Virginie Collombier

The academic literature has tended to divide the Salafis into three main categories – jihadi, political and quietist – and has distinguished them in terms of their ideological and methodological differences, notably pertaining to Salafi groups’ varying relationships with the state and political authority and their use of violence. What happens then when state institutions collapse, when there is no state authority or when the state authority is highly contested between different groups, none of which are able to definitively assert themselves over the others? In a context of political upheaval and armed conflict, how do Salafis relate to the state and to ‘politics’? The developments in Libya between 2011 and 2019 provided an ideal opportunity to look into these questions. Actors that identify with Salafism have played important roles in Libya’s various stages of conflict and political transformation since 2011. However, they have reacted to these transformations in a way that to som...

How have armed conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen challenged or weakened each state? This report underlines the main dynamics that have affected state capacity and authority and highlights the key challenges facing policymakers in rebuilding centralized, efficient and legitimate states. It puts particular emphasis on the need for building consensus around governance mechanisms that can reconnect local- and national-level institutions and manage resource distribution. It also underlines the need for a holistic approach towards rebuilding efficient and legitimate security structures, taking into account that any such efforts will be political and contentious.

Ce travail s'inscrit dans la continuité de précédentes études consacrées au régime égyptien, études qui se sont tout d'abord concentrées sur les relations bilatérales entre l'Egypte avec les Etats-Unis 1 , puis sur la gestion par le régime des contraintes externes et internes influant sur ses relations avec la société au moment de l'intervention américaine en Irak 2. A ce stade, il nous avait par suite semblé pertinent de nous intéresser à la gestion par le régime des projets de démocratisation, devenus centraux tant dans les initiatives internationales (et surtout dans la politique extérieure américaine) que dans les politiques nationales

The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in December 2015 resulted in some relative stabilization and improvement of the security situation of the country, especially in Tripoli. Yet, it has not brought the political and institutional divisions to an end. The diplomatic focus put on revising the LPA during 2017 has shed light on the vested interest in the status quo of some powerful armed groups linked to politicians and businessmen. This entails the risk of a new armed confrontation between rival groups in the near future. It also highlights the necessity of increased diplomatic focus on Libya's economic rehabilitation. This publication is part of the MENARA Future Notes series which in the form of policy briefs analyse ongoing events in the SEMCs and Middle East region, emphasising the implications for the EU, suggesting the best policy options and assessing plausible and preferable future scenarios.

This paper analyses the drivers behind some of the different types of proliferation of armed groups in power and politics that have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa after 2011. Based on thick empirical description and analysis of the highly distinct ways that armed groups have proliferated in Egypt and in Libya since 2011, the paper pinpoints two key dynamics: first, a process of "militarization of contention" in which regime-orchestrated repression drives forth a transformation of contentious politics from non-violent to armed forms of action. Second, a process of "militia-ization of politics" in which warfare, foreign interventions and the weakness of nascent state institutions drives forth a process in which armed actors are allowed to consolidate and expand their influence politics without necessarily sharing ideology or political agendas. The paper ends by drawing a number of policy-oriented conclusions with the aim to inspire international an...

Résumé La révolution libyenne (2011) a profondément transformé le champ socio-politique salafiste et son rapport à l’État et au politique. Ces transformations recouvrent trois dynamiques principales : participation politique dans les instances de la transition, ‘milicisation’ dans le chaos sécuritaire libyen, et compétition dans le champ religieux entre mouvances salafistes. Celles-ci ont adopté des stratégies différentes pour répondre au nouvel environnement politico-militaire : influence par le bas pour les Madkhalis et influence par le haut pour les salafistes politiques et post-jihadistes. Par ailleurs, les dynamiques d’allégeance dans le contexte de polarisation Est-Ouest sont tributaires à la fois de l’équilibre des forces en présence et de considérations idéologiques. Dans un environnement politico-sécuritaire mouvant, il n’est toutefois pas toujours possible de faire coïncider impératifs idéologiques et impératifs stratégiques, lesquels semblent toujours primer sur l’idéologie. Abstract The Libyan Revolution in 2011 brought durable change to the Salafist sociopolitical regional landscape and its relation to politics. Those transformations are characterized by three main dynamics: political participation to the institutions of the transition, “militiazation” amidst the Libyan security chaos, and inter-Salafist competition in the religious field. To answer this new political and military reality, Salafi movements adopted various strategies: Madkhalis tried to exert influence from the bottom-up, while political Salafists and post-Jihadists favored a top-down strategy. Besides, in a context characterized by intense polarization between the rival power centers in western and eastern Libya, allegiances have depended on both evolving balance of power and ideological considerations. Nevertheless, due to the unstable political and security environment, it has not always been possible to make ideological and strategic priorities coincide. Strategic considerations tend to have primacy over ideology.

Beyond the relative opening of the political system that characterized 2005 in Egypt — with the President being elected directly for the first time and the increased competition allowed during legislative elections — the 2005 elections also constituted an opportunity to consider and evaluate the internal struggles for influence under way within the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). In a context largely influenced by the perspective of President Husni Mubarak's succession and by calls for reform coming from both internal and external actors, changes currently occurring at the party level may have a decisive impact on the future of the Egyptian regime.

A partir de 2000, alors que le regime egyptien entre dans une periode de transition (evolutions du contexte national et international, perspective de la succession presidentielle, un nouveau groupe d'acteurs politiques conduit par le fils cadet du president, Gamal Moubarak, entreprend de conquerir le pouvoir. Ces nouveaux venus en politique, pour nombre d'entre eux issus des milieux d'affaires ou du monde academique, font du parti national democratique (PND), le parti presidentiel heritier du parti unique, l'instrument central de leur strategie. L'organisation partisane leur parait en effet l'outil le plus adapte a un contexte dans lequel le referent democratique est desormais incontournable. Dans la perspective de la succession a la tete de l'Etat, ils ambitionnent de reformer le parti presidentiel en vue d'en faire une organisation moderne et efficace, susceptible de leur permettre d'acceder au pouvoir via les elections et donc d'acquerir une legitimite, tant sur le plan interne que sur le plan externe. En 2008, les principaux fondements de leur strategie sont en place. Gamal Moubarak et ses proches ont acquis d'importantes responsabilites au sein du systeme politique. Par leur action, ils ont initie de reels changements dans l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Parti. En depit des efforts deployes et des resultats obtenus, leur capacite a conquerir le pouvoir lors de l'election presidentielle de 2011 demeure toutefois incertaine.

Mohamed Morsi est le premier civil president de l’Egypte, mais nul ne connait ses pouvoirs. Ceux-ci devront sans doute etre precises dans le cadre de compromis passes entre la confrerie des Freres musulmans et le Conseil supreme des forces armees. Le face-a-face entre ces deux forces dominantes determinera l’issue du processus constitutionnel. Beaucoup dependra egalement de la cohesion de la confrerie et des relations qu’elle entretiendra avec les autres forces politiques egyptiennes.

The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in December 2015 resulted in some relative stabilization and improvement of the security situation of the country, especially in Tripoli. Yet, it has not brought the political and institutional divisions to an end. The diplomatic focus put on revising the LPA during 2017 has shed light on the vested interest in the status quo of some powerful armed groups linked to politicians and businessmen. This entails the risk of a new armed confrontation between rival groups in the near future. It also highlights the necessity of increased diplomatic focus on Libya’s economic rehabilitation.

This working paper is the first draft of a work in progress on party politics in contemporary Egypt. Written in early 2013, following the first round of free elections to take place after Hosni Mubarak had been ousted from power, it focuses on non-Islamist parties, their development and their role in political change before and after the popular uprising of 2011. It shows that since 2011, similarly throughout the 2000s, political mobilization in the nonIslamist sphere has mostly happened through fluid networks and alliances, rather than coherent organizations created with a view to gaining power and governing. While attempting to identify some of the obstacles that have impeded party development before and after the 2011 revolution, this draft paper also underlines the determining impact those have had on democracy building.

Mohamed Morsi is the first civilian president of Egypt, but no one knows what powers he has. This will inevitably need to be specified within the framework of the negotiations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Supreme Council of the armed forces. The confrontation between these two dominant forces will determine the outcome of the constitutional process. Much will also depend on the cohesion of the Brotherhood and the relationships it will maintain with other Egyptian political forces.

The extreme fragmentation and violent competition that have characterized Libya's transition since 2011 and now threaten its very existence as a unitary state were not inevitable. The specific dynamics of the 2011 war have profoundly influenced the course of the transition. The choices made by Libya's new political elites, the intervention of foreign actors and the nature of the UN-led mediation process have also contributed to further divide the territory and the national community.

This paper, based on extensive interviews and fieldwork conducted in North Africa and the Sahel, considers the recent evolution of jihadi organizations in this region, and offers analysis of patterns of competition and violence among different jihadi groups. We argue that while there is a clear division between Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and those linked with the Islamic State (IS), this has never turned into a civil war among them, in contrast to the jihadi groups in the Middle East, who have competed violently, especially Al-Nusra Front and IS. More dangerous, and in the context of the collapse of the Islamic State in the Middle East, we have observed patterns of rapprochement of its North African-Sahelian affiliates with Al-Qaeda-linked groups. This paper also examines the fragmentation of the North African-Sahelian regional states system into two categories: a core of strong states controlling their borders and territories and thus able to contain jihadi groups (Tunisia, Algeria...

Le régime de Pervez Musharraf vacille. Alors que le Pakistan vient de célébrer son soixantième anniversaire et que des élections législatives sont programmées pour l'automne, les nuages s' accumulent au-dessus du général-président, arrivé au pouvoir ...

Across the Muslim world, from Iraq and Yemen, to Egypt and the Sahel, new alliances have been forged between the latest wave of violent Islamist groups –– including Islamic State and Boko Haram –– and local tribes. But can one now speak of a direct link between tribalism and jihadism, and how analytically useful might it be? Tribes are traditionally thought to resist all encroachments upon their sovereignty, whether by the state or other local actors, from below yet by joining global organizations such as Islamic State, are they not rejecting the idea of the state from above? This triangular relationship is key to understanding instances of mass ‘radicalization’, when entire communities forge alliances with jihadi groups, for reasons of self-interest, self-preservation or religious fervor. If Algeria’s FIS or Turkey’s AKP once represented the ‘Islamisation of nationalism’, have we now entered a new era, that of the ‘tribalization of globalization’?

Le régime de Pervez Musharraf vacille. Alors que le Pakistan vient de célébrer son soixantième anniversaire et que des élections législatives sont programmées pour l'automne, les nuages s' accumulent au-dessus du général-président, arrivé au pouvoir ...

... Retour. [10] Entretien avec l'auteur, 15 mai 2011. Retour. [11] Né en 1933, Safwat al-Shirîf sort diplômé de l'Académie ... Il est en particulier composé de Hussâm Badrâwî, Muḥammad Ragab, Muḥammad 'Abdillâh, Muḥammad Kamâl, Mâjid al-Shirbînî et Muḥammad Hîba. ...