Jennifer Marra Henrigillis

In 2014, Louis CK was unquestionably the philosopher king of comedy, a commercial, cultural, and creative icon who dared to explore the most vulnerable parts of society, culture, and himself. His jokes raised philosophical issues in epistemology and mirrored the philosophy of some of the greats. Then, with the revelation of sexual misconduct in 2017, CK was dethroned overnight. Many believed that CK's actions forfeit his access to the cultural marketplace the only way to truly show disgust and disapproval of CK would be to ban him from comedy clubs, remove him from creative roles, cancel the release of his films, and strip his work from streaming archives.

There is stark disagreement on what has been, and ought to be, done with Louis CK. Some comedians and commentators have understood CK as a sexual predator whose continued presence in the comedy world would only serve to reinforce rape culture, effectively telling victims that they don't matter and men that assault is forgivable. Other comedians and comedy audiences rejoice at the return of CK, believing that his comedy remains entertaining and worthwhile despite his behavior. There are several philosophical layers of this case to unravel, but after exploring the ways in which CK was the philosopher king of comedy before his fall, the present study focuses on the following two questions: (1) was the industry response to CK ’s actions the correct one? and (2) should CK be allowed to return to comedy?

In a time when morality itself has been undermined by rampant subjectivism and relativism on the one hand, and callous indifference on the other, we find ourselves in search of some universal guiding principle for moral decision making. But there is a danger, of course. Cultures that value individualism over all praise subjectivism and relativism for its tolerance and acceptance, dismissing strict objectivity as fascist. I argue that it is possible to have an objective ethic that respects humanity in all its variety and diversity while simultaneously providing, indeed insisting upon, an objective, foundational standard for normative judgment. I believe Cassirer provides us with such an ethic – it is laced within his philosophy of symbolic forms and the driving force of his later works. In this study, I will argue that normativity is built into the philosophy of symbolic forms at two levels: on the level of individual objects in relation to their appropriate symbolic form, and on the level of forms in their relation to other forms. Such normativity is objective, not relative, and cannot be reduced to mere subjective taste. The implications for this study are vast, both for Cassirer studies and moral investigations into contemporary issues.

The aim of this dissertation is to offer a new theory of humor that takes seriously both the universality and power of humor in culture. In the first chapter, I summarize historical and contemporary theories, and show how each either 1) fails to give any definition of humor, 2) fails as a theory of humor, and/or 3) underappreciates, dismisses, or does not consider the power of humor in experience.

The second chapter explains the failures of prior theories by understanding the problem in terms of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. These forms of culture are perspectives through which we express and understand our world, and each presents its own unique perspectives through which we can understand ourselves and the world. In the third chapter, I argue that humor is one of these necessary and universal symbolic forms of culture. I argue that confusions in the philosophy of humor stem from approaches to humor that understand it as part of some other symbolic form rather than as a form itself.
In the fourth chapter, I argue for the function of humor as that which reveals and exposes epistemic vices –laziness, arrogance, and closed-minded thinking about ourselves and the world. I support this argument by showing not only that all previous theories of humor have within them epistemic revelation as a consistent commonality, but also by showing that this revelation is necessary to the form of humor while it is, at best, accidental to other forms.

In my final chapter, I suggest that we ought to approach humor objectively, and that the normativity of the symbolic forms guides us toward such an approach. I offer two objective questions to ask about a given instance of humor: 1) does the humor idealize a liberated end? and 2) does the humor fulfil the cultural function of the symbolic form it represents by disrupting epistemically vicious thinking? If the answer to both of these questions is affirmative, then it is likely that the humor in question is morally praiseworthy. I conclude by offering suggestions for further study.

In this class, we will apply the three classical theories of humor (the Superiority Theory, the Incongruity Theory, and the Relief Theory) to contemporary comedy, with a focus on stand-up, improvisation, and sketch comedy. We will take a philosophical look at comedy by considering cultural (race, gender, etc.), political (satire, parody, etc.), and ethical implications (when jokes hurt, etc.), as well as discussing the nature of knowledge, belief, and perspective as it relates to comedy. We will watch clips of various figures in class in order to facilitate this discussion. Comedic figures and organizations of study will include, but are not limited to, Louis CK, Tina Fey, Dave Chappelle, Steve Martin, Saturday Night Live, The Second City, The Daily Show, The Nightly Show, and The Colbert Report. If available, we will also have a local comedian serve as a guest speaker.