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- Peter Gill has degrees from the universities of London and Essex. His main career was in teaching with an interlude w... morePeter Gill has degrees from the universities of London and Essex. His main career was in teaching with an interlude when he acted as a research and information officer for Merseyside Police Authority (1983-86). He was previously Professor of Politics and Security at Liverpool John Moores University and Research Professor in Intelligence Studies at the University of Salford. He wrote Policing Politics (Cass, 1994), Rounding Up the Usual Suspects (Ashgate, 2000) and Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: a comparative analysis of the limits of reform (Routledge, 2016). He has also co-authored Intelligence in an Insecure World (3rd edition, Polity, 2018) and Democratization of Intelligence (Routledge, 2015). He has written over 40 articles for academic journals and contributed to workshops and seminars on intelligence and democracy in Argentina, Brazil and Indonesia as well as many East and Southeast European countries. His continuing work focuses on the organisation, control and oversight of police and security intelligence agencies. In 2022 the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association named him their Distinguished Scholar.edit
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The central objective of democratic governance of intelligence is, through debate and law, to establish public confidence that the agencies work efficiently, effectively and properly. Oversight of intelligence can be seen as a contest... more
The central objective of democratic governance of intelligence is, through debate and law, to establish public confidence that the agencies work efficiently, effectively and properly. Oversight of intelligence can be seen as a contest between agencies, government and overseers for the control of information. The four interacting dimensions of information control are secrecy, gathering, evaluation and persuasion. This article assesses the oversight performance of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) through the prism of information control in investigating the allegations of UK involvement in torture since 2001. Operating within an overall context of executive dominance, these dimensions constitute a series of filters including what officers tell their managers, what the agencies record, what they tell ministers, what they tell oversight bodies and, finally, what the ISC reports to the public.
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A major feature of current security is the development of intelligence networks between agencies within and between nations and across public and private sectors. The performance of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is... more
A major feature of current security is the development of intelligence networks between agencies within and between nations and across public and private sectors. The performance of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is examined within this context, especially regarding allegations of collusion by UK agencies in rendition and torture. Proposed changes to the ISC are discussed and it is argued that the ISC must seek to leverage its limited powers by helping to construct an oversight network.
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The Intelligence Services Act 1994 brought significant change to intelligence governance in the UK but what may have appeared as important steps towards greater democracy may be better understood as essentially attempts to improve the... more
The Intelligence Services Act 1994 brought significant change to intelligence governance in the UK but what may have appeared as important steps towards greater democracy may be better understood as essentially attempts to improve the management of the agencies
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Abstract Intelligence studies has traditionally talked in terms of ‘threats’ though the idea of ‘risk’ has now entered its language, as it has so many other areas of policy. The key distinction remains the notion of threat of intentional... more
Abstract Intelligence studies has traditionally talked in terms of ‘threats’ though the idea of ‘risk’ has now entered its language, as it has so many other areas of policy. The key distinction remains the notion of threat of intentional action to cause harm: this is the central preoccupation of intelligence agencies that would not normally consider risks that might arise from, say, the unintended outcomes of accidents or interrupted supplies of resources. Another distinction is that intelligence is normally preoccupied with increasing knowledge in conditions of ignorance or uncertainty, while risk analysis is more likely to be quantifiable. The perception of a ‘new terrorism’ has led to the importation of the ‘precautionary principle’ to intelligence with potentially dangerous consequences for democracy. This requires enhanced thinking and practice with respect to the oversight of intelligence activities, especially in developing security networks.
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Official secrecy and the actions states take against so-called unauthorised disclosures by those working in intelligence agencies, referred to either as 'whistleblowers' or 'leakers', raise questions relating to both the law and ethics of... more
Official secrecy and the actions states take against so-called unauthorised disclosures by those working in intelligence agencies, referred to either as 'whistleblowers' or 'leakers', raise questions relating to both the law and ethics of security intelligence as well as the rights of officials. A recent case in Australia has brought this issue into sharp relief, but it concerns all states in which intelligence operates within a democratic framework. The ethical implications of intelligence operations demonstrate the need for the rights of officials to be better protected by their incorporation into processes of oversight.
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Este artigo identifica algumas das características principais da reforma no setor de inteligência na América Latina, dentro do contexto mais amplo das relações entre os estados e os agentes de segurança. São consideradas três questões... more
Este artigo identifica algumas das características principais da reforma no setor de inteligência na América Latina, dentro do contexto mais amplo das relações entre os estados e os agentes de segurança. São consideradas três questões principais: o legado autoritário, a transição e o lugar em que os estados se encontram, mas esta última questão é abordada mais para a conveniência da análise do que para sugerir qualquer sequência natural e necessária ou um destino para a mudança. Exemplos tirados da reforma das agências estatais de inteligência na Argentina e no Brasil são discutidos dentro da ideia mais ampla de "securitismo": um conceito amplo que descreve como o setor de segurança é governado atualmente em termos de interpenetração e dependência mútua dos estados, empresas e agentes "comunitários".
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What appears to be a ‘security panic’ in the wake of the September 2001 attacks in the United States, suggests parallels between the moral panic surrounding ‘mugging’ that inspired and informed the analysis of the relationship between the... more
What appears to be a ‘security panic’ in the wake of the September 2001 attacks in the United States, suggests parallels between the moral panic surrounding ‘mugging’ that inspired and informed the analysis of the relationship between the state and law and order in Policing the Crisis (1978) and the current concerns of the ‘war on terror’. However, while there are similarities, a direct comparison between 1970s ‘street robbery’ and 2000s ‘political violence’ would be rather artificial. Therefore, drawing on the theoretical framework for understanding the relation between state, law and violence set out in Policing the Crisis, this chapter compares events in Northern Ireland after 1969 with current concerns over ‘terrorism’.
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Widespread concerns and controversies have erupted in the wake of 9/11 in relation to the structures and processes by which states acquire intelligence with respect to security threats. More specifically, the controversies have centred on... more
Widespread concerns and controversies have erupted in the wake of 9/11 in relation to the structures and processes by which states acquire intelligence with respect to security threats. More specifically, the controversies have centred on the issue of ‘‘failure’’: first, to what extent did the 9/11 attacks reflect an intelligence failure on the part of US and other intelligence services and, second, how did most western intelligence services fail to identify the destruction or disposal of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction after 1991? Strenuous efforts have been underway since 2001 to develop more effective security governance both within and between nations. This article discusses these efforts to construct security intelligence networks with particular reference to developments in the US and UK, the main carriers of the so-called ‘‘global war on terror’’.
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Writing and research into policing has concerned issues of police action much more than their information and intelligence activities. Police themselves are now paying more attention to the latter for a number of reasons including... more
Writing and research into policing has concerned issues of police action much more than their information and intelligence activities. Police themselves are now paying more attention to the latter for a number of reasons including transnational policing ...
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A model of an intelligence 'system'is used to develop an exploratory map of specialist criminal intelligence units at municipal, provincial and federal levels in Canada. This involves part‐competing and... more
A model of an intelligence 'system'is used to develop an exploratory map of specialist criminal intelligence units at municipal, provincial and federal levels in Canada. This involves part‐competing and part‐complementary structures, especially as represented by ...
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... poor dissemination to other agencies; that FBI counter-terrorism was hindered by decentralisation and the culture of 'crime-fighting'; and that the NSA needing to be more proactive in gathering (STHS, 2002). The major... more
... poor dissemination to other agencies; that FBI counter-terrorism was hindered by decentralisation and the culture of 'crime-fighting'; and that the NSA needing to be more proactive in gathering (STHS, 2002). The major congressional effort in the year ...
This article examines the experience of oversight during the last fifty years in order to inform current debates in both the older and newer democracies. First, there is a discussion of certain key concepts: intelligence governance... more
This article examines the experience of oversight during the last fifty years in order to inform current debates in both the older and newer democracies. First, there is a discussion of certain key concepts: intelligence governance including control, authorisation and oversight; second, the difficulties facing oversight, specifically, how these can be alleviated by a structure involving both parliamentary and specialist bodies and, third, the challenges presented by the structures of surveillance corporatism and its reliance on bulk collection. It is concluded that this new intelligence architecture requires a form of decentred regulation of and by state and corporate actors.
This article examines the experience of oversight during the last fifty years in order to inform current debates in both the older and newer democracies. First, there is a discussion of certain key concepts: intelligence governance... more
This article examines the experience of oversight during the last fifty years in order to inform current debates in both the older and newer democracies. First, there is a discussion of certain key concepts: intelligence governance including control, authorisation and oversight; second, the difficulties facing oversight, specifically, how these can be alleviated by a structure involving both parliamentary and specialist bodies and, third, the challenges presented by the structures of surveillance corporatism and its reliance on bulk collection. It is concluded that this new intelligence architecture requires a form of decentred regulation of and by state and corporate actors.
This article examines the experience of oversight during the last fifty years in order to inform current debates in both the older and newer democracies. First, there is a discussion of certain key concepts: intelligence governance... more
This article examines the experience of oversight during the last fifty years in order to inform current debates in both the older and newer democracies. First, there is a discussion of certain key concepts: intelligence governance including control, authorisation and oversight; second, the difficulties facing oversight, specifically, how these can be alleviated by a structure involving both parliamentary and specialist bodies and, third, the challenges presented by the structures of surveillance corporatism and its reliance on bulk collection. It is concluded that this new intelligence architecture requires a form of decentred regulation of and by state and corporate actors.
The article argues that the mainstream literature on 'intelligence failure' is concerned with strategic, rather than tactical, intelligence and is therefore unhelpful in understanding specific attacks from known groups. Taking the... more
The article argues that the mainstream literature on 'intelligence failure' is concerned with strategic, rather than tactical, intelligence and is therefore unhelpful in understanding specific attacks from known groups. Taking the examples of the European attacks 2015-2018, the article examines the main organisational and process issues in security intelligence currently, including the new corporatism of state-corporate interdependence and the place of 'bulk collection'. Perhaps we should ask not 'why does intelligence sometimes fail?' but 'how does it succeed?'
In the second decade of the 21st century, the academic study of intelligence continues to develop apace, as evidenced by the growth in publishing, undergraduate and postgraduate academic courses that combine historical and social science... more
In the second decade of the 21st century, the academic study
of intelligence continues to develop apace, as evidenced by
the growth in publishing, undergraduate and postgraduate
academic courses that combine historical and social science
approaches, the increase in undergraduate programs in intelligence
analysis aimed at those seeking to enter the profession,
and the development of professional training courses internationally.
The idea of “intelligence studies” provides the overarching
context, but among those working within the field,
understandings vary as to precisely what it is or should be. This
is an opportune moment to reflect on our approaches to the
study of intelligence, the assumptions underpinning them, and
how the study has evolved since the 1950s. In doing this, we
identify three key questions that need to be considered: What
is “intelligence studies”?; should it be considered to be, or
should it aspire to become, a “discipline”?; and who is it for?
This article offers answers to each of these questions and
identifies the main areas of work within contemporary intelligence
studies in terms of four projects: the research/historical,
the definitional/methodological, the organizational/functional,
and the governance/policy.
of intelligence continues to develop apace, as evidenced by
the growth in publishing, undergraduate and postgraduate
academic courses that combine historical and social science
approaches, the increase in undergraduate programs in intelligence
analysis aimed at those seeking to enter the profession,
and the development of professional training courses internationally.
The idea of “intelligence studies” provides the overarching
context, but among those working within the field,
understandings vary as to precisely what it is or should be. This
is an opportune moment to reflect on our approaches to the
study of intelligence, the assumptions underpinning them, and
how the study has evolved since the 1950s. In doing this, we
identify three key questions that need to be considered: What
is “intelligence studies”?; should it be considered to be, or
should it aspire to become, a “discipline”?; and who is it for?
This article offers answers to each of these questions and
identifies the main areas of work within contemporary intelligence
studies in terms of four projects: the research/historical,
the definitional/methodological, the organizational/functional,
and the governance/policy.
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This paper provides an empirical comparison illustrating the conceptual points made in the previous chapter, specifically, the significance of many and various state, corporate and para-state intelligence agencies operating, sometimes in... more
This paper provides an empirical comparison illustrating the conceptual points made in the previous chapter, specifically, the significance of many and various state, corporate and para-state intelligence agencies operating, sometimes in cooperation, often in conflict, in the same space. The comparison is between Kosovo which declared its independence in 2008 and ‘Amexica’, Ed Vulliamy’s characterisation of the territory either side of the U.S.-Mexican border. This comparison of ‘most different’ examples in order to identify similar aspects of contemporary intelligence examines the roles of state security intelligence agencies, police and military intelligence units, foreign intelligence actors, private security companies, militias and vigilantes. It is the complex cooperation and conflicts between these multiple actors that poses not just a challenge to Intelligence Studies to move beyond its state-centredness but also to the very notion of the democratic governance of intelligence.
Arguably, it is only the state can secure adequate resources, and protect the general public interest in matters of security intelligence, so the process of democratising intelligence requires the development of state capacity not only... more
Arguably, it is only the state can secure adequate resources, and protect the general public interest in matters of security intelligence, so the process of democratising intelligence requires the development of state capacity not only in developing intelligence itself but also for the regulation of private companies and suppression of uncivil groups. Given the symbolic and material interdependencies of these intelligence ‘sectors’, this chapter considers how this might be achieved. Therefore the similarities between oversight and regulation are considered. The potential of mechanisms such as codes of conduct, for example, that of the International Stability Operations Association, is considered in the context of corporate social responsibility, the rise of public-private partnerships and the post-Snowden environment of seeking greater transparency of state-corporate surveillance cooperation. The dominance of informality in intelligence cooperation is shown to be a major hindrance to these efforts yet, while future research and activism must retain a realistic grasp of the pressures on states and governments when they perceive serious political or security threats, it must continue to challenge what will otherwise be the perpetuation of security intelligence as an ‘authoritarian enclave’.
A major feature of current security is the development of intelligence networks between agencies within and between nations and across public and private sectors. The performance of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is... more
A major feature of current security is the development of intelligence networks between agencies within and between nations and across public and private sectors. The performance of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is examined within this context, especially regarding allegations of collusion by UK agencies in rendition and torture. Proposed changes to the ISC are discussed and it is argued that the ISC must seek
to leverage its limited powers by helping to construct an oversight network.
to leverage its limited powers by helping to construct an oversight network.
Research Interests:
Widespread concerns and controversies have erupted in the wake of 9/11 in relation to the structures and processes by which states acquire intelligence with respect to security threats. More specifically, the controversies have centred on... more
Widespread concerns and controversies have erupted in the wake of 9/11 in relation to the structures and processes by which states acquire intelligence with respect to security
threats. More specifically, the controversies have centred on the issue of ‘‘failure’’: first, to what extent did the 9/11 attacks reflect an intelligence failure on the part of US and other
intelligence services and, second, how did most western intelligence services fail to identify the destruction or disposal of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction after 1991?
Strenuous efforts have been underway since 2001 to develop more effective security governance both within and between nations. This article discusses these efforts to construct security intelligence networks with particular reference to developments in the US and UK, the main carriers of the so-called ‘‘global war on terror’’.
threats. More specifically, the controversies have centred on the issue of ‘‘failure’’: first, to what extent did the 9/11 attacks reflect an intelligence failure on the part of US and other
intelligence services and, second, how did most western intelligence services fail to identify the destruction or disposal of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction after 1991?
Strenuous efforts have been underway since 2001 to develop more effective security governance both within and between nations. This article discusses these efforts to construct security intelligence networks with particular reference to developments in the US and UK, the main carriers of the so-called ‘‘global war on terror’’.
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The literatures regarding policing and regulation are largely separate, reflecting the common assumption that there is some essential distinction between the activities. The relevance of the decline in state sovereignty and associated... more
The literatures regarding policing and regulation are largely separate, reflecting the common assumption that there is some essential distinction between the activities. The relevance of the decline in state sovereignty and associated shifts to governance’
and the ‘regulatory state’ are discussed. Much state intervention regarding crime is aimed formally at the repression of illegal markets while states also seek to regulate legal ones. Yet the distinction is far less in practice: the ubiquity of ‘knowledge’ and
‘power’ problems facing states, the fragmentation of policing and regulatory agencies and the persistence of ‘enterprise’ crime are some of the factors discussed. The variety of relationships existing between police and regulators on the one hand, and firms and entrepreneurs ranged on a spectrum of legal through ‘grey’ to illegal markets, on the other, are examined. It is argued that there is no essential difference between the two activities. Rather, the analysis of contemporary policing would be improved by viewing it as part of a spectrum of regulation. This will facilitate analysis of the crucial interaction between regulators and markets.
and the ‘regulatory state’ are discussed. Much state intervention regarding crime is aimed formally at the repression of illegal markets while states also seek to regulate legal ones. Yet the distinction is far less in practice: the ubiquity of ‘knowledge’ and
‘power’ problems facing states, the fragmentation of policing and regulatory agencies and the persistence of ‘enterprise’ crime are some of the factors discussed. The variety of relationships existing between police and regulators on the one hand, and firms and entrepreneurs ranged on a spectrum of legal through ‘grey’ to illegal markets, on the other, are examined. It is argued that there is no essential difference between the two activities. Rather, the analysis of contemporary policing would be improved by viewing it as part of a spectrum of regulation. This will facilitate analysis of the crucial interaction between regulators and markets.
The Intelligence Services Act 1994 brought significant change to intelligence governance in the UK but what may have appeared as important steps towards greater democracy may be better understood as essentially attempts to improve the... more
The Intelligence Services Act 1994 brought significant change to intelligence governance in the UK but what may have appeared as important steps towards greater democracy may be better understood as essentially attempts to improve the management of the agencies
Following some democratization of intelligence in the 1990s, the prosecution of the ‘war on terror’ since 9/11 has apparently reinforced the incompatibility of secret intelligence and respect for human rights. The primary reason for this... more
Following some democratization of intelligence in the 1990s, the
prosecution of the ‘war on terror’ since 9/11 has apparently reinforced the
incompatibility of secret intelligence and respect for human rights. The primary
reason for this is the changed perception of security risks in the context of a ‘new’
terrorism. The roles of law, rights and ethics in intelligence are discussed with reference
to some of the more controversial intelligence activities: informers, interrogation,
intelligence sharing, rendition and covert action. Re-invigorated oversight is
necessary to protect human rights without hindering agencies’ ability to maintain
pubic safety.
prosecution of the ‘war on terror’ since 9/11 has apparently reinforced the
incompatibility of secret intelligence and respect for human rights. The primary
reason for this is the changed perception of security risks in the context of a ‘new’
terrorism. The roles of law, rights and ethics in intelligence are discussed with reference
to some of the more controversial intelligence activities: informers, interrogation,
intelligence sharing, rendition and covert action. Re-invigorated oversight is
necessary to protect human rights without hindering agencies’ ability to maintain
pubic safety.
After a brief introduction giving a short history of legislative oversight, a number of criteria by which committees can be evaluated are enumerated, including their mandate, membership, resources and access to information. The... more
After a brief introduction giving a short history of legislative oversight, a number of criteria by which committees can be evaluated are enumerated, including their mandate, membership, resources and access to information. The development of parliamentary oversight in the UK culminating in the creation of the Intelligence and Security Committee in 1994 is outlined. Its performance between 2001 and 2006
is described and assessed. It is concluded that, while it has made some appropriate criticisms of the agencies, it can be faulted in that both the style and substance of its reports are essentially managerialist and have paid inadequate attention to questions of human rights and the need for public education.
is described and assessed. It is concluded that, while it has made some appropriate criticisms of the agencies, it can be faulted in that both the style and substance of its reports are essentially managerialist and have paid inadequate attention to questions of human rights and the need for public education.
The study of the democratisation of intelligence in former authoritarian regimes and, more broadly, the relationship between intelligence and democracy, has hitherto concentrated on state intelligence services. The article challenges the... more
The study of the democratisation of intelligence in former authoritarian regimes and, more broadly, the relationship between intelligence and democracy, has hitherto concentrated on state intelligence services. The article challenges the utility of this state-centric model and considers the significance of corporate and para-state sectors of intelligence including their multiple interactions with states. ‘Securitism’ is developed as a model of these interactions which can be used in the analysis of contemporary intelligence governance and the profound challenges posed to the possibility of democratic control and oversight.
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Introduction: Oversight and accountability, along with control and authorisation, are specific aspects of intelligence governance.1 Accountability requires that officials explain their actions and take the consequences, but oversight is a... more
Introduction: Oversight and accountability, along with control and authorisation, are specific aspects of intelligence governance.1 Accountability requires that officials explain their actions and take the consequences, but oversight is a precondition for this to occur. For the purposes of this paper, I shall concentrate on oversight because it is the fundamental governing process that determines whether or not accountability can happen. I am taking one of the two COD definitions of oversight as my starting point: it is overseeing, supervising, scrutinising… It is not 'unintentional failure to notice or do something', though the former will involve examining the latter. Our objective should be to assess whether our current state of knowledge about oversight is such that we can confidently generalise about its practices, problems and potential solutions in such a way that is independent of the hundreds of specific political and governing cultures within which intelligence takes place.2 Why oversight? The central objective of democratic governance of security and intelligence is, through debate and law, to establish public confidence that the agencies work efficiently, effectively and properly; though we must realise that achieving all three may be 'an impossible trilemma'.3 Mark Pythian and I have defined oversight as 'a process of superintendence of the agency that is concerned not with day-today management, but with ensuring that the overall policies and methods of the agency are consistent with its legal mandate and comply with normative expectations that reflect wider societal values'.4 It
The paper considers the state of play with respect to modelling and explaining intelligence. First, there are some brief comments on the issue of theory itself; second, there is a more detailed consideration of the key elements of... more
The paper considers the state of play with respect to modelling and explaining intelligence. First, there are some brief comments on the issue of theory itself; second, there is a more detailed consideration of the key elements of information process and power which constitute 'intelligence' and, third, it examines the main variables of regime, strategy and technology that must be considered in explaining the nature of intelligence systems. The overall objective is to develop a model at a very general level that can potentially be applied anywhere to any state or non-state organisation. Finally some implications for future research are considered. 1