Transformative Animal Protection (2023)

OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN C7 7 Transformative Animal Protection Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka C7S1 7.1 Introduction The goal of this chapter is to address an important challenge confronting animal protection organizations (APOs): their immediate mandate is to rescue and protect individual animals, but can they also contribute to long-term structural transformation of human-animal relations? APOs like the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) operate in profoundly challenging and unjust circumstances—a world in which the killing and exploitation of animals on a massive scale is routine, sanctioned by law, and woven into the very fabric of modern capitalist societies and economies. APOs struggle valiantly to create a space that can provide basic care and protection for some of the animals trapped in this animal-industrial complex1 and promote policy changes aimed at blunting the violence. But the prospect of justice in human– animal relations is remote; APO staff are continuously confronted with tragic choices and a disheartening sense of being caught up in scenarios of unending crisis and band-aid solutions rather than contributing to a longer-term project of meaningful change for animals. C7P2 Indeed, APO staff may feel not only powerless to change these larger structures, but also at risk of becoming morally implicated in the very practices they hope to change. Whereas activist animal rights groups can take an uncompromising stand not to collaborate with unjust practices or institutions, APOs can rarely afford that C7P1 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Transformative Animal Protection In: The Ethics of Animal Shelters. Edited by: Valéry Giroux, Angie Pepper and Kristin Voigt, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197678633.003.0009 /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 282 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 283 C7P3 C7P4 C7P5 luxury. To fulfil their mandate, APOs may need to work collaboratively with law enforcement officers to enforce animal cruelty laws even if they view those laws as deeply inadequate and unjust.2 APOs may also be expected to work with government officials and animal industries in reviewing public policies even if they view these policy reviews as likely to rubberstamp unjust policies.3 They are also heavily dependent on donations from the general public and may worry that taking a strong public stand against animal agriculture, say, or animal experimentation, is likely to alienate key members of their donor community or damage their reputation with the general public. For all these reasons, APOs often feel they need to moderate their animal rights commitments (or indeed to avoid the language of animal rights entirely), sticking to “safe” campaigns around (noninstitutionalized) animal cruelty and neglect. Given these constraints, the prospects for APOs to play a transformative role seem dim. Perhaps we should simply recognize that different types of organizations play a different role in the moral division of labor. Whereas radical animal rights activists can advance a transformative agenda, the institutional constraints on APOs may require them to downplay transformative commitments. Our own view is more optimistic. We believe that most APOs can be part of (or contribute to) a transformative movement, changing the very terms on which human–animal relations are defined and not just patching up cracks in the status-quo that facilitate its ongoing functioning. Indeed, we believe that creating this sense of transformative possibility is important for maintaining staff and volunteer morale.4 APOs may inevitably be drawn into morally compromising relations with law enforcement, government regulators, animal industries, and donors but, if so, that is all the more reason to find spaces and places where staff and volunteers can act in an uncompromising way in pursuit of interspecies justice. While institutional constraints may preclude APOs from taking an uncompromising public stand on animal rights,5 we believe there is scope for APOs to be more transformative in their own internal practices and ethos and through grassroots partnerships. One way to promote transformative change is to engage in “prefigurative” /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 283 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 284 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka change:6 even within the current circumstances of profound injustice, one can try to carve out moments or spaces for treating animals the way they should be treated in a (more) just society and establishing the kinds of relationships with animals that would characterize a (more) just society. We move toward this better society by prefiguring it in the present. There are different visions of what a better society for animals C7P6 would look like, and this pluralism is undoubtedly reflected among APO workers and across different organizations. Our own view is that justice involves recognizing animals, not just as sentient beings who have rights not to be harmed, but also as agents who have their own lives to lead. In the case of many domesticated animals and others unable to lead lives independent of humans, it means recognizing them as equal members of a shared society who have the right to shape society and their relationships with us. A transformative model of animal protection, then, would attempt to prefigure, at a micro-level, a society in which these animals are seen as embodied agents and as full members of a shared society with humans. Commentators have discussed three broad reasons why prefigurC7P7 ative politics within a particular site or organization can contribute to transformative change throughout society as a whole. First, we need “laboratories of experience” to help us learn what futures are possible. In relation to animals, we have never asked as a society how animals want to live with us or made any attempt to explore the full range of possible modes of co-existence with them. There is a huge epistemic gap here that prefigurative politics can help overcome. Second, prefigurative politics is capacity-building. In a world where so many of our skills, habits, identities, values, and norms are tied to human supremacism, prefigurative politics enables us to develop new capacities for engaging in interspecies justice. Third, prefigurative politics has demonstration effects, sometimes due to pro-active attempts to diffuse the experience to a wider audience, but also simply from the way that the mere presence of such experiments in society serves to put inherited practices into question. For these and other reasons, many social movements have come to believe that, in addition to engaging in oppositional tactics to contest existing /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 284 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 285 C7P8 C7P9 C7P10 injustices in the larger society, one must also engage in constructive efforts at the micro-level to prefigure justice (Yates 2015). In previous work, we have explored the prospects for transformative strategies in sanctuary communities for animals rescued from animal agriculture (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015; Blattner et al. 2020). Not all farmed animal sanctuaries have a transformative agenda: some simply seek to provide decent care to these animals so that they can live out their lives in peace and comfort. (We can call this the “safe refuge” model of sanctuary.) But other sanctuaries have a more prefigurative political agenda of the sort we advocate: they view their sanctuaries as sites for humans and animals together to explore the sorts of new relationships that might emerge in a better society. These sanctuaries relate to the animal residents not just as vulnerable individuals who need protection and provision, but also as agents and members working together to create new relationships (which may or may not include humans).7 We have argued that prefigurative animal sanctuaries—and other forms of “intentional communities,” “enclaves,” or “counterpublics”—can play an important role in the wider struggle for animal rights. Can we imagine a transformative model for APOs more generally? As noted, one possible challenge concerns disagreement about what constitutes transformational change. What, exactly, is the goal being prefigured? This chapter offers a fairly radical vision of transformation, with a correspondingly challenging conception of the steps required to move toward it. Some (perhaps many) APOs and their staff will not share this vision, but we believe that the general strategy of prefigurement can apply even if the substantive guiding vision of justice differs and that some of the specific analyses and suggestions might be helpful in a broad range of cases. This connects to a further challenge: it is not obvious that organizations like the SPCA would even exist in a radically transformed world that takes interspecies justice seriously. Perhaps the idea of an organization devoted to animal “shelter” and “rescue” only makes sense in a society that treats animals as exploitable property. If so, then perhaps the very terms of the organization and the nature of its mandate preclude it taking on a more prefigurative as opposed /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 285 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 286 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka to band-aid role. And maybe some APOs’ ability to function is premised on maintaining a very modest set of goals of limiting damage within the contours of the existing system, a goal around which staff can rally even if they hold widely divergent ideas of just human–animal relations. Our view is that even in a much better world there will continue C7P11 to be a need for animal protection organizations and that prefiguring their role in a more just future is a worthwhile transformative project. This chapter begins by imagining how APOs might operate in such a transformed world. We then turn to the question of how this vision can inform their current operations. C7S2 7.2 Imagining APOs in a Better World C7P12 As noted, some people might believe that APOs would not be needed in a just society. For example, extinctionist views of human–animal relations are premised on the idea that domesticated animals would no longer exist in a just society and that humans would largely avoid intervening in the lives of all animals and exercising power over them. This view is most notably captured in Francione’s claim that the only right animals need is the right not to be property (Francione 2004). We have challenged this view on moral, prudential, and empirical grounds (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: chap 4). Humans don’t have the right to unilaterally bring about the demise of domesticated animals or expel them from society. Animals have the right to make their own decisions about how they will live, including the extent and nature of their involvement with humans, and, for some animals, living in multispecies communities with humans may be a desirable way to live. Moreover, the idea that humans can seal themselves off from animals, leaving them to get on with their lives without human impact, is untenable in a world in which countless animals gravitate to humans and (ever-expanding) human settlements. Of course there are also many wild animals living in the wilderness who do not gravitate to human settlement, and for them, an approach that creates boundaries and limits on human /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 286 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 287 C7P13 C7P14 activity and impacts is essential. But for countless domesticated animals (and for “liminal” urban wildlife animals), sharing space and possibly community with humans is inevitable.8 The asymmetrical power of humans and the inevitability of human impacts can’t be imagined out of existence, and so our goal should be to make the exercise of human power more accountable. Once we recognize the inevitability of geographic, ecological, and/ or social entanglement with animals, it becomes clear that APOs will continue to have a place even under more just circumstances. On the one hand, we can imagine that many current (and indeed expanded) functions of APOs would be incorporated into government and legal institutions—similar to child welfare, health, education, and advocacy—and be properly resourced through public funding. Human–animal relations would be the focus of core public policy development and implementation by democratic governments, not relegated to the periphery of ad-hoc nongovernmental organization (NGO) and volunteer efforts. But even the best public policy is beset by gaps, changing circumstances, and unpredictable events, so a continued role for emergency rescue and attention to emergent issues will persist. Even in a much better world animals will always be vulnerable in their relations with humans, and our relations with them will need to be subject to heightened scrutiny just as for other vulnerable groups within society. APOs, whether inside or outside government, will have a crucial ongoing role in advocacy and monitoring, enforcement, public education, and response to change. And there will be an ongoing requirement for expert crisis care at individual and societal levels (e.g., protection for stray, abandoned, mistreated animals; provision of emergency response to natural disasters, conflict, and social breakdown).9 In other words, even in a world dramatically improved in terms of human–animal justice, APOs will continue to exist and play a crucial role. The goal of this chapter is to show that anticipating this future role can help us to prefigure it in the current structure, policies, and relations of APOs, thereby contributing to transformation. Moreover, it may help make the work of APO staff and volunteers more tolerable and rewarding and less subject to burnout. Enabling /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 287 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 288 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka them to feel part of a project that goes beyond crisis management and unavoidable compromise with the animal-industrial complex can contribute to a sense of control and provide a welcome opportunity to contribute to and witness animal flourishing, thereby relieving some of the terrible pressure that comes from bearing responsibility for continuous life-and-death decisions in a seemingly unending cycle of animal suffering.10 C7S3 7.2.1 Crisis Care versus Permanent Residency: Different Representation for Different Circumstances An important distinction in the kinds of relationship APOs have with the animals they serve is between episodic/crisis care on the one hand and permanent home/sanctuary on the other. Some APOs provide crisis care (rescue, shelter, acute or preventative medical care, food provision) on a temporary or intermittent basis before releasing animals to their “home” (whether that home is in the wild, on the streets, or a new home arranged through adoption by human individuals and organizations). Other APOs themselves provide permanent homes or sanctuary to animals whether as part of the APO workplace or in dedicated sanctuaries for formerly farmed animals or rescued/rehabbed wild animals who cannot be released to the wild. And many APOs are in the business of providing both intermittent/crisis care for some animals and longer-term sanctuary for others. We believe that this is a crucial distinction since the forms of C7P16 power exercised over animals in these situations call for different kinds of accountability. While it is important for animals’ agency to be enabled and for their interests to be well represented in both episodic settings and long-term community, the forms of enablement and representation will be different. For starters, the kinds of decisions made about animals’ interests in a crisis care setting are more likely to be justifiably paternalistic because animals often require acute care (from injury, abuse, neglect) or other medical C7P15 /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 288 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 289 C7P17 C7P18 interventions (vaccines, etc.) that animals are not in a position to consent to in a fully informed way. This doesn’t mean that animals should not be consulted in these decisions, but rather that their preferences are less likely to be decisive (Blattner 2020; Healey and Pepper 2021). Many of the decisions made in animals’ permanent homes, neighborhoods, and workplaces, on the other hand, are ones that they can and ought to be able to make their own choices about and shape over time. The stable context and reiterative nature of decision-making make it possible for animals to learn about the options open to them and create new options, learn how to make decisions, and exercise greater control over their environment and relationships (Franks 2019; Côté-Boudreau 2019). A second distinction between crisis and long-term settings is that the power held by humans over animals in crisis care settings, while affecting crucial interests, is nevertheless of temporary duration. Animals may not have as much power over decision-making in this setting, but this is a short-term suppression of their freedom, not a permanent condition of subordination. The goal of paternalistic crisis interventions is to return animals to settings in which they exercise greater autonomy. In long-term settings, on the other hand, failure to respect animals’ participation and self-determination rights is far more problematic because it denies them the exercise of forms of autonomy possible for them and limits their opportunities to contest power and shape mutual relations that govern their daily lives. The work of most APOs falls more toward the crisis/intermittent care end of the spectrum.11 Care for stray and abandoned animals put up for adoption, treatment, and release of injured liminal/wild animals, trap-neuter-release (TNR) programs, and veterinary clinics for financially strapped families are examples of episodic/crisis care. However, many APOs also provide shelter for animals who are unadoptable or un-releasable (including seized exotic “pets” and farmed animals, injured liminal animals who can’t fend for themselves, dogs with behavioral issues precluding adoption, and so on). All too often, these animals end up being killed because many APOs have no capacity or mandate to provide a permanent home for such /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 289 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 290 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka animals. Increasingly, however, some APOs are exploring ways to provide permanent care for those animals who need it, either within their own organization or in partnership with other institutions and organizations. We expect this trend to continue, as many APO staff and C7P19 volunteers question long-standing practices of killing so-called unadoptable animals and push for a more “no-kill” ethos. However, this trend toward having animals under permanent care raises distinctive challenges. These animals don’t just require different kinds of care while under APO responsibility, but also need different kinds of political participation and representation, or so we will argue. C7S4 7.2.2 Animals Who Are under Permanent Care with APOs Regarding animals in the second category (i.e., those for whom an APO is providing permanent sanctuary), it is crucial to find ways for them to be able to contest and shape the environment that is their forever community. The APO isn’t just an institutional setting or civil society organization. From the perspective of animals who will live their entire lives within its ambit, the APO is their entire world, their only ecological, social, cultural, and political community. If meaningful agency for humans and animals requires a “holding environment” (Honig 2017), then the APO (and its partners) are that holding environment for long-term animal residents. Diminishments of autonomy and self-determination that might seem acceptable on a short-term basis become completely unacceptable if this is one’s whole life.12 (Consider quarantine and other restrictions under the current COVID-19 pandemic and how the duration of these restrictions makes all the difference in terms of our willingness to sacrifice some agency.) Supporting the agency of animals who become permanent C7P21 members of an APO community may be very challenging in some cases. Consider animals who have been abused or inadequately socialized, animals with severe injuries or illness requiring ongoing C7P20 /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 290 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 291 C7P22 C7P23 treatment, or wild animals who have been irreparably severed from the free-living communities and habitats in which they could truly flourish. The opportunity for many of these individuals to live selfdetermining lives is deeply compromised. Nevertheless, there may be important ways in which an APO could support their agency and their participation in shaping the world they share with humans, even if it is a second-best world. In our research concerning formerly farmed animals living in interspecies communities, we have explored various mechanisms for supporting animal agency and participation in community with humans, so that animals can co-author their relationships with us (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015; Donaldson 2020; Blattner et al. 2020). These include, first of all, cultivating the ethos that animals have a right to participation and the expectation that they can be agents. Agency is relational—created in the relationships between individuals (and between individuals and environments)—and this requires that we actively seek out, support and solicit the agency of others—that we be the “bearers” of each other’s agency, in Sharon Krause’s terminology (Krause 2013, 2016). Especially in cases where an animal’s agency has been suppressed or quashed, we must not take their apparent passivity or lack of initiative or interest or purposeful activity as evidence that they lack the capacity or desire for a more agential existence.13 Soliciting, enabling, and cultivating the agency of animals requires that they feel secure, that they feel part of a supportive and stable social community (for social animals), and that they have sufficient liberty, space, time, and social and environmental stimulation to explore possibilities, make serendipitous discoveries, and offer proposals for how to organize our lives together. And it requires ongoing relationships with responsive humans who get to know animals as individuals and community members and who are committed to recognizing and supporting their agency. These must be individuals whom animals like and trust. This support includes making appropriate adjustments to the social and physical environment. It means being responsive to animals’ proposals and pursuing them.14 It means scaffolding learning opportunities to help /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 291 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 292 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka individuals build competences and confidence, allowing animals to gradually explore a wider range of environments, social roles, activities, and relationships.15 And it means undertaking these steps in deliberate and demonstrable processes that can be reviewed by third parties with expertise in animal ethology, animal ethics, and interspecies democratic processes for achieving participation and co-authorship in community decision-making.16 Is there any realistic way that an APO could prefigure this form C7P24 of democratic community for the seized, injured, abused, and traumatized animals who come under their permanent care? One option is to create relationships with existing sanctuary communities to relocate animals, assuming of course that these sanctuaries are themselves committed to a prefigurative project. (Otherwise, the APO is just punting the responsibility.) This is undoubtedly a practical solution if appropriate sanctuaries exist, especially for farmed animals seized in neglect or cruelty cases. Or an APO could operate its own sanctuary. This would be an expensive option, although siting the sanctuary in a rural area with low property values might be a possibility. (Creating such a sanctuary as part of a deal with government/industry to restore/rewild a former industrial or agricultural area might make it more feasible financially.) An APO could also take a more direct role in fostering new kinds C7P25 of community partnerships that could provide the stable, socially and environmentally rich, and participatory framework that we are advocating. A possible inspiration here is the so-called greenhouse school located within a Finnish middle school. It is worth quoting in depth Hohti and Tammi’s description from their ethological study conducted at the school. The school C7P26 has a greenhouse located in the building’s atrium. This is the biggest educational greenhouse in the Nordic countries, complete with all the technology required to create a subtropical climate in the middle of the surrounding arctic environment. First used as a rescue facility for homeless pets, the greenhouse has evolved into an unofficial educational zoo inhabited by both rescue animals and purchased ones. The school is located in a disadvantaged, largely immigrant-background suburb. The /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 292 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 293 establishment of the greenhouse was possible in the early 1990s, when municipality allocated the resources for it following the so-called “positive discrimination” policy. The greenhouse inhabitants currently include approximately 40 bigger animals such as turtles, rabbits, a parrot, a dove, cockatiels, a green iguana, a water dragon, a corn snake, mice, guinea pigs, gerbils, a rooster and a hen. There are also smaller critters such as stick insects, ants, snails, mealworms and flies. Plants include tropical fruit trees, jacarandas, hibiscuses and more. Some animals are moving around on the floor of the greenhouse, some are in their cages and terrariums, or flying and sitting on beams close to the glass ceiling. The doors of the greenhouse are open to visitors, but there is the inner circle of some 20 students (aged 13–16) who like to spend most of their free time in the greenhouse. These greenhouse kids, as we like to call them, come in the greenhouse first thing in the morning, when it is often still dark, and they stay sometimes until the janitor leaves in the evening. Most of these young people have taken a course during sixth grade to qualify as responsible carers of the animals, and they are mentored by two biology teachers, Armi and Taina. Some of the secondary school students lead so-called animal clubs, which are afternoon clubs for smaller children, aged 8–12. Often, we find no adults present in the greenhouse. The young people spend time there on their own, taking full responsibility over feeding, cleaning and other daily tasks related to maintaining the greenhouse and taking care of the animals. (Hohti and Tammi 2019, 170) C7P27 It is not a great stretch to imagine that the turtles, rabbits, chickens, parrots, iguanas, and others who find their way into APO care could flourish in such a setting. As currently structured, this Finnish greenhouse school falls within a “safe refuge” model rather than the full “political” model we are advocating. While the greenhouse seeks to ensure good welfare standards, it is not conceived as the holding environment of animal residents’ agency: the main responsibility of humans is to provide protection and care, not to solicit and support animals’ agency in shaping important elements of their community. As it stands, therefore, one might worry that the greenhouse prioritizes human flourishing and learning through care of /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 293 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 294 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka animals, rather than directly centering the agency and rights of animals, a concern that we have expressed about some farmed animal sanctuaries (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015). Other dimensions of the description also raise red flags. Does being “open to visitors” perpetuate a zoo model of animals as entertainment for stranger/voyeur humans instead of a community model of ongoing relationship? And why are some animals “purchased”? But a community greenhouse model could be reconceived along C7P28 the lines of an intentional community or counterpublic—the center of a new web of relationships that model different human–animal relations, with the potential to transform all who come in contact with it. At a minimum, this model would stand as an alternative and challenge to the common perception of animals as “commodities” to be bought and sold (or simply killed or abandoned) as it suits the human owner. It would embody a deep moral commitment to the idea that even “non-adoptable” dogs or abandoned backyard chickens or exotic “pets” who are discarded by human owners are nonetheless owed moral concern. But it could also help to challenge the assumption that the best or only way to care for dependent animals is through assigning them to private individuals or families. We need to explore more social or communal modes of living with animals, in which animal residents are attended to and cared for by multiple humans with whom they develop trusting relationships. Building on these new relationships, the greenhouse could experiment with a more political model in which the space becomes the “holding environment” of democratic community and the center of a new idea of “the public” (based on the principles outlined above for soliciting, enabling, and cultivating animal agency and participation in joint world-making). In this model of political community, animals aren’t owned by humans or positioned as patients in an asymmetrical, institutional “safe refuge” arrangement, but rather are seen as neighbors and co-citizens occupying their own unique spot in a diverse democratic community. In practical terms, creating such a community would require an C7P29 APO to partner with a school board, retirement residence, prison, community group (e.g., biodome/botanic garden, food garden/hub), /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 294 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 295 C7P30 C7P31 or homeless shelter to create an experimental community where APO animals can live their “second-best life.”17 As noted, the great danger is that this might simply collapse into the familiar scenario in which institutions adopt resident animals solely to alleviate human boredom and loneliness, educate the public, or instill caring behavior in children—rather than exploring the transformative potential of democratic community with animals. So, important groundwork would have to be undertaken to find partners interested in this kind of radical project. Having said that, we think it is vital to acknowledge the mutuality involved. The fact is, humans would stand to benefit enormously from their relationships with animals in such a community. The whole point of shifting from a “safe refuge” model to a “political” model is that it places community members in a relationship of equal, reciprocal citizenship, rather than a hierarchical relationship between care-giving agent and recipient patient. And the mutual benefit is what makes this a realistic aspiration, not a utopian one. Schools, retirement homes, and other organizations with the finances to partner with an APO on such a project aren’t going to do so if they don’t perceive benefits for the populations they serve. In turn, animals in need of care and community stand to benefit from tapping into human resources of attention, interest, skill, imagination, and concern that are often wasted or frustrated by the structures of mainstream society that too often relegate children, seniors, street people, prisoners, and others to controlled settings of care and control rather than generative settings of participatory democratic community. What we are imagining here is a synergistic relationship in which animals and humans who typically lie outside of mainstream democratic practices become the center of new sites of democratic experimentation and renewal.18 It should also be noted that on this model it’s not just members of the public who enter into a new relationship with animals, but also staff at the APO. They would maintain a special duty as advocates for the animals as they transition to broader community membership and responsibility centered in the greenhouse community, but they could also, themselves, become part of this new community, /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 295 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 296 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka this reconstituted “public,” in a co-citizenship (and neighbor, friend, acquaintance etc.) relationship with animals and not just as caregiver/advocate. It was striking that, during our short visit with the Montreal SPCA, animals who had been permanently adopted by staff, spending time at the shelter as members of the SPCA family and not just clients/patients, seemed to fill a crucial role in comforting staff and reconciling them to the challenges of their workplace. Even if the total number of animals involved in an enduring greenhouse community initiative might be dwarfed by the numbers of animals cared for on an episodic basis in other APO programs, the opportunity to develop long-term relationships with at least some animals in a community setting that prefigures transformed human–animal relationships could be enormously beneficial for staff well-being. C7S5 7.2.3 Animals Who Are under Power of an APO a Temporary or Episodic Basis C7P32 Let us turn now to the second category of animals under APO care: namely, those who are receiving temporary or episodic care. The sort of long-term relationships of attention, trust, and mutual learning that make it possible for humans and animals to jointly coauthor a permanently shared community are not possible (and perhaps not necessary or desirable) for animals who are in the power of an APO on a short-term basis. We think it is important to keep the “permanent” model in mind, however, when thinking about temporary or episodic care in order to appreciate the unique dimensions, limitations, and challenges of representation and advocacy in the crisis-type setting. Animals in the temporary care of an APO are very vulnerable individuals, subject to the power of a large and complex organization that is mysterious to them (think of a small child undergoing treatment in a hospital). We know that in hospital settings, for example, patients need advocates. Having a robust framework of legal safeguards, professional ethical guidelines, and ethics review boards is certainly essential to protect patients, but is not sufficient. Crisis care institutions are subject to their own failures /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 296 15-Nov-22 20:08:44 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 297 C7P33 C7P34 (communications breakdowns, bureaucratic mentalities, incompetent or criminal staff, failures of attention and care to individuals, etc.). The policies and procedures of caring institutions are sometimes designed more for the efficiency or convenience of staff rather than the best interests of patients. Despite good intentions, it is easy to fall into patterns of manipulating patients into compliance with rules, practices, and decisions, rather than centering their needs and experience. So even if an APO operated with a strong commitment to interspecies justice, we should not assume that this means animals will be well represented (just as the legal framework of human rights does not guarantee that human residents/patients are wellrepresented within hospitals, group homes, hospices, shelters, etc.). We might envisage two broad ways of ensuring better representation of animals. First, animals would need advocates who take on a fiduciary role in relation to particular individual animals (animal “guardians”); and, second, an advocate with an independent/armslength role within the organization whose sole responsibility is to represent animals’ interests (animal “ombudsperson”). Animal guardians would be empowered to speak up on behalf of individual animals whose circumstances they know well and whose interests they can speak to, contesting or influencing APO decisions that affect that particular animal. Staff members at the Montreal SPCA, for example, already do this on an informal basis. They form special interests in or attachments to particular animals and advocate for them. This is sometimes viewed as a problem of partiality (special pleading for certain individuals when decisions should be made on an impartial utilitarian basis). But we would argue, rather, that these special attachments could form the basis of a system of effective guardianship. The problem is not that APO staff form attachments to particular animals under their care and speak up on their behalf. The problem is that not all animals have such a guardian. This problem can be addressed by formalizing the system. All (or a self-selecting subset of) staff would be assigned a certain number of animals for whom they stand in relation as guardian (selection based on animals’ inclinations/indications of trust and attachment, /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 297 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 298 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka human inclinations/indications of attachment, or random assignment if necessary). Rather than having to justify special pleading for a particular animal, APO staff would be obliged to do this for those individuals under their guardianship. (At the same time, they would be relieved of the burden of feeling they need to advocate for all animals under APO care. The burden would be shared.) When decisions affecting the animal are taken, the guardian’s input, while not decisive, would hold special weight. The fact of their strong attachment and special relationship to the animal in question, far from being seen as detracting from the possibility of dispassionate decisionmaking, would rather offer some assurance of the animal’s interests being heard as crucial decisions affecting their life are taken. An animal ombudsperson would operate on a more systemic C7P35 level, continuously reviewing APO policies and procedures with a view to centering the experience, interests and rights of animals and proposing modifications or reforms. The ombudsperson would not face any conflicting priorities (budgets, staff problems, work load, etc.) to interfere with their role as advocate. The key objective here is to create a position for an animal representative that isn’t automatically biased or compromised by cost–benefit analyses and other competing responsibilities and perspectives. If someone occupies the role of vet, legal advocate, or adoption coordinator within the organization, it is very hard for this role not to shape their perspective on animals’ interests and limit their ability to cast a critical eye on the workings of the institution. A dedicated animal ombudsperson would be in a better position to advance an unbiased and uncompromising form of animal representation, complementing the role of guardians. The role might encompass duties such as developing a bill of rights for animals within the institution or guidelines for decision-making affecting fundamental interests and overseeing the role of guardians. Perhaps most fundamentally, the role of the ombudsperson would be to make explicit the conflicting commitments and agendas within the institution; highlight the inevitable ways in which individual rights and interests can be sidelined by practical, administrative, managerial, and financial exigencies; and, where possible, implement policies to guard against the predictable pitfalls /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 298 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 299 C7P36 C7P37 of institutionalized care. Even in short-term care settings, it is important to recognize that animals’ interests must be independently represented within any organization—not subsumed under general and professional guidelines of care. The primary responsibility of animal guardians and ombudspersons in situations of episodic/crisis care is to act as a shield against institutional power—to hold that power to account on behalf of animals who, for a variety of reasons, cannot be effectively agential (e.g., they are held captive; they are often ill, traumatized and/or frightened; they tend to be both overstimulated and understimulated in ways that compromise well-being; and they are completely unfamiliar with the social and physical environment). Despite the best intentions of human caregivers, this is not a good environment for animals or a possible “holding environment” of effective agency. As we have argued, supporting animal agency in meaningful terms is only possible in relation to shaping and appropriating a long-term community environment where animals can indeed feel at home in their permanent home.19 This is not to say that agency is irrelevant in captive and crisis settings. On the contrary, even in highly constrained circumstances it is possible to give animals some sense of control over decisions concerning bedding, food, companions, etc., and this should be enabled as much as possible. (Supporting these forms of “micro” agency would be a particular responsibility of animal guardians.) Nevertheless, the primary goal of the animal guardian/ombudsperson is to act as a shield against institutional power and practices, not as an enabler of agency. This representation is intrinsically important to ensure justice for animals—providing a stronger voice for animals’ interests, ensuring that these interests, even if they cannot always be met, are at least not buried under the exigencies of crisis management. But we would suggest that creating these dedicated roles of animal guardians and ombudspersons would also be good for the staff and volunteers. Currently, staff members bear a terrible burden of being all things to the animals under their care, a burden which could be eased by sharing and formalizing advocacy roles. The guardian role would validate and empower (but also limit) a role that staff already assume /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 299 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 300 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka informally. An ombudsperson role would significantly remove the burden from staff of trying to be the best possible advocate for animals while carrying out their more immediately pressing duties as administrators, caregivers, medical practitioners, investigators, fundraisers, and public educators. It would also allow staff to feel that they are part of a prefigurative politics, piloting new forms of animal representation and political recognition and empowerment. C7S6 7.3 What Difference Would This Make to APOs under Current Circumstances? We have argued that, even in a just society, something like APOs would still be needed to provide both short-term and long-term care for vulnerable animals. But in such a future society, there would be built-in mechanisms to ensure (a) agency/participation for longterm residents and (b) effective advocacy/representation for shortterm residents. To what extent can this vision of a future APO be “prefigured” C7P39 today? Can an APO today instantiate the kinds of rights and relationships that we would like to see in a just society? We have explored a number of possibilities, including C7P38 C7P40 C7P41 C7P42 1. Working with partners to seed “alternative communities” for animals in long-term care along the lines of a more radical version of the “greenhouse school” (or existing prefigurative animal sanctuaries). 2. Creating roles for animal guardians/ombudspersons within the APO itself. We realize that these proposals may seem like they are imposing yet further expectations and burdens on an already overburdened (and underresourced) organization. Viewed from another angle, however, we can see these proposals as lightening the burden on staff, many of /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 300 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 301 C7P43 whom feel deeply torn between the constraints of their institutional roles and their moral aspirations for a more just world. In a better future, the distance between these constraints and aspirations would be much smaller, but, for the foreseeable future, the distance will be profound. We need to find a way, therefore, to reduce this conflict, and we believe that prefigurative policies can help here. Staff need to know that, notwithstanding the deeply morally compromised day-to-day realities of APOs in the current world, there are times and places where justice can be envisaged and explored, including in alternative communities or in new modes of political representation. This might in turn lead to a subtle reorientation of staff to those animals under their care—by separating the roles of care provider and advocate. It is a common pitfall of caring institutions—whether these institutions are caring for humans or animals—that caregivers take on “monopolies of care” which are unhealthy and unsustainable for both the caregiver and the cared-for.20 It is hard to predict how the practices and policies of an APO might change if these proposals were adopted. What sorts of communities would those animals in permanent care try to build with us? What sorts of priorities would animal guardians and animal ombudspersons establish for those in temporary care? This is impossible to predict. But this is the point of all genuinely transformative animal politics: we can’t know in advance what the consequences of enhanced animal agency and improved animal representation will be—we actually have to implement it to find out. And we believe that APOs have a valuable role to play in the process. C7P44 Acknowledgments C7P45 Thanks to Valéry Giroux, Angie Pepper, and Kristin Voigt for inviting us to be part of this volume and for helpful comments on our initial draft. Special thanks to Élise Desaulniers and the staff at the Montreal SPCA for sharing their experiences with us so openly and frankly. /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 301 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 302 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka Notes 1. The term “animal-industrial complex” originates in Noske (1989). For an update and elaboration, see Twine (2012). 2. As, e.g., when the law limits the SPCA to considering cases of cruelty that fall outside the standard operating procedures of industry and science while preventing them from attending to the vast structural cruelties of the animalindustrial complex. Or, as another example, when the SPCA must comply with an order to kill a dog who has attacked a human even if the behavior originates in human abuse and neglect. 3. As, e.g., in efforts to make incremental improvements to farm animal welfare legislation when the fundamental role of this legislation, arguably, is the authorization of violence against animals, not animal protection (Bryant 2010). APOs may also be expected to cooperate in the creation of guidelines for entities such as the Canadian Council on Animal Care and the National Farm Animal Care Council, two industry-led and unaccountable bodies to whom the government defers on matters concerning the well-being of researched and farmed animals. On how industry has captured these bodies, and sidelined pro-animal voices, see Bradley and MacRae (2011). 4. Insofar as the mandate of most APOs includes a principle of ensuring “protection” or “consideration” for animals, one could argue that a transformative commitment is already implicit in their mandate. However, many APOs explicitly deny that this principle entails repudiating ideologies of the instrumental use of animals. See, e.g., the Ontario SPCA’s explanation that it is an “animal welfare” and not an “animal rights” organization (https://ontariospca.ca/whowe-are/faqs/). Philosophically, one might question whether this is a coherent or defensible interpretation of the principle of protecting animals, but it has historically been the predominant view within many APOs, and efforts to move APOs in a more transformative direction have often been resisted by their governing boards and donors. For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, we will assume that APOs are defined first and foremost by their commitment to the immediate rescue and protection of individual animals and that the question of whether or how to supplement that with a more transformative commitment is a matter of ongoing debate. 5. For a discussion of the particular challenges facing APOs when their public pronouncements contradict prevailing social norms, see Chapter 5, this volume. In this chapter, our focus is less on public pronouncements and more on internal practices and grassroots partnerships. 6. The term “prefigurative politics” originates in Boggs (1977), who defined it as “the embodiment, within the ongoing political practice of a movement, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, and human experience that are the ultimate goal.” It has since become a central concept for understanding /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 302 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 303 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. a wide range of contemporary social movements. For a helpful overview, see Yates (2015). Sanctuaries are diverse and reflect a broad range of what might be deemed prefigurative elements—whether consciously adopted in those terms or more intuitively evolved in caring practice. Part of our goal in this chapter is to contribute analytic tools to identify these elements so that APOs can, if they choose, adopt them with greater intention. On the distinction between “domesticated” animals (who we’ve brought into our society to live and work alongside us), “liminal” animals (who are not domesticated but live among us as urban or suburban wildlife), and “wild” (or “wilderness”) animals (who attempt to live on their own habitat and generally avoid human contact), see Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011). See Pepper and Voigt (2021) for related discussion concerning the future role of zoos. On the high level of stress and burnout among animal shelter staff, see Dunn et al. (2019). Other APOs which fall primarily on the crisis end include wildlife rehab centers. Most of their work is transitory, involving crisis care for injured or orphaned liminal and wild animals who will be released into the wild. But some animals cannot be released safely into the wild, and, where permitted, rescue centers often provide a permanent home to these individuals. A related example is “drop in” forms of sanctuary for free-roaming animals—e.g., sanctuary clinics for village dogs, cows, and donkeys in India, or feral cat support networks— in which humans provide not just crisis care, but also a structure of ongoing supportive intervention. This ongoing support might include constructing shelters, providing food and intermittent medical care, and offering temporary respite from life on the streets. So, the distinction between temporary crisis care and a permanent home/community is a continuum, as is the distinction between more formally organized and informal care networks. Even the conservative field of animal welfare science has awakened to the importance of animal agency and autonomy. See Špinka and Wemelsfelder (2018) and Franks (2019) for recent overviews of studies concerning the inherent importance to many animals of being able to exercise control over their lives, to the point that they will sacrifice material benefits and other welfare outcomes in favor of retaining or achieving greater agency. See Franks (2019) for a discussion of this issue in the context of “choice studies” involving animals. For example, stressed animals in captivity may show little inclination to explore new options, which is sometimes taken as evidence that providing options does not contribute to their welfare. In reality, what this shows is that they are in a state of poor welfare and so unable to take up what would be welfare-improving options. /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 303 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 304 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka 14. See Meijer (2019) for a discussion of animals making proposals to us (and vice versa). 15. The idea that the capacity for choice requires “scaffolding” is familiar in child psychology. We extend it to animals living in interspecies communities in Donaldson and Kymlicka (2017). 16. In relation to farmed animal sanctuaries, we argue that this scaffolding should even extend to creating the conditions under which animal residents can safely exit community with humans over time, if they so choose. Animals who currently live in close relationships with humans might gradually form their own communities with much reduced interaction with humans. In the VINE sanctuary in Vermont, e.g., cows have the option of either leading a more independent semi-feral life on their own in the expansive upper pasture or living in more constant and direct interaction with humans and other animals in the middle pasture (as discussed in Donaldson and Kymlicka (2015) and Blatter, Donaldson and Wilcox (2020). This is unlikely to be a realistic option for the animals falling under permanent care of an APO. 17. We refer to it as “second best” to highlight the fact that it is a life path made necessary/possible by earlier misfortune or injustice. This does not preclude the possibility that this life path leads to a highly valued life, just as human tragedy can sometimes push people onto a new path that they ultimately cherish. 18. See Donaldson and Kymlicka (2016) for a more extended discussion of how prefigurative animal politics can be located within networks of participatory local institutional settings: e.g., having an animal sanctuary as part of complex that brings together a school and a home for seniors. 19. On the importance of animals being able to appropriate their environment to feel at home in it, see Bachour (2020), Bachour, Chang, and Van Patter (2021). 20. On the dangers of monopolies of care, see Gheaus (2018). C7S7 References C7P46 Bachour, O. (2020) “Alienation and animal labour.” In C. Blatter, K. Coulter, and W. Kymlicka (eds.), Animal Labour: A New Frontier of Interspecies Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 116–138. C7P47 Bachour, O., D. Chang, and L. Van Patter (2021) Dwelling with Animal-Others: Meaning-Making and the Emergence of Multispecies Community. (under review) C7P48 Blattner, C. (2020) “Animal labour: Toward a prohibition of forced labour and a right to freely choose one’s work.” In C. Blatter, K. Coulter, and W. Kymlicka (eds.), Animal Labour: A New Frontier of Interspecies Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 91–115. /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 304 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Transformative Animal Protection 305 C7P49 C7P50 C7P51 C7P52 C7P53 C7P54 C7P55 C7P56 C7P57 C7P58 C7P59 C7P60 C7P61 C7P62 C7P63 C7P64 C7P65 C7P66 C7P67 C7P68 Blattner, C., S. Donaldson, and R. Wilcox (2020) “Animal agency in community: A political multispecies ethnography of VINE Sanctuary.” Politics and Animals 6, 1–22. Boggs, C. (1977) “Marxism, prefigurative communism, and the problem of workers’ control.” Radical America 11(6), 99–122. Bradley, A., and R. MacRae (2011) “Legitimacy and Canadian Farm Animal Welfare standards development: The case of the National Farm Animal Care Council.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 24(1), 19–47. Bryant, T. (2010) “Denying childhood and its implications for animal-protective law reform.” Law, Culture and the Humanities 6(1), 56–74. Côté-Boudreau, F. (2019) Inclusive Autonomy: A Theory of Freedom for Everyone. PhD dissertation. Queen’s University (Kingston, Canada). Donaldson, S. (2020) “Animal agora: Animal citizens and the democratic challenge.” Social Theory and Practice 46(4), 709–735. Donaldson, S., and W. Kymlicka (2011) Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Donaldson, S., and W. Kymlicka (2015) “Farmed animal sanctuaries: The heart of the movement?” Politics and Animals 1, 50–74. Donaldson, S., and W. Kymlicka (2016) “Envisioning the zoopolitical revolution.” In Paola Cavalieri (ed.), Philosophy and the Politics of Animal Liberation. London: Palgrave, 71–116. Donaldson, S., and W. Kymlicka (2017) “Rethinking membership and participation in an inclusive democracy: Cognitive disability, children, animals.” In Barbara Arneil and Nancy Hirschmann (eds.), Disability and Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 168–197. Dunn, J., C. Best, D. L. Pearl, and A. Jones-Bitton (2019) “Mental health of employees at a Canadian animal welfare organization.” Society and Animals, in press. Francione, G. (2004) “Animals: Property or persons?” In Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions. New York: Oxford University Press, 108–142. Franks, B. (2019) “What do animals want.” Animal Welfare 28(1), 1–10. Gheaus, A. (2018) “Children’s vulnerability and legitimate authority over children.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 35(S1), 60–75. Healey, R., and A. Pepper (2021) “Interspecies justice: Agency, self-determination, and assent.” Philosophical Studies 178(4), 1223–1243. Hohti, R., and T. Tammi (2019) “The greenhouse effect: Multispecies childhood and non-innocent relations of care.” Childhood 26(2), 169–185. Honig, B. (2017) Public Things: Democracy in Disrepair. New York: Fordham University Press. Krause, S. (2013) “Beyond non-domination: Agency, inequality and the meaning of freedom.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 39(2), 187–208. Krause, S. (2016) “Agency.” Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon. Issue 3:5. https:// www.politicalconcepts.org/ Meijer, E. (2019) When Animals Speak: Toward an Interspecies Democracy. New York: New York University Press. /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 305 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 306 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka C7P69 Noske, B. (1989) Humans and Other Animals: Beyond the Boundaries of Anthropology. London: Pluto Press. C7P70 Pepper, A., and K. Voigt (2021) “Covid-19 and the future of zoos.” Ateliers de l’éthique/The Ethics Forum 16(1), 68–87. C7P71 Špinka, M., and F. Wemelsfelder (2018) “Environmental challenge and animal agency.” In Michael Appleby, Anna Olsson, and Francisco Galindo (eds.), Animal Welfare, 3rd ed. Wallingford: CABI, 39–55. C7P72 Twine, R. (2012) “Revealing the animal-industrial complex: A concept and method for critical animal studies.” Journal of Critical Animal Studies 10(1), 12–39. C7P73 Yates, L. (2015) “Rethinking prefiguration: Alternatives, micropolitics and goals in social movements.” Social Movement Studies 14(1), 1–21. /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 306 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN C8 Afterword Élise Desaulniers C8P1 C8P2 C8P3 C8P4 It is astonishing that, almost two centuries after the creation of the first shelters, this work constitutes, to my knowledge, the first real ethical reflection on the stakes of animal protection organizations. The daily life in a shelter is one of emergencies and unexpected events. The moments when we can sit down and take a step back from what we are doing are rare, if not nonexistent. Meeting with a group of ethicists and reading their recommendations made me realize the complexity of our work and provided a solid and necessary foundation for our reflections and continuous improvement processes. The Montreal SPCA is the oldest and still one of the most important animal protection organizations in Canada. We take care of 12,000 to 15,000 animals each year. Although it is the main provider of animal services to the City of Montreal, we are funded primarily through donations and self-generated revenue. The Montreal SPCA’s mission goes beyond that of most shelters: it is to protect animals from neglect, abuse, and exploitation; represent their interests and ensure their well-being; promote public awareness; and contribute to the development of compassion for all sentient beings. In addition to shelter activities, the Montreal SPCA also offers a spay/neuter service for low-income families, operates an investigation office that enforces animal protection laws, and works to advance the animal cause in Quebec with its animal advocacy team. The Montreal SPCA is behind the recent modifications to the Civil Code of Quebec, which now recognizes animals as sentient beings. It is due to the Montreal SPCA’s efforts that cats, dogs, and rabbits who Élise Desaulniers, Afterword In: The Ethics of Animal Shelters. Edited by: Valéry Giroux, Angie Pepper and Kristin Voigt, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197678633.003.0010 /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 307 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN 308 Élise Desaulniers do not come from shelters can no longer be sold in pet stores across the city, that the ban on certain breeds of dogs has been ended, and that horse-drawn carriages no longer operate in Old Montreal. Our organization is much more than a traditional shelter. It is one C8P5 of the leading animal rights groups in Quebec. It is therefore important for us to be exemplary in our ways. We don’t just want to adopt best practices; we want to establish them. The recommendations that have been made (and are reproduced in this volume) will be read and analyzed carefully. Some of them have already been implemented or are in the process of being implemented, such as vocabulary issues or the creation of an ethics committee. Others, such as the creation of a second site, seem difficult to implement in the short term, but they illustrate the difficulties of realizing our ambitious projects in our current facilities. When we talk about organizing the Montreal SPCA into subunits that have discretion over their own budgets, rather than being in ongoing competition for limited resources with several other units, this seems difficult with very limited financial resources. The issue is not so much the distribution of the budget as the size of the budget itself, which forces prioritization. Other recommendations require more thought, such as anything to do with our enforcement powers and our criticism of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAPAQ). We must ask ourselves what is best for the animals in the short, medium, and long term—and, above all, whether one of the problems is not that the SPCA is one of the only groups defending animal rights in Quebec. A common thread linking all these issues is the fact that in C8P7 Quebec—as elsewhere in the world—funding for animal protection depends almost exclusively on donations from the public and therefore on public opinion. Deprived of subsidies, organizations like ours spend a good part of their resources on fundraising activities that are necessary to offer basic care to animals—such as shelter and veterinary care—that represent staggering costs. Our organizations do not always have the freedom of other advocacy groups to make C8P6 /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 308 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN Afterword C8P8 C8P9 309 bold moves that put their funding at risk. On the other hand, the optimization of scarce resources is a constant concern. Since the visit of the group of ethicists who wrote these recommendations for our shelter, much has changed at the Montreal SPCA. New programs, especially for cats with ringworm and unweaned kittens, have been implemented and are already being emulated elsewhere in Quebec. Processes have been improved to ensure that all options are truly considered when making decisions about an animal’s life. The pandemic has also forced us to rethink and optimize all our services as well as develop a series of community support programs. We now temporarily house the animals of victims of domestic violence and refugees. We have a food bank to provide pet food to those who are going through difficult times. We have helped develop shelters for people experiencing homelessness that now house animals and provide training for street youth to learn proper animal care. All of this community work is missing from the recommendations but will undoubtedly become more and more important in our work over the next few years. It makes us realize the importance of thinking about our relationships with animals in a broader way. More and more groups are putting forward the concept of One Health: animal health, human health, and environmental health are intrinsically intertwined and interdependent. The health of one affects the health of all. I believe that animal welfare groups like ours will be called on to work in concert with other organizations to help create a more just and sustainable world. Shelters and animal welfare in the broadest sense should no longer be thought of in silos but as part of a larger whole. Of course, all this will certainly lead to other ethical reflections. But it is by fighting for more social justice and by reducing inequalities that we will arrive at a fairer world for animals. /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 309 15-Nov-22 20:08:45 OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 15 2022, NEWGEN /12_first_proofs/files_to_typesetting/validation Giroux210722_EAP_BR_ATUS.indd 310 15-Nov-22 20:08:45