Thomas Juneau

During the 2015 federal election campaign in Canada, Justin Trudeau and his opposition Liberal Party promised that if elected, they would re-calibrate the country’s foreign policy towards what they defined as its traditional preference for engagement and multilateralism. Central to the Liberal platform was a pledge to re-establish diplomatic relations with Iran, which had been suspended in 2012 by the Conservative Government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

The Liberals won a majority in October 2015 and subsequently tried to act on that promise. But reopening Canada’s embassy in Tehran proved easier said than done. In June 2018, the Liberal Government suspended these efforts, temporarily, when all its members of parliament voted in favor of a Conservative motion calling for the cessation of re-engagement efforts. This article explains how and why this outcome came about, and with what consequences.

Four factors explain why the Liberal Government’s efforts to re-open a Canadian embassy in Tehran and to see an Iranian embassy in Ottawa did not succeed. The legacy of policies adopted by the Harper Government, first, significantly complicated re-engagement efforts. The Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, in particular, hampered Ottawa’s efforts. As had occurred in the past, second, the complex politics of consular cases intervened, throwing additional roadblocks. Third, a growing split emerged within the Liberal Party on the issue, with those opposing re-engagement gaining momentum until the June 2018 vote. Fourth and finally, even though there was a window of opportunity in 2016 during which both Canada and Iran were genuinely committed to re-engagement, it remained that, throughout the process, bilateral relations were not a priority for either side. Though the Conservatives view this failure to re-open embassies as positive, it is costly for Canada: re-establishing diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic is not a major foreign policy priority, but not having an embassy in Tehran prevents Ottawa from achieving some interests in the Middle East.

Did Iran emerge as the winner from the nuclear deal it agreed to with leading powers in 2015? According to critics, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) allowed Iran to significantly enhance its position in the Middle East. It is certainly undeniable that the JCPOA has benefitted the Islamic Republic. Yet most of the constraints on Iran’s power that existed prior to the deal remain strong after its implementation. There are four such constraints: those deriving from the regional structure; international sanctions; the containment ring surrounding the Islamic Republic; and Iran’s own economic mismanagement. These constraints, moreover, are unlikely to disappear for the foreseeable future: Iran’s difficult regional position has not changed; though some sanctions are being lifted, many remain; Iran will continue to be strangled by containment; and its economy will remain crippled by mismanagement. This has important implications: the foundation on which hawkish prescriptions for post-JCPOA Iran are based – that a rising Iran has emerged as the winner from the deal – is inaccurate. It follows that hawkish prescriptions to intensify its isolation and punishment are unjustified. Realists propose a more accurate assessment of Iranian power. As such, their prescriptions combining cautious engagement with continued containment are more appropriate.

It is a common view that Iran is emerging as a winner from the war in Syria. Indeed, the survival of the Assad regime now seems likely for the foreseeable future. Yet this is a pyrrhic victory for its close ally Iran: it has been dragged into a costly quagmire with no end in sight. Iran and its allies (Assad, Russia, various local and foreign Shia militias) have been lining up tactical victories on the battlefield since 2015, including the recapture of Aleppo in 2016, but these do not amount to winning the war. The Islamic Republic has no choice but to continue pouring resources and suffering the growing costs of its commitment only to preserve a rump of the Assad regime. This is a classic case of mission creep: Iran intervened lightly at first but got dragged into an ever costlier spiral. Iran–and Russia–in this sense are now responsible for a devastated country ripped apart along sectarian and regional fault lines and which suffers from a humanitarian disaster of epic proportions.

Iran’s nuclear ambitions have been at the center of Middle Eastern politics and a global nonproliferation source of concern for almost twenty years. Much has been written on the topic, but one important question has received less attention: was it beneficial for the Islamic Republic? How have the gains and losses associated with its nuclear pursuits compared to each other? This article attempts to provide a comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits of Iran’s nuclear program. We start with an overview of the literature on why states pursue nuclear programs. This allows us to build a list of objectives that states can hope to achieve through their nuclear ambitions. We use these as yardsticks to assess the gains Iran has reaped and the losses it has incurred. This leads to the conclusion that even though Iran earned some benefits from its nuclear program, these have been costly; ultimately, the costs have exceeded the benefits. We conclude by reflecting on what the Iranian case tells us more broadly about the study of nuclear proliferation.

Canada's policies in the Middle East receive large amounts of media attention, but there is surprisingly little scholarly work about them. Of the few studies on the topic, moreover , most focus on analyzing past or current policies. This is certainly useful, but there is virtually no academic work focused on prescription. There is, as such, a need for theoretically informed studies laying out the rationale for a sound Canadian policy framework for the region. In this context, this paper proposes

Iran’s ambition is to be the dominant state in the Persian Gulf and an indispensable regional power in the broader Middle East. This is a plausible aspiration. Iran’s potential assets include a large population, a central geographic position, and a wealth of hydrocarbon resources. Despite facing favorable regional circumstances after 2001, however, Iran failed to fulfil this ambition. Iran’s power is brittle: its conventional military is increasingly obsolescent, its economy is strangulated by sanctions and mismanagement, and the country is more diplomatically isolated than it has been for decades. Iran has mostly developed a narrow power base that enables it to engage in spoiling tactics and to deny opportunities to its adversaries. As a result, Iran’s influence—its ability to actually shape the regional environment in the direction it favors—is heavily constrained.

This paper explains why Iran is not a rising regional hegemon, as one often hears, but rather a mid-sized regional power frustrated at not reaching its ambitions.1 It analyzes the brittleness of Iran’s power and explains how this constrains its ability to influence regional developments, especially in Yemen, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, and the ongoing civil war in Syria. The report also explains how Iran’s nuclear program has been excessively costly despite the limited gains it has brought the country. Even more worryingly for Iran, the situation is unlikely to improve in coming years, as a number of regional trends are set to perpetuate or even worsen the constraints on its ability to project its influence. 

This has important implications. As it continues negotiations with the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United States, and the UK—and Germany) on its nuclear program, Iran is dealing from a position of significant and growing weakness, not strength. The status quo is, for the Islamic Republic, excessively and increasingly costly. Tehran’s optimal outcome from these talks has thus not been to consolidate its regional preponderance but rather to cut its losses after years of mounting sanctions and isolation. In approaching the next and potentially final stages of the nuclear negotiations, the United States is in a position of strength. Pressure has worked: the Islamic Republic has been contained. It is militarily weak, economically strangulated, and diplomatically isolated.

In the first half of 2014, the organization then known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant swept across north-western Iraq while it simultaneously expanded the territory under its control in adjacent portions of northeastern Syria. The group, which renamed itself the Islamic State (IS) in June 2014, is led by former members of Al Qaeda in Iraq and also includes Sunni Iraqi actors holding grievances against the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad (mostly former members of Saddam Hussein’s regime and alienated Sunni tribes), as well as a wide variety of armed Sunni opposition groups in Syria. Many of them have bandwagonned with IS’s success by either fusing or allying themselves with the group, without necessarily having much affinity with its ideology. As of April 2015, IS either controls or has an effective presence in an area spanning the Syrian-Iraqi border roughly the size of England. Estimates of its strength vary significantly. The CIA has estimated it at between 20,000 and 30,000, though some experts have suggested figures closer to 100,000.
 
By mid-2014, IS threatened to continue to expand the territory under its control in Iraq and Syria. There were even plausible fears that it could cross into neighbouring countries, especially Jordan. Even if IS had chosen consolidation rather than expansion, its presence would have worsened an already disastrous civil war in Syria. Additionally, it would have entrenched sectarian divisions and further weakened the central state in Iraq, and it would have represented a magnet and a safe haven for terrorists in the heart of the Middle East. IS has also openly called for attacks on Western states, including Canada. This is a plausible threat: IS – which can operate either indirectly by inspiring lone self-radicalized actors or directly by planning attacks launched by extremist travellers – has demonstrated both the ambition and the capability to carry through on some of its promises. 

In response, in mid-2014 the U.S. built a broad international coalition to confront IS. In Syria, five Arab states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain and Qatar) initially joined the U.S. in launching airstrikes against IS. In Iraq, a dozen Western states have contributed with airstrikes, trainers, and a variety of other assets. In September 2014, Canada announced that it would join this coalition targeting IS in Iraq. Canada committed for an initial period of six months six CF-18 fighter aircraft, two Aurora aerial reconnaissance aircraft, and one air-to-air refuelling aircraft. About sixty-nine special operations troops also launched an advise-and-assist mission with Kurdish Peshmerga militias in northern Iraq. Ottawa announced in March 2015 that it would extend the commitment for an additional twelve months, and that it would expand the area of air strikes to northeastern Syria. 

This paper argues that this approach, even though it is highly flawed, represents the least bad alternative for Canada. This assessment can be separated in five steps: 
 What are Canada’s interests in the fight against IS?
 What is the strategy to counter IS?
 Is this strategy consistent with Canada’s interests?
 Is this strategy working?
 What should the next steps be for Canada?

The proposed $15 billion sale of light armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia has brought significant attention – mostly negative – to Canada’s partnership with the Arabian Peninsula kingdom. Much of this criticism is valid: the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia is abysmal, and Canada and its allies incur costs by being associated with Riyadh’s poor foreign policy choices. But to stop the analysis here and call for the cancelling of the deal fails to take into account the strategic rationale underlying the relationship with Saudi Arabia. Despite its many flaws, the partnership between Saudi Arabia and West, and therefore Canada, remains necessary; rejecting it and turning Saudi Arabia into a rival would make things worse. An important implication is that the best way forward with regards to the LAV deal is to collectively hold our nose, uphold the agreement, and move on.

This article argues that using graphic novels is an effective and valuable pedagogical tool to enhance the teaching of international relations, and specifically the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Graphic novels combine the best of film and prose in delivering a cognitive and affective experience that allows students to access the subject matter in a manner that complements the use of more conventional textbooks. Three such novels—Pales-tine, by Joe Sacco (2001), Exit Wounds, by Rutu Modan (2007), and Waltz with Bashir, by Ari Folman and David Polonsky (2009)—raise a number of important and relevant themes such as life under occupation and the shadow of terrorism, the intractability of conflict, the sources of violence, tensions within Israeli society, and collective memory and identity. After reviewing these three novels, this article discusses the benefits and challenges associated with using graphic novels in the political science classroom.

Yemen, the poorest and most populous country on the Arabian Peninsula, has long been a prime candidate to join the failed state club. After the wave of uprisings sweeping through the Middle East reached the country in early 2011, the already high levels of instability and violence reached new heights and threatened to accelerate a steady march towards collapse. Even though a variety of scenarios can be identified for the future of Yemen, the most likely paths all imply a period of prolonged instability. This will carry significant consequences for regional and international security, in particular, by providing al Qaeda's local franchise with an attractive safe haven from which to plan and launch operations.

There is a strong possibility that state authority in Yemen will considerably erode in the coming years under the effect of multiple pressures. This could lead to at least partial, and possibly complete, failure of the state, which would have important regional and international implications. However, a number of key initiatives, if implemented by Yemen and the international community, could in the best of cases prevent the gradual deterioration of the situation or at least limit the speed and extent of the erosion of state authority. Importantly, should preventive measures be unsuccessful, other initiatives could contain the eventual negative implications of state failure in Yemen.  In this context, this article asks three questions:
• What are these multiple pressures that could lead to the failure of the Yemeni state?
• What would be the impact of state failure for regional and international security?
• What can be done to prevent failure or, alternatively, to contain the implications of the erosion of state authority should preventive measures not succeed?

It has become common to hear that American power in the Middle East is waning. The recent U.S.-Russia deal on the elimination of Syria’s chemical-weapons program, for example, has even led some to talk of U.S. weakness in the region. This article instead argues that American power in the Middle East is not declining but is, in fact, slightly increasing, due principally to U.S. military domination, the strong positions of its regional partners and the stagnation or decline of its rivals. It is true that U.S. ambition in the Middle East is diminishing, albeit only slightly. This is distinct, however, from power. A pronounced and durable decrease in U.S. regional ambition, moreover, is not sustainable. Because of structural pressures, it is difficult for the United States to more than marginally reduce its regional presence. It is not losing its grip on the Middle East but trying, with only partial success, to loosen it.

Iran is alone in the world. Its acute strategic loneliness is primarily the result of structural factors inherent in its place in the regional and international systems and is largely independent of the actions of whoever governs the country. Its international posture does not render cooperation with other states impossible, nor does it predetermine a condition of permanent conflict with its neighbors. Strategic loneliness, however, explains why Iran has very limited common interests with its neighbors and why cooperation is difficult and costly to achieve. Tehran’s policies, as a result, can worsen or improve the situation but cannot fundamentally change it. 

Analyzing a state’s international posture or position in the international system is a necessary first step that should form the foundation of foreign-policy analysis. After briefly explaining what strategic loneliness implies, this article therefore will lay out the essential features of Iran’s place in the regional and international balances of power, which explain the persistence of its strategic loneliness. It then looks into how this posture shapes the parameters of Iran’s most important bilateral relations. Next, the article argues
that efforts launched in 2013 by President Hassan Rouhani to solve the nuclear standoff between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies and partners, on the other, are unlikely to alter more than marginally the Islamic Republic’s posture. Even if Tehran and the international community reach a long-term solution, Iran’s loneliness will endure.

In early 2014, the organization then known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant swept across northwestern Iraq while simultaneously expanding the territory under its control in eastern Syria. The group, which renamed itself the Islamic State (IS) in June 2014, is led by members of what used to be al-Qaeda in Iraq. It has incorporated Iraqi Sunnis who hold grievances against the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad (mostly former members of Saddam Hussein’s regime and alienated tribes) as well as a variety of armed Syrian opposition groups. By mid-2014, IS threatened to further expand in Iraq and Syria, while there were plausible fears that it could cross into neighboring countries, especially Jordan. It has entrenched sectarian divisions and further weakened the state in Iraq and has worsened an already devastating civil war in Syria. It represents a magnet and a safe haven for terrorists in the heart of the Middle East.

The United States has developed a three-pillared strategy to confront IS. The first pillar, mostly based on air strikes, seeks to weaken the group but is far from sufficient to defeat it. The second pillar
therefore calls for training and equipping local partners who are to assume responsibility for militarily defeating IS. The third pillar acknowledges that IS is a symptom, not a cause, of the broken politics in Iraq and Syria; any long-term solution must therefore be political. This strategy is far from ideal, but it is arguably the least bad option available. Yet, given that the second and third pillars are in the best of cases long-term endeavors, the approach amounts, in the short term at least, to containment. More important, a failure to significantly boost local partners and find political solutions in Iraq and Syria would de facto lock the United States into a long-term containment strategy. This is not necessarily a bad option, but it does carry significant implications.

The civil war in Syria has caused the death of more than 200,000 civilians and combatants and one of the largest refugee crises in recent memory, while it increasingly destabilizes the Levant. The crisis in Syria therefore represents an extraordinarily challenging foreign policy conundrum. A wide variety of responses – ranging from the imposition of no-fly zones to doing nothing – have been considered in Ottawa and in allied capitals since 2011. Each of these options, however, raises significant challenges.

This article explores how Canada considered those alternatives. As is systematically the case for a non-great power, these policy options were shaped more by deliberations in allied capitals – especially Washington – and only indirectly by actual developments in Syria. After laying out Canada’s interests relative to the war in Syria, the article details four policy alternatives that Canada has faced since 2011, based on liberal pacifism, liberal interventionism, isolationism and containment. Among this menu of deeply flawed options, containment has steadily emerged as Canada’s de facto approach. This has been the right choice: it is the least bad course of action available as it best allows Ottawa to protect and promote its interests. Nevertheless, Canada could do more to implement a more comprehensive containment framework.

For years, mounting instability had led many to predict the imminent collapse of Yemen. These forecasts became reality in 2014 as the country spiralled into civil war. The conflict pits an alliance of the Houthis, a northern socio-political movement that had been fighting the central government since 2004, alongside troops loyal to a former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, against supporters and allies of the government overthrown by the Houthis in early 2015. The war became regionalized in March 2015 when a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of ten mostly Arab states launched a campaign of air strikes against the Houthis. According to Saudi Arabia, the Houthis are an Iranian proxy; they therefore frame the war as an effort to counter Iranian influence.

This article will argue, however, that the Houthis are not Iranian proxies; Tehran’s influence in Yemen is marginal. Iran’s support for the Houthis has increased in recent years, but it remains low and is far from enough to significantly impact the balance of internal forces in Yemen. Looking ahead, it is unlikely that Iran will emerge as an important player in Yemeni affairs. Iran’s interests in Yemen are limited, while the constraints on its ability to project power in the country are unlikely to be lifted. Tehran saw with the rise of the Houthis a low cost opportunity to gain some leverage in Yemen. It is unwilling, however, to invest larger amounts of resources. There is, as a result, only limited potential for Iran to further penetrate Yemen.