Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson

This is a review essay of <Jonas Mekas: Again, Again It All Comes Back to Me in Brief Glimpses> (MMCA, Seoul, Nov. 8, 2017- Mar. 4, 2018), arguably the biggest- if not, as I noted in the review, THE first- retrospective of Mekas’s career in Asia.

Parting ways with the popular understanding of Mekas as the pioneer and master of the diary mode of filmmaking (e.g. <365 Day Project>, (2007)) , marked by its irreducibly personal anecdotes and secrets, I draw attention to a different, almost counterintuitive aspect of his audiovisual images where the personal partakes of, if you will, ‘impersonal’ memories (of which Bergson and Deleuze spoke), or, a la Alain Resnais , <Toute la mémoire du monde>. 

“Memories, they say my images are my memories. No no no! These are not memories: this is all real what you see - every image, every detail, everything is real, everything is real and it’s not a memory, it has nothing to do with my memories anymore. Memories are gone, but the images are here, and they are real! What you see, every second of what you see, here, is real. Is real. Right there in front of your eyes, what you see, it’s real. There, in front of you. Yes, from that screen, it’s all real.” (Jonas Mekas, <Outtakes From The Life of a Happy Man>, 2012)

This book explores Henri Bergson's notions of Simultaneity and Duree in Sadeq Hedayat's The Blind Owl and William Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury, two prominent modernist narratives in contemporary Iranian and American literature. This book demonstrates how Bergsonian interpretation of temporality (duree), manifests itself in Hedayat's The Blind Owl and Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury which incorporates all the standard features of stream of consciousness and monologue writing and which deliberately defy the traditional temporal division through analysis of similarities and differences in structure, techniques and entity of the two texts. It examines the narratological qualities of stream of consciousness  on the level of language-speech and pre-speech level in both texts, to argue the nature  of memory images.

Pour Gilles Deleuze, l’expérience artistique atteint une limite où les facultés ne fonctionnent plus normalement, car elles n’ont plus face à elle un simple donné. Le projet de l’empirisme transcendantal tel que le définit Deleuze est de comprendre et montrer ce niveau sous-jacent de l’expérience ordinaire, que l’on ne perçoit pas d’habitude parce qu’on n’y prête pas attention. Ce niveau est transcendantal car il rend raison du donné, il est la condition du donné et le constitue. Ce niveau suppose donc que les facultés que sont la perception et la mémoire ne fonctionnent plus normalement, habituellement. Dans cette étude, nous allons, à partir de l’assise de l’empirisme transcendantal, tenter de voir comment le cinéma néoréaliste, et plus précisément dans le cinéma de Rossellini montre ce niveau transcendantal de l’expérience en révélant des espace-temps qui rompent avec l’espace-temps délimité de l’expérience quotidienne. Le néoréalisme est justement un cinéma qui donne à voir des images et des sons qui rompent avec notre perception habituelle. Nous allons voir en quoi ce cinéma peut-être une expérimentation des limites de la perception où l’on percevrait l’imperceptible dans le perceptible, l’indicible dans le dicible. C'est précisément pour Deleuze l’imperceptible qui est Idée, fondement et structure du réel donné.

What is the relationship between Foucault’s concept of biopower and Deleuze’s concept of control? Despite the similarities between these two concepts, there is not a single scholarly article that solely thematizes this question, nor a comparative survey of the answers given so far. This essay aims to fill this lacuna. Drawing on Deleuze's unpublished and untranslated lectures on Foucault, the original thesis of this essay is thus that biopower and control are the same concept of power in both content and form.

In short, this essay does for the concept of the assemblage what Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben did for Foucault in their essays on the dispositif: it extracts from a large body of work the core formal features of its operative methodology or logic.

Bergson’u vitalist, spritualist bir filozof olarak gören akım-
lardan farklı olarak Deleuze, Bergson’un virtüelite kavra-
mından hareketle yeni bir materyalist ontoloji türetmiştir.
Bu dönüşümü serimlemek için burada öncelikle Bergson’un
felsefesi ana hatlarıyla, kısaca izah edilmektedir. Bu, müm-
kün olduğunca Deleuze’ün müdahâlesi parantezine alına-
rak, bir Bergson okuması olacaktır. Ardından Deleuze’ün
kendi Bergson monografileri incelenmekte ve nihayetinde
Deleuze’ün Bergson’un imaj kavramından hareketle geliş-
tirdiği sinema felsefesi açıklanmaktadır. Deleuze, Bergson’u
virtüel hâlinden çıkarıp, geçmişin bir katmanından anın
ihtiyaçlarına göre güncellemiştir. Lakin her güncelleme bir
farklılaşmadır.

Driven by a negentropic impulse, this article brings traditional Chinese qi theory and yin-yang theory into dialogue with Bergson's notion of élan vital and Deleuze's notions of the virtual and the actual. It shows that Daoist spiritual alchemy and Zennist introspective meditation involve an inversion of Bergsonian differentiation or creative evolution. The suggestion is that Daoism and Zen privilege the virtual over the actual, re-formability over form. Therein lies the essence of Daoist rejuvenation and Zen awakening. The claim is that the existence of a virtual double makes a " thing " vital, energetic, and spiritual. The article invokes the reasoning behind the Yijing to indicate that hyper-technologization goes hand in hand with spiritual impoverishment, and that spiritual alchemy in our era should help address the spiritual deficit created by technology. [Peter Zhang & Lin Tian. Qi and the Virtual in Daoist and Zen Literature: A Comparison with Western Vitalist Thought. China Media Research, 14(4): 99-109] 10

It is possible to raise pictorial questions in Kandinsky depending on the time rather than the space? How can time be the measure of a Kandinsky work when the pictorial becomes basically apparent by an extension on a material support?In Cours du Bauhaus, a compilation of Kandinsky notes, appear terms such origin, transformation, adaptation, movement, evolution, etc. There are concepts extracted from studies and experiments linked with natural sciences. Kandisnky transfers the results of the experimentation about transformations that arise in alive organisms in pictorial work. Kandinsky manuscripts recently published, confirm his interest about evolutionist theories. Kandinsky knew the principles proposed by Darwin. Although seems that he accepts the Darwinian idea of a common ancestor, in a text of Punkt und Linie will assert that laws that govern the formal similarities between living beings, are not directly applicable in artistic work. In a Cours du Bauhaus note emphasizes the importance of the vitalism, a doctrine that supports that vital phenomenons have a singular and specific character that moves away every conception that reduces to mechanical or physic-chemical phenomenons. The bibliographic reference of this note is Die Kultur der Gegenwart, the same publication of which he extracts some of the outlines that appear in Punkt und Linie. It is the only time that appears the name of Herni Bergson in a Kandinsky text.Kandinsky develops a representation system from a theoretical writings that see in the change the deeper reality of things, a formal grammar in which evolution form will substitute each forms made one following the other, and in which the movement has more than in the successive positions of a mobile. Darwinian natural selection theory, tried to explain species adaptation to environment. Kandisnky will define laws which will regulate adaptation between formal elements. One shape is the result of a mutual adaptation between the material and the psychological. Kandinsky introduces in some of his works a device that causes movement: the pendulum, a device that fits perfectly to the mechanisms that our intellect uses to reproduce movement. The pendulum is adapted to the observer's interior self, a place where the given time is true, never outside this one. The pendulum is in the Kandinskyan system, the paradigmatic formal element of the movement.Kandinskyan grammar is not based in laws that require a previous knowledge. The outlines of the formal elements are enough permeable to make one self insert its action and modify it according to his needs. Kandinsky does not pretend to show us some events but to attend them; we do not have to observe something that happens in front of us, because what happens in front of us is ourselves. We witness a swing between two ends apparently opposites, then we witness the change, we are in the movement. Is the moment of the reciprocal adaptation between our and the composition time. Kandinskyan language, based on the action, combines in present.We will conclude saying that a Kandinsky drawing is not a representation of something steady but a views succession: the result of an effort placed in the future. Although we are on a material support, the shapes had not lost their contact with movement yet. The formal elements we perceive are given in the future. Are drawings that sink in a temporal dimension rather than a space dimension: they last because we make them last in our duration. We will end also saying: Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, "Introduction à la métaphysisque" and L'Évolution créatice, Bergson documents, are primary sources that configure Kandinsky work.

El objetivo de este artículo es estudiar el Curso de Xavier Zubiri de 1975 Reflexiones sobre lo estético (dos lecciones) a la luz de la “noología”, horizonte de pensamiento que el autor español dejó planteado al final de su vida. Allí lo estético cobra otra dimensión en su estudio al vincular las tres esferas de la noología: la aprehensión primordial de la realidad (el trato inmediato con las cosas), el logos sentiente (la afirmación de la realidad por medio de todas las formas del lenguaje) y la razón sentiente (la construcción en la realidad de nuevas formas de realidad). A partir de estas tres categorías cardinales, vemos lo estético en un primer nivel de la aprehensión misma (en el ámbito de la sensación), otro segundo nivel en donde lo estético se diseña y son las artes las que expresan lo fruitivo de la realidad y por último, un tercer nivel que son las obras de arte propiamente dichas.

У раду се анализира реконструкција естетичког система Анрија Бергсона, коју је у својим програмским и есејистичким написима дао Станислав Винавер. Посебна пажња посвећена је бергсонистичкoj доктрини о стваралачкој (књижевној) еволуцији која показује значајну меру сличности с адекватним учењем руских формалиста.

The paper analyzes the reconstruction of Henry Bergson’s aesthetics, which is provided in programmatic and essayistic writings of Stanislav Vinaver. Special attention has been paid to Bergsonian theory of creative (literary) evolution, which shows significant similarity to adequate teachings of Russian formalists.

Bergson elaborou sua filosofia e seus principais conceitos a partir de estudos específicos de temas bem delimitados, embora em cada um desses estudos ele levantasse um desses “grandes problemas” propriamente filosóficos. Analisando suas obras, no entanto, perceberemos a recorrência constante daquela que talvez seja a noção-chave de sua filosofia. Este estudo procura mostrar como a noção de virtualidade está implicada na teoria bergsoniana da memória, do tempo, da evolução, bem como em suas concepções relativas ao pensamento, à linguagem e à criação, e como ela exprime toda uma orientação característica, essencial, do pensamento de Bergson.

RÉSUMÉ: La notion de virtualité chez Bergson
 
Bergson a élaboré sa philosophie et ses principaux concepts par des études spécifiques sur de thèmes bien délimités, bien que dans chacun de ces études il posait l’un de ces “grands problèmes” proprement philosophiques. Cependant, en analysant ses oeuvres, nous nous rendons compte de l'importance d'une notion qui est, peut-être, la notion clé de sa philosophie. La notion de virtualité est impliquée, en effet, dans la théorie bergsonienne de la mémoire, du temps, de l'évolution, aussi bien que dans leurs conceptions relatives à la pensée, au langage et à la création – et exprime toute une orientation caractéristique, essentiel, de la pensée de Bergson.

Conference paper, Association of Art Historians, Brighton, 2019. Panel 'Vitalist Modernisms'.

The connection between surrealism and Bergson's ideas has received relatively little critical scrutiny. While conspicuous, given a general accord regarding a rejection of positivism and a sense of the limits of scientific knowledge, the reasons for this oversight might be identified in terms of the vicissitudes of Bergson's reputation and the historical shifts in the critical focus on his work. By the time André Breton had published his Manifesto of Surrealism (1924), Bergson's philosophical star was waning, and it is most likely that the association of Bergsonism with the deeply conservative 'spiritualism' lingering over from the previous decade largely determined Breton's circumspection towards ties with the philosopher. Furthermore, it is only since the growing absorption of Gilles Deleuze's reappraisal of Bergson's significance-as well as the deeper critical facilitation of evolutionary theory within philosophy and the humanities at large-that Bergson's philosophically and politically redeemed writings can be seen more clearly to relate to certain key principles of surrealism: most notably, a vital affirmation of life in all its complexity and excess. This paper will explore the ways in which a post-Deleuzian reading of Bergson might open up a clearer picture of the relations between the philosopher of the élan vital and an intellectual movement that, perhaps more than any in the modernist era, embraced the radically transformative possibilities of an open-ended, spontaneously creative principle of life and art.

My contribution to Bergsonian studies consists in extracting Bergson’s theory of time from his three main texts, Time and Free Will (TFW), Matter and Memory (MM) and Creative Evolution (CE), with references to his other works, The Creative Mind (CM), Duration and Simultaneity (DS), Mind-Energy (ME), The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (TSMR), An Introduction to Metaphysics (Introduction). This extraction, as well as offering a concise exposition of this theory, also reveals its incomplete and fragmentary nature, and the remainder of this study consists in an attempt to fill in the gaps and respond to questions which arise along the way.
    I find the biggest attraction of Bergson is in his attempt to grasp the nature of time and show a way of treating time as metaphysical reality, overcoming difficulties humbly admitted to by St. Augustine.  But Bergson’s theory of duration is not a completed, finalized theory. Firstly, it is not put forward in a systematic way and needs to be extrapolated from his more general discourse; secondly, it contains inconsistencies and gaps; and thirdly, it does not address some obvious issues. Moreover, some of Bergson’s claims are too strong and need to be examined carefully.
    In the expository chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), I examine Bergson’s theory of time, which can be called a theory of duration, from his major texts, Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution. In each book Bergson introduces duration anew as if disregarding claims made in previous texts; thus each time duration is given a different, sometimes seemingly opposite, meaning. However, where an unsympathetic critic would see inconsistencies, I see phases of conceptual development of the idea of duration. This being said, Bergson’s phases are not linked in a satisfactory way. A key strategy of this study, therefore, will be to fill gaps, raise further questions, and develop new arguments.     
    I move from duration as a psychological process in Time and Free Will to duration as the universal movement in Creative Evolution, via the intermediate proposal in Matter and Memory that duration is a general principle of being. Duration in Bergson turns out to be an all-embracing concept, itself equivalent to the idea of being. Indeed, can we find in Bergson anything which is not duration? Spatial objects, one may suggest, reading Time and Free Will. But as readers of Matter and Memory, we have to accept duration of matter and duration within matter. In Creative Evolution, everything non-durational is reduced to an illusion, and from this position, we can equate ‘duration’ and ‘being’. The main aspect in which the idea of duration differs from the idea of being is that duration already entails a characteristic of being as moving which, according to Bergson, is its necessary feature. What the term ‘duration’ achieves is to weld motion onto being and demonstrate that being cannot be regarded in any other way than as being in motion, the being that has a history. Also, it emphasizes the omnipresence of motion and change, so that even in those cases when we struggle to find and define substance, such as in music or thought, we still find change and motion.
    I take on board Bergson’s idea that duration is heterogeneous. The idea of heterogeneity emerges when Bergson analyses psychological continuity. Elements of such continuity (emotions, sensations) are not clear-cut, even though we commonly distinguish one emotion or sensation from another. This division, I agree with Bergson, is artificial and done for convenience, as in reality one state of consciousness flows into another and ultimately there is just the unity of the conscious process corresponding to the life of a concrete person. 
    However, this idea of heterogeneity entails a paradox. Although its elements are inseparable, they are different and diverse, so, on the one hand, Bergson wants us to accept that we cannot individualize them as if they were autonomous units, but on the other hand he does not allow them to be merged into a homogenized stream. In Chapter 5, I attempt to resolve this paradox by claiming that the identity of elements within duration, not given ostensibly, is nevertheless manifested through their unique effects on the world. Bergson says very little about the structure of heterogeneity, and later in Chapter 5, I analyse its composition on a general metaphysical level.
    In Chapter 6, I address time as such and, in particular, Bergson’s claim that time must be understood exclusively in qualitative terms. I argue that temporal ordering, pastness and futurity cannot be reduced to qualities, and that time cannot be understood without relations. Also, I dispute Bergson’s attempt to consider time in separation from space, as there is no purely temporal reality totally free from spatial features.
      Chapter 7 marks a transition from duration as a general metaphysical term to its concrete manifestations. Concrete examples of duration, given by Bergson, include psychological and biological processes, movement of a physical body and, as an all-embracing duration that includes all worldly processes, the universe. I propose the duration of a concrete human being as such an all-embracing duration because a human self involves all layers of being, from minerals to mind, which can acknowledge any worldly phenomena and account for them in an epistemic process. Of course, if the universe could be said to contain all worldly processes, the self merely represents them.   
    In Chapter 8, I look at epistemic processes and begin to analyse the perception of one’s own selfhood in self-consciousness. According to Bergson, an epistemological act is defined either by its analytical or intuitive component, but I contest his opposition of intuition and intellect and present the epistemological act as a three-fold process of primary (pre-conceptual) intuition, intellectual rationalization and secondary (post-conceptual) intuition. I emphasize that the perception of one’s self, acquired in this way, gives a picture of an all-embracing unity of human existence, from various manifestations of matter and life to the complexities of mind. 
    Bergson presents duration as an uncontroversial and harmonious continuity, but Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate that, inevitably, duration entails discontinuity in various senses. In Chapter 9, I suggest a view on reality, which reinstates its continuity. I suggest that when we observe continuity from the past to the present, in actual fact we remain in the present, retaining knowledge of the consecutive events. This knowledge interferes with our view of the past and prevents us from seeing it as a fresh present with an indefinite future. On the other hand, if we look backwards into the past, we can get a sense of continuity, moving from the latest and more complex to the earlier and less complex, without making different temporal periods overlap and interfere with one another.

Özet Deleuze, özcü düşünme biçimine getirdiği eleştiriler sebebiyle Batı felsefesindeki önemli filozoflardan birisidir. Onun açısından özcü düşünme eleştirilmesi gereken yapısal düşünme biçimidir. Yapısal düşünme biçimi yerine oluşa dayalı fark düşüncesi getirilmelidir. Oluşa dayalı fark düşüncesini savunan filozoflardan birisi Bergson'dur. Özcü düşünmeye ciddi eleştiriler yönelten Bergson, aşkın varlık görüşü yerine içkin varlık görüşünü benimsemiştir. Bu görüş doğrultusunda her şeyi evrene içkin olarak açıklamıştır. Bergson açısından evren dâhil tüm şeyler evrimle meydana gelmiştir. Deleuze'e göre, Bergson'da tüm şeyler sürenin farklılaşması sonucunda oluşmuştur. Dolayısıyla bu makalede Bergson'un Deleuze felsefesine etkisi ele alınacaktır. Ayrıca Deleuze'un Bergson felsefesi üzerinden özcü düşünceyi nasıl eleştirdiği tartışılmaya çalışılacaktır.
Abstract Deleuze is one of the important philosophers in Western philosophy due to his criticism to essentialist thinking. According to Deleuze essentialist thinking is a form of structural thinking that needs to be criticized., A difference idea based on existence should be brought instead of structural thinking. Bergson is one of the philosophers who advocates the idea of difference based on existence. Bergson who criticised essencialist thinking seriously, has adopted the view of immanent being instead of transcendent being. With this view he explained everything inherently to the universe. According to Bergson all things including universe happened by evolution. According to Deleuze all things in Bergson were formed as a result of the differentiation of time. So, in this article Bergson's impact on Deleuze's philosophy will be discussed. Also, how Deleuze criticized essentialist thinking through Bergson's philosophy will be discussed.

Lionel Astesiano Joie et Liberté chez Bergson et Spinoza CNRS Éditions 464 pages Il peut sembler étonnant de vouloir rapprocher Bergson et Spinoza. En effet, nous avons du côté de Spinoza, une pensée systématique et déterministe et chez Bergson une philosophie qui s'oppose à toute forme de dogmatisme et de systématicité pour s'intéresser à la vie de l'esprit et aux données immédiates de la conscience. Alors que Spinoza prétend rendre compte des affects comme un géomètre, Bergson rejette le parallélisme psychophysiologique, arguant qu'il n'est pas possible d'appliquer le modèle mathématique à la vie de l'esprit dans la mesure où l'on ne peut traduire en termes quantitatifs ce qui est d'ordre qualitatif. Cependant, si Bergson se réfère dans ses oeuvres à des philosophes comme Leibniz ou Spinoza pour souligner les limites d'un rationalisme, à ses yeux, trop systématique, il présente, dans ses cours, Spinoza sous un jour plus favorable et ne cache son attachement envers ce penseur dont il lira régulièrement les oeuvres tout au long de sa vie. Envisagée sous cet angle, on pourrait donc aller jusqu'à penser que l'oeuvre de Bergson est, sous certains de ses aspects, un dialogue implicite avec la pensée de Spinoza. Ainsi, l'éloignement apparent qui semble les rendre incompatibles l'un à l'autre demande à être nuancé et interrogé. C'est à cette interrogation que procède Lionel Astesiano dans ce livre, lorsque, après avoir souligné les différences qui les séparent, il met en évidence la communauté d'intuition qui les réunit et que Bergson lui-même n'a pas manqué de percevoir. Soulignant une certaine proximité entre l'intuition initiale de la pensée de Spinoza et celle des Alexandrins, Bergson y perçoit une dimension d'ordre mystique qui serait comme en partie dissimulée par l'exposé mathématique et systématique de la pensée de Spinoza, qu'il faut distinguer du spinozisme qui réduirait justement cette philosophie à sa systématicité. Lionel Astesiano s'efforce donc dans ce livre, sans jamais tomber dans le piège de privilégier l'une au dépens de l'autre, d'établir des passerelles entre ces deux pensées. Aussi, sans nier leurs irréductibles différences, il nous permet de mieux comprendre ce qu'entend Bergson lorsqu'il affirme que tout philosophe a deux philosophies, la sienne et celle de Spinoza. On pourrait ne voir dans cette formule que l'affirmation selon laquelle Spinoza se situerait totalement du côté de l'intelligence et de sa tendance éléatique à nier le mouvement et la durée, tandis que Bergson se situerait du côté d'une intuition et renouant avec une approche plus vivante de la réalité. Cependant, cette approche est trop simpliste et se trouve remise en question dans le 1

Este libro es un ensayo sobre el pensamiento de Deleuze.
Por un lado, eso quiere decir que aquí seguimos un camino libremente trazado, de carácter introductorio, en medio de la multiplicidad de su obra, pero que exige de antemano un recorte del tema. Como el título del
libro lo sugiere al proponer como punto de partida el tema de la imagen, nos embreñamos inmediatamente en un laberinto de problemas filosóficos cuyos despliegues fueron dando lugar a nuevas trayectorias en el intento de definir el estatuto y el alcance de este concepto, tan
volátil y versátil como la luminosidad de una proyección
cinematográfica, que desparrama toda su realidad concentrada al chocarse con una pantalla. Por otro lado, este libro es resultado de una investigación científica (posdoctorado), lo que circunscribe su contenido a una rigurosa aplicación de métodos según criterios que nos permitieron construir el laberinto deleuziano de la imagen manteniendo la coherencia de su estructura argumentativa.
Sobre la bibliografía utilizada, privilegiamos las traducciones existentes de las obras de Deleuze (en castellano o en portugués), aunque siempre cotejándolas con el texto original en francés. Esto se debe a una necesidad de hacer filosofía en América del Sur, que implica de
algún modo desterritorializar al propio Deleuze de la filosofía francesa aprovechando brechas como la sustancial mención de Glauber Rocha en los libros sobre cine.
Este hallazgo fue como una aguja en el pajar, algo nuestro sobre lo que ellos escriben y que sirve de estímulo para pensar nuestra cultura y los problemas del presente y obedece también a una finalidad pedagógica del libro, que puede ser útil en la enseñanza de la filosofía y en
proyectos de extensión universitaria.
Dejo momentáneamente de escribir en primera persona del  plural, como lo recomienda la norma académica, para confesar la dificultad paradójica que fue para mí escribir filosofía en mi lengua materna después de veinticinco años viviendo en Brasil. Aprendí a filosofar en portugués, pero la necesidad de publicar un libro en mi tierra natal me empujaba más allá del miedo, ante la falta de erudición con la tradición filosófica argentina. Lo mismo se podría decir de Deleuze, que para mí era un filósofo “nuevo” al cual me había aproximado Bergson, por su crítica al mecanismo cinematográfico del pensamiento, que Deleuze supo dar vuelta recalcando su teoría de las imágenes y usarla de
trampolín para evaluar el alcance filosófico del cine. Colmar esas deficiencias a corto plazo sería imposible, pero lo posible era aceptar el desafío y escribir como quien escribe filosofía por primera vez.

Capítulo final de cierre del libro "Paracinema. La desmaterialización del cine en las prácticas artísticas" (Trama editorial 2012, premio "Escritos sobre arte" de la Fundación Arte y Derecho, Madrid 2011). Este capítulo se mantiene prácticamente intacto con respecto a la versión original escrita en 2008 como conclusión de la tesis doctoral "Paracinema: de la materialdad fílmica a la desmaterialización del cine".

A fenomenologia procura criar, desde Hegel, um modelo explicativo para a história que esbarra em suas próprias limitações. Forma-se uma teoria sobre as teorias da história, mas que são incapazes, mesmo com toda a sofisti-cação, de explicar o devir histórico ou a prática da escrita historiadora. É menos em "Tempo e Narrativa" do que em "A memória, a história e o esquecimento" que Paul Ricoeur demonstra as aporias do discurso filosófico frente à plastici-dade da produção historiográfica. Mas não está em jogo as velhas celebrações a respeito da historiografia francesa, dos Annales. O que se destaca é o entrecru-zamento entre o que Deleuze, ao ler Bergson, entende por "objeto real" com-preendido como "imagem-cristal" ou "descrição cristalina", onde o real e o imaginário, o presente e o passado, o atual e o virtual são indiscerníveis, duplas por natureza. O que se pergunta com esta investigação não é apenas o que é o objeto da história, mas qual sua natureza, como ele funciona ao se traçar uma zona de indiscernibilidade em que se pode perguntar como se pensa a história e fazer o inventário de sua escrita, ao se perguntar qual a natureza do documento historiográfico ou das perguntas que levam a se realizar uma pesquisa histórica.

«Deleuze è un filosofo difficile e suggestivo che induce esercizi di ammirazione spesso sconfinanti in mimetismi fastidiosi. Il deleuziano, in genere, non spiega ma “ammicca”. Attraverso l’uso dei concetti modulati dal sintetizzatore analogico “Deleuze” l’esegeta deleuziano suppone una complicità nel lettore e, invece di commentare, spiegare e illustrare, procede per parole d’ordine. L’effetto è quello di una comunicazione per iniziati che si rivolge a chi già anticipatamente condivide la bontà di una ipotesi ermeneutica, lasciando indifferenti gli altri. La scrittura di Giacomo Pezzano è invece ostentatamente piana. Pezzano non rifugge l’esempio, anzi lo cerca con insistenza. Non teme di illustrare il sistema-Deleuze con frequenti citazioni tratte dall’attualità, non ha nemmeno in orrore il senso comune tanto dileggiato dallo stesso Deleuze e dai deleuziani, perché sa che questo, se preso alla lettera, è foriero di tutti paradossi che animano la deleuziana “logica del senso”. La chiarezza della sua esposizione è mirabile e permette anche al lettore non specialista di partecipare dell’universo Deleuze. Pezzano legge la filosofia di Deleuze sotto la grande categoria della trasformazione: sub specie transformationis. Non una filosofia della trasformazione (genitivo oggettivo), ma una filosofia che appartiene alla trasformazione: filosofia della trasformazione è un genitivo soggettivo. Questo significa che il mondo è un evento, cioè un processo di individuazione in atto e che la filosofia, in quanto modulazione di concetti, ne è, non la descrizione, ma la continuazione con altri mezzi» (dalla Prefazione di Rocco Ronchi)

The current article deals with the correlation between virtual and physical reality as they concern the
body. The thesis of this article is that the lived body transposed into virtual reality becomes a body without organs in Deleuze’s terms, i.e. the lived body, a sensitive field of sensorial events immersed in a lived space, becomes a virtual body made up of intensities, of pure forces or magnitudes within a vector space, thereby losing its affective qualities. Furthermore, lived and virtual bodies build up a correlation bridged not by intentionality, as phenomenology would maintain, but by sensation. Virtuality is thus characterised by both the loss of corporeality and the simulation of the lifeworld. But how can the split between the real and the virtual body be bridged? On the one hand, in Deleuze’s conception of sensation, real and virtual collapse into one another so that the real world ‘resonates’ with its virtual double. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of form relates both realities in terms of a correlation of signification between the physical and the existential realms. With recourse to the notion of structure or form, I will argue that the phenomenal and the virtual do not represent different modes of being, but are bound by a correlation
ruled by sensation as a system of intensive forces.

Dans la littérature européenne, il y a toute une lignée de la «folie» ambigüe, parfois lucide, censée de révéler la vérité, de faire justice, de corriger le réel. C'est la «folie» de Hamlet, du pirandellien Enrico IV, d'Alonso Quijano auto-proclamé Don Quichotte. Sous le masque, de tels héros agissent afin d'améliorer l'ordre moral du monde, et d'en tirer au jour une vérité essentielle, jalousement cachée ou malheureusement oubliée. Motif littéraire aux origines beaucoup plus anciennes que le Baroque qui l'a consacré, el gran teatro del mundo croise ainsi l'auto-fiction du fou, le plus lucide y compris, tel qu'en témoignent l'oeuvre de Shakespeare, de Cervantes, de Pirandello, et jusqu'à un certain point, de I.L. Caragiale. Chez ce dernier, il y a  tout un monde à l’envers, qui, à quelques exceptions près, reste comme tel après la fin du texte; l'anarchie d'une fête des fous s'y installe à la longue. Les personnages de I.L. Caragiale défient, presque tous, soit moralement «le raisonnable», soit pathologiquement «la rationalité». Le comique y découle non seulement «du mécanique plaqué sur le vivant», mais aussi d'un soupçon de folie «plaquée» sur la raison. Notre approche est donc une relecture de la dramaturgie de I.L. Caragiale, dans la perspective d'une archéologie de l'imaginaire, plus précisément d'une (arché)typologie de la folie comme dérapage ou (prémisse de) réparation, telle que l'a déjà consacrée une longue histoire des mentalités européennes.
Mots-clés: «monde à l’envers», «nef des fous» (stultifera navis), (dé)raisonnable, el gran teatro del mundo, I.L. Caragiale, Michel Foucault, Năpasta [Le Malheur], D'ale carnavalului [Du carnaval], O scrisoare pierdută [Une lettre perdue].

(Abridged but largely revised Japanese version now published in: https://amzn.to/2yMjgso)
  My aim is to clarify the concept of virtuality expressed in Bergson’s philosophy.
  According  to  Deleuze,  virtuality  is creativity  and  starkly contrasts with possibility. However, an examination of Matter and Memory shows that (1) when the word “virtual” modifies  “action”,  it  is  interchangeable  with  “possible”,  and expresses  the  indeterminacy  of  the perceiver’s  will,  which  is  one  of  the  necessary  conditions  of  perception;  (2)  when  this  word modifies “recollection”, it is interchangeable with “unconscious and powerless” and expresses the necessary part of Bergson’s proof of the existence of the external world; and (3) examples of this term being used in the Deleuzean meaning are very rare.
  Finally, I suggest that the contrast between the virtual and possible, which is made by Deleuze, blinds us to the fine argument of Bergson.

El objetivo de este artículo es destacar la especificidad de la recepción deleuziana del pensamiento de Henri Bergson a propósito del concepto de imagen a partir de su desarrollo en los libros sobre cine de Gilles Deleuze: La imagen movimiento: estudios sobre cine 1 (1983) y La imagen tiempo: estudios sobre cine 2 (1985). Este análisis tiene una relevancia singular sobre los diversos planos de la experiencia: estéticos, ontológicos, políticos y pedagógicos. Se trata de mostrar de qué manera la teoría de las imágenes, propuesta por Bergson en Materia y memoria (1896), es reinterpretada por Deleuze asumiendo nuevas posiciones filosóficas, cuyo alcance excede el de la propuesta original, manteniendo, con todo, la absoluta coherencia argumentativa.

Cada espectador de cinema é diferente, se porta de maneira própria perante um filme, sente algo de completamente diferente do restante do público. Ainda assim, existe algo que o grande apaixonado por esta arte possui em comum com outros que partilham desta paixão, e este algo carrega o nome de cinefilia. Neste livro busca-se compreender as diferentes abordagens de um espectador frente a um filme, para que se caminhe em direção à compreensão de que a cinefilia é uma emoção que une espectador e filme num mesmo tecido de memória.

This paper looks at Alain Resnais’ Last Year in Marienbad (1961) and Chris Marker’s La Jetée (1962). It rests on a premise of film as a constructed ordered world that answers only to itself, and that exists only in the ‘now’. Both films respond to particular questions: what happens if we move back and forth in time reinventing our past and our present? (Marienbad) or, can we escape our ruined present by moving into the future? (La Jetée). The main points are the future as an escape from the ever-present present; Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage by which we recognise ourselves; jouissance, and the object petit a, the looking for which (both in terms of ‘search’ and ‘seeing’) is the ‘where’ from which we derive our pleasure; and Jean-Luc Nancy’s description of how film touches us, and the pleasure in being within this moment, not knowing where we are going.