Ryszard Piotrowski

According to Article 216.5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland it shall be permissible neither to contract loans nor provide guarantees and financial sureties which would engender a national public debt exceeding three-fifths of the value of the annual gross domestic product. The method of calculating the value of the annual gross domestic product and national public debt shall be specified by statute. However, this provision co-establishing the principle of balance budget as constitutional value is not an absolute paradigm. It is limited by other constitutional values and principles, including the principle of common good, and should not be abused against the principle of diligence and efficiency in the work of state bodies.

Zasada równowagi i trójpodziału władz zalicza się do najbardziej fundamentalnych wartości konstytucyjnych, ponieważ wiąże się z uznaniem i zagwarantowaniem praw człowieka. Innymi słowy jest istotą Konstytucji, czyli aktu ograniczającego prawa większości w celu umożliwienia realizacji prawa i wolności jednostki. Kluczowe znaczenie ma również powiązanie tej gwarancji z istotą systemu demokratycznego, w którym zasada większości jest ograniczona przez prawa człowieka. Zasada kontroli i równowagi może w pełni funkcjonować tylko w odniesieniu do kultury poszanowania praw człowieka. Status suwerena wymaga legitymizacji, która wynika z podporządkowania się suwerena Konstytucji. Można zatem wnioskować, że atrybut suwerenności w rzeczywistości należy do wartości ukształtowanych przez kulturę i powiązanych z ponadczasowymi zasadami i zasadami moralnymi odpowiadającymi wiecznym dylematom ludzkości – wartościom, które tworzą kulturę konstytucyjną, tj. wspólnotowym zbiorem wartości. Władca nie sprawuje najwyższej władzy nad wartościami, a wartości są zawarte w Konstytucji, która jest nierozerwalnie związana z narodem i jego suwerennością. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej odzwierciedla zasady liberalnej demokracji lub tego rodzaju demokracji, w której źródła praw człowieka nie wynikają z woli większości. Model rządzenia przyjęty w Konstytucji można określić, jako demokrację konsensualną. Praktyka konstytucyjna przeszła drogę, w której system demokracji konsensualnej – określony w Konstytucji RP, z siłą większości ograniczanej przez prawa mniejszości – zamienia się w system większościowej demokracji, oparty nie na dialogu między większością a opozycją, ale na mocy parlamentarnej większości, która lekceważy systemową rolę opozycji.

The system of governance in contemporary Poland is founded mainly on a negative narrative of distrust. That narrative brought to power the country’s present scaremongering rulers. They continue feeding the public with frightening stories of an influx of refugees, threats of war and terrorist attacks, evils of globalisation and a loss of cultural identity to foreign ways of life. A balance between distrust of rulers and trust in them is part of democracy’s constitutional identity. Those currently in power sow distrust in liberal democracy and its values – they violate the constitution, stir up distrust of elites, and make attempts at bringing the judiciary to heelwhile staging judges bashing propaganda campaigns. Distrust of European law and European institutions is part and parcel of this process. The negative narrative weakens and threatens to disenfranchise civil society, blurring the line between law and lawlessness. It also weakens those in power.

The notion of the contribution of the Sejm to enacting laws indicates that particular participants of the legislative process get committed into the adoption of socio-political resolutions which appear in the form of normative acts, ranking as laws. It seems therefore to be worthwhile to point out the criteria behind the legislative work — both with regard to the actions taken by deputies individually or as a group, within the framework of the legislative procedure provided for by the regulations of the Sejm, or the actions of either the organs of the Sejm or other parliamentary agencies which participate in the legislative process. In order to establish the regularities of the legislative behaviour and interpret the Sejm legislation, the statistical methods become useful, particularly that they are propitious to disclose the characteristic attitudes of the deputies, establish ideological qualities and orientations which can be assumed as the motivating factors. This particularly regards the analysis of the amendments to acts. The analysed procedures of submitting amendments allow to make a distinction into typical political functions they perform. Accordingly, the amendments are to: safeguard law and order, protect the rights and interests of citizens, improve the provisions of the law (delete contradictions, improve the legibility of acts and complexity of regulations), make the functioning of the state apparatus more democratic, protect national economy,ensure a social factor in administration, consolidate and expand socialist democracy, accelerate socio-economic and technological progress. The quantitative indices make it easier to understand the process and outcome of the legislative work. They cannot replace interpretation and assessment, however. The indices should not be applied apart from the functions of institutions of the socialist parliamentarianism, since this is what they reflect, or the sociolegal reality at the period of which they are a fragment. A questionaire and interview can be availed of when attempting to determine the individual contribution of the deputies to the work on a resolution. The data from questionaires are of auxiliary importance. The examination of various documents, press information, statistical data, questionaires in the legislative work in a particular sphere provides the basic sources for generalization as to the contribution of the Sejm into the legislative process. The following classification of sources and auxiliary materials can be made:1. formal information (legal acts, parliamentary prints, formal documentation of the legislative work, the resolutions of the party and political fractions, social and political organizations). 2. Informal information (political information on the legislative work and socio-political foundations of bills, informal documents relating to the legislative work, informations covering discussions and consultations, opinions disseminated by mass-media, specialized studies in particular domains of law, reports by scholars, results of questionaires and polls). The socialist parliament, being a central state body passing resolutions, has an impact on the political contents of the latter. The all-national party programme is formulated in co-operation with the groups of society outside the party, which differ in terms of political organization. It is in the Sejm that this colaboratin can take place. The Sejm holds an exceptional position in our system, for beside co-operating in passing state resolutions, also with regard to their political contents, it participates in optimizing decisions, which finally appear in the form of acts, and the very process of adopting resolutions. The role the Sejm plays in enacting laws cannot be separated from the structure of passing resolutions in parliament. Since it is an ’’open” structure, it is possible to incorporate various subjects in the process of passing resolutions through polls, consultations, discussions on intended resolutions. The procedure of passing resolutions in the Sejm consists of several stages and therefore it is possible to call the structure of the said processes the “structure of a dialogue”, where different opinions and standpoints can be confronted when a measure is being searched. Collective resolutions are favourable to avail of the knowledge, experience and abillities of individuals, thus to enrich the contents of the respective measures. The structure of the process of passing resolutions in the Sejm facilitates self-control and enables to apply the optimizing criteria in a complex manner.

Jeżeli Prezydent nie wystąpił z wnioskiem do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w przedmiocie danej ustawy przed jej podpisaniem, może z umotywowanym wnioskiem przekazać ustawę Sejmowi do ponownego rozpatrzenia. Tak ukształtowane weto prezydenckie ma charakter zawieszający, co odpowiada konstytucyjnemu modelowi relacji między Prezydentem a parlamentem, wynikającemu z zasady podziału władz. W praktyce zdarza się skierowanie ustawy do ponownego rozpatrzenia krótko przed zakończeniem kadencji Sejmu – tak, że izba nie zdąży odnieść się do wniosku Prezydenta. W takiej sytuacji zgodnie z zasadą dyskontynuacji postępowanie w sprawie weta zostanie zakończone, a weto prezydenckie z zawieszającego zostaje przekształcone w absolutne. Wykładnia Konstytucji uzasadniająca transformację weta nie uwzględnia konsekwencji zasady podziału władz, która wyklucza powierzenie głowie państwa ostatecznej i nieodwołalnej decyzji o losie ustawy. Wątpliwości interpretacyjne dotyczące stosowania zasady dyskontynuacji wo...

The notion of the contribution of the Sejm to enacting laws indicates that particular participants of the legislative process get committed into the adoption of socio-political resolutions which appear in the form of normative acts, ranking as laws. It seems therefore to be worthwhile to point out the criteria behind the legislative work — both with regard to the actions taken by deputies individually or as a group, within the framework of the legislative procedure provided for by the regulations of the Sejm, or the actions of either the organs of the Sejm or other parliamentary agencies which participate in the legislative process. In order to establish the regularities of the legislative behaviour and interpret the Sejm legislation, the statistical methods become useful, particularly that they are propitious to disclose the characteristic attitudes of the deputies, establish ideological qualities and orientations which can be assumed as the motivating factors. This particularly re...

The system of governance in contemporary Poland is founded mainly on a negative narrative of distrust. That narrative brought to power the country’s present scaremongering rulers. They continue feeding the public with frightening stories of an influx of refugees, threats of war and terrorist attacks, evils of globalisation and a loss of cultural identity to foreign ways of life. A balance between distrust of rulers and trust in them is part of democracy’s constitutional identity. Those currently in power sow distrust in liberal democracy and its values – they violate the constitution, stir up distrust of elites, and make attempts at bringing the judiciary to heelwhile staging judges bashing propaganda campaigns. Distrust of European law and European institutions is part and parcel of this process. The negative narrative weakens and threatens to disenfranchise civil society, blurring the line between law and lawlessness. It also weakens those in power.

The rapid development of information and communication technology has made it imperative that new human rights be spelled out, to cope with an array of expected threats associated with this process. With artificial intelligence being increasingly put to practical uses, the prospect arises of Man’s becoming more and more AI-dependant in multiple walks of life. This necessitates that a constitutional and international dimension be imparted to a right that stipulates that key state-level decisions impacting human condition, life and freedom must be made by humans, not automated systems or other AI contraptions. But if artificial intelligence were to make decisions, then it should be properly equipped with value-based criteria. The culture of abdication of privacy protection may breed consent to the creation and practical use of technologies capable to penetrate an individual consciousness without his or her consent. Evidence based on such thought interference must be barred from court ...

According to Article 216.5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland it shall be permissible neither to contract loans nor provide guarantees and financial sureties which would engender a national public debt exceeding three-fifths of the value of the annual gross domestic product. The method of calculating the value of the annual gross domestic product and national public debt shall be specified by statute. However, this provision co-establishing the principle of balance budget as constitutional value is not an absolute paradigm. It is limited by other constitutional values and principles, including the principle of common good, and should not be abused against the principle of diligence and efficiency in the work of state bodies.

Zasada równowagi i trójpodziału władz zalicza się do najbardziej fundamentalnych wartości konstytucyjnych, ponieważ wiąże się z uznaniem i zagwarantowaniem praw człowieka. Innymi słowy jest istotą Konstytucji, czyli aktu ograniczającego prawa większości w celu umożliwienia realizacji prawa i wolności jednostki. Kluczowe znaczenie ma również powiązanie tej gwarancji z istotą systemu demokratycznego, w którym zasada większości jest ograniczona przez prawa człowieka. Zasada kontroli i równowagi może w pełni funkcjonować tylko w odniesieniu do kultury poszanowania praw człowieka. Status suwerena wymaga legitymizacji, która wynika z podporządkowania się suwerena Konstytucji. Można zatem wnioskować, że atrybut suwerenności w rzeczywistości należy do wartości ukształtowanych przez kulturę i powiązanych z ponadczasowymi zasadami i zasadami moralnymi odpowiadającymi wiecznym dylematom ludzkości – wartościom, które tworzą kulturę konstytucyjną, tj. wspólnotowym zbiorem wartości. Władca nie sprawuje najwyższej władzy nad wartościami, a wartości są zawarte w Konstytucji, która jest nierozerwalnie związana z narodem i jego suwerennością. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej odzwierciedla zasady liberalnej demokracji lub tego rodzaju demokracji, w której źródła praw człowieka nie wynikają z woli większości. Model rządzenia przyjęty w Konstytucji można określić, jako demokrację konsensualną. Praktyka konstytucyjna przeszła drogę, w której system demokracji konsensualnej – określony w Konstytucji RP, z siłą większości ograniczanej przez prawa mniejszości – zamienia się w system większościowej demokracji, oparty nie na dialogu między większością a opozycją, ale na mocy parlamentarnej większości, która lekceważy systemową rolę opozycji.

I. The essence of the democratic power established in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (hereinafter the Constitution) is to limit this power in order to protect the rights of the individual from threats that may be posed by the rule of the majority, especially when this majority seeks to impose its values and beliefs on others. This limitation is expressed both by the principle of the separation and balance of powers, as well as by the principle of a democratic state ruled by law and, above all, by the principle of inherent and inalienable human dignity. The system of the Republic of Poland and the interpretation of provisions concerning the organisation of the state apparatus and its mode of operation are subordinate to the latter principle.1 According to Article 30 of the Constitution, the source of rights and freedoms is the inherent and inalienable dignity of the person. This dignity is inviolable, and it is the responsibility of the public authorities to respect and p...

Where a system of constitutional judicial review is in place, the concept of democracy is understood as rejecting claims about an unlimited will of the sovereign as the source of state authority, and confining democracy to such manifestations of the majority will which enjoy Constitutional legitimacy – meaning that they are in compliance with the version of a human rights culture that has been inscribed in the Constitution and which is embraced by Constitutional judges when delivering their adjudication. Following the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, the political significance of the Constitutional Tribunal has increased enormously. Only the Constitutional Tribunal is capable of preventing the centre of political power (which governs over the legislative and executive branches) from pursuing its plans. According to parliamentary majority in order to change Poland and fulfil commitments to the electorate, the ruling party had to see to it that the Tribunal’s make-up is pluralistic. Otherwise, all their efforts would be exposed to destruction by the Constitutional Tribunal. This way of thinking, though, implies that the Constitutional Tribunal can be changed in an ordinary law in such a way as to render it incapable of opposing the ruling majority. Regarding the ongoing Constitutional crisis over the Constitutional Tribunal, a scenario involving the observance of the basic law does not appear to be a likely one – unless such scenario leads to the expectation, however mistaken, that political gains can thus be scored and that the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal will no longer pose a threat to plans of the parliamentary majority.

Zasada równowagi i trójpodziału władz zalicza się do najbardziej fundamentalnych wartości konstytucyjnych, ponieważ wiąże się z uznaniem i zagwarantowaniem praw człowieka. Innymi słowy jest istotą Konstytucji, czyli aktu ograniczającego prawa większości w celu umożliwienia realizacji prawa i wolności jednostki. Kluczowe znaczenie ma również powiązanie tej gwarancji z istotą systemu demokratycznego, w którym zasada większości jest ograniczona przez prawa człowieka. Zasada kontroli i równowagi może w pełni funkcjonować tylko w odniesieniu do kultury poszanowania praw człowieka. Status suwerena wymaga legitymizacji, która wynika z podporządkowania się suwerena Konstytucji. Można zatem wnioskować, że atrybut suwerenności w rzeczywistości należy do wartości ukształtowanych przez kulturę i powiązanych z ponadczasowymi zasadami i zasadami moralnymi odpowiadającymi wiecznym dylematom ludzkości – wartościom, które tworzą kulturę konstytucyjną, tj. wspólnotowym zbiorem wartości. Władca nie sprawuje najwyższej władzy nad wartościami, a wartości są zawarte w Konstytucji, która jest nierozerwalnie związana z narodem i jego suwerennością. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej odzwierciedla zasady liberalnej demokracji lub tego rodzaju demokracji, w której źródła praw człowieka nie wynikają z woli większości. Model rządzenia przyjęty w Konstytucji można określić, jako demokrację konsensualną. Praktyka konstytucyjna przeszła drogę, w której system demokracji konsensualnej – określony w Konstytucji RP, z siłą większości ograniczanej przez prawa mniejszości – zamienia się w system większościowej demokracji, oparty nie na dialogu między większością a opozycją, ale na mocy parlamentarnej większości, która lekceważy systemową rolę opozycji.

Where a system of constitutional judicial review is in place, the concept of democracy is understood as rejecting claims about an unlimited will of the sovereign as the source of state authority, and confining democracy to such manifestations of the majority will which enjoy Constitutional legitimacy – meaning that they are in compliance with the version of a human rights culture that has been inscribed in the Constitution and which is embraced by Constitutional judges when delivering their adjudication. Following the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, the political significance of the Constitutional Tribunal has increased enormously. Only the Constitutional Tribunal is capable of preventing the centre of political power (which governs over the legislative and executive branches) from pursuing its plans. According to parliamentary majority in order to change Poland and fulfil commitments to the electorate, the ruling party had to see to it that the Tribunal’s make-up is pluralistic. Otherwise, all their efforts would be exposed to destruction by the Constitutional Tribunal. This way of thinking, though, implies that the Constitutional Tribunal can be changed in an ordinary law in such a way as to render it incapable of opposing the ruling majority. Regarding the ongoing Constitutional crisis over the Constitutional Tribunal, a scenario involving the observance of the basic law does not appear to be a likely one – unless such scenario leads to the expectation, however mistaken, that political gains can thus be scored and that the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal will no longer pose a threat to plans of the parliamentary majority.

The rapid development of information and communication technology has made it imperative that new human rights be spelled out, to cope with an array of expected threats associated with this process. With artificial intelligence being increasingly put to practical uses, the prospect arises of Man’s becoming more and more AI-dependant in multiple walks of life. This necessitates that a constitutional and international dimension be imparted to a right that stipulates that key state-level decisions impacting human condition, life and freedom must be made by humans, not automated systems or other AI contraptions. But if artificial intelligence were to make decisions, then it should be properly equipped with value-based criteria. The culture of abdication of privacy protection may breed consent to the creation and practical use of technologies capable to penetrate an individual consciousness without his or her consent. Evidence based on such thought interference must be barred from court proceedings. Everyone’s right to intellectual identity and integrity, the right to one’s thoughts being free from technological interference, is as essential for the survival of the democratic system as the right to privacy – and it may well prove equally endangered.

The essence of the democratic power established in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is to limit this power in order to protect the rights of the individual against threats that may be posed by the rule of the majority, especially when this majority seeks to impose its values and beliefs on others. This limitation is expressed both by the principle of the separation and balance of powers and by the principle of a democratic rule of law, and above all by the principle of the inherent and inalienable dignity of man. In the light of the Constitution, the supremacy of the nation as a constitutional value is not of an absolute nature, especially in the context of the special status of human rights which is anchored in the concept of dignity. The current Basic Law, granting the supreme authority to the Polish Nation, requires that the authority of that supremacy be exercised in compliance with the principles and in forms set forth in the Constitution. This means in particular, the constitutional legitimacy of the judiciary to restrict, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution as the supreme law, the powers of other authorities, as well as the authority (sovereign) exercising its power directly. The existence of independent judiciary leads, on the one hand, to the rejection in the conception of a democratic state, of the assumption of an unlimited scope of power of the governing authority, and on the other hand, to the recognition as a determinant of democracy of only those manifestations of the will of the majority, which have a constitutional legitimacy and are therefore in line with the version of the culture of human rights as enshrined in the Basic Law and which are accepted by judges at the time of the ruling.