Martin Stocker

This essay critically examines the Kremlin's utilization of historical narratives as a strategic instrument in Russia's domestic and foreign policy, with a particular focus on the year 2020. This period is significant due to the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War, an event the Kremlin leveraged to bolster its historical narrative and, by extension, its neo-imperialist ambitions (Kremlin 2020; Roth 2020). The introduction sets the stage by highlighting the importance of history in Russian political discourse, emphasizing how the Kremlin's manipulation of historical events serves not only to reinforce its power domestically but also to project its influence on the international stage. The discussion further explores the intricacies of this manipulation, detailing the constitutional reform led by President Vladimir Putin as part of the broader strategy to entrench the regime's power through a revised historical narrative. This narrative not only glorifies Russia's past achievements but also positions the current regime as the inheritor of a proud and victorious tradition, thereby legitimizing its rule and policies.  The conclusion underscores the critical role that the Kremlin's politics of history plays in shaping Russia's domestic and international policy directions. It argues that this strategic use of history transcends mere narrative construction, serving as a pivotal element in the regime's efforts to consolidate power. The manipulation of historical memory is identified as a key mechanism for mobilizing public support domestically, while also serving as a tool for asserting Russia's power and influence on the global stage. The essay concludes that the Kremlin's politics of history is an essential component of its neo-imperialist strategy, designed to sustain and amplify the Putin regime's authority.  Keywords: Kremlin history, Russian neo-imperialism, Putin reforms, Historical manipulation, Soviet anniversary, Russian policy, History in politics, Neo-imperialist strategy, Power consolidation, Historical narratives

In the European geopolitical landscape, the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 intensified debates on neutrality's evolving role in international relations. This research zeroes in on Sweden and Switzerland, both historically neutral, to analyse shifts in the concept of neutrality against these global alterations. Employing grounded theory, an in-depth analysis of primary and secondary sources facilitated a comparative review of each country's stance post-crisis vis-à-vis their historical commitment to neutrality. Findings reveal Switzerland's sustained allegiance to traditional neutrality, whereas Sweden displayed apprehensions, pondering NATO membership for security. These observations highlight a broader global recalibration of neutrality's significance amidst shifting geopolitical alliances. The Russia-Ukraine episode has propelled states to reevaluate their strategic orientations. Switzerland's unwavering approach symbolizes neutrality's enduring essence, while Sweden's evolution underscores contemporary security challenges. It is pivotal to note the unique geopolitical contexts of each neutral nation, cautioning against universal extrapolations. This evolving neutrality paradigm warrants deeper exploration, especially concerning global diplomatic and peace initiatives. Keywords: Neutrality, International Relations, Geopolitical Shifts, Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Grounded Theory, Sweden, Switzerland, NATO Membership, Security Considerations, 21st Century Diplomacy.

In dieser Arbeit wird die militärische Spionageabwehr der Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg untersucht. Dabei handelt es sich um ein Forschungsdesiderat, dem sich bislang keine historische Arbeit primär oder detailliert mit dem Gegenstand widmete. Während Hans Rudolf Fuhrer (1982), Hans Senn (1995) und Christian Rossé (2015) den schweizerischen Nachrichtendienst für die Zeit von 1939 bis 1945 gut erforschten, wird hingegen die Tätigkeit der Spionageabwehr nur übersichtsartig thematisiert. In dieser Arbeit wird auf Aufbau und Form, die Methoden und Tätigkeiten des militärischen Spionageabwehrdienstes (Spab) während des zweiten Weltkrieges untersucht. Da die Spionageabwehr in enger Zusammenarbeit mit der Bundespolizei und der Bundesstaatsanwaltschaft operierte, werden Fragen hinsichtlich der Zuständigkeiten, Strukturen und Prozesse geklärt. In einem ersten Teil wird die Entstehung einer Spionageabwehrstruktur in der Schweiz ab dem Ersten Weltkrieg mit ihren unterschiedlichen Akteuren nachgezeichnet. Diese Entwicklung kulminierte 1939 in der Etablierung des Spab, deren Organisationsgeschichte hier erstmals die reichhaltig dargestellt wird. Ferner werden qualitative Erörterungen und Erkenntnisse – mit denen der Autor in einigen Fällen auch bestehende Mythen widerlegen kann –durch quantitative Erhebungen ergänzt, die für weiterführende Forschung von Interesse sind. Als Basis dienten die im Bundesarchiv vorhandenen Akten zur Spionage- und Sabotageabwehr, jene des persönlichen Stabs des Generals Guisans, der Generalstabsabteilung sowie die Akten der Bundesanwaltschaft während des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Die tragende Kraft hinter dem Spab war deren Chef, Robert Jaquillard. Ohne ihn hätte es keine effiziente und professionellen Spionageabwehr gegeben. Dabei wurde ein engmaschiges Netz aus autonom agierenden Funktionären im Aussendienst gespannt. Der Vorwurf einer geheimen Elite mit Carte-Blanche erscheint gerechtfertigt, wenn man den obsessiven Geheimhaltungshabitus des Spab und die fehlende richterliche Kontrolle berücksichtig. Die Funktionäre des Spab rekrutierten sich allesamt aus den grösseren Polizeikorps. Mit der Erweiterung der Methoden zur Erreichung ihrer Ziele, von Prävention hin zu Repression, griff der Spab direkt in die Hoheit der zivilen Behörden ein. Diese Verlagerung des Tätigkeitsfeldes der Spab prägte das Verhältnis zu den zivilen Bundesbehörden negativ, das in persönlichen Ränkespielen ausuferte. Es bleibt die Frage offen, ob der Spab eine Existenzberechtigung hatte. Obschon rechtsstaatlich hoch umstritten, kann der Spab auf eine stolze Bilanz zurückblicken. Hauptsächlich im Bereich der Kriminaltechnik setzte er wichtige Akzente und mit Robert Jaquillard hatte die militärische Spionageabwehr einen Vordenker, dem es entgegen teilweise antiquierter Denkweisen gelang, eine Brücke zur Moderne zu schlagen.

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This work examines Swiss military counterintelligence during the Second World War, a research desideratum to which no historical work has devoted primary or detailed attention to the subject matter. While Hans Rudolf Fuhrer (1982), Hans Senn (1995), and Christian Rossé (2015) have done an excellent job of researching the Swiss intelligence service for the period from 1939 to 1945, the activities of counterintelligence, on the other hand, have only been addressed in an overview. This work examines the structure, form, methods, and activities of the military counterintelligence service (Spab) during the Second World War. Since the Counterintelligence Service cooperates closely with the Federal Police and the Office of the Federal Prosecutor, questions regarding responsibilities, structures, and processes are clarified. In the first part, the emergence of a counterintelligence structure in Switzerland from the First World War onwards is traced to its various actors. This development culminated in 1939 with the establishment of the Spab, whose organizational history is presented here in rich detail for the first time. Furthermore, qualitative discussions and findings - with which the author can also refute existing myths in some cases - are supplemented by quantitative surveys that are of interest for further research. The files available in the Federal Archives on counterespionage and sabotage, those of General Guisan's staff, the General Staff Department, and the files of the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland during the Second World War served as a basis. The driving force behind the Spab was its head, Robert Jaquillard. Without him, there would have been no efficient and professional counterintelligence. A close-meshed network of autonomously acting functionaries in the field was spun. The accusation of a secret elite with carte blanche seems justified when one considers the obsessive secrecy habitus of the Spab and the lack of judicial control. The Spab's functionaries were all recruited from the larger police corps. By expanding the methods used to achieve its goals, from prevention to repression, the Spab directly encroached on the sovereignty of the civilian authorities. This shift in the Spab's field of activity harmed its relationship with the civilian federal authorities, which escalated into personal intrigues. The question remains whether the Spab had a right to exist. Although highly controversial from the point of view of the rule of law, the Spab can look back on a proud record. It was mainly in the field of forensic technology that it set essential accents, and with Robert Jaquillard, military counterintelligence had a mastermind who succeeded in building a bridge to the modern age, despite some old ways of thinking.

In November 1969 it became public that the arms manufacturer Bührle had illegally supplied weapons to Nigeria, which was in the midst of a civil war. Illegal because Switzerland officially embargoed Nigeria. For an adequate understanding of the topic, the historical contextualization with the neutrality and foreign policy of the 1950s and 1960s is imperative.
The constant practice of the Federal Council until the 1960s was not to allow war material exports to areas in which an armed conflict takes place or threatens to break out. This practice constituted an essential principle of Swiss war material export policy. As will be shown, this practice, reminiscent of the "general export ban" of 1946, was handled exceptionally volatilely. A federal decree from March 1949 admitted the exceptional approval of arms export if they did not contradict any international convention or were contrary to the interests of the federal state. The main research questions answered are: The Federal Council has negligently failed to codify the legal provisions in the approval of arms exports. It did so by orienting itself too much towards the political opportunism. The latter was the maxim of action.
Furthermore, the Federal Council was excessively open to the economic interests of the arms industry. The basis of legitimation was the armed neutrality doctrine codified in the Hague Convention on land warfare of 1907. The Federal Council undermined its neutrality in the 1950s and 1960s, due to its security policy and the doctrine of self-assertion. Moreover, economic policy considerations played a significant role in the licensing procedure for arms exports as well. Basis of the investigation is the federal files, archived at the Foundation of Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis) from the mid-1940s to the early 1970s.