- 8505917375
- Broward College, Philosophy, Faculty Memberadd
- Philosophy, Epistemology, Ethics, Philosophy Of Religion, Political Philosophy, Applied Philosophy, and 26 moreRationalism, Medical Ethics, Experimental philosophy, Applied Ethics, Critical Thinking, A Priori Knowledge, Naturalized Epistemology, Internalism/Externalism, Liberalism, Critical Thinking Skills, Normative Ethics, Naturalism, Intuition, Teaching Philosophy, Rationality, Metaphilosophy, Analytic Philosophy of Religion, Problem of Evil, Social Epistemology, Epistemic Justification, Philosophical Methodology, Evidence, Bioethics, Beliefs, Virtue Epistemology, and Skepticismedit
- I am Assistant Professor of Medical Humanities and Bioethics at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences. I re... moreI am Assistant Professor of Medical Humanities and Bioethics at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences. I received my Ph.D. from Florida State University in 2009 where I wrote a dissertation defending a moderate rationalist account of a priori justification.
My research has since expanded into social epistemology, particularly into questions about epistemic authority and expertise. My current projects include writing on the nature and limits of expertise and exploring epistemic implications for expertise in applied contexts, such as medical research, politics, and clinical ethics.edit
What does it mean to be an expert? What sort of authority do experts really have? And what role should they play in today's society? Addressing why ever larger segments of society are skeptical of what experts say, Expertise: A... more
What does it mean to be an expert? What sort of authority do experts really have? And what role should they play in today's society?
Addressing why ever larger segments of society are skeptical of what experts say, Expertise: A Philosophical Introduction reviews contemporary philosophical debates and introduces what an account of expertise needs to accomplish in order to be believed. Drawing on research from philosophers and sociologists, chapters explore widely held accounts of expertise and uncover their limitations, outlining a set of conceptual criteria a successful account of expertise should meet.
By providing suggestions for how a philosophy of expertise can inform practical disciplines such as politics, religion, and applied ethics, this timely introduction to a topic of pressing importance reveals what philosophical thinking about expertise can contribute to growing concerns about experts in the 21st century.
Table of contents
1. Introduction
2. What Experts Do
3. Building a Philosophy of Expertise
4. Truth-tracking Accounts
5. Performance-tracking Accounts
6. The Epistemic Facility Account
7. Expertise and Disagreement
8. The Limits of Expertise
Bibliography
Index
Addressing why ever larger segments of society are skeptical of what experts say, Expertise: A Philosophical Introduction reviews contemporary philosophical debates and introduces what an account of expertise needs to accomplish in order to be believed. Drawing on research from philosophers and sociologists, chapters explore widely held accounts of expertise and uncover their limitations, outlining a set of conceptual criteria a successful account of expertise should meet.
By providing suggestions for how a philosophy of expertise can inform practical disciplines such as politics, religion, and applied ethics, this timely introduction to a topic of pressing importance reveals what philosophical thinking about expertise can contribute to growing concerns about experts in the 21st century.
Table of contents
1. Introduction
2. What Experts Do
3. Building a Philosophy of Expertise
4. Truth-tracking Accounts
5. Performance-tracking Accounts
6. The Epistemic Facility Account
7. Expertise and Disagreement
8. The Limits of Expertise
Bibliography
Index
Research Interests: Expert Systems, Epistemology, Testimony, Legitimacy and Authority, Expertise, and 13 moreTrust, Expert testimony, Sociology of Expertise, Epistemic Justification, Social Epistemology, Epistemology of Disagreement, History and Sociology of Expertise, Professions and expertise, Epistemology of Testimony, Authority, Obedience to authority, History of Philosophy, and psychology of expertise
An epistemic look at rationality in political decisions and a strategy for mitigating rational failure. Under contract and in preparation.
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Under contract with Springer. This collection addresses whether ethicists, like authorities in other fields, can speak as experts in their subject matter. Though ethics consultation is a growing practice in medical contexts, there remain... more
Under contract with Springer. This collection addresses whether ethicists, like authorities in other fields, can speak as experts in their subject matter. Though ethics consultation is a growing practice in medical contexts, there remain difficult questions about the role of ethicists in professional decision-making. Contributors examine the nature and plausibility of moral expertise, the relationship between character and expertise, the nature and limits of moral authority, how one might become a moral expert, and the trustworthiness of moral testimony. This volume engages with the growing literature in these debates and offers new perspectives from both academics and practitioners. The readings will be of particular interest to bioethicists, clinicians, ethics committees, and students of social epistemology. These new essays promise to advance discussions in the professionalization and accreditation of ethics consultation.
This anthology is aimed at academic bioethicists, clinical ethics consultants, and clinicians who serve on ethics committees and IRBs. It has two aims: 1) to engage with the most recent debates regarding moral expertise, especially as it relates to clinical ethics consultation, and 2) to invite new perspectives on moral expertise that suggest ways clinical ethicists can benefit clinicians, patients, and families in the health care setting.
This anthology is aimed at academic bioethicists, clinical ethics consultants, and clinicians who serve on ethics committees and IRBs. It has two aims: 1) to engage with the most recent debates regarding moral expertise, especially as it relates to clinical ethics consultation, and 2) to invite new perspectives on moral expertise that suggest ways clinical ethicists can benefit clinicians, patients, and families in the health care setting.
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An accessible explanation of the basic concepts and strategies of good reasoning. With Peter Fosl and Galen Foresman.
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An introduction to logic and critical thinking. Suitable for courses in critical thinking, introductory logic, rhetoric, and courses aimed at preparing students for graduate school. It is unique in that it explicitly includes a chapter on... more
An introduction to logic and critical thinking. Suitable for courses in critical thinking, introductory logic, rhetoric, and courses aimed at preparing students for graduate school. It is unique in that it explicitly includes a chapter on reasoning on graduate school entrance exams. We explain how to reason with truth tables, categorical logic, basic sentential logic, and inductive generalizations and analogies. We also explain how to interpret probability statements, how to avoid formal and informal fallacies, and how to reason about scientific claims. In the 2nd edition, we have included a chapter called "Putting it All Together," where we explain how to use the tools demonstrated in the book to reason through common types of essays. Written with Robert Arp.
"Watson and Arp have built an accessible portal for students learning logic and its basis in human language and expression. In addition to serving courses on formal logic, the text provides straightforward and clear supplements for instructors who teach college writing with a focus on argumentation. In particular, its sections on the challenges of inductive reasoning and logical fallacies will prove especially helpful for showing undergraduates how to better analyze evidence and critique arguments."
Ray Bossert, PhD, Writing Center Director at Notre Dame of Maryland University
"Watson and Arp have built an accessible portal for students learning logic and its basis in human language and expression. In addition to serving courses on formal logic, the text provides straightforward and clear supplements for instructors who teach college writing with a focus on argumentation. In particular, its sections on the challenges of inductive reasoning and logical fallacies will prove especially helpful for showing undergraduates how to better analyze evidence and critique arguments."
Ray Bossert, PhD, Writing Center Director at Notre Dame of Maryland University
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An introduction to ethics infused with examples from television shows. With Robert Arp. "Following on the heels of the widely popular Philosophy and Popular Culture book series (published both by Wiley-Blackwell and Open Court Press),... more
An introduction to ethics infused with examples from television shows. With Robert Arp.
"Following on the heels of the widely popular Philosophy and Popular Culture book series (published both by Wiley-Blackwell and Open Court Press), What's Good on TV incorporates excellent examples from a variety of television shows in order to illustrate rather difficult philosophical concepts. ... This is, overall, a really enjoyable and informative book, and would function well as secondary literature in an introductory ethics or applied ethics course." (Bertha Alvarez Mannien, Ph.D., Arizona State University)
Two reviews of the book:
1) http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6518
2) http://bufvc.ac.uk/reviews/what%E2%80%99s-good-on-tv
"Following on the heels of the widely popular Philosophy and Popular Culture book series (published both by Wiley-Blackwell and Open Court Press), What's Good on TV incorporates excellent examples from a variety of television shows in order to illustrate rather difficult philosophical concepts. ... This is, overall, a really enjoyable and informative book, and would function well as secondary literature in an introductory ethics or applied ethics course." (Bertha Alvarez Mannien, Ph.D., Arizona State University)
Two reviews of the book:
1) http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6518
2) http://bufvc.ac.uk/reviews/what%E2%80%99s-good-on-tv
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A layperson's introduction to philosophy. With Robert Arp.
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The consumer/survivor/ex-patient movement contends that individuals diagnosed with mental health conditions are routinely doubted or dismissed when they make claims about their needs, values, and interests. Too many therapists, the claim... more
The consumer/survivor/ex-patient movement contends that individuals diagnosed with mental health conditions are routinely doubted or dismissed when they make claims about their needs, values, and interests. Too many therapists, the claim goes, take a parentalist stance toward their patients. Recent work on expertise shows how some patients can acquire competence with their medical condition sufficient for sophisticated participation in management of their care; that is, they can become “patient experts.” This chapter argues that many psychotherapy patients can become patient experts and, thereby, benefit from robust shared decision making (SDM). In these cases, attitudes of distrust and protectionism can lead to the moral failure of epistemic injustice, thereby harming both the patient and the therapeutic relationship. Drawing on recent literature on epistemic injustice, SDM, and expertise from epistemology, the authors contend that the success of SDM relies largely on the therapist’s appreciation of the varying types and degrees of expertise and epistemic advantage involved in decision making.
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Bioethics 21 (6):5–16. doi:10.1080/15265161.2020.1863512. Garrett, J. R. 2015a. Two agendas for bioethics: Critique and integration. Bioethics 29 (6):440–7. doi:10.1111/bioe. 12116. Garrett, J. R. 2015b. Cracks in the foundations of... more
Bioethics 21 (6):5–16. doi:10.1080/15265161.2020.1863512. Garrett, J. R. 2015a. Two agendas for bioethics: Critique and integration. Bioethics 29 (6):440–7. doi:10.1111/bioe. 12116. Garrett, J. R. 2015b. Cracks in the foundations of Engelhardt’s bioethics. In At the foundations of bioethics and biopolitics: Critical essays on the thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr, ed. L. M. Rasmussen, A. S. Iltis, and M. J. Cherry, 215–230. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. Okin, S. M. 1989. Justice, gender, and the family. New York, NY: Basic Books. Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Increased opioid use in the United States has resulted in greater incidence of misuse. Orthopaedic patients are more likely to be prescribed opioids for pain. Low health literacy is related to opioid misuse; therefore, orthopaedic patient... more
Increased opioid use in the United States has resulted in greater incidence of misuse. Orthopaedic patients are more likely to be prescribed opioids for pain. Low health literacy is related to opioid misuse; therefore, orthopaedic patient education tools on use of opioids must be easy to read, understand, and use for patients of all skill levels to be effective. This project aimed to review a broad array of opioid patient education tools and evaluate them from a health literacy perspective. Content evaluation revealed that not all tools expressed the same essential messaging. The mean readability score of the tools assessed was 9.5 grade; higher than the national and recommended 8th-grade reading level. Therefore, many opioid patient education tools may be difficult for patients to read and understand. Improvements in readability and other health literacy best practices are recommended to improve reading, comprehension, and use of opioid patient education tools. (Journal of Surgical...
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What does it mean to be an expert? What sort of authority do experts really have? And what role should they play in today's society? Addressing why ever larger segments of society are skeptical of what experts say, Expertise: A... more
What does it mean to be an expert? What sort of authority do experts really have? And what role should they play in today's society? Addressing why ever larger segments of society are skeptical of what experts say, Expertise: A Philosophical Introduction reviews contemporary philosophical debates and introduces what an account of expertise needs to accomplish in order to be believed. Drawing on research from philosophers and sociologists, chapters explore widely held accounts of expertise and uncover their limitations, outlining a set of conceptual criteria a successful account of expertise should meet. By providing suggestions for how a philosophy of expertise can inform practical disciplines such as politics, religion, and applied ethics, this timely introduction to a topic of pressing importance reveals what philosophical thinking about expertise can contribute to growing concerns about experts in the 21st century. Table of contents 1. Introduction 2. What Experts Do 3. Building a Philosophy of Expertise 4. Truth-tracking Accounts 5. Performance-tracking Accounts 6. The Epistemic Facility Account 7. Expertise and Disagreement 8. The Limits of Expertise Bibliography Index
Research Interests: Sociology, Expert Systems, Epistemology, Testimony, Legitimacy and Authority, and 14 moreExpertise, Trust, Expert testimony, Sociology of Expertise, Epistemic Justification, Social Epistemology, Epistemology of Disagreement, History and Sociology of Expertise, Professions and expertise, Epistemology of Testimony, Authority, Obedience to authority, History of Philosophy, and psychology of expertise
With the Healthcare Ethics Consultant Certification (HEC-C) offered through the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH), the practice of clinical ethics has taken a decisive step into professionalization. But without an... more
With the Healthcare Ethics Consultant Certification (HEC-C) offered through the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH), the practice of clinical ethics has taken a decisive step into professionalization. But without an unambiguous sense of what clinical ethicists can contribute to the clinical environment, it is unclear what the HEC-C ensures clinical ethicists can do. Though the ASBH enumerates a set of core competencies, many disagree over what role those competencies empower ethicists to serve. Two recent publications are notable for advocating conflicting positions on the question of ethicists' competence: "Ethics Expertise: What It Is, How to Get It, and What to Do with It" by Christopher Meyers (2018) and Rethinking Health Care Ethics by Stephen Scher and Kasia Kozlowska (2018). In response to Scher and Kozlowska's argument that the primary role of ethicists is to create space to engage clinician's moral intuitions, this analysis follows Meyers in contending that ethicists can also contribute a kind of moral expertise. However, acquiring moral expertise is no easy task, and it is unlikely to be substantiated by a certification exam. This analysis draws on research from the psychology of expertise to outline the sort of training needed to cultivate and enhance moral expertise.
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Abram Brummett and Erica Salter offer a welcome addition to discussions of ethics expertise. The literature on this subject is still relatively small, but it is growing, and there is much conceptual work left to do, such as clarifying... more
Abram Brummett and Erica Salter offer a welcome addition to discussions of ethics expertise. The literature on this subject is still relatively small, but it is growing, and there is much conceptual work left to do, such as clarifying assumptions about the nature of expertise and the roles of various kinds of experts, identifying conditions for the possibility of ethics expertise, and elucidating plausible contributions of clinical ethics consultants (CECs). Taxonomies are helpful in this regard because even when they miss the mark (and I have few complaints about the Brummett/Salter taxonomy) they give the epistemic community a sense of orientation, a big-picture perspective on a debate that can be corrected or tweaked in ways that move the conversation forward. In this commentary, I attempt to clarify the concept of expertise in a way that makes their taxonomy more effective in discussions of ethics expertise. To show how this might work, I discuss their closing examples of Archard and Fiester.
Research Interests:
A significant proportion of the U.S. population exhibits low health literacy. Evidence suggests that low health literacy is correlated with higher medical costs and poorer health outcomes. Even more concerning, evidence suggests that low... more
A significant proportion of the U.S. population exhibits low health literacy. Evidence suggests that low health literacy is correlated with higher medical costs and poorer health outcomes. Even more concerning, evidence suggests that low health literacy threatens patients’ and families’ autonomy and exacerbates injustices in patients who are already vulnerable to difficulties navigating the health care system. There is also, however, increasing evidence that health literacy interventions—including initiatives such as plain language practices and teach-back—improve comprehension and usefulness of health care information. I show how health literacy best practices can enhance the work of clinical ethicists in their primary roles of policy, consultation, and education. In the final section, I suggest ways health literacy initiatives may be enhanced with insights from clinical ethicists.
Research Interests:
A popular critique of the kalām cosmological argument is that one argument for its second premise (what I call the Impossible Formation Argument, IFA) illicitly assumes a finite starting point for the series of past temporal events,... more
A popular critique of the kalām cosmological argument is that one argument for its second premise (what I call the Impossible Formation Argument, IFA) illicitly assumes a finite starting point for the series of past temporal events, thereby begging the question against opponents. Rejecting this assumption, opponents say, eliminates any objections to the possibility that the past is infinitely old and undermines the IFA’s ability to support premise 2. I contend that the plausibility of this objection depends on ambiguities in extant formulations of the IFA and that we may resolve these ambiguities in a way that does not presuppose a finite staring point. I also argue that this disambiguation allows us to construct an argument demonstrating that the concept of an infinite past entails a contradiction.
Research Interests:
Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony... more
Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony puts subjects in a better position than non-expert testimony to obtain knowledge about a subject matter. I offer three arguments showing that veritism is an inadequate account of expert authority because the reliable access condition renders expertise incapable of performing its social role. I then develop an alternative explanation of expert authority that I call the epistemic facility account, arguing that having a certain type of competence in a subject matter or domain of subject matters is sufficient for explaining expert authority while avoiding the problems with veritistic accounts.
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The coherence of the distinction between experiential and non-experiential evidence has been challenged by Michael Devitt (2005; 2011) and Albert Casullo (2003). Devitt and Casullo argue that, if this distinction challenge cannot be met,... more
The coherence of the distinction between experiential and non-experiential evidence has been challenged by Michael Devitt (2005; 2011) and Albert Casullo (2003). Devitt and Casullo argue that, if this distinction challenge cannot be met, arguments defending a priori justification are unmotivated. In the spirit of finding a constructive solution, Casullo offers a natural kinds approach as a possible way of articulating the distinction that should be acceptable to both rationalists and empiricists. I argue that Casullo’s alternative approach cannot, in principle, articulate a distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification and conclude that the classical approach remains the most plausible option. I then offer accounts of experiential and non-experiential evidence that avoid criticisms of earlier accounts, are neutral between rationalists and empiricists, and that do not beg the question against empiricists about the existence of a priori justification. I conclude that the distinction challenge has been answered and there is one fewer obstacle to a plausible defense of the existence of a priori justification.
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Page 1. WHHT'S UNIJERSTHNUING ETHICS THRUUEH TELEVISIUN Page 2. Jamie Carlin Watson and Robert Arp Page 3. Page 4. What's Good on TV? Page 5. Page 6. What's Good on TV?... more
Page 1. WHHT'S UNIJERSTHNUING ETHICS THRUUEH TELEVISIUN Page 2. Jamie Carlin Watson and Robert Arp Page 3. Page 4. What's Good on TV? Page 5. Page 6. What's Good on TV? Understanding Ethics Through Television Jamie Carlin Watson and Robert Arp Page ...
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UMI, ProQuest ® Dissertations & Theses. The world's most comprehensive collection of dissertations and theses. Learn more... ProQuest, A priori justification and experience. by Watson, Jamie Carlin, Ph.D., THE FLORIDA STATE... more
UMI, ProQuest ® Dissertations & Theses. The world's most comprehensive collection of dissertations and theses. Learn more... ProQuest, A priori justification and experience. by Watson, Jamie Carlin, Ph.D., THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY, 2009, 213 pages; 3399249. ...
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Albert Casullo (2000, 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against... more
Albert Casullo (2000, 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against naturalism applies equally to moderate rationalist accounts of a priori justification. They conclude that dilemma arguments are, therefore, insufficient for establishing an advantage for moderate rationalism over naturalized epistemology. I argue that both Casullo's and Oakley's criticisms depend on an illicit assumption, namely, that dilemma arguments presuppose a meta-justificatory demand that naturalists provide non-circular support for their basic sources of evidence. I argue that this assumption is not necessary for the force of dilemma arguments, and I construct a version that avoids this misreading. I conclude that, although there remain strategies for responding to dilemma arguments, they constitute a challenge naturalists must take s...
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A common philosophical account of expertise contends that (a) the good of expertise lies in the fact that it is grounded in reliably true beliefs or knowledge in a domain and (b) rejecting this truth-linked view threatens the authority of... more
A common philosophical account of expertise contends that (a) the good of expertise lies in the fact that it is grounded in reliably true beliefs or knowledge in a domain and (b) rejecting this truth-linked view threatens the authority of experts and opens one to epistemic relativism. I argue that both of these claims are implausible, and I show how epistemic authority and objectivity can be grounded in the current state of understanding and skill in a domain. Further, I argue that what I call a “cognitive systems” approach is consistent with this domain-linked account of expert authority, is empirically supported, and provides a philosophical foundation for both empirical and conceptual work on the nature and scope of expertise.
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This study assessed patients' health literacy and expectations for total hip (THA) and total knee (TKA) replacement surgery, and compared health literacy levels of patients and their caregivers. A convenience sample of 200 THA/TKA... more
This study assessed patients' health literacy and expectations for total hip (THA) and total knee (TKA) replacement surgery, and compared health literacy levels of patients and their caregivers. A convenience sample of 200 THA/TKA participants, patients and their caregivers, participated in this study. Results demonstrated no statistical difference in health literacy between patients and their caregivers. However, patients with lower health literacy had significantly lower expectations for walking after surgery. Practices should be aware that caregivers may not be any better equipped to consume and use complicated patient education materials than the patient they are assisting. Additionally, lower health literacy, rather than or in addition to race or social factors, may contribute to disparities in opting for THA/TKA because of lower expectations for walking after surgery. Healthcare practices should develop patient educational materials that are easy for all patients and careg...
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Robert Bass (2011) argues that the evidential problem of evil can be strengthened by the application of a Bayesian conditionalization argument. I argue that, whatever the merits of Bayesian conditionalization arguments, they are... more
Robert Bass (2011) argues that the evidential problem of evil can be strengthened by the application of a Bayesian conditionalization argument. I argue that, whatever the merits of Bayesian conditionalization arguments, they are unsuccessful in substantiating the evidential problem of evil because the problem of evil doesn’t meet the necessary conditions for applying the formula informatively. I offer two examples to show that a successful application of the Bayesian formula must pass two tests, the competency test and the connection test. I then show that the problem of evil passes neither, and is therefore not strengthened by the Bayesian analysis. I conclude that Bass’s reformulated argument poses no substantive threat to theism.
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The provider–patient relationship is typically regarded as an expert-to-novice relationship, and with good reason. Providers have extensive education and experience that have developed in them the competence to treat conditions better and... more
The provider–patient relationship is typically regarded as an expert-to-novice relationship, and with good reason. Providers have extensive education and experience that have developed in them the competence to treat conditions better and with fewer harms than anyone else. However, some researchers argue that many patients with long-term conditions (LTCs), such as arthritis and chronic pain, have become “experts” at managing their LTC. Unfortunately, there is no generally agreed upon conception of “patient expertise” or what it implies for the provider–patient relationship. I review three prominent accounts of patient expertise and argue that all face serious objections. I contend, however, that a plausible account of patient expertise is available that it provides a framework both for further empirical studies and for enhancing the provider–patient relationship.
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With the Healthcare Ethics Consultant Certification (HEC-C) offered through the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH), the practice of clinical ethics has taken a decisive step into professionalization. But without an... more
With the Healthcare Ethics Consultant Certification (HEC-C) offered through the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH), the practice of clinical ethics has taken a decisive step into professionalization. But without an unambiguous sense of what clinical ethicists can contribute to the clinical environment, it is unclear what the HEC-C ensures clinical ethicists can do. Though the ASBH enumerates a set of core competencies, many disagree over what role those competencies empower ethicists to serve. Two recent publications are notable for advocating conflicting positions on the question of ethicists’ competence: “Ethics Expertise: What It Is, How to Get It, and What to Do with It” by Christopher Meyers (2018) and Rethinking Health Care Ethics by Stephen Scher and Kasia Kozlowska (2018). In response to Scher and Kozlowska’s argument that the primary role of ethicists is to create space to engage clinician’s moral intuitions, this analysis follows Meyers in contending that ethicists can also contribute a kind of moral expertise. However, acquiring moral expertise is no easy task, and it is unlikely to be substantiated by a certification exam. This analysis draws on research from the psychology of expertise to outline the sort of training needed to cultivate and enhance moral expertise.
Research Interests:
Johnny Brennan (2020) makes a compelling case for supplementing Elizabeth Anderson’s (2011) criteria for how novices can identify experts with a “meta-cognitive” approach. I review Brennan’s argument for thinking there is a lacuna in... more
Johnny Brennan (2020) makes a compelling case for supplementing Elizabeth Anderson’s (2011) criteria for how novices can identify experts with a “meta-cognitive” approach. I review Brennan’s argument for thinking there is a lacuna in Anderson’s criteria and his supplemental strategy, and suggest that Brennan has highlighted an important distinction between external and internal obstacles to identifying experts. While Anderson’s criteria aims to mitigate external obstacles to accurately identifying experts, Brennan’s meta-cognitive approach goes further, aiming to mitigate the internal obstacles. In response, I argue that Brennan’s approach faces its own limitations. I argue that novices who would use Brennan’s strategy must be disposed to use their epistemic energies differently than they currently do. And second, I argue that there is a third set of obstacles, that I call “ecological,” that neither Anderson’s nor Brennan’s strategies mitigate. Ecological obstacles are those that stem from relative differences in competence among novices and experts. Different novices will have different evidence at their disposal to assess an expert’s trustworthiness, and different types of expertise require different types of evidence depending on the novice assessing them.
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Abram Brummett and Erica Salter offer a welcome addition to discussions of ethics expertise. The literature on this subject is still relatively small, but it is growing, and there is much conceptual work left to do, such as clarifying... more
Abram Brummett and Erica Salter offer a welcome addition to discussions of ethics expertise. The literature on this subject is still relatively small, but it is growing, and there is much conceptual work left to do, such as clarifying assumptions about the nature of expertise and the roles of various kinds of experts, identifying conditions for the possibility of ethics expertise, and elucidating plausible contributions of clinical ethics consultants (CECs). Taxonomies are helpful in this regard because even when they miss the mark (and I have few complaints about the Brummett/Salter taxonomy) they give the epistemic community a sense of orientation, a big-picture perspective on a debate that can be corrected or tweaked in ways that move the conversation forward. In this commentary, I attempt to clarify the concept of expertise in a way that makes their taxonomy more effective in discussions of ethics expertise. To show how this might work, I discuss their closing examples of Archard and Fiester.
Research Interests:
A significant proportion of the U.S. population exhibits low health literacy. Evidence suggests that low health literacy is correlated with higher medical costs and poorer health outcomes. Even more concerning, evidence suggests that low... more
A significant proportion of the U.S. population exhibits low health literacy. Evidence suggests that low health literacy is correlated with higher medical costs and poorer health outcomes. Even more concerning, evidence suggests that low health literacy threatens patients’ and families’ autonomy and exacerbates injustices in patients who are already vulnerable to difficulties navigating the health care system. There is also, however, increasing evidence that health literacy interventions—including initiatives such as plain language practices and teach-back—improve comprehension and usefulness of health care information. I show how health literacy best practices can enhance the work of clinical ethicists in their primary roles of policy, consultation, and education. And in the final section, I suggest ways health literacy initiatives may be enhanced with insights from clinical ethicists.
Research Interests:
A common philosophical account of expertise contends that (a) the good of expertise lies in the fact that it is grounded in reliably true beliefs or knowledge in a domain and (b) rejecting this truth-linked view threatens the authority of... more
A common philosophical account of expertise contends that (a) the good of expertise lies in the fact that it is grounded in reliably true beliefs or knowledge in a domain and (b) rejecting this truth-linked view threatens the authority of experts and opens one to epistemic relativism. I argue that both of these claims are implausible, and I show how epistemic authority and objectivity can be grounded in the current state of understanding and skill in a domain. Further, I argue that what I call a “cognitive systems” approach is consistent with this domain-linked account of expert authority, is empirically supported, and provides a philosophical foundation for both empirical and conceptual work on the nature and scope of expertise.
Research Interests:
An entry in 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
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Mortal Dilemmas: The Troubled Landscape of Death in America is an accessible and informative contribution to the public conversation over death and dying. To the many scholarly and popular voices, Donald Joralemon adds the... more
Mortal Dilemmas: The Troubled Landscape of Death in America is an accessible and informative contribution to the public conversation over death and dying. To the many scholarly and popular voices, Donald Joralemon adds the anthropologist's to explore five end-of-life challenges through political, legal, religious, and bioethical lenses: assisted dying, uncertain mental states, the definition of death, the role of grief, and memorialization. He bookends his discussion with the question of whether America is a death-denying culture, and he draws on his research into these five dilemmas to argue that, despite some popular claims to the contrary, U.S. culture has adapted some sophisticated means of embracing death.
Research Interests:
A popular critique of the kalām cosmological argument is that one argument for its second premise (what I call the Impossible Formation Argument, IFA) illicitly assumes a finite starting point for the series of past temporal events,... more
A popular critique of the kalām cosmological argument is that one argument for its second premise (what I call the Impossible Formation Argument, IFA) illicitly assumes a finite starting point for the series of past temporal events, thereby begging the question against opponents. Rejecting this assumption, opponents say, eliminates any objections to the possibility that the past is infinitely old and undermines the IFA’s ability to support premise 2. I contend that the plausibility of this objection depends on ambiguities in extant formulations of the IFA and that we may resolve these ambiguities in a way that does not presuppose a finite staring point. I also argue that this disambiguation allows us to construct an argument demonstrating that the concept of an infinite past entails a contradiction.
Research Interests:
Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony... more
Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony puts subjects in a better position than non-expert testimony to obtain knowledge about a subject matter. I offer three arguments showing that veritism is an inadequate account of expert authority because the reliable access condition renders expertise incapable of performing its social role. I then develop an alternative explanation of expert authority that I call the epistemic facility account, arguing that having a certain type of competence in a subject matter or domain of subject matters is sufficient for explaining expert authority while avoiding the problems with veritistic accounts.
Research Interests:
An introduction to epistemic justification on Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epi-just/
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epi-just/
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Book review on Metapsychology.mentalhelp.net
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Part of answering the social epistemological question How should the pursuit of knowledge be organized? involves identifying obstacles to the pursuit of knowledge and developing strategies for overcoming them. There is some reason to... more
Part of answering the social epistemological question How should the pursuit of knowledge be organized? involves identifying obstacles to the pursuit of knowledge and developing strategies for overcoming them. There is some reason to believe the technology intended to enhance our access to evidence has the unintended consequence of distracting from important sources of it. And even worse, this technology makes it easier for a small minority to manipulate beliefs and interests in new and subtle ways. Here, I explain a phenomenon called the filter bubble and how the preferences we express through our use of the Internet can be used to undermine epistemically responsible behavior. I argue that what I will call filtering bias is a type of censorship in which there is significant public interest and that, although there are no promising solutions to the problem, understanding this obstacle can help us guard against complacency when using technology as part of our epistemic activities.
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The coherence of the distinction between experiential and non-experiential evidence has been challenged by Michael Devitt (2005; 2011) and Albert Casullo (2003). Devitt and Casullo argue that, if this distinction challenge cannot be met,... more
The coherence of the distinction between experiential and non-experiential evidence has been challenged by Michael Devitt (2005; 2011) and Albert Casullo (2003). Devitt and Casullo argue that, if this distinction challenge cannot be met, arguments defending a priori justification are unmotivated. In the spirit of finding a constructive solution, Casullo offers a natural kinds approach as a possible way of articulating the distinction that should be acceptable to both rationalists and empiricists. I argue that Casullo’s alternative approach cannot, in principle, articulate a distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification and conclude that the classical approach remains the most plausible option. I then offer accounts of experiential and non-experiential evidence that avoid criticisms of earlier accounts, are neutral between rationalists and empiricists, and that do not beg the question against empiricists about the existence of a priori justification. I conclude that the distinction challenge has been answered and there is one fewer obstacle to a plausible defense of the existence of a priori justification.
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Robert Bass (2011) argues that the evidential problem of evil can be strengthened by the application of a Bayesian conditionalization argument. I argue that, whatever the merits of Bayesian conditionalization arguments, they are... more
Robert Bass (2011) argues that the evidential problem of evil can be strengthened by the application of a Bayesian conditionalization argument. I argue that, whatever the merits of Bayesian conditionalization arguments, they are unsuccessful in substantiating the evidential problem of evil because the problem of evil doesn’t meet the necessary conditions for applying the formula informatively. I offer two examples to show that a successful application of the Bayesian formula must pass two tests, the competency test and the connection test. I then show that the problem of evil passes neither, and is therefore not strengthened by the Bayesian analysis. I conclude that Bass’s reformulated argument poses no substantive threat to theism.
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Albert Casullo (2000; 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against... more
Albert Casullo (2000; 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against naturalism applies equally to moderate rationalist accounts of a priori justification. They conclude that dilemma arguments are, therefore, insufficient for establishing an advantage for moderate rationalism over naturalized epistemology. I argue that both Casullo’s and Oakley’s criticisms depend on an illicit assumption, namely, that dilemma arguments presuppose a meta-justificatory demand that naturalists provide non-circular support for their basic sources of evidence. I argue that this assumption is not necessary for the force of dilemma arguments, and I construct a version that avoids this misreading. I conclude that, although there remain strategies for responding to dilemma arguments, they constitute a challenge naturalists must take seriously.
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Here I offer the first in a series of unique arguments for libertarian natural rights to life, liberty, and property. The strength of many arguments for libertarian rights is often challenged on the grounds that they appeal to... more
Here I offer the first in a series of unique arguments for libertarian natural rights to life, liberty, and property. The strength of many arguments for libertarian rights is often challenged on the grounds that they appeal to controversial metaphysical structures or moral principles. To avoid these challenges, I appeal to a set of epistemic considerations to show that, in order to structure a society that affords optimal opportunity for citizens to obtain their interests, we have a rational obligation to protect individuals’ freedom to pursue those interests. In this paper, I defend the second premise of a larger argument for negative natural rights, which states that every individual has a strong reason to regard every other individual as having an epistemic advantage with respect to evidence regarding her interests and how to obtain them.
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Presentation for UT Health, San Antonio, 2021.
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Research Interests: Medical Sciences, Applied Philosophy, Applied Ethics, Decision Making, Medical Education, and 10 moreCritical Thinking, Decision Making Under Uncertainty, Applied Epistemology, Argumentation Theory and Critical Thinking, Assessment of Critical Thinking, Clinical Ethics, Psychology of Decision Making, Clinical Judgement, Critical Thinking Skills, and Clinical judgement and decision-making
A classroom discussion for law students on heuristics and biases.
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Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony... more
Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony puts subjects in a better position than non-expert testimony to obtain knowledge about a subject matter. I offer three arguments showing that veritism is an inadequate account of expert authority because the reliable access condition renders expertise incapable of performing its social role. I then develop an alternative explanation of expert authority that I call the epistemic facility account, arguing that having a certain type of competence in a subject matter or domain of subject matters is sufficient for explaining expert authority while avoiding the problems with veritistic accounts.
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Albert Casullo (2000; 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against... more
Albert Casullo (2000; 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against naturalism applies equally to moderate rationalist accounts of a priori justification. They conclude that dilemma arguments are, therefore, insufficient for establishing an advantage for moderate rationalism over naturalized epistemology. I argue that both Casullo’s and Oakley’s criticisms depend on an illicit assumption, namely, that dilemma arguments presuppose a meta-justificatory demand that naturalists provide non-circular support for their basic sources of evidence. I argue that this assumption is not necessary for the force of dilemma arguments, and I construct a version that avoids this misreading. I conclude that, although there remain strategies for responding to dilemma arguments, they constitute a challenge naturalists must take seriously.
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The coherence of the distinction between experiential and non-experiential evidence has been challenged by Michael Devitt (2005; 2011) and Albert Casullo (2003). Devitt and Casullo argue that, if this distinction challenge cannot be met,... more
The coherence of the distinction between experiential and non-experiential evidence has been challenged by Michael Devitt (2005; 2011) and Albert Casullo (2003). Devitt and Casullo argue that, if this distinction challenge cannot be met, arguments defending a priori justification are unmotivated. In the spirit of finding a constructive solution, Casullo offers a natural kinds approach as a possible way of articulating the distinction that should be acceptable to both rationalists and empiricists. I argue that Casullo’s alternative approach cannot, in principle, articulate a distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification and conclude that the classical approach remains the most plausible option. I then offer accounts of experiential and non-experiential evidence that avoid criticisms of earlier accounts, are neutral between rationalists and empiricists, and that do not beg the question against empiricists about the existence of a priori justification. I conclude that the distinction challenge has been answered and there is one fewer obstacle to a plausible defense of the existence of a priori justification.
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A brief summary of my courses, online and face-to-face.
A statement of how I view teaching philosophy, its uniqueness and importance.
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A discussion of the evidential problem of evil.
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This is a presentation given in a Communication Studies course on Death and Dying for the purpose of offering a philosophical perspective on the harm associated with death.
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This presentation was invited as a philosophical supplement to the arguments in the film The Privileged Planet.
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A discussion of moral relativism and defense of realism.
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Presentation for ASBH 2021.
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Theoretical and empirical work on expertise suggests that most skepticism about practical moral expertise--the epistemic authority to advise on moral matters--is unfounded. This presentation was part of a panel at ICCEC (International... more
Theoretical and empirical work on expertise suggests that most skepticism about practical moral expertise--the epistemic authority to advise on moral matters--is unfounded. This presentation was part of a panel at ICCEC (International Conference on Clinical Ethics Consultation) in Oxford, UK, June 21st, 2018.
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A presentation for the 2017 ASBH conference.
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Many ethicists and health care professionals support the practice of enlisting philosophers as ethics consultants. But many of the same people, not least among them ethicists, are skeptical of the idea that ethicists can speak... more
Many ethicists and health care professionals support the practice of enlisting philosophers as ethics consultants. But many of the same people, not least among them ethicists, are skeptical of the idea that ethicists can speak authoritatively about moral matters in these practical contexts. Part of the worry stems from the sense that, when ethicists have attempted to speak authoritatively, they become dogmatic, appealing to overly rigid models that ignore the complexities of practical settings. They also worry that ethical decisions are not the sort of decisions for which one person can authoritatively advise another. This skepticism has led to conceptions of ethics consultation denuded of moral content, conceptions we label “culture therapy.” We argue that culture therapy undermines both the motive for and potential benefits of enlisting ethics consultants, which raises concerns for quality care and misappropriates the term "ethics." As an alternative, we argue that, with some careful distinctions and a firm sense of the limitations of bioethical expertise, the skeptical worries can be allayed, and there is a robust sense of ethics consultation that avoids both academic hubris and the dangers of culture therapy.
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This is chapter 2 of a book in progress Expertise: A Philosophical Introduction, under contract with an academic publisher. Comments from any discipline welcome. Please ignore the footnotes (they are incomplete).
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Dominic Cobb and his team of dream specialists steal ideas from people’s minds while they sleep. Their latest project is to attempt the opposite, the fabled and highly improbable implanting of an idea—inception. Unfortunately, while... more
Dominic Cobb and his team of dream specialists steal ideas from people’s minds while they sleep. Their latest project is to attempt the opposite, the fabled and highly improbable implanting of an idea—inception. Unfortunately, while inside a target’s mind, it is almost impossible to distinguish reality from the dream state constructed for the project. The ability to construct such vivid dreams suggests that our own dreams could be so vivid that we cannot tell, at any given time, that we aren’t dreaming. In this chapter, I explain the dream argument for the skeptical conclusion that we do not know whether any of our beliefs are true and three strategies for debunking it. Since it seems unlikely that the argument will be debunked anytime soon, I consider what the dream thieves should believe even if they cannot tell when they aren’t dreaming. I argue that if truth is not the only thing that makes beliefs valuable—for example, if there are intellectual virtues, such as trust and humility—it may be rational to continue believing in a certain way even if your beliefs may be false.