Jennifer Marra Henrigillis

In 2014, Louis CK was unquestionably the philosopher king of comedy, a commercial, cultural, and creative icon who dared to explore the most vulnerable parts of society, culture, and himself. His jokes raised philosophical issues in epistemology and mirrored the philosophy of some of the greats. Then, with the revelation of sexual misconduct in 2017, CK was dethroned overnight. Many believed that CK's actions forfeit his access to the cultural marketplace the only way to truly show disgust and disapproval of CK would be to ban him from comedy clubs, remove him from creative roles, cancel the release of his films, and strip his work from streaming archives.

There is stark disagreement on what has been, and ought to be, done with Louis CK. Some comedians and commentators have understood CK as a sexual predator whose continued presence in the comedy world would only serve to reinforce rape culture, effectively telling victims that they don't matter and men that assault is forgivable. Other comedians and comedy audiences rejoice at the return of CK, believing that his comedy remains entertaining and worthwhile despite his behavior. There are several philosophical layers of this case to unravel, but after exploring the ways in which CK was the philosopher king of comedy before his fall, the present study focuses on the following two questions: (1) was the industry response to CK ’s actions the correct one? and (2) should CK be allowed to return to comedy?

In a time when morality itself has been undermined by rampant subjectivism and relativism on the one hand, and callous indifference on the other, we find ourselves in search of some universal guiding principle for moral decision making. But there is a danger, of course. Cultures that value individualism over all praise subjectivism and relativism for its tolerance and acceptance, dismissing strict objectivity as fascist. I argue that it is possible to have an objective ethic that respects humanity in all its variety and diversity while simultaneously providing, indeed insisting upon, an objective, foundational standard for normative judgment. I believe Cassirer provides us with such an ethic – it is laced within his philosophy of symbolic forms and the driving force of his later works. In this study, I will argue that normativity is built into the philosophy of symbolic forms at two levels: on the level of individual objects in relation to their appropriate symbolic form, and on the level of forms in their relation to other forms. Such normativity is objective, not relative, and cannot be reduced to mere subjective taste. The implications for this study are vast, both for Cassirer studies and moral investigations into contemporary issues.