SUEZ WAR AND TURKIYE'S APPROACH

SUEZ WAR AND TURKEY'S APPROACH The 50's and 60's were the height of the Cold War between the two polarized powers of the world. Many countries of the world were able to use the Cold War to their advantage by receiving competing assistance from both sides in the war. Egypt was no different than these many other underdeveloped nations in that it wanted to use the Cold War to its advantage as well. Egypt and other Arab nations had gained full independence from the empires controlled by European powers such as Great Britain and France. These young nations with ancient cultures and histories strove to gain economic and military sufficiency while asserting their political rights as free peoples. NASSER Egypt was being led by Gamel Abd al-Nasser who announced an aggressive development program in 1952 for which he was lobbying for funds from around the world. ''Nasser hoped that he would be the one to reunite the Arab people, therefore, he developed a foreign policy that would place him in the position to do that. The essence of Nasser's policy was a return to dignity. The primary objective of his policy was independence from external control, (military, political, and economic). Thus, he hoped to restore the dignity of the Arab people by removing the corruptive influence of all types of foreign entanglements. Central to his policy was the principle of positive neutralism or non-alignment.'' He started by raising funds mainly through the UN, World Bank and the Western Democratic nations but soon sought the assistance of Communist nations. When an arms deal with Czechoslovakia went through, US Secretary of State John Dulles announced withdrawal of US funds and assistance for Nasser's development program. In response to the harsh treatment of Egypt by the United States, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. THREE FORCES CAME TOGETHER ''In 1956, three of the Twentieth Century's most dominant forces came together in a short, violent clash in the Egyptian regions known as the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula. These three forces were: Nationalism, the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict.'' The Cold War struggle between the West against the Communist East dominated by the Soviet Union and China both helped and hindered the Nationalist goals of many African and Asian countries. For example, Egypt sought foreign aid in building the Aswan Dam project which would control the Nile River. The United States and Britain, major players in the West, declined to help Egypt because of her political and military ties to the Soviet Union. The Soviets eagerly rushed in to aid Egypt. After this, Egypt came to be considered a friend of the Soviets, and a nation not overly friendly to the West. In this way, the Cold War affected the young nation of Egypt and her relations with the rest of the world. The Arab-Israeli conflict began in 1948 and caused Egypt and Israel to be bitter foes until 1979. The second war between these Middle East neighbors took place in 1956. As part of Egyptian President Nasser's nationalist agenda, he took control of the Suez Canal zone away from the British and French companies which owned it. At the same time, as part of his ongoing struggle with Israel, Egyptian forces blocked the Straits of Tiran, the narrow waterway that is Israel's only outlet to the Red Sea. Israel and Egypt had clashed repeatedly since their 1948 war as Egypt allowed and encouraged groups of Palestinian fighters to attack Israel from Egyptian territory. ''The nationalization of the canal took the world by surprise, especially the British and French stockholders who owned the Suez Canal Company. Although Nasser promised that the company would be compensated for its loss, Britain, France, and Israel began plotting to take back the canal and overthrow Nasser as well. Britain, France and Israel united as the tripartite collusion. Israel opted to participate in the plans against Egypt in order to gain favor in the sight of western nations because the small developing nation was in constant fear of being overrun by Arab nations.'' ISRAELI'S RESPONSE In response, Israeli forces constantly made cross-border raids in retaliation. Britain and France, both of whom were in the process of losing their centuries-old empires, decided on a strategy straight our of their 19th Century Imperial histories. This plan led to a joint invasion and occupation of the Suez Canal zone by Britain and France. This was meant to reassert control of this vital waterway to the British and French companies stung by Nasser's bold nationalization. At France's suggestion, planning was coordinated with Israel, a fact which all three nations denied for years afterwards. Israel was not able to use the canal, but the Jewish state's aims regarding Egypt went beyond that grievance. Since the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian refugees had often crossed into Israel seeking to regain property and possessions expropriated by the government and to reach relatives. Some engaged in violence. Israel began responding with massive reprisal raids against entire villages in the Arab countries. Most significant was the attack on the town of Gaza in February 1955, when children as well as men were killed. That attack prompted Egypt to end direct peace talks with Israel and to turn to the Soviet Union for arms. ''It was only at that point that Egypt sponsored an anti-Israeli guerrilla organization whose members were known as the Fedayeen. In August Israel attacked the Gaza Strip village of Khan Yunis, killing 39 Egyptians. The attacks in the Gaza Strip, masterminded by officials loyal to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, subverted Nasser's efforts to make peace with Israel. Ben-Gurion's successor, Moshe Sharett, re-sponded positively to Nasser's overtures, but Gen. Moshe Dayan and others undermined Sharett. During the winter of 1955, for example, Israeli warplanes flew over Cairo repeatedly to demonstrate Egyptian military impotence.'' The Israeli government had earlier tried to prevent a warming of U.S.-Egyptian relations by having saboteurs bomb American offices in Cairo in 1954, an episode that became known as the Lavon Affair. When Egypt uncovered the operation, Israel accused Nasser of fabricating the plot. Two of the 13 men arrested were hanged, and their hangings were used as a pretext for Israel's February 1955 attack on Gaza. Six years later, the Israeli government's complicity was confirmed. Israel's bad relations with Egypt were also aggravated by the seizure of an Israeli ship, which was provocatively sent into the Suez Canal in September 1954. Both sides had seized each other's ships before, and this incident appears to have been provoked by Israel as a way to get Great Britain to compel Egypt to permit Israeli ships to use the waterway as part of a final agreement on the Suez Canal. '' In 1956, the Israeli army invaded Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. Soon after, the forces of Great Britain and France launched air attacks against Egypt. That crisis had its roots in two factors: friction at the armistice line, established after the 1948 war between Israel and Egypt, and control over the Suez Canal. Another factor was the withdrawal of the U.S. offer to help finance the High Aswan Dam in upper Egypt, a prized project of the country's new ruler and champion of Arab nationalism, Gamal Abdel Nasser.'' On October 29, 1956, Israeli troops invaded Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and quickly overcame opposition as they raced for Suez. The next day, Britain and France offered to temporarily occupy the Canal Zone and suggested a 10 mile buffer on either side which would separate the Egyptian forces from the Israelis. Nasser refused, and on October 31, Egypt was attacked and invaded by the military forces of Britain and France. In response to these developments, the Soviet Union, which at the time was ruthlessly suppressing an anti-Communist uprising in Hungary, threatened to intervene on Egypt's behalf. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA President Eisenhower of the United States pressured Britain, France and Israel into agreeing to a cease-fire and eventual withdrawal from Egypt. The United States, caught by surprise by the dual invasions, was more concerned with the Soviet war in Hungary and the Cold War than with Britain and France's dealings involving Suez. The last thing President Eisenhower wanted was a wider war over Suez. ''The US found itself in the middle of the Crisis from the moment it began. The US faced the seemingly impossible choice of abandoning its allies or standing on principle. The two men guiding US foreign policy were John Foster Dulles and Dwight Eisenhower. Their handling of the situation showed a depth of understanding not only of the specific crisis but the US position in the Middle East. Both Britain and France attempted to maintain their influence in the Middle East. These two colonial powers would be severely tested by the rise of nationalism in the region. Many have defined the Crisis in terms of the end of an era (colonialism), and the beginning of another (Pan-Arabism). Britain had developed a number of ways to maintain its influence without abject political control. The very concept of the Commonwealth was one example. Another example was the Baghdad Pact, which Britain hoped to use to keep its foot in the Middle Eastern door. Nasser's reaction to the Pact should have alerted the two colonial powers to the type of opposition their actions would receive. US foreign policy, as it often was in the Cold War, was in a state of transition. The Eisenhower Doctrine would follow on the heels of this Crisis and the Rollback policy had conveniently been rolled under the White House carpeting. Much has been made about Dulles the moral crusader, he has been portrayed as one who based his foreign policies on his personal beliefs about good and evil.'' RESULTS OF WAR The war itself lasted for only a week, and invading forces were withdrawn within the month. As a result, Egypt firmly aligned herself with the Soviet Union, which armed Egypt and other Arab nations for the continuing struggle against Israel. The Crisis ended quickly with all sides agreeing to a cease-fire November 6,1956. ''The troops were withdrawn from the Canal Zone in December under the direction of the United Nations. The canal was returned to Egypt's possession and reparations were paid by Egypt under the supervision of the World Bank. Overall the actions of the tripartite collusion were not at all beneficial to the democratic plight in the Cold War because they drew Nasser and Egypt into further relations with the USSR. The fight over the canal also laid the groundwork for the Six Day War in 1967 due to a lack of a peace settlement following the 1956 war.'' Between 1930 and 1960, Turkey's core foreign policy objectives regarding the Middle East, the Turks were not very interested in the political structure and objectives of their Middle East neighbors. ''Lack of experience in the region and Kemalist foreign policy's avoidance of regional affairs during the Republic's initial years enabled successive Turkish governments not only to pursue but to justify this course. The fact that Turkey, despite initial hesitation, went forward with the idea of a Middle Eastern Defense Organization and then the Baghdad Pact shows Turkey's willingness to be subservient to the will of its allies, and especially the United States into whose sphere of influence it had entered.'' During these years, Turkey took a few actions that later came under immense criticism. Turkey's voting record in the UN was one of those problematic issues. In 1955, Turkey voted against Algerian independence in the General Assembly. In 1957, Turkey abstained from voting on an Afro-Asian proposal for Algerian self-determination. Support for the British-initiated Baghdad Pact was another DP government action harshly criticized during the 1960s for alienating the Arabs and causing Turkey's isolation. The 1956 Suez Crisis was a test case for Turkey's Middle East policy. During the crisis, although Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel on November 20, 1956, it nevertheless informed the Israelis that it would remain friendly. Afterwards, diplomatic relations were continued at a lower level with exchange of charge d'affaires. ''Since the Suez Crisis caused alienation of the Arab states, a rift formed between the Baghdad Pact members and non-members. The Baghdad Pact, largely due to its divisive nature, came to be regarded as a failure. What Turkey was trying to achieve through its Middle East policy during the 1950s was not gaining regional states' friendship, for whom it did not seem to care very much. It may even be argued that the Turks were not yet conscious of the importance of the role the Third World, and particularly the Middle East states, was beginning to play internationally. The alienation of Middle East states was a side effect of Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy, which, during the 1960s, made rapprochement with the Middle East its foreign policy objective, again not for its own sake but in order to strengthen Turkey's position vis-à-vis the West.'' Still, Turkish foreign policy of the 1950s became the main criterion against which later policies would be tested, though in a different way. The policies of the 1950s were accepted as mistakes not to be repeated so that the so called new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, drafted in the mid-1960s, was intended to become a continuity in negation. REFERENCES: -Mostyn, Trevor Ed. Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge University Press, 1988. -Goff, Richard. The Twentieth Century: A Brief Global History. McGraw-Hill Inc, 1994. -Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Nasser and the Struggle for Independence," Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, 1990 -Roger Louis and Roger Owen, "The Historical Context," Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) -Albert Hourani, "Conclusion," Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) Bilge Criss, Turkish Foreign Policy Toward The Middle East, Vol1. Journal. 1997