In November 1969 it became public that the arms manufacturer Bührle had illegally supplied weapons to Nigeria, which was in the midst of a civil war. Illegal because Switzerland officially embargoed Nigeria. For an adequate understanding... more
In November 1969 it became public that the arms manufacturer Bührle had illegally supplied weapons to Nigeria, which was in the midst of a civil war. Illegal because Switzerland officially embargoed Nigeria. For an adequate understanding of the topic, the historical contextualization with the neutrality and foreign policy of the 1950s and 1960s is imperative. The constant practice of the Federal Council until the 1960s was not to allow war material exports to areas in which an armed conflict takes place or threatens to break out. This practice constituted an essential principle of Swiss war material export policy. As will be shown, this practice, reminiscent of the "general export ban" of 1946, was handled exceptionally volatilely. A federal decree from March 1949 admitted the exceptional approval of arms export if they did not contradict any international convention or were contrary to the interests of the federal state. The main research questions answered are: The Federal Council has negligently failed to codify the legal provisions in the approval of arms exports. It did so by orienting itself too much towards the political opportunism. The latter was the maxim of action. Furthermore, the Federal Council was excessively open to the economic interests of the arms industry. The basis of legitimation was the armed neutrality doctrine codified in the Hague Convention on land warfare of 1907. The Federal Council undermined its neutrality in the 1950s and 1960s, due to its security policy and the doctrine of self-assertion. Moreover, economic policy considerations played a significant role in the licensing procedure for arms exports as well. Basis of the investigation is the federal files, archived at the Foundation of Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis) from the mid-1940s to the early 1970s.
By the end of 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will enter into force, creating new treaty organs that will further develop international institutional law as it applies to these quasi-international organizations. The states parties to... more
By the end of 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will enter into force, creating new treaty organs that will further develop international institutional law as it applies to these quasi-international organizations.
The states parties to the ATT did not create a new international organization to support the treaty regime, but instead created treaty organs to do the same task, specifically the Conference of States Parties (CSP) and the Secretariat. While the creation of international organizations was once seen as the best solution, states are increasingly attracted to the creation of treaty organs instead. The emergence of yet more treaty organs into the already crowded field shows that this approach may now be the dominant method for giving effect to bureaucratic regimes, displacing the older preference for formal international organizations. In creating these organs, the states parties to the ATT are drawing on several decades’ worth of experience with these bodies and the initial steps taken already show that the ATT organs will continue and buttress crystallizing international practice on treaty organs.
This article will review the text of the ATT pertinent to the treaty organs and place the new regime into a comparative study of similar treaty organs. It will also contribute to the scholarship on treaty organs by functionally applying international institutional law to these entities. This approach is not merely a wish; rather, it represents the current practice regarding these organs, as evidenced through the wide-ranging comparative study of the application of international institutional law.
This Handbook identifies reporting synergies among select multilateral conventional arms treaties and instruments. It provides practical guidance to States on sources of information, methods and approaches that can be used to facilitate... more
This Handbook identifies reporting synergies among select multilateral conventional arms treaties and instruments. It provides practical guidance to States on sources of information, methods and approaches that can be used to facilitate reporting and information sharing between the Arms Trade Treaty, the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and the Firearms Protocol. Additionally, the Handbook offers a useful side-by-side comparison of the ATT initial report template and the PoA reporting template, as well as between the ATT annual report template and the UNROCA reporting form.
1. This Treaty hereby establishes a Secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of this Treaty. Pending the first meeting of the Conference of States Parties, a provisional Secretariat will be responsible for the... more
1. This Treaty hereby establishes a Secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of this Treaty. Pending the first meeting of the Conference of States Parties, a provisional Secretariat will be responsible for the administrative functions covered under this Treaty. 2. The Secretariat shall be adequately staffed. Staff shall have the necessary expertise to ensure that the Secretariat can effectively undertake the responsibilities described in paragraph 3. 3. The Secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties. Within a minimized structure, the Secretariat shall undertake the following responsibilities: (a) Receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by this Treaty; (b) Maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of contact; (c) Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty implementation and promote international cooperation as requested; (d) Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this Treaty; and (e) Perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties.
A central element of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the risk-assessment criteria in articles 6 and 7. The flexibility in the wording of the two articles has required efforts to reach common interpretations of the criteria in order to... more
A central element of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the risk-assessment criteria in articles 6 and 7. The flexibility in the wording of the two articles has required efforts to reach common interpretations of the criteria in order to lessen the scope for different assessment outcomes. These efforts, as well as improved and aligned national practices, will enhance the treaty's long-term impact. While there are limits to how far some states parties will want to go, there is a genuine preparedness to look at ways to increase the effectiveness of the ATT that should be encouraged and supported.
Il presente studio intende offrire un’analisi comparata della modalità con cui i Governi di Francia, Germania, Regno Unito, Spagna e Svezia informano i rispettivi Parlamenti in merito alle esportazioni nazionali di equipaggiamenti... more
Il presente studio intende offrire un’analisi comparata della modalità con cui i Governi di Francia, Germania, Regno Unito, Spagna e Svezia informano i rispettivi Parlamenti in merito alle esportazioni nazionali di equipaggiamenti militari. Lo studio analizza poi la situazione attuale in Italia, posta sotto scrutinio, e il percorso con cui vi si è giunti. L’analisi combinata del quadro europeo e delle specificità italiane mira a formulare una serie di raccomandazioni concrete e fattibili per migliorare la comunicazione governativa italiana al Parlamento: l’obiettivo primario è trovare un punto di equilibrio, oggi e nel medio periodo, tra la necessità di fornire al Parlamento gli elementi per una valutazione adeguata e quella di proteggere gli aspetti più delicati della politica estera, di difesa e industriale del Paese.