Piya Tan

There is a paradox with morals in anthropology: on the one hand, morals are not considered as a legitimate object of study and are looked upon with suspicion; on the other hand, there is an increasing concern for moral issues both in society and within the discipline. Basing my analysis on several empirical studies which I briefly evoke, I call for the development of a moral anthropology. This does not mean that anthropologists should become moralists but that they should study morals as they do politics, religion or medicine. I discuss the two reasons, epistemological and historical, why anthropologists have been reluctant to enter this field of research. I analyse the ambiguities and risks which are effectively inherent to this particular domain. I conclude with two propositions and their two corollaries in favour of moral anthropology, but insist on the heuristic value of the intellectual discomfort aroused by morals among anthropologists.

0.2.1 This is not a historical comparison of early Buddhist psychology and secular psychology. Perhaps, in our study, we may notice some remarkable coincidence of ideas in these terms, and perhaps such overlapping may help us better understand the 5 aggregates in modern terms without watering their meaning and purpose in the early Buddhist texts. Indeed, we hope this experimental, even heuristic, quest for a faithful or reflective terminology in English will facilitate for a better understanding of the 5 aggregates as living experience. [Part I]

http://dharmafarer.org 34 THE SPREAD OF BUDDHISM A study of strategic patterns in global Buddhist growth Piya Tan SYLLABUS (1) Buddhism and mission. (2) Levels & development of Buddhism. (3) Buddhism in Sri Lanka: traditions & contradictions. (4) Buddhism in south-east Asia: kingship; Indianization. (5) Buddhism in east Asia: politics, persecutions & syncretism. (6) Lay Buddhism: Responses, utopias & cults. (7) Buddhism: the West & Oceania. (8) Buddhist studies. (9) Buddhist responses to external challenges. (10) Buddhism today.

1 Buddhist psychology Buddhist growth, on a higher level, invariably focusses on knowing the mind, training it, and freeing it from suffering. The true nature of existence is marked by the characteristics of impermanence, suffering and not-self. During post-Buddha times, as Buddhist philosophy developed, various efforts to systematize and standardize the Buddha’s teachings were made, and came to be known as the Abhidhamma tradition. An important development in the Abhidhamma method of clarifying the deepest aspects of understanding the mind and seeing reality is the analysis of existence right down to its atomic level, as it were. Although the early Abhidhamma tradition never actually got down into such detailed definition of “atoms” of experience or states of matter, such ideas became popular in later times. While such atomic models of experience and insight are interesting, even useful, in some way, it should be remembered that they are not canonical. Such models are at best theor...

1.1.1 Our problems are man-made and mind-made. The teaching on the three unwholesome roots is one of the most basic of Buddhist teachings. 1 A canonical definition of the three roots is given in the Mūla Sutta (A 6.38).2 The (Akusala,mūla) Añña,titthiyā Sutta (A 3.68), which immediately precedes it, explains the level of difficulties in dealing with each of the three roots. 3 These three unwholesome roots easily manifest themselves at the pre-conscious level, motivating us to break the precepts, or do something negative. Any these roots are controlled by something that lie even deeper, in our unconscious, that is, the latent tendencies. 4 Although the Buddha has given these teachings over 2500 years ago, it is only about a century ago that western learning has come to systematize them, calling them their own. However, even on their own, these ancient Buddhist truths help to give us a good understanding of contemporary social problems, such

http://dharmafarer.org 1 Monastics, Sex and Marriage Renunciation, monastic celibacy and the challenges of secularism and modernism with special reference to Japanese Buddhism up to the end of the 20 th century A reflection by Piya Tan ©2008, 2011 1 The purpose of renunciation 1.1 NO SEX PLEASE, WE’RE MONASTICS. The issue of monastics and sex has been discussed elsewhere. 1 We shall here list only the key points related to our discussion on ―monastics, sex and marriage,‖ especially in connection with clerical marriage and fornication. 2 By definition, a monastic—that is, a monk (bhikkhu) or a nun (bhikkhuṇī)—has gone forth (pabbajita) from the household or family life to a homeless life. To remind himself and show to others that this is the case, a renunciant shaves off hair and beard and put on the saffron robes. 3

http://dharmafarer.googlepages.com or http://www.dharmafarer.org 29 The Radiant Mind The nature of the mind and the subconscious according to Early Buddhism (an introduction) [The spiritual potential of the human mind] Essay and translations by Piya Tan ©2004

The four focusses of mindfulness (cattro satipahna) [SD 13] 1. the contemplation of the body (kāyânupassanā); 2. the contemplation of feeling (vedanā’nupassanā); 3. the contemplation of mind (cittânupassanā); 4. the contemplation of phenomena (dhammânupassanā). The four right efforts (samma-p,padhna) [SD 10.2] [5] 1. the effort to prevent unarisen evil states from arising (savara padhāna); [6] 2. the effort to abandon arisen evil states (pahāna padhāna); [7] 3. the effort to cultivate unarisen wholesome states (bhāvanā padhāna); and [8] 4. the effort to maintain arisen wholesome states (anurakkhanā padhāna). The four paths to spiritual power (iddhi,pda) [SD 10.3] [9] 1. the desire to act (chanda); [10] 2. effort (viriya); [11] 3. mind or consciousness (citta); and [12] 4. investigation (ie wisdom) (vmasā). The five spiritual faculties (pac’indriya) [SD 10.4] [13] 1. faith (saddh’indriya); [14] 2. effort (viriy’indriya); [15] 3. mindfulness (sat’indriya i); [16] 4. concentr...

LOVE: UNIVERSAL VS STRUCTURED. In Chinese culture, there are two philosophical views of love, one based on Confucianism, which emphasizes deeds and duties (external conduct), the other based on Mohism, which champions universal love (internal cultivation and external expression). A core concept in Confucianism is 仁 ren (benevolent love), which focuses on duty, action and attitude in a relationship, rather than love itself.

4.1 Buddhicizing the Chinese “soul” 4.1.1 The Nirvāṇa Sūtras. Like many other ancient cultures, the Chinese, too, have a concept of a soul or abiding entity that survives the person‘s death. The Chinese word for such an abiding entity is línghún 靈魂. One of ancient China‘s largest and wealthiest temple, built in 328 (Eastern Jin dynasty) by the Indian monk, Huìlǐ 慧理, 1 is called Língyǐn Sì 靈隐寺, the ―Temple of the Soul‘s Retreat,‖ belonging to the Chán school, located north-west of Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. In its heyday, during the kingdom of Wúyuè guó 吳越國 (907-978) [5.1.2.1], the temple boasted of 9 multi-storey buildings, 18 pavilions, 72 halls, more than 1300 dormitory rooms, inhabited by more than 3000 monks. Many of the rich Buddhist carvings in the Fēilái fēng 飛來峰 grottos and surrounding mountains also date from this era. The Chinese word for anattā (P) or anātman (Skt) (non-self) is wúwǒ 無我, literally meaning ―not-I.‖ There is no Chinese word for not-linghun. As such, altho...

1 The Pali Bahu Dhātuka Sutta and its parallel 1.1 THE 28 POSSIBILITIES AND IMPOSSIBILITIES. The whole section on the 28 possibilities and impossibilities (ṭhāṇâthāṇa) [§§12-19] is found in the Aṭṭhāna Vagga (A 1.15) and the Vibhaṅga (Vbh §809), which calls it “the Tathagata’s knowledge of true reality regarding cause as cause and non-cause as non-cause” (tathāgatassa ṭhānañ ca ṭhānato aṭṭhānañ ca aṭṭhānato yathā,bhūtaṁ ñāṇaṁ) (Vbh 335). Its Commentary glosses “possibility” (ṭhāna) as “cause” (hetu) (VbhA 423). A detailed analysis of these 28 statements is given in the Sammoha,vinodanī (the Vibhaṅga Commentary). Basically, this teaching says that an individual who is accomplished in right view would never regard formations (things of this world) as permanent, nor pleasurable, nor as self, but it is possible for an ordinary worldling to think so [§12]; or commit any of the five heinous karmas, that is, killing of one’s own mother or father, or an arhat, or shedding Buddha’s blood, or...

1 The nature of worldly experience 1.1 THE DYNAMICS OF EXPERIENCE. In this paper, we will examine the nature of craving, and its relationship with the extreme views of eternalism and nihilism: we are of course discussing the conditions that lead to the arising of suffering, that is, the second noble truth. Before we can have some useful working idea of craving (taṇhā), it is helpful to understand how we experience the world around us and inside us. According to the Madhu,piṇḍika Sutta (M 18) and the Mahā Hatthi,padopama Sutta (M 28.8), sense-experience begins when these three conditions concur: the sense-faculty (say, the eye), its senseobject (a visible form), and proper attention towards the object. Then there follows sense-stimulus (contact, phassa), for example, seeing. The Suttas then, each in their own words, go on to explain how suffering arises and how it ends. The Mahā,nidāna Sutta (D 15) explains that we experience only two kinds of phenomena: the physical and the mental.

There is a paradox with morals in anthropology: on the one hand, morals are not considered as a legitimate object of study and are looked upon with suspicion; on the other hand, there is an increasing concern for moral issues both in society and within the discipline. Basing my analysis on several empirical studies which I briefly evoke, I call for the development of a moral anthropology. This does not mean that anthropologists should become moralists but that they should study morals as they do politics, religion or medicine. I discuss the two reasons, epistemological and historical, why anthropologists have been reluctant to enter this field of research. I analyse the ambiguities and risks which are effectively inherent to this particular domain. I conclude with two propositions and their two corollaries in favour of moral anthropology, but insist on the heuristic value of the intellectual discomfort aroused by morals among anthropologists.

Contemporary developments in Chinese Buddhism by Piya Tan ©2008 (2 nd rev), 2009 (3 rd rev) 7.1 HOW BUDDHISM CHANGED THE CHINESE LANGUAGE So far, we have examined Buddhism in Chinese from its beginnings to today, not so much in a historical sequence, as by way of social themes and historical patterns. Here, by way of conclusion, we shall look at Buddhist presence in Chinese culture (especially language), the inherent resilience of Buddhism as a religion (surviving religious plagiarism, persecutions and political challenges). We will close with an overview of the preceding chapters, and finally reflect on the purpose behind this book. The renowned Sinologist Victor H Mair, in his monumental edition of The Columbia History of Chinese Literature, writes of Buddhism's contribution to China

Buddha-nature and universal awakening: the rise of Chinese Buddhist humanism by Piya Tan ©2008 (2 nd rev), 2009 (3 rd rev) 4.1 Buddhicizing the Chinese "soul" 4.1.1 The Nirvāṇa Sūtras Like many other ancient cultures, the Chinese, too, have a concept of a soul or abiding entity that survives the person's death. The Chinese word for such an abiding entity is línghún 靈魂. One of ancient China's largest and wealthiest temple, built in 328 (Eastern Jin dynasty) by the Indian monk, Huìlǐ 慧理, 1 is called Língyǐn Sì 靈隐寺, the "Temple of the Soul's Retreat," belonging to the Chán school, located northwest of Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. In its heyday, during the kingdom of Wúyuè guó 吳越國 (907-978) [5.1.2.1], the temple boasted of 9 multi-storey buildings, 18 pavilions, 72 halls, more than 1300 dormitory rooms, inhabited by more than 3000 monks. Many of the rich Buddhist carvings in the Fēilái fēng 飛來峰 grottos and surrounding mountains also date from this era. The Chinese word for anattā (P) or anātman (Skt) (non-self) is wúwǒ 無我, literally meaning "not-I." There is no Chinese word for not-linghun. As such, although a Chinese Buddhist would intellectually or verbally accept the notion that there is no I (that is, an agent in an action), he would probably unconsciously hold on to the idea of some sort of independent abiding entity or eternal identity, that is, the linghun, which is, in effect, the equivalent of the brahmanical ātman. The situation becomes more complicated with Mahāyāna discourses, such as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, that speak of a transcendent Buddha-nature as the true self. 2 The Dà nièpán jīng 大涅槃經 or Mahā,parinirvāṇa Sūtra 3 is a Mahāyāna version of the Buddha's final discourse, which stresses on the fact that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature fóxìng 佛性, and that all beings, even the spiritually rootless icchantika (yīchǎntí 一闡提) [3.4.5.2], will become Buddhas. The Dà nièpán jīng is one of the major texts of East Asian Mahāyāna Buddhism, of which there are a number of variant translations including: (1) Fó bān ní huán jīng 佛般泥洹經 (Buddha Parinirvāṇa Sūtra), T5, 2 fascicles (juăn 卷), translated in Cháng'ān by Báifǎzǔ 白法祖, sometime between 290 and 307. 4

Some new directions in Chinese Buddhism by Piya Tan ©2008 (2 nd rev), 2009 (3 rd rev) 6.1 CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES 6.1.1 Robert Sharf, in his important "Prolegomenon to the study of medieval Chinese Buddhist literature" (2002:1-27), raises some vital issues in the study of Chinese Buddhism, which is often riddled with historical and hermeneutical problems. Some of his observations are summarized here. Firstly, the claim that Kumārajva's translations were more "accurate" than those of his predecessors is problematic. The popularity of Kumārajva's translations was not due to their fidelity to the originals, but rather to the elegance and accessibility of his prose. As such, Kumārajva's translations continued to be favoured long after the more technically accurate translations of Xuánzàng were available (2002:12). The various so called Chinese "schools" of Buddhism are not really discrete entities. Such traditions as Sānlún (三論) (the "Three-treatise" of Madhyamika), Dìlún (地論) (the Yogācāra,bhūmi school) and Shèlún (攝論) (the Mahāyāna,saṅgraha school) are better regarded as "organizational categories applied after the fact by mediaeval Buddhist historians and bibliographers" (2002: 7). The notion that the Táng dynasty was the golden age of Buddhism in general and Chán in particular turns out to be the product of Sòng Chán polemicists:

Gaoseng chuan 高僧傳 [Kao-seng chuan; Gāosēng zhuàn, "Biographies of eminent monks"] 518 The Gaoseng zhuan. K1074, T2059; (14 fascicles). Compiled by Huìjiǎo 慧皎, 18th year of Tianjian 天 監, Liang dynasty 梁 (519 CE) in Jiaxiang Monastery (嘉祥寺), Guiji, ed. (會稽 T2149-267a:29; T2154-538a:21) Nanjio 1490; Ono 3:350b. The first attempt in China to compile a biography of eminent monks and nuns, from 67 (Latter Han) to 519 (Liang). The orig text has records of 257 people, and the supplement 243 people; divided into 10 thematic sections: 譯經科; 義解科; 神異科; 修禪科; 明律科; 亡身科; 誦經科; 興福科; 經師科; 昌導科. The final fasc incl preface & index by Huijiao, who states his intention to overcome the faults of such works, which tends to exaggerate the virtues and overlook the shortcomings of the persons described. As such, it is one of the more reliable earlier refs on the history of Chinese Buddhism [翻譯名義集 T 2131.54.1080c1]. [AC Muller http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?9a.xml+id('b9ad8-50e7-50b3'); Sources: Lancaster The Korean Buddhist Canon: A Descriptive Catalogue, Kamata, Daizōkyō zen kaisetsu daijiten.] Sengyou 僧祐 [Seng-yu; Sēngyòu] (445-518) 1927 Hung-ming chi 弘明集 [Essays Elucidating the Doctrine]. Sibu beiyao ed. Shanghai: Chung-hua Co, 1927. Sengzhao 僧肇 [Seng-chao; Sēngzhào] (384-414) 413 涅槃無名論 Nièpán wúmíng lùn "Nirvana is Nameless" (T45.1858.157a12-b26) → CHANG Chung-yuan (tr) 1974. Shenhui heshang chanhua lu →YANG Zengwen, 1996 (under Secondary Sources) T →Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo [Cited by volume, page, number, page register of the text or collection] 1924-32 Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經 [Dàzhèng xīnxiū dàzàngjīng; Rev version of the canon, compiled during the Taishō era].

Chinese challenges to Buddhism Buddhist interactions with Confucianism and Daoism; and Chinese Mahāyāna by Piya Tan ©2008 (2 nd rev), 2009 (3 rd rev) There are means by which the linguistic genius of a nation defends itself against what is foreign by cunningly stealing from it as much as possible.

Table of Contents § Topic § Topic 1 Early Buddhist psychology 3.6.1 The defence mechanism of isolation 1.1 CONTENT SUMMARY AND SIGNIFICANCE 3.6.2 The isolated person 1.1.1 Sutta summary and significance 3.6.3 Dealing with isolation 1.1.2 A psychology of Buddhist cult leaders 3.6.4 Reaction formation 1.2 "DEFENCE MECHANISMS" IN EARLY BUDDHISM 3.7 DENIAL 1.2.1 "Defences": the early Buddhist context 3.7.1 The defence mechanism of denial 1.2.2 The 8 kinds of persons 3.7.2 The person in denial 1.2.3 The various types of defence mechanisms 3.7.3 Dealing with denial 1.3 "PSYCHOLOGICAL CASES" IN THE SUTTAS 3.8 OVERCOMING DEFENCE MECHANISMS 1.3.2 Psychotherapy and Buddhism 4 Overcoming defences in path-training 1.3.3 What the Sutta is really about 4.1 DEPENDENT BEINGS 2 Defence mechanisms in the Sutta 4.1.1 The path or pathology? 2.1 AN OFFENCE MAY BE CONSCIOUS OR UNCONSCIOUS 4.1.2 Fettered selves 2.2 SUMMARY OF DEFENCES MENTIONED IN THE SUTTA 4.1.3 Absolute truth, relative truth 3 Defence mechanisms in real life 4.1.4 Relational training 3.1 REPRESSION 4.2 THE ROOTS OF UNCONSCIOUS DEFENCES 3.1.1 The defence mechanism of repression 4.2.1 Roots and feelings 3.