Paolo Di Leo

This article proposes an alternative to O'Connell's thesis regarding the young Augustine's theory of man through a detailed parallel analysis of the Latin text of the De Genesi contra Manichaeos and of the Greek text of the Enne-ads and illustrates Augustine's dependence on and at the same time distance from Plotinus' thought. Through a strictly philological analysis of all the texts under exam the article demonstrates that O'Connell's conclusions, which for years have stirred a heated debate among scholars, cannot be held. Augustine never thought of man in Paradise as disembodied, as O'Connell suggests, but rather as provided with a body that was different from the one man has on earth. In the last forty years of scholarship on the relation between Plotinus and Augustine one of the most controversial questions has surely been that of the understanding of the human soul by Augustine. Did he see human souls, and hence human beings tout court, as fallen from a previous state of bliss in a celestial pre-existence? The scholar who first posed this question, R.J. O'Connell, gave it a positive answer: in his works he sustains that, in his view on human nature and on the origin and ultimate essence of the soul, Augustine did not just sympathize with a theory at odds with the orthodox doctrine of the Church, but openly sustained it. As a base for his speculation Augus-tine used the writings of Plotinus, through which he would have de facto 'platonized' Christianity, introducing an understanding of the faith that results in a falsification of its true message. It is easy to see the deep relevance of such a hypothesis concerning Augustine's speculation: for, if correct, it would completely reshape our understanding of one of the figures that most influenced the development of Western thought, while at the same time it would prompt a re-evaluation of the

In the last 30 years or so there has been a flourishing of scholarly works on Plotinus, above all in the form of commentaries on each single treatise of the Enneads. This has deepened our knowledge of one of the greatest thinkers not only of antiquity, but of the history of philosophy. That this statement is not a hyperbole is shown by the esteem in which thinkers such as Hegel and Bergson held Plotinus. It was, therefore, a dutiful task of scholars to elucidate and study in detail the works of such a great mind; a task, as everybody who has engaged with the Enneads knows, most difficult, given the unsystematic nature of Plotinus’ exposition topped with his often cryptic, if not altogether obscure, style. However, as great and praiseworthy the efforts of scholars have been, and as deeper an understanding of Plotinus’ thought, of its sources and of its problems we have reached, the Enneads continue to be an unknown work for the larger public of cultivated and informed readers. It is not uncommon, at least in my experience, that during a conversation on philosophy with other colleagues, well versed in ancient thinkers besides the modern authors on whom they specialise, any mention of Plotinus provokes surprise and the not always so shy acknowledgement of ignorance regarding his work. ‘Plotino . . . chi era costui?’ one could say, paraphrasing Manzoni’s famous sentence. The Enneads of Plotinus series, edited and directed by J.M. Dillon and A. Smith, to which this commentary belongs, aims precisely at making Plotinus known to the wider public of cultivated readers, thus undertaking a task whose importance cannot be stressed enough. This, and the series published in French by Flammarion under the direction of L. Brisson and J.-F. Pradeau, represent the only attempt at fulfilling this task in a systematic way. In both series the only limitation is the fact that the original Greek text is not provided and by the peculiar habit, in fashion both in the English-speaking world and in France, to transliterate Greek words when it is necessary to refer to them. The lack of a facing Greek text makes it difficult for the reader who knows some Greek to check on the original to assess the soundness of the translation, while the transliterated Greek words do not help in any substantial way those who do not know Greek. I stress this point, because the series is not only very useful for those who are new to Plotinus, but it is equally useful and important for experts, given the fact that it approaches the text from a genuinely philosophical point of view. This helps to clarify and bring into focus the problems that underpin the entirety of philosophy in its historical unfolding, making explicit the position that Plotinus took in relation to these problems. The present work is divided into three parts. A brief introduction highlights the fundamental problems that chapters 30–45 of IV.4 and chapters 1–8 of IV.5 deal with, while at the same time providing a clear schematisation of the arguments. A translation of the text follows, which distinguishes itself in its clarity and readability. Whoever is acquainted with Plotinus knows how difficult, at times baffling, his prose can be, which not even Porphyry’s editing could fully tame. At times G.’s translation differs significantly from A.H. Armstrong’s, either for the sake of clarity or more radically for different choices regarding the reading of the Greek text. In the latter case, the reading followed by G. is always signalled and discussed in the commentary: in such cases, as already noted, the inclusion of the Greek text would have been an indispensable tool. After the text there THE CLASSICAL REVIEW 48

This article proposes to solve the question of whether Porphyry could be considered to have been one of the authors of Augustine’s Platonicorum libri by centering on a seemingly marginal detail: Augustine’s acquaintance, during his stay in Italy and immediately after his return to Africa, with Porphyry’s engagement with the doctrine of the astral body. The writings of Porphyry that were allegedly part of the Platonicorum libri show a clear and unmistakable presence of the doctrine of the astral body. However, in his works composed in Italy Augustine does not appear to be aware of this. Thus, most likely Porphyry’s works were not part of the books that had such a great influence in Augustine’s conversion.

This article deals with the concept of freedom in Bergson and in Plotinus. This concept is a central one in Bergson's work, as he himself remarks many times: it is on this concept that he builds his thought and starting from it he interrogates the thought that precedes his. In investigating the presence of this concept in Plotinus, Bergson sees it as linked to the concept of the individuality of the soul, and to this te concept of freedom would be confined in Plotinus' thought. What follows will question Bergson's reading, showing that the concept of freedom in Plotinus is much more pervasive and closer to that of Bergson than Bergson himself thought. The result of this comparison will be to suggest that both philosophers understand freedom as will. Instead of closing the problem, this conclusion opens up new questions both historical and philosophical: Can the concept of will be seen as a foundational one in the history of philosophy since its Greek inception? Is will t...

Articolo sottoposto a doppia blind review. Inviato il 10/12/2017. Accettato il 20/01/2018. This article deals with the concept of freedom in Bergson and in Plotinus. This concept is a central one in Bergson's work, as he himself remarks many times: it is on this concept that he builds his own thought and starting from it he interrogates the thought that precedes his. In investigating the presence of this concept in Plotinus, Bergson sees it as linked (and confined to) the concept of the individuality of the soul. This article seeks to question Bergson's reading, showing that Plotinus' concept of freedom is much more pervasive and closer to that of Bergson than Bergson himself thought. As a result, I suggest that both philosophers understand freedom as will. Instead of closing the problem, this conclusion opens up new questions both-historical and philosophical: Can the concept of will be seen as a foundational one in the history of philosophy starting from its Greek inception? Is the will the more radical concept under which to elaborate on freedom? *** Bergson's philosophy has in its center a paradox: reality as such is the manifestation of freedom. This peculiar position is made evident already in the title of his major work, L'évolution créatrice, where that simple adjective attributes to the unfolding of nature the free act of making the unexpected emerge. In turn, this implies that the source of this freedom is a consciousness. All that lives, then, is the springing up of a free consciousness: the élan vital unfolds as an act of freedom, based on no previous plan or on an already codified script. One would be tempted to water down this daring statement, to eliminate what in it is paradoxical, by changing the word «freedom» with the milder word «contingency». Were such an operation possible and legitimate within the frame of Bergson's thought, then the other horn, so to say, of the paradox would have been dealt with: we would have been able to eliminate altogether the word consciousness from the equation. However, neither of these words can be eliminated: the writings of Bergson are filled with them and in fact his entire philosophical experience rests on them. The duration (durée) is the accumulation of all the acts of freedom, which progressively build up to shape

This article proposes an alternative to O'Connell's thesis regarding the young Augustine's theory of man through a detailed parallel analysis of the Latin text of the De Genesi contra Manichaeos and of the Greek text of the Enne-ads and illustrates Augustine's dependence on and at the same time distance from Plotinus' thought. Through a strictly philological analysis of all the texts under exam the article demonstrates that O'Connell's conclusions, which for years have stirred a heated debate among scholars, cannot be held. Augustine never thought of man in Paradise as disembodied, as O'Connell suggests, but rather as provided with a body that was different from the one man has on earth. In the last forty years of scholarship on the relation between Plotinus and Augustine one of the most controversial questions has surely been that of the understanding of the human soul by Augustine. Did he see human souls, and hence human beings tout court, as fallen from a previous state of bliss in a celestial pre-existence? The scholar who first posed this question, R.J. O'Connell, gave it a positive answer: in his works he sustains that, in his view on human nature and on the origin and ultimate essence of the soul, Augustine did not just sympathize with a theory at odds with the orthodox doctrine of the Church, but openly sustained it. As a base for his speculation Augus-tine used the writings of Plotinus, through which he would have de facto 'platonized' Christianity, introducing an understanding of the faith that results in a falsification of its true message. It is easy to see the deep relevance of such a hypothesis concerning Augustine's speculation: for, if correct, it would completely reshape our understanding of one of the figures that most influenced the development of Western thought, while at the same time it would prompt a re-evaluation of the