Emanuele Sica

In contrast to its brutal seizure of the Balkans, the Italian Army’s 1940–1943 relatively mild occupation of the French Riviera and nearby alpine regions bred the myth of the Italian brava gente, or good fellow, an agreeable occupier who abstained from the savage wartime behaviors so common across Europe. Employing a multi-tiered approach, this book examines the simultaneously conflicting and symbiotic relationship between the French population and Italian soldiers. At the grassroots level, the book asserts that the cultural proximity between the soldiers and the local population, one-quarter of which was Italian, smoothed the sharp angles of miscommunication and cultural faux-pas at a time of great uncertainty. At the same time, it encouraged a laxness in discipline that manifested as fraternization and black marketeering. The book’s analysis of political tensions highlights how French prefects and mayors fought to keep the tatters of sovereignty in the face of military occupation....

This chapter focuses on the Italian Army’s full occupation of southeastern France that began with the November 1942 invasion. In November 1942 more than 150,000 Italian soldiers deployed in the French free zone following the Allied invasion of North Africa. Many “unredeemed lands,” such as the County of Nice, Savoy, and Corsica, were occupied effortlessly by the Italian Army in just a few weeks. The irredentist movement hailed this occupation as the achievement of the Mare Nostrum, Italy’s full control of the Mediterranean Sea. However, what was in theory a political victory shortly became a strategic nightmare. This chapter examines the Italian occupation’s chaotic nature; its moderation and suspicion toward the French population; its ambiguous attitude toward the irredentists; and its ambivalent relationship with the Vichy regime. It shows that the first period of the military occupation established the triangular relationship between Italian military, French population, and Itali...

Giulio Douhet is arguably one of the most important airpower advocates and as such his ideas has been debated in military circles. His strategic bombing theories carried out in the Second World War up to contemporary air force operations and are still cited in military colleges around the world. Yet, his influence in Italian military circles during the interwar years was uneven. His abrasive character along with his incessant lobbying in the political arena ruffled the feathers of many generals and politicians, to the point that he was court-martialed and incarcerated for one year during the First World War under the direct order of the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, General Luigi Cadorna. Released from active duty in 1920, Douhet dedicated the remaining of his life to advocating for an independent air force, unbridled by the other forces' budget and hierarchy. His opera omnia Il Dominio dell'Aria ("The Command of the Air") first published in 1923 and translated in several languages quickly became a manifesto for air force commanders wanting to spread their wings, both metaphorically and literally.
My paper analyze the reception of Douhet's ideas by the Italian military establishment during the First World War and its aftermath, showing its relevance for the creation of the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) in 1923. I will endeavor to show the impact of his ideas at the Italian Air Force Academy, l'Accademia Aeronautica and in the debate in the thirties over the necessity for the Fascist regime of modernizing its air fleet to pursue Mussolini's expansionist policies.

/Résumé analytique June 1940: The Italian Army and the Battle of the Alps Emanuele Sica This article focuses on the " Battle of the Alps " of June 1940, which pitted the Italian Regio Esercito against the French Armée des Alpes. Fearing that an early capitulation of France to the German invasion that had begun in May would prevent Italy from sharing the spoils of victory, Mussolini ordered an offensive against France on 15 June 1940. Despite the battle raging in the north, the French Army successfully repelled the attacking force and the Italian assault petered out after a few days, with no significant victories and few territorial gains. Aside from the difficulties of crossing the Alpine mountain range, a geographical feature the French had strongly fortified, the Italian campaign was hindered by poor strategy, ineffective tactics, an outdated military doctrine that failed to acknowledge the importance of combined arms warfare, and appallingly inadequate materiel owing to the erosion of the Italian military industrial base in the 1930s. In fact, the Battle of the Alps set the tone for the overall disappointing military campaign of the Regio Esercito in the Second World War, as the Italian army never fully recovered from its dismal start. Nous nous concentrons, dans cet article, sur la « Bataille des Alpes » de juin 1940, qui opposa la Regio Esercito italienne à l'Armée française des Alpes. Craignant qu'une capitulation anticipée de la France devant l'invasion allemande, qui avait déjà commencé en mai, empêcherait l'Italie d'avoir une part aux butins de guerre, Mussolini ordonna une attaque contre la France le 15 juin 1940. En dépit des combats qui faisaient rage plus au nord, l'armée française réussit à repousser l'ennemi et l'assaut ita-lien tourna court après quelques jours n'ayant remporté aucune victoire importante et reçu que peu de gains territoriaux. À part des difficultés encourues à travers la chaîne de montagnes des Alpes, un élément géographique que la France avait solidement fortifié, la campagne d'Italie fut entravée par une stratégie médiocre, des tactiques inefficaces, une doctrine militaire périmée qui négligea de re-connaître l'importance des forces alliées armées et du matériel épouvantablement inadéquat à cause de la dégradation de la base industrielle militaire de l'Italie dans les années 30. En fait, la Bataille des Alpes fut un présage pour la campagne militaire décevante en tout point du Regio Esercito durant la seconde guerre mondiale, car l'armée italienne ne se remit jamais de son départ lamentable.