Applies the hermeneutic theory of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the Postcolonial theory of Édouard Glissant to the issue of overcoming ethnocentrism in intercultural communication
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Abstract: In recent years, Philippe has developed a brilliant theory of linguistic justice. In several articles, especially in ‘Must Europe be Belgian?’, he has argued that language policies in Europe and worldwide should be developed in... more
Abstract: In recent years, Philippe has developed a brilliant theory of linguistic justice. In several articles, especially in ‘Must Europe be Belgian?’, he has argued that language policies in Europe and worldwide should be developed in a ‘Belgian’ way. This ‘Belgian’ solution implies that each territory in the world should be officially monolingual, which is essentially the case in the Belgian regions Flanders and Wallonia. However, Belgium has a third region, Brussels, with an official bilingual language policy. Belgium does contain two models, then, for linguistic justice: the Brussels model which grants rights to more than one native language group living on the territory, and the Rest Of Belgium (ROB) model which works on the premise that each territory should be officially monolingual, applying a cujus regio ejus lingua principle. Philippe argues for the universalization of the ROB model. I argue for the opposite position: the universalization of the Brussels model for dealing with the vast linguistic heterogeneity of the present world.
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This article revisits the principal argument Will Kymlicka has developed for a marriage between liberalism and multiculturalism: that the liberal value of freedom requires a cultural context of choice. I show that this freedom argument... more
This article revisits the principal argument Will Kymlicka has developed for a marriage between liberalism and multiculturalism: that the liberal value of freedom requires a cultural context of choice. I show that this freedom argument rests on a romantic philosophy of language. Critics of this freedom argument have pointed out that it is not necessarily an individual’s own culture that provides freedom: any culture could do so. I articulate a romantic-Kymlickean response to this critique by showing how individuals’ life choices come to be entwined with the particular culture that provides their context of choice. But while that safeguards existing individuals from assimilation, it does not block future generations from being introduced into the life-world of an additional cultural context. Such slow intergenerational assimilation projects are not necessarily worrisome, however. They can sometimes have the virtue of realizing non-identity values in addition to freedom.
In this article, we examine how language and linguistic membership might feature in luck egalitarianism, what a luck-egalitarian theory of linguistic justice would look like, and, finally, what the emphasis on language teaches us about... more
In this article, we examine how language and linguistic membership might feature in luck
egalitarianism, what a luck-egalitarian theory of linguistic justice would look like, and,
finally, what the emphasis on language teaches us about the validity of standard luckegalitarian
assumptions. We show that belonging to one language group rather than
another is a morally arbitrary feature and that where membership of a specific linguistic
group affects individual chances, the effects of such bad brute luck ought to be neutralized
on the luck-egalitarian view. We assess two ways of redressing those kinds of unjustified
inequalities: the ‘universal language’ option and the ‘linguistic advantages for all’
option. But we also argue, in the second part, that exploring luck egalitarianism through
the lens of language exposes some difficulties intrinsic in many existent luck-egalitarian
theories. We argue that treating circumstances one identifies with as choices is problematic.
In addition, we argue that the linguistic preconditions of both the capacity to be
responsible as well the exercise of responsibility complicate the idea of individual
responsibility on which most luck-egalitarian theories rely. We conclude by suggesting
the need to develop a luck-egalitarian theory of justice which is less reliant on causal
features of the distinction between choice and circumstance and which is more sensitive
to the idea of collective cooperation as opposed to individual responsibility.
egalitarianism, what a luck-egalitarian theory of linguistic justice would look like, and,
finally, what the emphasis on language teaches us about the validity of standard luckegalitarian
assumptions. We show that belonging to one language group rather than
another is a morally arbitrary feature and that where membership of a specific linguistic
group affects individual chances, the effects of such bad brute luck ought to be neutralized
on the luck-egalitarian view. We assess two ways of redressing those kinds of unjustified
inequalities: the ‘universal language’ option and the ‘linguistic advantages for all’
option. But we also argue, in the second part, that exploring luck egalitarianism through
the lens of language exposes some difficulties intrinsic in many existent luck-egalitarian
theories. We argue that treating circumstances one identifies with as choices is problematic.
In addition, we argue that the linguistic preconditions of both the capacity to be
responsible as well the exercise of responsibility complicate the idea of individual
responsibility on which most luck-egalitarian theories rely. We conclude by suggesting
the need to develop a luck-egalitarian theory of justice which is less reliant on causal
features of the distinction between choice and circumstance and which is more sensitive
to the idea of collective cooperation as opposed to individual responsibility.
This introduction does three things. We first give an overview of the lin- guistic justice debate in normative political philosophy. We then situate Philippe Van Parijs’s position within it, by zooming in on Van Parijs’s two major... more
This introduction does three things. We first give an overview of the lin- guistic justice debate in normative political philosophy. We then situate Philippe Van Parijs’s position within it, by zooming in on Van Parijs’s two major normative claims: the support of the rise of English as the global lingua franca and the defence of linguistic territoriality. Finally, we clarify how each of the essays that follow this introduction relates to those two claims.
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Contemporary political philosophy has only recently witnessed a widespread emergence of analyses of justice beyond the context of the nation‐state. When modern political philosophers devised principles of justice in the past, they... more
Contemporary political philosophy has only recently witnessed a widespread emergence of analyses of justice beyond the context of the nation‐state. When modern political philosophers devised principles of justice in the past, they typically took for granted that ...
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All material published by the The Association of Departments of Foreign Languages in any medium is protected by copyright. Users may link to the ADFL Web page freely and may quote from ADFL publications as allowed by the doctrine of fair... more
All material published by the The Association of Departments of Foreign Languages in any medium is protected by copyright. Users may link to the ADFL Web page freely and may quote from ADFL publications as allowed by the doctrine of fair use. Written permission is required for any ...
Long-term immigrants often have the option but not the obligation to acquire citizenship in their state of residence. Contrary to the received wisdom, this article defends the idea of mandatory citizenship for immi- grants. It suggests... more
Long-term immigrants often have the option but not the obligation to acquire citizenship in their state of residence. Contrary to the received wisdom, this article defends the idea of mandatory citizenship for immi- grants. It suggests that the current asymmetry in the distribution of political obligations between native-born citizens and immigrants is unfair. It also argues that mandatory citizenship is required by the principle that those who persistently affect others should share a democratic setting. Finally, it claims that mandatory citizenship is more compatible with the ideal of democratic equality and more conducive to a stable society.