Laurence Binet

The case study "MSF and the Rohingya 1992 - 2014" brings to light two decades of MSF advocacy activities as part of its humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya people in Bangladesh and Myanmar and explores the questions and dilemmas the organisation was confronted with surrounding speaking out.

The "Salvadoran Refugee Camps in Honduras 1988" case study describes the dilemmas regarding a stance that … was not supposed to be public.
In 1988, after 8 years in the Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras, MSF decided to withdraw. It refused to meet the excessive, and even dangerous, demands of the refugee committees which were extensions of the Salvadoran guerrilla that exerted a tight and violent control over the refugee camps.
MSF, however, refused to reveal the real reasons for its departure so as to avoid a crackdown of the Honduran army on the refugees.
During internal debates that preceded its withdrawal, dilemmas and questions arose: In order to continue assisting the refugee population is it acceptable that this aid strengthens the guerrilla’s totalitarian hold over the refugees? Having decided to withdraw in the name of certain principles, is it acceptable to publicly expose these principles, thereby potentially endangering the refugees by revealing the presence of the guerrilla forces in the camps? On the other hand, would remaining silent about the reasons for withdrawal not negate the sense and impact of such a decision?

The “Genocide of Rwandan Tutsis 1994” case study is describing the difficulties and dilemmas met by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) during the genocide of Rwandan Tutsis in April, May and June 1994. The killings occurred in spite of the presence of UN troops in Rwanda, and the members of the UN Security Council were slow to call the Tutsi extermination ‘genocide’, hence evading the obligation to intervene and stop the slaughter, as stipulated by international law.
MSF met with government officials and issued public statements to try to mobilise governments out of their inertia, eventually calling to an international armed intervention.
These statements and actions resulted from numerous debates, conflicts and contradictory interpretations of the Rwandan situation and of MSF’s role addressing the following dilemmas: Was it acceptable for a humanitarian organisation, to remain silent when confronted with genocide or, on the contrary, to call for armed intervention, an action that would lead to loss of human life? Could MSF call on UN member states to pursue other means of action, thereby risking giving legitimacy to ineffective responses, given the nature of genocide? Launched just as France proposed to intervene in Rwanda, was there a risk that MSF’s appeal for armed intervention would be appropriated for political gain?

The “Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire -Tanzania 1994-1995” case study is describing the constraints and dilemmas met by MSF when confronted with camps under the tight control of ‘refugee leaders” responsible for the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsis from April to June 1994.
The camps were transformed into rear bases from which the reconquest of Rwanda was sought, via a massive diversion of aid, violence, propaganda, and threats against refugees wishing to repatriate.
Was it acceptable for MSF to assist people who had committed genocide? Should MSF accept that its aid was instrumentalised by leaders who used violence against the refugees and proclaim their intention to continue the war in order to complete the genocide they had started? For all that, could MSF renounce assisting a population in distress and on what basis should its arguments be founded?

The ‘Violence of the new Rwandan regime’ case study is describing the difficulties and dilemmas that Médecins Sans Frontières faced in 1994 and 1995 when confronted with the abuses and crimes of the new regime that had taken over in Rwanda in July 1994: Was it acceptable for MSF, having denounced the génocidaires’control over the Rwandan refugees in Zaire and Tanzania, to encourage the return of these refugees to Rwanda, given the insecurity that potentially awaited them? Did MSF have a responsibility to alert them to what was occurring in Rwanda? Could MSF – after having issued a call for an international armed intervention to put an end to the genocide – now criticise the regime that had effectively done so, thereby risking accusations of favouring the génocidaires and supporting the revisionists? Should MSF keep silent in order to continue caring for detainees who might otherwise die in the appalling prison conditions?

The ‘Hunting and killings of the Rwandan refugee in Zaire/Congo’ case study is describing the constraints and dilemmas faced by Médecins Sans Frontières’ teams in 1996 and 1997 when trying to bring assistance to the Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire, after their camps had been attacked by the rebel forces supported by the Rwandan army: could MSF extrapolate from the little known conditions of these refugees and their health needs to speak out about their presumed current plight, despite the fact that it had no access to them? Conversely, given lack of access, should MSF refrain from making predictions? Is it wise for a humanitarian organisation to predict the worst? Given that MSF was being used to lure refugees from hiding, should the organisation cease activities in the area or pursue them, condemning manipulation in the hope of preventing massacres – but at the risk of endangering its teams and other operations in the region? Should MSF call for the refugees to remain in eastern Zaire, with its deadly dangers, or participate in their forced repatriation to Rwanda, where their security was not guaranteed either?

The “Famine and Forced Relocations in Ethiopia 1984-1986” case study is describing the difficulties and dilemmas met by MSF during the famine that decimated the Ethiopian population in 1984-1985. This famine triggered an unprecedented humanitarian mobilisation and huge media attention. But the Ethiopian regime at the time also used the international aid as a bait to attract the populations and forcibly resettle them in appalling conditions. In this context: what should have been done when it appeared that aid was being used against the population for whom it was intended? Could MSF’s denunciation have endangered international aid operations in Ethiopia? By taking such positions, could MSF put its own existence and, thus, its other activities at risk?

The ‘Violence against Kosovar Albanians NATO’s intervention 1998-1999’ case study describes the constraints and dilemmas facing Médecins Sans Frontières teams that witnessed a process of terror and expulsion which they described as the ‘deportation’ of Kosovar Albanians by Serb forces. It also described MSF’s reaction to NATO aerial bombings and the control exercised over the refugee camps by this party to the conflict. Should MSF denounce the violence being committed against Kosovars at the risk of being excluded from access to these people and of encouraging the NATO intervention? Should MSF take a stance on the NATO intervention? What sort of relationship should be established with countries that were committed either militarily (such as NATO members) or politically (Greece) in the conflict and their civil societies? Should MSF raise the alarm about the absence of the UNHCR in the management of the refugee camps, at the risk of reinforcing this marginalization? Is it justifiable to carry out an assessment mission that sacrifices the principle of operational independence, by invoking an interpretation of the principle of impartiality that implies a responsibility to assist victims on both sides of a conflict?

The ‘MSF in North Korea 1995-1998’ case study is describing the constraints and dilemmas that lead MSF to speak out publicly while its teams were trying to bring assistance to the North Korean population on its territory between 1995 and 1998 and to the North Korean refugees in Asia in the following years: Until which limit, could MSF, in order to draw closer to a population in distress, accept to work without being able to apply the basic principles of humanitarian action: access to populations, free evaluation of needs and supervision of the destination of our assistance? Should it accept to work for a population oppressed by a totalitarian regime with the risk of its assistance serving to reinforce this oppression, support this regime? Whilst making public calls for emergency aid for the North Korean health system, was MSF not participating in reinforcing this regime?

The ‘Somalia 1991-1993: Civil War, Famine Alert and a UN “Military-Humanitarian” Intervention‘ case study is describing the difficulties and dilemmas met by MSF during the first years that it was committed to helping the Somali people, after the civil war started in 1991: Should MSF employ armed guards? As the quasi-only source of information in the field, how far could MSF go in releasing information without favouring one party to the conflict or another? How to draw attention on the famine in Somalia, when all cameras were focused on the Gulf War? What position should MSF take about an armed intervention aiming to protect humanitarian aid convoys, with widespread support of the population, but raising MSF’s fears that it would worsen the insecurity? How should MSF react to the excesses and abuses of this intervention?

On 14 December 1995, the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords ended the separatist war in former Yugoslavia and created the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Twenty years on, MSF reveals how the organization spoke out about a conflict marked by ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, targeted assaults of humanitarian organizations and individuals, and the unfulfilled promises by the International Community.
MSF claimed that mass distributions of aid were simply a ‘humanitarian alibi’ of the international community that lacked the will to take political and military measures to end the conflict. Some MSF leaders even called for an armed intervention against the Bosnian-Serb artillery bombing Sarajevo.
In December 1992, MSF published a report describing the Bosnian Serb policy of ethnic cleansing. They denounced the Bosnian Serbs for hindering supplies to Srebrenica and Gorazde Muslim besieged enclaves. They raised awareness and denounced the lack of protection of the population when the enclaves came under attack in 1994 and 1995 despite being declared safe zones by the UN.
In August 1995, MSF denounced a lack of access to the Serb refugees and from 2000, MSF advocated for parliamentary commissions to be set up to investigate the military and political responsibilities of the States involved in the Srebrenica crisis.
This Speaking Out Case Study explores the variety of questions and dilemmas MSF faced, Among them: to what extent should MSF risk the lives of its staff in order to operate in conflict zones? Should MSF condemn obstacles set up to limit the access to the population if it meant no longer having any access at all? Should MSF denounce the fact that humanitarian aid was presented by the international political leaders as the only solution to the conflict and call for military force, an action that would lead to loss of human life?

The ‘War crimes and politics of terror in Chechnya 1994-2004’ case study describes the constraints, questions and dilemmas experienced by MSF while speaking out during the two Russian-Chechen wars and the following years of ‘normalization’. Was speaking out the right thing to do with regard to Russia, a power with a veto at the UN Security Council and a tradition of propaganda control of the public arena? Was it realistic to rely on raising the awareness of other UN member states via their public’s opinion? In a context of terror, when dealing with a regime in denial of the reality of a conflict, was it useful and was it up to MSF to call for having this situation qualified as ‘war’? Should MSF take into account the possibility of a casual link between instances of its public speaking out and the security incidents involving its staff? When one of its staff members was taken hostage, should MSF speak out in the media to create visibility that affords him/her some protection, or conversely remain as discrete as possible so as to avoid a rise in his/her ‘market value?’ Should MSF publically point out responsibilities, negligence, or even complicity of the government on which soil the kidnapping had occurred, thereby taking active steps to secure the hostage’s release or should it refrain from such a discourse so as to avoid the opposite effect? Should MSF continue to publically denounce the violence inflicted on people in the region, at the risk of radicalising those parties to the conflict responsible for the kidnapping, and place the hostage’s life in danger?

The case study 'MSF and Srebrenica 1993-2003' explores the constraints and dilemmas raised when MSF spoke out about the events that occurred in Srebrenica's Muslim enclave. The enclave was besieged in 1993 and then seized by Bosnian Serb forces in July 1995. 8,000 men over the age of 16 were massacred, despite the presence of United Nations peacekeeping forces supposedly providing protection in what had been declared a 'security zone'. With teams present in the enclave throughout, Médecins Sans Frontières testified to what happened and called on the various countries involved to hold inquiries and establish where military and political responsibility lay for the fall of the enclave and abandon of the people of Srebrenica. By agreeing to provide a minimally acceptable level of relief to a besieged population, wasn't MSF contributing to the strategy of the besieging troops while concurrently softening their image? Could MSF call for the evacuation of civilians who wished to leave thereby risking abetting the ethnic cleansing policy of the besieging army? Having trusted the UN Protection Force's commitment to protect the enclave and its population, must MSF accept partial culpability for or complicity in the UN's abandonment of the enclave and the ensuing massacre of the population? Didn't MSF give the population the false impression that it would be safe as long as the team was present? Is it the role of a humanitarian medical organisation to issue an appeal for an investigative parliamentary commission then, once it is established, to actively monitor it with a critical eye? Contrarily, how can MSF not try to understand the circumstances and responsibilities, which, at the global level, led to the abandonment and massacre of a population to which its teams had provided relief? Can MSF be content with calling for a parliamentary investigation without ensuring that it asks the types of questions likely to elicit answers that shed light on the events? Should Srebrenica be viewed as an accident of history or as a clear-cut example of the impossibility of protecting populations under international mandates established by the UN?

The Rohingya people live in northern Rakhine state (formerly Arakan), located in western coastal Union of Myanmar (formerly Union of Burma) bordering Bangladesh to the north. The stateless Rohingya are predominately a Muslim minority, in a majority-Buddhist country. Since the late 70s, the Rohingya have fled persecution and violence to seek refuge in Bangladesh.The case study "MSF and the Rohingya 1992 - 2014" brings to light two decades of MSF advocacy activities as part of its humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya people in Bangladesh and Myanmar and explores the questions and dilemmas the organisation was confronted with surrounding speaking out

Cet article a été rédigé à partir de l’étude Crimes de guerre et politiques de terreur en Tchétchénie 1994-2004, réalisée par Laurence Binet et publiée dans la collection « Prises de parole publiques de Médecins Sans Frontières ». Cette collection de MSF, à destination interne, est progressivement rendue publique sur le site http://www.speakingout.msf.org. Elle s’efforce de décrire les processus de prise de décision qui ont mené aux positionnements publics de MSF lors de grandes crises humanitaires, ainsi que les dilemmes et controverses qui les ont accompagnés. Les études y prennent la forme d’un récit chronologique composé d’extraits de documents propres à  l’organisation (rapports de situation, de mission, échanges de courriels, comptes rendus de réunions, communiqués de presse, rapports de témoignages) et d’articles de presse. S’y ajoutent des extraits d’entretiens menés avec les protagonistes de MSF, acteurs des processus. À partir de ces sources, l’article proposé ici décrit l...