In this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic of choice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises about how agents are expected to act, i.e., about their default choice... more
In this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic of choice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises about how agents are expected to act, i.e., about their default choice behavior. To do this, we merge one of the most prominent logics of agency in the philosophical literature, namely stit logic (Belnap et al. 2001; Horty 2001), with the well-known logic of counterfactuals due to Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973). A key component of our semantics for counterfactuals is to distinguish between deviant and non-deviant actions at a moment, where an action available to an agent at a moment is deviant when its performance does not agree with the agent’s default choice behavior at that moment. After developing and axiomatizing a stit logic with action types, instants, and deviant actions, we study the philosophical implications and logical properties of two candidate semantics for choice-driven counterfactuals, one called rewind inspired by Lewis (Nous 13(4), 455–476 1979) and the other called independence models motivated by well-known counterexamples to Lewis’s proposal Slote (Philos. Rev. 87(1), 3–27 1978). In the last part of the paper we consider how to evaluate choice-driven counterfactuals at moments arrived at by some agents performing a deviant action.
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We propose a refinement of STIT logic to make it suitable to model causal agency and responsibility in basic multi-agent scenarios in which agents can interfere with one another. We do this by supplementing STIT semantics, first, with... more
We propose a refinement of STIT logic to make it suitable to model causal agency and responsibility in basic multi-agent scenarios in which agents can interfere with one another. We do this by supplementing STIT semantics, first, with action types and, second, with a relation of opposing between action types. We exploit these novel elements to represent a test for potential causation, based on an intuitive notion of expected result of an action, and two tests for actual causation from the legal literature, i.e. the but-for and the NESS tests. We then introduce three new STIT operators modeling corresponding notions of causal responsibility, which we call potential, strong, and plain responsibility, and use them to provide a fine-grained analysis of a number of case studies involving both individual agents and groups.
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In this paper, we present an extensional system of mereology suitable to account for the intuitive distinction between heaplike and non-heaplike entities. Since the need to capture this distinction has been a key motivation for... more
In this paper, we present an extensional system of mereology suitable to account for the intuitive distinction between heaplike and non-heaplike entities. Since the need to capture this distinction has been a key motivation for non-extensional mereologies, we first assess the main non-extensional systems advanced in the last years and highlight some mereological and metaphysical difficulties they involve. We then advance a novel program, according to which the distinction between heaplike and non-heaplike entities can be accounted for by bringing together the parthood relation characterized by classical extensional mereology and an Aristotelian extensional notion of potential parthood. Thus, while rejecting the thesis of mereological monism, our proposal is consistent with the thesis of mereological extensionalism. We show that within this framework it is possible to characterize the above-mentioned distinction, to define the relation of material constitution, and to capture three fundamental standpoints in metaphysics.
Research Interests: Metaphysics and Mereology
We study imagination as reality-oriented mental simulation (ROMS): the activity of simulating non-actual scenarios in one’s mind, to investigate what would happen if they were realized. Three connected questions concerning ROMS are: What... more
We study imagination as reality-oriented mental simulation (ROMS): the activity of simulating non-actual scenarios in one’s mind, to investigate what would happen if they were realized. Three connected questions concerning ROMS are: What is the logic, if there is one, of such an activity? How can we gain new knowledge via it? What is voluntary in it and what is not? We address them by building a list of core features of imagination as ROMS, drawing on research in cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind. We then provide a logic of imagination as ROMS which models such features, combining techniques from epistemic logic, action logic, and subject matter semantics. Our logic comprises a modal propositional language with non-monotonic imagination operators, a formal semantics, and an axiomatization.
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It is well-known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes... more
It is well-known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes are acknowledged as such if we have intuitions telling us that things should be different. The aim of this paper is to introduce a paradox-free deontic action system by (i) identifying the basic intuitions leading to the emergence of the paradoxes and (ii) exploiting these intuitions in order to develop a consistent deontic framework, where it can be shown why some phenomena seem to be paradoxical and why they are not so if interpreted in a correct way.
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Intentionality is traditionally defined as the property of a mental state to be directed at something presented in a particular way. The fact that we can think about objects which do not exist makes this definition problematic: what kind... more
Intentionality is traditionally defined as the property of a mental state to be directed at something presented in a particular way. The fact that we can think about objects which do not exist makes this definition problematic: what kind of things are those objects? The aim of this paper is to analyse the definition of intentionality as a relation in theories which do not admit non-existent special entities. In particular, I consider John R. Searle and tim Crane’s theories of intentionality and I argue that neither Searle’s notion of a non-ordinary relation between the intentional state and the intentional object nor Crane’s idea of a relation between the intentional state and the intentional content succeed in holding together the traditional definition of intentionality and the purpose to not be committed to some kind of special entities. This intent seems finally hardly compatible with the traditional definition of intentionality.
In this paper we introduce two conflict tolerant and dynamic deontic systems DNC and DNC+ in which normative conflicts are analysed as conflicts between normative codes containing norms that prescribe the realisation of incompatible... more
In this paper we introduce two conflict tolerant and dynamic deontic systems DNC and DNC+ in which normative conflicts are analysed as conflicts between normative codes containing norms that prescribe the realisation of incompatible states of affairs. The systems present two crucial traits: first, norms and codes are explicitly represented in it; second, the connections between norms and codes and the way in which codes are updated by introducing new norms are properly defined. We will show how the systems can be used to fruitfully analyse paradigmatic cases of civil conflicts. Specifically , DNC and DNC+ will allow us to model the genesis of a conflict by keeping track of which agent triggered it and, relatedly, to capture the basic distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious objection.
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Currently available systems of action deontic logic are not designed to model procedures to assess the conduct of an agent which take into account the intentions of the agent and the circumstances in which she is acting. Yet, procedures... more
Currently available systems of action deontic logic are not designed to model procedures to assess the conduct of an agent which take into account the intentions of the agent and the circumstances in which she is acting. Yet, procedures of this kind are essential to determine what counts as culpable not doing. In light of this, we design an action logic, AL, in which it is possible to distinguish actions that are objectively possible for an agent, viz. there are no objective impediments for the agent to do them, and actions that, besides being objectively possible, are compatible with the setting or intentions of the agent.