy and the state. In fact, the term “liberal” has received connotations that, especially in the United States but also, for example, in France, still support the old dictum of Schumpeter (1954, p. 394): “as a supreme, if unintended, compliment, the enemies of the system of private enterprise have thought it wise to appropriate its label.”
    Angst, Schadenfreude, Leitmotiv, oder Weltschmerz gehören zu den deutschen Lehnworten, die man in vielen europäischen Sprachen findet, da ihre Bedeutung aufgrund spezifisch deutsch-kultureller Prägung und Autorenschaft kaum adäquat zu... more
    Angst, Schadenfreude, Leitmotiv, oder Weltschmerz gehören zu den deutschen Lehnworten, die man in vielen europäischen Sprachen findet, da ihre Bedeutung aufgrund spezifisch deutsch-kultureller Prägung und Autorenschaft kaum adäquat zu übersetzen ist. Dasselbe gilt für Ordnungspolitik. Von Europäischer Ordnungspolitik zu reden verrät daher bereits eine spezifisch deutsche Sicht auf die Europäische Union. Dies macht die Suche nach einer Europäischen Ordnungspolitik freilich nicht sinn- oder ergebnislos. Tatsächlich wurden aus gutem Grund und mit nicht schlechtem Erfolg der Europäischen Union zentrale ordnungspolitische Kompetenzen anvertraut. Auch wenn Ordnungspolitik vielen Europäern ein Fremdwort bleibt wenn sie dem Leitmotiv dennoch instinktiv folgten, stünde es um eine Europäische Ordnungspolitik nicht schlecht, vielleicht besser als um eine deutsche Ordnungspolitik auch wenn hier kaum eine politische Sonntagsrede ohne Verweis auf ordnungspolitische Tugenden auskommt. ...
    Is Friedrich von Hayek in some specific, perhaps paradoxical, way a "classical liberal paternalist"? My answer will be an unsatisfying "yes and no" depending not only on my interpretation of Hayek, but also on the... more
    Is Friedrich von Hayek in some specific, perhaps paradoxical, way a "classical liberal paternalist"? My answer will be an unsatisfying "yes and no" depending not only on my interpretation of Hayek, but also on the manifold interpretations one can give to the concepts of paternalism and classical liberalism (or, indeed: liberty). I start with an interpretation of Hayek’s account of "modernity". Here, I hint at a first potential paradox in the form of a "magic triangle" composed of (a) Hayek’s praise and explanation of the evolutionary emergence of the spontaneous order of the market and civil society, (b) Hayek’s fierce opposition to modernist thinking and the fatal conceit of rationalist constructivism and (c) Hayek’s gloomy visions of politics, legislation, or public choice. Next, I shortly distinguish various dimensions of paternalism and confront these with Hayek’s classical liberalism. In the following parts, I offer a brief acco...
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    The paper is organized as follows: in part 2, I give a short account of Humboldt's boundaries of the state that relates to many present-day challenges to classical liberalism: his blunt rejection of any solicitude of the state for the... more
    The paper is organized as follows: in part 2, I give a short account of Humboldt's boundaries of the state that relates to many present-day challenges to classical liberalism: his blunt rejection of any solicitude of the state for the positive welfare of the citizen which also covers education, religion and any kind of moral paternalism. In part 3, I refer to the new economic literature on the optimal size and number of nations in order to discuss whether small states are more likely to be (nearly) minimal states. This literature tends to disregard Humboldt's arguments in favour of exposing the individual to varieties of situations that he can choose and from which he can learn to self-develop. Therefore, in part 4, I argue that the evolutionary merits of this exposure can be illustrated by regarding institutional competition as a Hayekian discovery procedure. In part 5, I look at the partial removal of borders within the European Union and, using some intuitions from club t...
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    ABSTRACT Gäbe es nichts Neues unter der Sonne, gäbe es auch keinen Wettbewerb, sondern nur das Nirwana stetigen Verharrens im Gleichgewicht. Wäre alles Relevante allen gegeben und bekannt, bräuchte es keinen Wettbewarb, um das bereits... more
    ABSTRACT Gäbe es nichts Neues unter der Sonne, gäbe es auch keinen Wettbewerb, sondern nur das Nirwana stetigen Verharrens im Gleichgewicht. Wäre alles Relevante allen gegeben und bekannt, bräuchte es keinen Wettbewarb, um das bereits Gegebene und Bekannte herauszufinden. Würde man, etwa im Sport, bei Berufungsverfahren oder bei Ausschreibungen, Wettbewerb inszenieren, obwohl man schon vorab die Gewinner zu kennen meint oder festgelegt hat, machte man sich entweder der Anmaßung, der Zeitverschwendung oder de Betrugs schuldig.

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