Obert Hodzi

Nelson Chamisa is central to the political terrain of contemporary Zimbabwe. Post the soft coup of November 2017 and the death of Morgan Tsvangirai in early 2018, Chamisa became president of the Movement for Democratic Change party and contested the July 2018 presidential election. The tempo of changes in the Movement for Democratic Change presidency is not related directly to the shift from Mugabe to Mnangagwa. However, broader politics formed an important context for Chamisa’s contested claim for the Movement for Democratic Change presidency. In examining Chamisa and the Movement for Democratic Change, the article highlights linkages between personality politics and electoral mobilization, and how this relates to political party institutionalization.

This introductory article examines the concept of strategic localization, which is central to the theme of this Special Issue of Politics & Policy. We focus on how African states, for regime survival and/or pragmatic reasons, reinterpret China's development discourse and preferences and implement them in their local contexts. We hypothesize that the China model of development has become a rhetorical commonplace used to legitimize policies perceived to be: (1) better for regime survival (e.g., no political conditionalities; dissemination of resources to elites); and (2) superior to other development models (more suitable for developing countries, better at developing strong states).

States in Africa are labeled "system ineffectual," inconsequential to global politics, and lacking material and ideational capabilities to structure their foreign relations. The result is a portrayal of a passive Africa at the whims of its bilateral partners-be they China, the United States, or Russia. Contra this impolitic framing of Africa, this article explores how states in Africa are strategically shaping the norms of development paradigms promoted by foreign powers and influencing external actors to legitimize their preferred norms. Empirically focusing on China's development model in Africa, the article examines how norms related to the model are being shaped and diffused; and how through the ingenuity of political elites, China is making the China model "on the go." The main argument is that political elites in Africa are strategically reconstructing the China model, creating their own multifaceted versions that delicately balance their own domestic interests and their bilateral relations with China while deriving maximum benefits from the People's Republic of China.

The EU-China cooperation on security in Africa has remained on the level of aspirations and policy formulation with insignificant tangible results. Traditionally, the EU has played a strong role in Africa’s security architecture, and China’s participation within this policy area will open up areas of possible cooperation and conflict. Both China and the EU share the same goals in Africa—a stable and secure Africa. To achieve that objective, Africa, China and the EU agree, in principle, that a comprehensive approach that incorporates both traditional and non-traditional security methods, as well as a greater level of development support for African nations, must be taken. However, several challenges impede such cooperation. An EU arms embargo on China, conceptual gaps between the EU and China in human rights and sovereignty, and increasing levels of competition for natural resources are all barriers to trilateral security. This paper outlines those challenges, focusing particularly on barriers to cooperation in the areas of traditional and non-traditional security and development aid projects.

Relations between China and African nations have intensified following the ratification of several multilateral and bilateral developmental agreements, especially after the third Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in 2006. In the past decade, the
relations have transcended to the micro-level, with important implications for households and individuals. Of note are the varying
forms of population migration between the two places for reasons
ranging from business ventures, education, asylum-seeking and
family making and reunification. Using various primary and secondary data sources, the seven articles in this special issue delve into
the wellbeing, social identities and different kinds of socio-cultural
and economic inequalities of Africans in China and Chinese in
Africa. Altogether, the articles affirm that policies and mechanisms
to ensure decent living conditions, enhanced sense of belonging
and social equity among Africans in China and Chinese in Africa are
critical to the future of China-Africa relations.

African students’ mobility to China is growing – making China the second most popular destination for African students studying abroad, after France. Generally, due to the pervasive poverty and inequality in African states, educational mobility is a means to escape individual socio-economic challenges for the transformation of lives. However, is the African students’ mobility to China able to achieve those expectations? Through a critical analysis of current scholarship in African student education mobility the paper explores the underlying material and ideational motivations of China’s education support in Africa. In probing Africans’ educational mobility to China, the paper pushes the boundaries of enquiry beyond the surface of affordable education. Examining the asymmetries emerging from African students’ mobility to China and questioning the bridging effect of educational mobility, the paper finds that education aid and development in Africa have always been a factor of external powers’ domestic and foreign interests.

Exploring the representational effect of tourism, this study examines factors that influence perceptions that Chinese outbound tourists are representatives or de facto ambassadors of the Chinese government advancing its national objectives abroad. The paper finds that the Chinese government is ambivalent, and at times inconsistent about endowing individual tourists with the responsibility to serve as its de facto ambassadors. In addition, the paper argues that the role of tourism in China's bilateral relations with South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe influence general perceptions among bureaucrats and elites in the three countries that Chinese outbound tourists are representatives of the Chinese government.

With a few exceptions, armed civil wars are no longer commonplace in Africa, but anti-government protests are. Instead of armed rebels, unarmed civilians are challenging regimes across Africa to reconsider their governance practices and deliver both political and economic change. In their responses, regimes in countries like Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Rwanda, and Burundi have favored the combat mode—responding to dissent with military and repressive means. With few options, civilian movements look to the United States for protection and support while their governments look to China for reinforcement. If the United States seeks to reassert its influence in Africa and strengthen its democratic influence, its strategy needs to go beyond counterterrorism and respond to Africa’s pressing needs while supporting the African people in their quest for democracy and human rights.

This introduction presents background information to a special issue exploring the complexities of the Chinese identity and forms in which ‘Chineseness’ is expressed by Chinese migrants in Africa. Existing literature and media reports on the Chinese in Africa assumes that they are a homogenous group, this introduc- tory article argues to the contrary. The Chinese diaspora in Africa range from descendants of migrants that settled in Africa in the seventeenth century to twenty-first century migrants. This histor- ical and contemporary engagement between China and African countries is essential to understanding the diversity and hybridity of Chinese identity in Africa. This observation provides the basis for the six articles in this special issue. Based on ethnographic observation and in-depth interviews with the Chinese diaspora and locals in Zimbabwe, Ghana, Zambia and South Africa, the articles provide a compelling argument on why there is no single Chinese identity in Africa.

Socialization of Africa into the liberal international order was largely a preserve of the West. However, as China expands its economic and political influence across Africa, the liberal international order is being put to the test. Representing alternative global governance norms and values, China is seeking the legitimation of its emerging global leadership by delegitimizing its rival, the United States. How the delegitimization and expected 're-socialization' of Africa are unfolding is this article's subject of enquiry. Based on expert interviews conducted in Africa and China, the article examines the interlink between legitimation and 're-socialization' within the context of China's rising influence in Africa. It advances the argument that China is concerned with having a global order, operating based on norms and values favourable to its national and geopolitical interests. In making this argument, the article refocuses the attention onto the subtle making of a global order preferred by China, at least in Africa.

Traditional methods of rigging elections are falling out of favour in the eyes of leaders keen to have their authoritarian regimes validated at the ballot box. Aided by digital technologies, a loyal supporter base and a lucrative party identity and narrative, opposition parties like Zimbabwe’s MDC are taking their turn at manipulating the outcomes of elections, and forcing the hand of those who legitimise them.

The liberal international order has been under heavy strain in recent years. From Brexit to Trump's presidency, its tenacity is being put to the test. The resultant commotion should be a window of opportunity for China to materially revise the existing order or establish an alternative order under its leadership. However, the puzzle that is unfolding but not yet significantly examined is that China is seemingly not taking advantage of the upheaval in the liberal international order to substantially revise the order or set up a new one. Premised on the metaphor of " following the flow, " this paper argues that there is understandable rationale as to whyChina is appearing to ignore the opportunity to establish a China-led global order. It then explores the approach in China’s posture as protector of globalization and the liberal international order.

India, Brazil and South Africa’s efforts within the framework of the IBSA Dialogue Forum formed in 2003 have done little to change or challenge the balance of power. Indeed, their collective objective of reordering the international system and reforming the United Nations Security Council to make it more responsive to contemporary geopolitical realities seems, in the words of John Snyder, to constitute ‘empty bravado or hopeful illusions.’ Focusing on the three countries, emerging powers increasingly dissatisfied with their position in the current global order; this paper probes the efficacy of their collective objective. The paper advances the argument that prospects for the three countries to reorder the international system are diminishing because they failed to convert their democratic credentials and economic growth into global influence. The final stroke on their epitaph, it will be argued, is the emerging recoiling of the USA from global governance and China’s seeming willingness to take on global leadership alone.

Prevailing narratives in the discourse on China-Africa engagement are that China is developing Africa. This paper departs from those narratives because they disregard the agency of Africa's political elite. Basing its argument on the nature of the African political elite, the paper analyses their role in determining the impact of China's economic and trade engagement on economic development in their respective countries. To do that, it first discusses the nature and identity of African political elites, and examines how they control their states and scarce resources. Having done that, the paper then analyses their role in determining the nature and extent of development emanating from their countries’ economic engagement with China. It then concludes that it is not how much foreign states invest in African countries that determines Africa's rise, but rather political elites who influence the direction of their states’ development.

This Asia Paper explores how China, a ‘partial’ global power, can set the agenda and determine the rules in a global order dominated by a declining yet unyielding global power. In exploring this question, we present the argument that building ‘alternative’ regional and global institutions might be a safer strategy for China. Further, it examines how China is through institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) incrementally delimiting its sphere of influence and shaping other states’ actions in Asia.

South Africa is an emerging power with competing and often conflicting regional and international identities. On the one hand, it identifies itself with Western liberal order norms and values of democracy, human rights and the responsibility to protect, while on the other, it strives to identity with pan-African ideals of ‘African Renaissance’ and ‘African Solutions for Africa’s Problems’ that are opposed to Western interventionism and influence on African states. Caught in-between the North-South conflict of ideas, South Africa’s foreign policy behavior on issues regarding security, human rights and justice arguably reflect diverse but contradictory emphases. Analyzing South Africa’s foreign security behavior in Africa, this chapter employs the concept of ‘self-other’ identity formation to first examine whether South Africa’s designation as an ‘emerging power’ has exacerbated its identity dilemma – inhibiting its ability to exercise regional leadership in Africa. Second, the chapter assesses the impact of controversies emanating from its identity dilemma on the United States’ security policy in Africa. It then concludes by assessing whether these controversies are limiting or enhancing cooperation between the United States and South Africa on security in Africa.

For China, South Sudan assays its long-standing foreign policy principles and development ideologies in Africa - the non-interference principle and the idea that economic development brings peace and security. But beyond that, it ostensibly unveils the intricacies of Beijing’s foreign policy strategies, especially the efficacy of its non-interference principle when faced with intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. In a space of three years, China’s position in the South Sudanese civil war revolved around strict adherence to its non-interference principle, urging parties in the conflict to seek political solutions, direct mediation and deployment of combat troops under the auspices of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan. At face value, the shift from one strategy to the other suggests the absence of a coherent strategy, implying that Beijing is being opportunistic, crafting its strategies as it goes. Although it might be the case that Beijing is ‘learning on the job’, its strategy in South Sudan is not linear but rather a deliberately convoluted strategy of ‘parallels’. This article, accordingly, explores this strategy of ‘parallels’ and the implications it may have on Beijing’s future engagement with civil wars in Africa.

Africa is currently being courted by both China and Japan. Rich in natural resources and a growing market, Africa is important to both East Asian economic giants. They have provided Africa with generous financial and economic development deals totalling over US$90 billion between December, 2015 and August 2016. The most recent move was from Japan. At the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) held in Kenya recently (the first time in Africa), Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced a US$30 billion public-private partnership to develop quality infrastructure, health systems and others in Africa.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Access to Information is by no means an end in itself, rather it is a means through which communities and individuals alike obtain knowledge of the rights that accrue to them and demand their fulfilment. Further, it is a tool for enhancing citizen engagement and participation in their governance, attaining mass-based empowerment and local level poverty reduction as well as building the organisational capacity of local communities by building a critical mass for the demand of accountability and realisation of other fundamental human rights.
Yet, the centrality of information to maintaining political power in countries such as Zimbabwe mean that access to information is sternly restricted. The culture of secrecy prevalent in most government departments suggest that access to information is not seen as a right but a privilege that government officials dispense at will. To maintain that secrecy, legislation such as the Access to Information and Privacy Protection Act widely limit the information accessible to the public while other legislation like the Public Order and Security Act effectively control dissemination of any information to the public by restricting public gatherings.
Based on focus group discussions and interviews conducted, it was noted that people in Zimbabwe are generally unaware of their right to access information and the procedure of requesting information from government departments; on the other hand, it was revealed that the media has dominated the campaign for access to information thereby erroneously sending a message that access to information is only for media practitioners. The effect has been the lack of nationalisation of the access to information campaign. As a result, it has been recommended that civic education to raise the public’s awareness of the right of access to information is essential while at the same time the government is lobbied to implement a proactive information disclosure policy for all its departments. Meanwhile, the current legislative framework could be transformed through the current constitution-making process which provides an indelible opportunity for reform of access to information laws and a constitutionally guaranteed right of access to information.

Through a comparative analysis of the criminal justice system of Kenya and Zimbabwe; this study will examine the role, action and issues affecting the two legal systems as they relate to issues of accountability and impunity. It will critically explore reforms and measures taken in Kenya to address issues of accountability and impunity in the country’s criminal justice system, with the intention of making recommendations on how the criminal justice system in Zimbabwe can be reformed to purge the culture of impunity and lack of accountability seemingly characteristic of the system.

This paper examines the use of sexual violence as a political strategy during elections in Zimbabwe. It argues that the transitional justice discourse in the country has been defined narrowly and unwittingly focuses on civil and political rights abuses; thus failing to capture the subtle dimensions of structural inequalities suffered by women. Accordingly, without a known gender policy in the ONHRI, politically motivated sexual violence remains at the fringes of transitional justice mechanisms in Zimbabwe.

The economic voting theory and the responsibility hypothesis posit that voters hold the government accountable for economic performance and will vote for the incumbent if the economy is good. The core assumption, is that, there is an incumbent and an opposition contesting in an election. But, this is not always the case. In elections following a transitional power sharing government, the schism between the incumbent and the opposition is generally blurred. Political parties that usually contest in the elections would have been part of the transitional power-sharing government. In such cases, voters are not able to apportion responsibility, and political parties compete to claim credit and assign blame. This increases the propensity for election commodification. Applying this proposition to Zimbabwe’s 2013 elections, this paper contends that commodification of elections increases in polls following a transitional power sharing government when political parties contesting in the elections were part of the transitional power sharing government; making it difficult for voters to determine responsibility for policy, leading to intense competition among political parties to claim credit and apportion blame for performance of the transitional power-sharing government.

This paper argues that the crisis of electoral democracy in Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire is a result of underlying structural and institutional deficiencies within national and regional multinational institutions. It assesses the extent to which they have been ‘enablers’ or ‘spoilers’ of electoral based transitions to democracy. Yet it avoids generalisations of the security sector’s involvement in political transitions. In terms of structure, the paper is divided into four sections. Section one will briefly discuss the theoretical perspectives of the election-democracy trajectory. It argues that although elections are a major variable for democracy, unless the ‘ecology of elections’ is conducive, elections may not be an instrument of transition to democracy. The second section analyses the militarisation of politics and the role of the security sector in aiding or stalling democratisation. Section three will assess the role of regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of West African States and the African Union in electoral-based political transitions in Africa. Lastly, the paper will discuss how the security sector and multinational African institutions can aid political transitions to democracy in troubled African countries.

The youth in Zimbabwe have often been described as disenfranchised, corruptible and susceptible to manipulation by politicians. This narrative assumes that the youth are a homogenous group, uniform in their grievances and consensual about strategies to resolve them. Analysing the case of youth participation in the 2013 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe, this article challenges that assumption by arguing that the youth are polarised and struggling to articulate a national objective that might be able to shift the country’s political discourse. It contends that the majority of Zimbabwean youth act as loosely affiliated individuals seeking personal rather than group benefits. At the same time, by assessing the engagement of youth within political parties either as supporters or officials, the article further argues that the structural dynamics of these political parties deny the youth agency and make them conform. It therefore concludes that participation by the youth in the 2013 elections was mainly driven by individual interests rather than collective grievances or political identity.

This book gives a compelling analysis and explanation of shifts in China’s non-intervention policy in Africa. Systematically connecting the neoclassical realist theoretical logic with an empirical analysis of China’s intervention in African civil wars, the volume highlights a methodical interlink between theoretical and empirical analysis that takes into consideration the changing status of rising powers in the global system and its effect on their intervention behaviour. Based on field research and expert interviews, it provides a rigorous analysis of China’s emergent intervention behaviour in some key African conflicts in Libya, South Sudan and Mali and broadens the study of external interventions in civil wars to include the intervention behaviour of non-Western rising powers.