Paul Raymont

I consider and reject the claim that recent varieties of non-reductive physicalism, particularly Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, are committed to a new kind of epiphenomenalism. Non-reductive physicalists identify each mental, event with a physical event, and are thus entitled to the belief that mental events are causes, since the physical events with which they are held to be identical are causes. However, Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and others have argued that if we follow the non-reductive physicalist in denying that mental features can be reduced to physical properties, then we must regard mental properties as being causally irrelevant to their bearers' effects, In short, the non-reductive physicalist is said to be committed to the belief that while there are mental causes, they do not cause their effects in virtue of being the types of mental state that they are. It is in this sense that non-reductive physicalists are thought to represent a new form of epiphenomenalism. After a brief survey of the history of epiphenomenalism, and its mutation into the contemporary strain that is believed to afflict non-reductive physicalism, I argue against the counterfactual criterion of the sort of causal relevance that we take mental features to enjoy. I then criticize the 'trope' response to the epiphenomenalist threat, and conclude that much of the current debate on this topic is based on the mistaken belief that there is some variety of causal relevance that is not simply a brand of explanatory relevance. Once this is seen, it will seem much less plausible that mental properties are excluded from relevance to the phenomena of which we typically take them to be explanatory.

I maintain that Leibniz's distinction between 'organic machines of nature' and the artificial machine that we produce cannot be adequately understood simply in terms of differing orders of structural complexity. It is not simply that natural machines, having been made by God, are infinitely more complex than the products of our own artifice. Instead, Leibniz's distinction is a thoroughly metaphysical one, having its root in his belief that every natural machine is a corporeal substance, the unity and identity conditions of which derive ultimately from its substantial form. Natural machines are thus true unities, while artificial machines are mere aggregates of substances and are therefore only accidental unities. I briefly explore this connection between Leibniz's distinction between natural and artificial machines and his views about individuality. I conclude on a polemical note, in which it is suggested that these results undermine the currently popular view that Leibniz renounced corporeal substances toward the end of his life.

<jats:p>I maintain that dispositions are not causally relevant to their manifestations. The paper begins with a negative argument, which is intended to undermine David Lewis' recent attempt to restore causal potency to dispositions by identifying their instantiations with the instantiations of their causal bases. I conclude that Lewis' attempt to vindicate the causal credentials of dispositions meets obstacles that are analogous to (though importantly different from) those that beset Donald Davidson's attempt to accord a causal role to the mental. I then consider an argument recently given by Frank Jackson against the causal relevance of dispositions (to their manifestations). Jackson's argument relies on a conception of dispositions that is not likely to be shared by those who defend their causal relevance. I sketch an alternative conception of dispositions that links them more closely to their causal bases, but argue that even on this model dispositions are causally impotent. The paper closes with a defense of the claim that dispositions, in spite of their causal irrelevance to their manifestations, are nevertheless causal-explanatorily relevant to them.</jats:p>

Though we take mainly a philosophical approach, we hope that the results of our work will be useful to researchers on consciousness who take other approaches. Everyone agrees, no matter what their point of view on consciousness, that consciousness has a representational base. However, there have been relatively few well-worked-out attempts to say what this base might be like. The two best developed are perhaps the higher-order thought (HOT) and the transparency approaches. Both are lacking. Starting from the notion of a self-presenting representation, we develop an alternative view. In our view, a representation, a completely normal representation, is the representational base for not just for consciousness of its object (if it has one), but also itself and oneself as its subject. The unified picture of consciousness that results should assist research on consciousness.

I maintain that Leibniz's distinction between 'organic machines of nature' and the artificial machine that we produce cannot be adequately understood simply in terms of differing orders of structural complexity. It is not simply that natural machines, having been made by God, are infinitely more complex than the products of our own artifice. Instead, Leibniz's distinction is a thoroughly metaphysical one, having its root in his belief that every natural machine is a corporeal substance, the unity and identity conditions of which derive ultimately from its substantial form. Natural machines are thus true unities, while artificial machines are mere aggregates of substances and are therefore only accidental unities. I briefly explore this connection between Leibniz's distinction between natural and artificial machines and his views about individuality. I conclude on a polemical note, in which it is suggested that these results undermine the currently popular view th...

<jats:p>I maintain that dispositions are not causally relevant to their manifestations. The paper begins with a negative argument, which is intended to undermine David Lewis' recent attempt to restore causal potency to dispositions by identifying their instantiations with the instantiations of their causal bases. I conclude that Lewis' attempt to vindicate the causal credentials of dispositions meets obstacles that are analogous to (though importantly different from) those that beset Donald Davidson's attempt to accord a causal role to the mental. I then consider an argument recently given by Frank Jackson against the causal relevance of dispositions (to their manifestations). Jackson's argument relies on a conception of dispositions that is not likely to be shared by those who defend their causal relevance. I sketch an alternative conception of dispositions that links them more closely to their causal bases, but argue that even on this model dispositions are causally impotent. The paper closes with a defense of the claim that dispositions, in spite of their causal irrelevance to their manifestations, are nevertheless causal-explanatorily relevant to them.</jats:p>

Traditionally, one of the primary obstacles for physicalist accounts of the mind has been the apparent contrast between the intrinsic nature of our experiences and the intrinsic nature of the brain states with which they are allegedly identical. For instance, the intrinsic nature of an itch seems quite different from that of any electro-chemical state or event in the brain.

RÉSUMÉLes physicalistes non réductivistes sont de plus en plus souvent considérés comme des épiphénoménalistes involontaires, puisque leur refus de réduire les traits mentaux à des propriétés physiques implique, dit-on, que s'il y a bien des causes mentales, aucune d'elles, néanmoins, ne produit ses effets en vertu du type d'état mental qu'elle représente. Face à cette critique, j'examine, et rejette, la réponse qui fait appel à l'idée de «trope». Je tiens, cependant, pour instructif cet échec du modèle de la pertinence causale basé sur les tropes, dans la mesure où il illustre une confusion qui est au cœur même du concept de pertinence causale, un concept qui est central dans la critique du physicalisme non réductiviste. En identifiant cette confusion, j'espère dissiper l'idée que le physicalisme non réductiviste véhiculerait quelque engagement envers l'épiphénoménalisme.

Page 1. In Search of the Elusive Qualia by Paul David Raymont Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia May, 1993 © Copyright by Paul David Raymont, 1993 Page 2. ii ...

Though we take mainly a philosophical approach, we hope that the results of our work will be useful to researchers on consciousness who take other approaches. Everyone agrees, no matter what their point of view on consciousness, that consciousness has a ...

According to David Rosenthal, a mental state is conscious just in case its subject suitably represents herself as being in that state, where this entails that the mental state " is accompanied by a noninferential, nondispositional, assertoric thought to the effect that one is in that very state " (2002a, p. 410; see also Rosenthal, 1997, p. 742). This assertoric thought, since it is about another mental state, is a higher-order thought (HOT). Let us use 'HOTm' for a HOT that is about mental state m (where m is, say, visually representing something as being blue). The claim is that m's being conscious consists in its being suitably represented by HOTm. Rosenthal requires that HOTm be a different state from m, so that m does not represent itself. This is because, he says, " Absent some reason to the contrary, distinct mental functions call for distinct states " 1997, p. 738). So the represented mental state, m, the one of which the subject is conscious,...

According to David Rosenthal, a mental state is conscious just in case its subject suitably represents herself as being in that state, where this entails that the mental state “is accompanied by a noninferential, nondispositional, assertoric thought to the effect that one is in that very state ” (2002a, p. 410; see also Rosenthal, 1997, p. 742). This assertoric thought, since it is about another mental state, is a higher-order thought (HOT). Let us use ‘HOTm ’ for a HOT that is about mental state m (where m is, say, visually representing something as being blue). The claim is that m’s being conscious consists in its being suitably represented by HOTm. Rosenthal requires that HOTm be a different state from m, so that m does not represent itself. This is because, he says, “Absent some reason to the contrary, distinct mental functions call for distinct states ” (2004, p. 30; see also Rosenthal, 1986, 344-5; 1997, p. 738). So the represented mental state, m, the one of which the subject...

... Andrew Brook Institute of Cognitive Science Carleton University Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Canada abrook@ccs.carleton.ca Paul Raymont Department of Philosophy Trent University Peterborough ON K9J 7B8, Canada paulraymont@hotmail.com © Andrew Brook & Paul Raymont ...

Non-reductive physicalists are increasingly regarded as unwitting epiphenomenalists, since their refusal to reduce mental features to physical properties allegedly implies that while there are mental causes, none of these causes produces its effects in virtue of being the type of mental state that it is. I examine, and reject, the “trope” response to this charge. I take the failure of the trope model of causal relevance to be instructive, since it illustrates a confusion that lies at the heart of the concept of causal relevance, a concept that is central to the criticism of non-reductive physicalism. By identifying this confusion, I hope to dispel the notion that non-reductive physicalism carries any commitment to epiphenomenalism.

I defend Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind from a criticism that has been advanced by Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis. According to their criticism, what Mary lacked when she was in her black and white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience from a first-person perspective. Her subsequent discovery of what it is like to experience redness amounts to no more than her acquisition of these abilities. The physicalist can admit this, since it does not commit one to the view that there are any facts of which Mary was ignorant (in spite of her exhaustive knowledge of truths about the physical world). I argue against this view, on the grounds that the knowledge of what an experience is like cannot be equated with the possession of any set of abilities.

Physicalist accounts of the mind can be judged by whether they do justice to the
phenomenal contents of our conscious states. That is, the physicalist must make room in his/her ontology for the qualitative "raw feel" of mental states and events. Many philosophers have argued that physicalists cannot accommodate these phenomenal contents or "qualia" within their ontologies, and that, consequently, physicalism should be rejected. Recently, Frank Jackson has formulated a powerful version of this argument, which he dubs "the knowledge argument." In Chapter One, I shall present his argument, along with a complex criticism of it by Michael Tye. According to Tye, the new knowledge (in the knowledge argument), which Jackson regards as knowledge of a new property (a quale), is in fact that had already a new way of knowing a physical feature that had already been known of before in a different manner. I shall present what I take to be conclusive reasons for rejecting Tye's position. In Chapter Two I move on to a discussion of the importance of various views of knowledge by acquaintance in the context of the knowledge argument. I also discuss the ineffable nature of our qualia knowledge. In Chapter Three I consider and reject a criticism of Jackson that was advanced by Terence Horgan and that, like Tye's criticism, depends crucially on the premise that what Jackson regards as being knowledge of a new property in fact amounts to nothing more than a new way of knowing a physical property that was already beforehand. Finally, in Chapter Four I consider and reject Earl Conee's criticism of Jackson, which relies on a different understanding of the word "physical" and which thus does not truly address Jackson’s knowledge argument.

There's a lot of overlap between this paper and my 'Rosenthal on Inaccurate HOTs' (2005, see below). This more recent version includes more about HOT-theory's prospects for defeating the worries that arise from the possibility of targetless HOTs.