MARSHALL PLAN

Μέχρι τώρα, το σχέδιο Μάρσαλ στην Ελλάδα και η παρουσία της Αμερικανικής Αποστολής Βοήθειας στην Ελλάδα έχει μελετηθεί γενικά. Απουσιάζει όμως η εξειδίκευση σε συγκεκριμένα έργα. Το αρχείο της ΟΛΘ ΑΕ, διαθέσιμο στους ερευνητές, προσφέρει την δυνατότητα να διερευνήσουμε συγκεκριμένες περιπτώσεις πλουτίζοντας την γενική εικόνα.
Το Λιμάνι της Θεσσαλονίκης καταλήφθηκε από τις Γερμανικές δυνάμεις κατοχής τον Απρίλιο του 1941. Τον Οκτώβριο του 1944 βομβαρδίστηκε από την Αγγλοαμερικανική αεροπορία με αποτέλεσμα να καταστραφούν σε μεγάλο βαθμό οι εγκαταστάσεις του. Την καταστροφή συμπλήρωσαν οι Γερμανοί κατά την αποχώρησή τους με ανατινάξεις με αποτέλεσμα η καταστροφή των εγκαταστάσεων να φτάσει το 80%. Μετά το τέλος του πολέμου, η νέα διοίκηση της ΕΖΘ και ΛΤΘ αναλαμβάνει την ανασυγκρότηση του λιμένος. Ωστόσο, η καταστροφή μηχανημάτων και ο παλαιομένος χαρακτήρας τους, η δυσχέρεια των προπολεμικών τεχνικών εταιριών, αλλά κυρίως η έλλειψη πόρων εμπόδιζε την γρήγορη και αποτελεσματική επίλυση βασικών προβλημάτων υποδομής.
Οι πρώτες αποκαταστάσεις έγιναν από τον βρετανικό στρατό. Στη συνέχεια, στο ευρύτερο πλαίσιο του Δόγματος Τρούμαν και του Σχεδίου Μάρσαλ και ειδικότερα στο πλαίσιο της αμερικανικής παρέμβασης στον ελληνικό εμφύλιο πόλεμο εμπλέκεται ενεργά ο αμερικάνικος παράγοντας. Συγκεκριμένα, αποφασίστηκε η συγκρότηση της Αμερικανικής Αποστολής Βοηθείας στην Ελλάδα (AMAG). Η αμερικανική εταιρία Steers-Grove υπέγραψε τρεις ειδικές συμβάσεις με το Λιμενικό Ταμείο Θεσσαλονίκης και ανέλαβε να επισκευάσει συγκεκριμένα έργα και να παραχωρήσει τεχνικό εξοπλισμό. Στην συνέχεια, το ΛΤΘ αναλαμβάνει το ίδιο με χρηματοδότηση από το σχέδιο Μάρσαλ. Το 1951, οι φορείς του λιμένα περιγράφουν ως άθλο την αποκατάσταση και την πλήρη λειτουργία του λιμένος. Η ανακοίνωση συνοδεύεται με στοιχεία και εικόνες από το αρχείο της ΟΛΘ ΑΕ.
Συνοψίζοντας  επιχειρείται να προστεθεί μια ουσιαστική ψηφίδα στο μεγάλο ζήτημα της αμερικανικής βοήθειας στην Ελλάδα εν μέσω εμφυλίου πολέμου και τη μεταπολεμική ανασυγκρότηση της χώρας.

Portugal and the post-war economic reconstruction.
The Marshall Plan and the Portuguese economy of the 50's.

The subject of this book is to study the participation of Portugal in the European Recovery Program (the official designation of the Marshall Plan), analysed within the general framework of the Portuguese economy of the period after the Second World War.
The post-war years constituted an entr’acte, important in the Portuguese economic history, where the participation of Portugal in the Plan Marshall fits in. It was during that period, from the War up to, symbolically speaking, the beginning of the execution of the First Development Plan, that our Country, between hesitations and readjustments, followed the transition paths from the economy of war to the economy of peace and structured the essential of the economic model which prevailed until the end of the Fifties.
Portugal’s meeting with the Marshall Plan has contributed to intensify the involvement of our Country in an increasing process of internationalization and opening onto the outside world.
This work stands up for and tries to demonstrate that: (i) the financial aid, granted to Portugal, constituted a foreign financing which mobilized Portuguese capitals too; (ii) its use was integrated and has introduced adjustments into the economic policy orientations of our Country; (iii) was important to contain and overcome the multifaceted crisis that affected the Portuguese economy and society at that time; (iv) contributed to eliminate our balance of payments deficit and facilitated the supply of commodities necessary to overcome the crisis and to reduce its economic and social effects; (v) provided the acquisition of equipments for some projects which depended on that supply to start or continue their activity.
To have resort to the Technical and Productivity Assistance, one of the least ‘visible’ faces of Portugal’s participation in the Marshall Plan, constituted one of its most important and lasting profits.
The Marshall Plan acted, therefore, essentially as a catalyst and an instrument for innovation and improvement. The history of our Country’s involvement in the Marshall Plan, that is studied in this work, is an integral part of the conjuncture of transition that our Country went through in the post-war; it was the way out bridge of the end of the Second World War, between co-operation and self-sufficiency, between the inexorability of the limits of the autarky and the possible autarky, between the Lei de Reconstituição Económica (Law of Economic Rebuilding) and the First Development Plan, between Portugal markedly agricultural and Portugal under an industrialization process that superimposed the projection of a rural Portugal.

Portugal e a Reconstrução Económica do Pós-Guerra.
O Plano Marshall e a Economia Portuguesa nos anos 50.

O objecto deste livro é o estudo da participação de Portugal no European Recovery Program (designação formal do Plano Marshall), observado no contexto geral da economia portuguesa do pós II Guerra Mundial.
Os anos do pós-guerra constituíram um entreacto, importante na história económica portuguesa, no qual se integra a participação de Portugal no Plano Marshall. Foi durante esse período, que decorreu da Guerra até, simbolicamente, ao início da execução do I Plano de Fomento, que o País, entre hesitações e reajustamentos, percorreu os caminhos da transição da economia de guerra para a economia de paz e estruturou o essencial do modelo económico que prevaleceu até aos últimos anos da década de 50.
O encontro de Portugal com o Plano Marshall contribuiu para a intensificação do envolvimento do nosso País num processo de crescente internacionalização e abertura ao exterior.
Este trabalho defende e procura demonstrar que: (i) o auxílio financeiro concedido a Portugal, constituiu um financiamento externo que mobilizou também capitais portugueses, (ii) a sua utilização integrou-se e introduziu ajustamentos nas orientações da política económica do País; (iii) foi conjunturalmente importante no que respeita à contenção e superação da crise multifacetada que na altura afectava a economia e a sociedade portuguesas; (iv) contribuiu para eliminar o défice da nossa balança de pagamentos e facilitou o abastecimento de bens essenciais necessários para debelar a crise e para lhe minorar os efeitos económicos e sociais; (v) viabilizou a aquisição de equipamentos para alguns projectos que dependiam desse fornecimento para o início ou a prossecução da sua actividade.
O aproveitamento do programa de Assistência Técnica e Produtividade, constituindo uma das faces menos 'visíveis' da participação de Portugal no Plano Marshall terá constituído algum dos seus benefícios mais importantes e duradouros. 
Por tudo isso, o Plano Marshall foi essencialmente um elemento catalizador e um instrumento de inovação e crescimento. A história do envolvimento do nosso País no Plano Marshall, que se estuda neste trabalho, foi parte integrante da conjuntura de passagem que o País atravessou no pós-Guerra; foi ponte de saída do fim da II Guerra Mundial, entre a cooperação e auto-suficiência, entre a inexorabilidade dos limites da autarcia e autarcia que era possível, entre a Lei de Reconstituição Económica e o I Plano de Fomento, entre o Portugal acentuadamente agrícola e o Portugal em processo de industrialização que se sobrepôs à projecção do País rural.

A ridosso della campagna elettorale per il 18 aprile 1948 si aprì un intenso dibattito sull'utilizzo dei fondi americani nel Sud Italia e sull’opportunità che il Piano Erp poteva costituire per una definitiva risoluzione della questione meridionale. Questo fu l'argomento del convegno “Erp e Mezzogiorno" svoltosi a Bari nel settembre 1948, che vide coinvolti, come organizzatori, gli esponenti pugliesi dell’ex-azionismo e della nuova “Terza Forza” e, come relatori, alcuni tra i più noti esperti di questioni agrarie, finanziarie e industriali del Paese.
Fu Michele Cifarelli a curare i temi e l’impostazione dei lavori.
In quel momento segretario regionale pugliese del Pri, Cifarelli coinvolse nel progetto Francesco Compagna, Guido Macera, Mario Paggi, Manlio Rossi-Doria, Ferruccio Parri, Ernesto Rossi, il carteggio con i quali è stato recuperato in diversi archivi e posto in calce al volume.
A lui si deve, inoltre, un’attualissima riflessione sul ruolo fondamentale dell’Europa per risolvere il problema delle “aree depresse”. L’European Recovery Program, dunque, poteva costituire un’occasione per rinsaldare il progetto dell’unificazione europea e per affrontare finalmente in una dimensione più ampia, internazionale, il problema del Sud.
La pubblicazione degli Atti non fu mai portata a compimento, nonostante lo stato avanzato del lavoro di raccolta e di redazione dei discorsi: attraverso il recupero delle carte di Michele Cifarelli, conservate in diversi archivi, è oggi possibile, a 70 anni di distanza dal Congresso, completare l’operazione di sistemazione e di edizione.
Lo scopo di questo volume è testimoniare il grande contributo dato dal Congresso al dibattito sulla ricostruzione post-bellica e all’orientamento dell’opinione pubblica, attraverso tutti i canali di informazione allora disponibili, in primo luogo la carta stampata e i cinegiornali.

United Europe was born as a construction entrusted with the anchorage of the Member States to capitalism, thus representing an intensifier of neoliberal thought and practice. Mainly, this result has been achieved through a sort of market of reforms, i.e. through the concession of financial assistance as a counterpart for the acceptance of the neoliberal orthodoxy, in line with what happened with the distribution of the funds related to the Marshall plan. The same scheme can be observed in connection with the enlargement of the European construction to the South and East, with the distribution of the cohesion funds, as well with the ongoing restructuring of sovereign debts.

Το βιβλίο αυτό αποτελεί μια πρώτη απόπειρα να φωτιστεί η «αθέατη» πλευρά της αμερικανικής βοήθειας στην Ελλάδα, η βοήθεια στη στέγαση: ένα απολύτως προσδιορισμένο επεισόδιο που τοποθετούσε το δίλημμα «καπιταλισμός ή κομμουνισμός» στο πολύ οικείο επίπεδο του καθημερινού βίου και της διαμόρφωσης τρόπων ζωής. Σε μια εποχή που τα κράτη της Ευρώπης ανοικοδομούσαν την κατοικία για τους πολλούς στη βάση του συστήματος που είχαν αναπτύξει από τον μεσοπόλεμο, δηλαδή του κρατικά παρεχόμενου μπλοκ κατοικιών, οι Έλληνες δεν έλαβαν από πρόνοια του κράτους παρά σε ελάχιστες ποσότητες το προϊόν «τελειωμένη κατοικία». Αντί αυτού, αυτό το οποίο τους προσφέρθηκε ήταν το αποτέλεσμα της μελετημένης εφαρμογής μιας αμερικανικής σύλληψης, μιας τεχνογνωσίας, που ακόμα τελούσε υπό έλεγχο και τελειοποιούταν, και ονομάστηκε «υποστηριζόμενη αυτοβοήθεια στη στέγαση». Η Ελλάδα υπήρξε το πρώτο παγκοσμίως πείραμα μεγάλης κλίμακας με βάση το οποίο οι Αμερικάνοι μπόρεσαν να αποτιμήσουν τα οφέλη της αυτοβοήθειας στη στέγαση, την οποία, μέσα από μια σειρά επίσημων θεσμών, φορέων και οργανισμών θα εφάρμοζαν στη συνέχεια, σχεδόν σε όλον τον «αναπτυσσόμενο» κόσμο.
Για τους Αμερικάνους σύμβουλους στέγασης που ήρθαν στην Ελλάδα, η προτροπή για αυτοστέγαση στη διάρκεια της Ανοικοδόμησης δεν ήταν απλώς υποκατάστατο της παροχής «τελειωμένης στέγης», ούτε η εκπλήρωση ενός γενικού λαϊκού αιτήματος για στέγαση με ίδια μέσα (ως ικανοποίηση της ιδιαίτερης «φύσης» του Έλληνα, αυτού του υποτιθέμενου λάτρη της ιδιόκτητης στέγης). Με την εφαρμογή των προγραμμάτων αυτοστέγασης, ο ελληνικός λαός αναμενόταν ότι θα διδαχθεί κοινωνικές συμπεριφορές, θα μυηθεί σε νέα ιδανικά και αξίες -τελικά, θα αποκτήσει μια νέα ψυχολογία, η οποία θα διαμόρφωνε τη νέα, εκσυγχρονισμένη, ταυτότητά του. Στη σφαίρα επιρροής των Αμερικάνων, η με ίδιες προσπάθειες απόκτηση ιδιωτικής στέγης έγινε πραγματικά το κυρίαρχο εργαλείο μέσω του οποίου μια ολόκληρη χώρα διαπραγματεύτηκε τη μετάβασή της στη νεωτερικότητα.

If successfully realised, the Belt and Road Initiative will be the most ambitious and expansive developmental project the world has ever seen. It is not, however, unprecedented. In the aftermath of the Second World War the United States developed what was then an equally unprecedented and ambitious initiative designed to simultaneously facilitate the (re)development of some of the world's key economies and reinforce its own position as the leader of the western world. Both the American Marshall Plan and China's BRI are important expressions of geoeconomic influence and power. This paper compares the two projects from the perspectives of 'hegemonic transitions' and 'comparative hegemony' in order to highlight some striking similarities and noteworthy differences, and gauge the prospects for the BRI and its possible scenarios. Comparatively speaking, the BRI does not have the same sort of compelling geopolitical imperatives and narrative that the emerging Cold War provided for American hegemonic leadership. The Chinese project also lacks the comprehensive global institutional architecture developed in the aftermath of the Second World War that facilitated American influence. Consequently, it may prove more difficult for China to utilise the BRI to translate potential geoeconomic leverage into the sort of hegemonic influence that the US enjoyed during the Cold War, despite its unparalleled ambitions.

Ameryka powinna sięgnąć po politykę stanowczego powstrzymywania, by przeciwstawić radzieckiemu imperium zdecydowaną siłę na wszystkich obszarach, na których Rosjanie usiłowaliby zaszkodzić interesom światowego pokoju i stabilności - pisał w 1947 r. amerykański dyplomata i politolog GEORGE F. KENNAN

In November 1969 it became public that the arms manufacturer Bührle had illegally supplied weapons to Nigeria, which was in the midst of a civil war. Illegal because Switzerland officially embargoed Nigeria. For an adequate understanding of the topic, the historical contextualization with the neutrality and foreign policy of the 1950s and 1960s is imperative.
The constant practice of the Federal Council until the 1960s was not to allow war material exports to areas in which an armed conflict takes place or threatens to break out. This practice constituted an essential principle of Swiss war material export policy. As will be shown, this practice, reminiscent of the "general export ban" of 1946, was handled exceptionally volatilely. A federal decree from March 1949 admitted the exceptional approval of arms export if they did not contradict any international convention or were contrary to the interests of the federal state. The main research questions answered are: The Federal Council has negligently failed to codify the legal provisions in the approval of arms exports. It did so by orienting itself too much towards the political opportunism. The latter was the maxim of action.
Furthermore, the Federal Council was excessively open to the economic interests of the arms industry. The basis of legitimation was the armed neutrality doctrine codified in the Hague Convention on land warfare of 1907. The Federal Council undermined its neutrality in the 1950s and 1960s, due to its security policy and the doctrine of self-assertion. Moreover, economic policy considerations played a significant role in the licensing procedure for arms exports as well. Basis of the investigation is the federal files, archived at the Foundation of Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis) from the mid-1940s to the early 1970s.

Marshall Planı, Avrupa’nın gelişmesinde önemli bir projedir.
Bugünkü Avrupa Birliği’nin temellerini oluşturan Marshall Planı’na;
Türkiye, 8 Temmuz 1948 tarihinde dâhil edilmiştir. Türkiye, Marshall
Planı içerisinde olmasına rağmen, kalkınamamıştır. Türkiye’nin
Marshall Planından beklentilerinin yüksek olması, Türkiye’yi Amerika
Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ile daha da yakınlaşması sonucunu
getirmiştir. Çalışmamız bağımlılık teorisi çerçevesinde Marshall
Planının getirmiş olduğu modernleşme kuramını ele almaktadır. Bu
bağlamda Batı Avrupa’nın modernleşme kuramı çerçevesinde
gelişmesinin sebepleri, çalışmamızda ortaya konulurken, Türkiye’nin
ise, Marshall Planı ile ABD’ye bağımlılığının artması hususu ele
alınmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, Marshall Planının Türkiye’de başarısız
olmasının sebepleri ortaya konulmaktadır.

1938 - Crystal Night and related questions of legal status of Jewish minority in the period of National Socialism

This article deals with one of the turning point for Jewish minority living in Germany in 1938. So called Crystal Night was long-time prepared and planned pogrom which helped national socialists to sharpen the anti-Jewish restrictive practices.

Tento příspěvek se zabývá jednou z klíčových událostí roku 1938 pro židovskou menšinu žijící v Německu - tzv. „křišťálovou nocí“ – což byl dlouho připravovaný a plánovaný pogrom, který posloužil národním socialistům jako záminka pro zostření protižidovských opatření. V druhé části se tento článek zabývá právními předpisy hospodářské povahy vydanými mezi léty 1938 – 1939, na základě kterých byli nejen němečtí, ale později i ostatní Židé na Německem okupovaných územích nejprve odstraněni z hospodářského života a později oloupeni o všechen jejich majetek. Tento příspěvek dokazuje, že jedním z klíčových důvodů pro pronásledování Židů představovala právě snaha o získání jejich majetku.

This paper aims to perform an analysis of the complex course of events that surrounded the division of Europe after World War Two and, more particularly, the adoption of the Marshall Plan, with special emphasis on the positions of East-European governments, such as the one of Romania. This topic may now be subjected to a more comprehensive investigation, thanks to the newly-published literature, based on more open archives and a more objective view of this thorny subject. Hence, this article reviews part of the recent historiography related to the Marshall Plan and further traces its roots by moving backwards to the interwar period and that of the Second World War.

Mały, kłapouchy foksterier o imieniu Nipper to jeden z najsłynniejszych psów w historii. Urodził się w 1884 r. i trafił w ręce londyńskiego scenografa Marka H. Barrauda. Po jego przedwczesnej śmierci Nipperem zaopiekował się brat Marka Francis. Prowadził pracownię malarską. Kiedyś zobaczył, jak Nipper wsłuchuje się i wpatruje w tubę grającego gramofonu. Uwiecznił tę scenkę. Wkrótce obrazek wpadł w oko pracownikowi wytwórni fonograficznej, która dziś działa pod szyldem EMI. Dyrekcji firmy obrazek przypadł do gustu tak bardzo, że uczyniła zeń swe logo i Nipper zagościł na płytach winylowych. Pojawiła się też plotka, nieprawdziwa zresztą, że Nipper wpatrzony w tubę słuchał nagranego głosu swego pierwszego pana - his master's voice.

Come si comportarono gli Stati Uniti nel secondo dopo guerra? e come reagirono
davanti la minaccia della Guerra Fredda?
Il testo che segue nasce proprio da questi interrogativi. Gli anni tra il 1944 e il 1947
segnarono il corso della Guerra Fredda e della storia a venire: da un lato furono il frutto
dell’assetto mondiale post-bellico e dall’altro definirono gli equilibri internazionali tra i
due blocchi.
Gli Stati Uniti furono gli unici ad uscire vincitori dal secondo conflitto mondiale sia
sotto il profilo bellico, che sotto quello economico. Questa posizione di forza gli ha
permesso di impostare delle politiche volte ad affermare la loro presenza sulla
scacchiera internazionale.
Nei paragrafi a seguire si vuole fornire l’idea di come gli Stati Uniti hanno reagito
davanti alla minaccia espansionista del colosso sovietico, nonostante cambi di
maggioranze politiche e visioni interne non sempre omogenee. Questa tensione verso il
contenimento ha permesso agli americani di attuare politiche e dottrine rimaste nella
storia.

In this article, we analyze the role played by George Frost Kennan diplomat in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. At the end of World War II, amid tensions involving the U.S. and the USSR, Kennan proposed a strategy aiming to contain a possible action expansionist power rival.  In  their  analysis,  the  main  danger  posed  by  the  Soviet  Union  was  not  military,  but  its ideological attractiveness within the western democratic societies. From this assumption, Kennan elaborated the doctrine of containment, basilar axis of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. A career diplomat and expert on Soviet society, Kennan produced throughout his life a voluminous work  related  to  American  diplomacy  and  its  main  challenges  in  the  context  of  the  Cold  War. Nevertheless,  since  the  beginning  of  the  second  Truman,  Kennan  moved  away  from  core government  power  and  expressed  a  number  of  criticisms  of  the  foreign  policy  of  his  country, which,  for  him,  encouraged  the  arms  race.  Thus,  Kennan  criticized  the  implementation  of  the Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO and the role played by the U.S. in the Korean War and Vietnam.  

After World War II, we can define the main situation in Europe by the word ''catastrophe'', no matter if the European country is on winners or losers side because for Europe ''nobody wins'' in World War II. Both infrustructures and economies of European states were collapsed so, in order for these states to recover, a planned and systematic arrangement was needed.

Propaganda für die Demokratie
Die Filme des Marshall-Plans

Der nach dem US-amerikanischen Außenminister George C. Marshall benannte "Marshall-Plan" trug wesentlich zur wirtschaftlichen und politischen Stabilisierung Nachkriegseuropas bei. Unter den "freien Völkern Europas" profitierte insbesondere Deutschland von den Segnungen dieses "European Recovery Programs" (ERP). Die Idee eines "neuen Europa" ohne Handelsbarrieren, Seite an Seite mit den ehemaligen westlichen Kriegsgegnern, bedeutete nicht nur wirtschaftlichen Aufstieg, sondern vermittelte auch wichtige Identifikationsmöglichkeiten für eine "geistig obdachlos" gewordene deutsche Gesellschaft. Die bisher kaum beachteten, propagandistisch angelegten Filme des Marshall-Plans sollten sicherstellen, dass nicht nur ein positives Demokratieverständnis, sondern auch ein bestimmtes Amerikabild in den Köpfen der Bevölkerung verankert wurde: die USA als verlässliche Supermacht, kultureller Impulsgeber und moralisches Vorbild.

Von Frank Mehring
COPYRIGHT Dieses Manuskript ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Der Empfänger darf es nur zu privaten Zwecken benutzen. Jede andere Verwendung (z.B. Mitteilung, Vortrag oder Aufführung in der Öffentlichkeit, Vervielfältigung, Bearbeitung, Übersetzung) ist nur mit Zustimmung des Autors zulässig. Die Verwendung zu Rundfunkzwecken bedarf der Genehmigung des DeutschlandRadios.

With the beginning of the Second World War, Greece entered the war fighting against Italy in 1940, which caused the country to weaken, and was eventually occupied by Germany. After the defeat of the Axis Powers and the Second World War ending, civil war occurred in Greece between 1946-1949. The country got even weaker on political, economic and military aspects. The political and economic problems in Greece, plus the impact of the Civil War and the Cold War dragged the country into an even worse situation. Greece needed a more powerful country’s military and economic aid, in order to rebuild itself.
However, Turkey’s balanced policy and neutral stance let to some sense of global isolation, Turkey did not actively participate in the war due to its neutral policy, an effort to establish positive relations with both Allied Forces and Axis Powers. Turkey struggled to receive support within the postwar bipolar world order and turned to the Western world and their alliances. The United States was unwilling to accept the self-serving Soviet Union demands upon Turkey, especially over the straits issue.
In 1947, Turkey and Greece grew closer to the West with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which ultimately led to their joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Signed between Western countries in 1949, NATO was created in order to counter the growing Soviet threat. In 1950, as an act of good faith, Turkey and Greece committed troops to the United Nations Army in South Korea as a part of the Korean War effort, hoping to be accepted in to NATO.
Turkey and Greece enjoyed closer relations NATO countries throughout this period and due to their strategic locations, the US supported the accession of both countries to NATO.
Although Turkey and Greece's efforts to join NATO brought no immediate results, both countries persistently pursued policies that attracted the support of the United States. Eventually, on May 15, 1951, the US submitted a NATO proposal to grant membership to Turkey and Greece.
Following a series of negotiations, Greek and Turkish parliaments both accepted the membership proposal put forth by the NATO Council. On February 18, 1952, Greece and Turkey’s memberships to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were validated.
The first part of this work comprises topics namely: the general situation of Greece after the German occupation, the Civil War and post-Civil War process, the general situation in Turkey, the transition to a multi-party system, Turkey’s intent to align with the West and the Democratic Party period. The second part comprises chapters covering the following topics: the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the establishment of NATO and the Korean War, with facts derived from Turkish, Greek and English sources. The information is given about that time period. The third part analyses information derived from newspaper columns, articles, books and other publications reflective of the time period during the admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO.
Keywords: Cold War, Greece’s membership to NATO, Korean War, Marshall Plan, NATO, Truman Doctrine, Turkey’s membership to NATO

The relation between the U.S. and Europe has gone through many events including war. But during the aftermath of World War II, Europe had suffered a huge defeat and many European countries could not survive on its own. That is why the U.S. establishes the Marshall Plan since they are the richest country in the world after WWII ended. With the Marshall Plan, the U.S. is willing to aid the European countries especially the allied states in the West by providing an economic reconstruction as well as to penetrate any communist activities. But the plan didn’t go smoothly because there are still some actors that are against the U.S. plan. The purpose of this research is to investigate what drove the U.S. to help the Western European states counterparts and how does each region respond to the Marshall Plan with both the U.S. and Western European respective foreign policy. This research is done by the case study method because the data was collected through many different sources with deep analysis and study of the case. As a result, the data collected prove that the U.S. is willing to help the Western European states because they have abandoned the isolationism by aiding other states that are suffering from the war and trying to penetrate any communism activity in the European regions. Also, it has caused the Soviet Union to act against the Marshall Plan by establishing the Molotov Plan to counter American domination. This recommends that in order to build good cooperation with other states, the U.S. should ignore any argument that is against the foreign policy of the U.S. and start focusing on proceeding and execute the policy for a better result and achievement.

This essay examines the French reception of the Carl Schmitt's thought, specifically its Hegelian strand. Beginning with the early readings of Schmitt's thought by Alexandre Kojève and Georges Bataille during the mid-1930s, it attends to the partial adoption of Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction and his theories of sovereignty and neutralization in Kojève and Bataille's Hegelian writings, as well as to their critical responses. The essay then turns to examine the reading of Kojève by the Jesuit Hegelian résistant Gaston Fessard during the war, a reading specifically intended to delegitimate Vichy as a “slave-prince,” resistance to whom would be legitimate. The final section returns to Bataille and his 1948 book The Accursed Share in order to propose that his Maussian understanding of the Marshall Plan suggested an overcoming of the friend/enemy distinction, a suggestion that was later made explicit in a 1957 talk by Kojève at Düsseldorf before Schmitt and a group of his supporters. At stake throughout are both the thoroughly critical reception of Schmitt, the particular political inflection of Hegel carried out by and in Kojève's reading, and certain methodological links between conceptual history and the reception history.

In October 1951 John McAteer, who had been selected by the Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC) as a member of a team that was to visit the United States under the auspices of Ireland’s Marshall Aid Technical Assistance (TA) programme, had his application for an entry visa rejected. This paper examines this episode of Ireland’s Marshall Plan participation experience drawing upon files in the Irish National Archives. It begins by tracing the difficulties the 1945 split between rival Irish trade union congresses created for efforts to foster joint employer-trade union action within Ireland’s Marshall Aid TA programme. It then turns to the manner in which one of the union congresses, the ITUC, selected the members of its team to visit the USA and the issues raised by the selection for part of its own support base as well as for agencies of the Irish and US governments involved in Marshall Aid administration. Once McAteer had been refused a visa the ITUC decided to combine protest at his exclusion with continued participation in the TA project despite internal demands that it withdraw entirely.  Briefing of the press by ITUC officers may have been responsible for press coverage that suggested that the Stormont government was to blame for the US attitude towards McAteer. No evidence to support such a contention has been found in the Irish National Archives files examined.

Whereas much has been written about the economic vicissitudes of postwar Greece, the same cannot be said about the concomitant intellectual developments. What accounts for the evolution of Greece's development discourse, particularly the shift in attitudes toward industrialization in the 1940s? Existing interpretations are found wanting, primarily for downplaying the independent role of economic ideas in accounting for the rise in industrial optimism. In this context, the role of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in influencing, not the economy per se, but the discourse about the economy is important. The international transmission of ideas, however, also depends heavily on the "milieu of potential receivers" (Spengler 1970). Mounting antagonism between Left and Right inevitably politicized industrialization debates and conditioned visions for Greece's postwar development. The role of engineers-a professional community whose interests transcended the conventional Left-Right divide, and whose conception of development was steeped in the very same notions of modernization and technocratic efficiency that underscored much of the European Recovery Program-was critical. By placing engineers at the forefront of reconstruction, early Marshall Plan administrators in Greece not only helped the rapid dissemination of industrialism, but also imbued the vision of development with an allegedly apolitical and technocratic aura - one which persisted long after engineers were replaced by economists in the charting of development policy.

BEGINNINGS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: OUTBREAK OF THE COLD WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE (1945–1949)

Abstract

The aim of this article was to show the origin of the transatlantic security partnership and the process that led to the creation of NATO in 1949. The article draws attention to the aggravation of East–West relations, which resulted in the outbreak of the Cold War and the transformation of the US policy after the Second World War. The worsening of the international situation also led to the initiation of Western European countries’ cooperation and integration in the area of security and defence. The outbreak of the Cold War was the result of a significant transformation of international relations consisting mainly in the emergence of two superpowers, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union. Due to Moscow’s expansionist policy, after 1945 the United States abandoned its traditional isolationist policy in favour of active involvement in Europe’s problems. The initiatives adopted in 1947 following the new American approach, i.e. the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and
the containment doctrine are analysed. Western European countries’ actions in the field of security are also taken into account, because the commitment of the United States to defend Europe was dependent on the development of cooperation in this area by the Europeans themselves. This cooperation was reflected in the Treaty of Dunkirk signed by the United Kingdom and France in 1947 and in the Treaty of Brussels signed a year later by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, which led to the creation of the Western Union. The main problems that emerged during the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations and their resolution within the framework of the transatlantic bargain, which is the basis of NATO's functioning, are also analysed.

Key words: NATO, Cold War, Soviet expansionism, policy of containment,
Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, security of Western Europe, Treaty of Dunkirk, Treaty of Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty

Il movimento europeista nacque giacobino con la Rivoluzione Francese, si ripropose contro di essa come programma reazionario, rinacque a metà Ottocento come corollario dei moti sociali, percorse il Novecento tra socialismo riformista, liberalismo e fascismo, e infine si concretizzò nel secondo dopoguerra come espressione di un'ideologia nazionalista continentale, semplice estensione dell'ideologia patriottica nazionale. Ma le basi materiali su cui formalmente sorse risiedevano nella politica degli Stati Uniti, che avevano vinto la guerra e avevano bisogno di utilizzare un fiume di dollari immobilizzati dalla Grande Depressione. Dollari che furono elargiti secondo un piano preciso dettato dalle nuove opportunità scaturite dal dopoguerra. Non a caso tale piano fu elaborato e proposto dal segretario di Stato americano Marshall, non un politico ma uno stratega, ex capo di stato maggiore durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Si trattava della continuazione della guerra con altri mezzi.

L'articolo prenderà in esame l'esperienza dell'Italia all'interno dell'Organizzazione per la co-operazione economica europea (Oece) negli anni della prima legislatura repubblicana. A par-tire da una riflessione sulle motivazioni tanto economiche quanto politico-diplomatiche che si posero alla base dell'adesione italiana all'Oece, questo contributo analizzerà le misure di li-beralizzazione commerciale perseguite dal paese all'interno degli organi decisionali dell'or-ganizzazione. Si darà risalto alla dimensione europea delle iniziative che l'Italia elaborò nell'ambito della progressiva riduzione di dazi, tariffe e contingentamenti alle importazio-ni di beni provenienti dai mercati internazionali. Si passeranno in rassegna le principali ini-ziative presentate in sede Oece dalla delegazione italiana e verranno presi in considerazione i provvedimenti promossi a livello europeo da parte dei maggiori partner della Penisola: i piani Stikker e Pella (1950); la nascita dell'Unione europea dei pagamenti (Uep, 1950); il pacchetto di liberalizzazioni introdotto da La Malfa (1951); la reintroduzione delle restrizioni quantitative da parte di Regno Unito e Francia (1951-1952). Questo contributo intende perciò sondare la natura, i presupposti e gli esiti della "filosofia liberalizzatrice" sviluppata dalle classi dirigen-ti dello stato italiano nel più ampio contesto del processo di integrazione economica del Vec-chio continente e della genesi di quello che sarebbe poi divenuto il mercato comune europeo.

Non fu il liberismo a far cadere valore e produttività, fu al contrario la caduta di valore e produttività a instillare nella testa degli uomini l'esigenza di cercare qualche espediente, uno qualsiasi pur di sfuggire all'incubo della caduta del profitto: ecco perché si è rispolverato il liberismo, già morto e sepolto fra le due guerre (ammesso e non concesso che sia mai esistito), ovvero l'illusione che si potesse, con il miracoloso mercato, con le leggi selvagge della "mano invisibile" di Smith che tutto aggiusta, rimediare alla dittatura inesorabile della legge del valore.