Suez Crisis

Presenter/Producer: Annabelle Quince

The Suez Canal is one of the world’s most vital trade routes. It’s the shortest sea link between Asia and Europe and about 12% of global trade passes through it each year. But the Canal is situated in one of the most volatile regions in the world and its history has been defined by that geography. 

Duration: 29min 6sec
Broadcast: Sun 25 Apr 2021, 12:05pm

Guests

Dr Lucia Carminati
Social and cultural historian of modern Middle East and an assistant professor at Texas Tech University. Author of Suez: A hollow canal in need of peopling. Currents and stoppages in the historiography, 1859-1956.

Mohamed Gamal-Eldin
Historian of Modern Egypt specialising in architecture and social history - including the Suez Canal cities from 1856 to 1936.

Zachary Karabell
Author of Parting the desert: the creation of the Suez Canal.

La storia del canale più famoso del mondo riguarda da vicino anche l'Italia, le sue ambizioni e le sue esigenze. E sullo sfondo i nostri rapporti con i nostri "alleati" europei: Francia e Gran Bretagna. Ieri come oggi pronti a tutto pur di tenere lontano Roma. Per avere un'idea basta leggere sia un libro appena uscito — "Suez. Il Canale, l'Egitto e l'Italia" — che questa intervista al suo autore: Marco Valle

This article is a study on dignity and the politics of dignity in postcolonial Egypt, and focuses
on the historicity and socioeconomic background of two events: the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis
during the rise of post-independence nationalism and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution during the
Arab Spring. This study reviews the importance of the concept of dignity in philosophy and the
social sciences, specifically pertaining to the development and postcolonial need for dignity and
recognition, which the author terms ‘dignition.’ The central question here is how the conception
of dignity has evolved between the two events and what the implications are for the consequent
understanding of dignity.

Buraimi is an oasis in south-eastern Arabia. In the early 20th century it shot to notoriety as oil brought the world’s attention to this corner of the Arabian Peninsula. In this exciting account of the conflict, Michael Quentin Morton tells the story of how the overwhelming power of oil and the conflicting interests of the declining British Empire and the United States all came to a head, shaping the future of the Gulf States.

With colourful additions from first-hand accounts, Morton brings a range of historical figures to life, from the American oilmen arriving in steamy Jeddah in the 1930s, to the rival sheikhs of the oasis competing for power, wealth and allegiances, as well as the great players in world politics: Churchill, Truman and lbn Saud. This entertaining, yet thoroughly researched, book is both a story of decisive conflict in the history of Middle East politics and also of the great changes that the discovery of oil brought to this land. """

Abstract
As part of Operation Kadesh, a battalion of Israeli paratroopers were dis-
patched at the eastern entry to the Mitla Pass. The Egyptians sent an infantry
brigade to this region, but they did not attempt at destroying the enemy; one
of the battalions, however, occupied defensive positions. When the forces of
the 202nd Brigade commanded by Ariel Sharon arrived at the place, he was in-
clined to storm the Pass, but his superiors did not consent to that. Eventually,
he was allowed to send a „patrol”, to which he assigned substantial forces. The
„patrol”, commanded by Major Mordechai Gur, ran into ambush, which start-
ed long fights that in the end led to the clearing of the Mitla Pass, although it
cost Israel 36 dead soldiers. At the same time, a decision was made in Cairo to
leave the Sinai Peninsula. This article constitutes an analysis of the above Israe-
li military actions.

On March 23, the Suez Canal, one of the world’s busiest transport arteries, became blocked in both directions when the ultra-large Golden-class container ship Ever Given (operated by the firm Evergreen), en route from Malaysia to the Netherlands, ran aground cross-ways. For nearly a week, the massive vessels remained lodged along both embankments of the man-made waterway. According to various estimates, every day of blockage was costing the global economy approximately $9.6 billion

Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 27 September 1955 announcement of his decision to buy a massive amount of weapons from Czechoslovakia sent shockwaves around the world. The
years preceding 1955 had seen a long lull in the arms race between Israel and the Arab states, the result of strenuous efforts by Britain, the US, and France. Now, the quantity and
quality of weapons that Egypt was about to purchase were going to tip the scale in the Arab side’s favor. Furthermore, in the years 1952-55, Egypt received considerable sums of
American aid money for economic development. American diplomats in Cairo had been trying to convince Nasser to sign a military assistance agreement with the US, which
would have allowed Egypt to obtain American arms at low cost. But despite all that effort, it seemed that Egypt was drifting away from the West and into the communist orbit after
the announcement of the arms deal.

In the period immediately after the Suez Crisis, Harold Macmillan continued the Eden
government’s previous efforts to bring down the Nasser regime in Egypt. This policy
produced mixed reactions in Whitehall, although officials withheld their doubts while the
new government sought to repair relations with the Eisenhower administration in 1957. The inconclusive outcome of the Jordan and Lebanon interventions in 1958 ultimately allowed the Foreign Office to push for a policy of disengagement from the wider region, although a strengthened British military posture in the Gulf and southwestern Arabia threatened renewed difficulties with local nationalists by the time Macmillan left office in 1963.

“By the 1850s, Khedive Said Pasha (khedive is the title Ottomans gave to Egypt’s governors) granted French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps permission to construct a canal. It was accomplished by the Suez Canal Company and was given a 99-year lease over the waterway and surrounding. area. In the 1830s, a work of French explorer and engineer Linant de Bellefonds had performed a survey of the Isthmus of Suez which confirmed that the Mediterranean and Red seas were at the same level of altitude. Thus, making construction of a canal significantly easier.
“Lesseps created the International Commission for the Piercing of the Isthmus of Suez. The commission was made up of 13 experts, including Alois Negrelli, a leading civil engineer. Negrelli built upon the work of Bellefonds and his original survey of the region. Construction began, at Port Said  in early 1859. The work took 10 years, and an estimated 1.5 million people worked on the project. By that time, Egypt was effectually  ruled by Britain and France. Khedive Ismail Pasha formally opened the Suez Canal on 17 November 1869.

The article discusses how the emerging genre of American and British science fiction symbolised and expressed Cold War anxieties after 1949. 
It begins by briefly showing how a popular Western symbolised the Berlin Airlift, then considers how several new Sci Fi novels, including "The Martian Chronicles," "The Day of the Triffids," "I am Legend," and "The Bodysnatchers" each respond more precisely to changing Soviet aggression. 
The chief writers explored are Ray Bradbury, Robert Heinlein, John Wyndham, Richard Matheson, Jack Finney, and the television writer Terry Nation.  Connections are drawn between key science fiction novels and public concerns about possible atomic war, espionage fears, future Soviet invasion, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
It then suggests a shift in meaning affecting British science fiction from the mid-1950s, with rising fears about the demise of empire, and concerns that European civilisation is waning.  The chief writers discussed in this regard are John Christopher, whose work is linked with the Suez Crisis, & J.G. Ballard's "The Drowned World."  Strong links are also established between several British science fiction novels and William Golding's "Lord of the Flies."
9pp.

The 50's and 60's were the height of the Cold War between the two polarized powers of the world. Many countries of the world were able to use the Cold War to their advantage by receiving competing assistance from both sides in the war. Egypt was no different than these many other underdeveloped nations in that it wanted to use the Cold War to its advantage as well

The Suez crisis of 1956 has attracted significant attention from British political historians, especially since the opening-up of government archives in 1986. Most debate, however, has focus on the level of high politics and has neglected the less tangible effects of the crisis on British political consciousness and collective memory. Using a range of sources primarily drawn from the national press and debates in Parliament – grouped together under the loose term ‘public politics’ – this thesis explores the discourses surrounding the events of 1956 and the continued relevance of ‘Suez’ in national collective memory to the present day, together with the role played by the crisis in conditioning the British public for future integration with the rest of Europe.
An analysis of the public dialogue in 1956 reveals that the decision to intervene or not in Egypt was not only debated in terms of contemporary affairs, but also took place under the shadow of the past, especially the memory of appeasement and a nostalgic longing for empire. Such emotive debates clouded the political judgement of politicians and commentators and framed Suez as an epoch-defining event from the outset.
As has been previously recognised, Suez revealed to the British political elite and public that the nation could no longer play the global role it had once exercised in a changing postwar order characterised by the Cold War and the breakup of the European empires. The crisis opened up debate on the future of Britain’s role in the world, including discussion of the question of European integration. At the level of national consciousness, the political and moral humiliation of Suez produced a debate on national decline; more fundamentally, it brought into question the legitimacy of the social and political Establishment.
Finally, this thesis concludes with an analysis of the role occupied by the events of 1956 in British collective memory. Drawing on French theories of memory, it is shown that despite the reluctance of successive British governments to make official enquiries or commission histories in the post-Suez decades, the experience of 1956 was so intense that it left an indelible mark on national memory. The ‘Suez’ memory was deployed by politicians for partisan capital over flashpoints in African decolonisation. Moreover, it was commonplace in the debate about the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, demonstrating the longevity of the memory. Though discursive rather than conclusive, these various strands of inquiry attempt to situate the political narrative of 1956 in an emotive context, in the process explaining the resonance of Suez in collective memory and political consciousness to the present day.

British discourse during the Suez Crisis of 1956 was wide-ranging and deeply divided. Public discourse emerged in late July 1956, following Colonel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. It reached a climax following the Anglo-French invasion and occupation of the Canal Zone at the end of October 1956 and eventually petered out by January 1957, by which time the first UN 'peacekeeping' force (UNEF) had replaced British and French troops. Though the Crisis was concerned with whether or not Britain could use force to protest its economic interests in the Canal and its operation, the apparent collusion between Britain, France, and Israel in precipitating the conditions for invasion became a late feature of the crisis debate, particularly at the international level. The British government sought to justify its actions in international law throughout. However, there was widespread international distrust of British motivations and its behaviour at the UN. The invasion occurred at precisely the same time as the Soviet Union quelled a popular uprising in Hungary. This action provoked comparisons with Anglo-French action in Egypt, which served to further de-legitimize British Prime Minister Eden's claims to be acting in the interests of international peace and security. The comparison and distrust of British actions led to widespread challenge to 'naked' British imperialism. By mapping the policy and public discourses that emerged during the Crisis, this chapter provides a rich, empirical account of international law's role in domestic politics, and contextualizes the theory on the politics of justification.

In the wake of the publication of the Chilcot Inquiry the chapter is an important reminder of the striking similarities between the Iraq War and Suez Crisis.

The battles in Gaza in 1956 have remained on the sidelines of research into the Sinai Campaign. The paper analyses the forces involved, the course of the battles, and the death toll on both sides. The article is based primarily on Hebrew and Arabic-language publications

From the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, Greeks comprised one of the largest and most influential minority groups in Egyptian society, yet barely two thousand remain there today. This painstakingly researched book explains how Egypt’s once-robust Greek population dwindled to virtually nothing, beginning with the abolition of foreigners’ privileges in 1937 and culminating in the nationalist revolution of 1952. It reconstructs the delicate sociopolitical circumstances that Greeks had to navigate during this period, providing a multifaceted account of demographic decline that arose from both large structural factors as well as the decisions of countless individuals.

Description in LRIL:

The following five papers arise from an ‘Author-Meets-Readers’ event on Anne Orford’s International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge UP, 2011) held at the University of Sydney Law School on 13 December 2012.  The first four papers respond to the text, focusing in turn on Dag Hammarskjo¨ld’s reaction to the Suez Crisis, and the relevance to the book of, respectively, Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. The fifth essay is Anne Orford’s rejoinder, comprising a meditation on international legal method. The event was organised by Fleur Johns for the Sydney Centre for International Law and all authors wish to record their thanks to Associate Professor Johns for organising the event. The foci adopted in the various papers were chosen not to converge on a particular reading or concept but in order to capture the theoretical and historical diversity of the book.

This article focuses on the post-WW2 history of the Channel Tunnel project, the major engineering feature of the 20th century. It covers the
design and promotion of the twin bored tunnel for car shuttles and through trains up to its first failure in 1975. A substantial part of today’s Channel Tunnel engineering, management and finance originated during these two decades. Colonial crisis, European construction freezes and oil embargoes were reflected in the stops and goes of this great transport infrastructure project. The scope of the article
is limited to corporate history, with the necessary insights into government relations.  It reassess the role of the
Channel Tunnel Study Group in the light of new material.

" The building of the Suez Canal in Egypt offers many lessons about business-government relations, international lobbying, public relations and business communications, scandals and public diplomacy.

GERMAN/DEUTSCH - Die Geschichte des Suezkanals ist ein Lehrstück über das Verhältnis von Unternehmen und Staaten, internationale Lobbyarbeit, PR-Kampagnen, Skandale und Public Diplomacy.
Schlagwörter: Ägypten, Börse, Corvée, Diplomatie, Dreyfus-Affäre, Eisenbahn, Finanzmärkte, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Imperialismus, Interessenvertretung, Lobby, Osmanisches Reich, Panamakanal, Skandal, Sklaverei, Staatsschulden, Suezkanal, Zwangsarbeit
Organisationen: Anonyme Studiengesellschaft für den Orient
Unternehmen: Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, GDF Suez
Personen: Kaiserin Eugenie, Frédéric Bartholdi, Ferdinand de Lesseps, Napoleon Bonaparte, Napoleon III., Abdel Nasser, Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple), Muhammad Said, Giuseppe Verdi, Königin Victoria
Publikationen: Der Isthmus von Suez, La Lune, Standard (London)"

Notwithstanding the crisis of Suez of 1956 and the Six Days War of 1967, the oil shock following the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was unexpected for Europe. European countries had to manage a completely new situation: oil supplies had been used as a powerful political weapon which was capable to undermine their capitalist economies. It was necessary to establish a dialogue between Europe and Arab producers of oil.
The Euro-Arab dialogue marked the beginning of a new Era: new in terms of diplomacy with the Arab powers, new in terms of approach towards the European energy policy.

Business history can be a valuable, even critical element in teaching international management – not only at elite institutions and at postgraduate level, but at universities of applied sciences and in undergraduate education, too. It is specifically relevant for programs with a focus on Europe. Students should be given a chance to discover common and connected pasts of European enterprise. The article offers a rationale for curriculum integration and discusses case selections and teaching methods for non-historians. Five exemplary themes are presented: East India companies, financial market bubbles, telegraphy, the Suez Canal, and the emergence of airlines.
Zusammenfassung
Unternehmensgeschichte kann ein wertvoller, sogar kritischer Beitrag in der Vermittlung des internationalen Managements sein – nicht nur an elitären Einrichtungen und im Master, sondern auch an Fachhochschulen und in Bachelor-Studiengängen. Besonders relevant ist sie für Studiengänge mit Fokus Europa. Studenten sollten eine Chance erhalten, die gemeinsame und zusammenhängende Vergangenheit europäischer Unternehmenstätigkeit zu entdecken. Der Artikel begründet die Integration ins Curriculum und diskutiert Fallauswahl und Lehrmethodik für Nichthistoriker. Eine exemplarische Auswahl von fünf Themen wird gezeigt: Ostindienkompanien, Finanzmarkt-Blasen, Telegrafie, der Suezkanal und die Entstehung von Fluggesellschaften.

"Tényleg olyan sokat kíván egy nép, mikor maga akar dönteni sorsa fölött?" Ezt kérdezte Golda Meir, Izrael külügyminisztere az ENSZ közgyűlésén 1956 novemberében - de nem Izraellel és a szuezi válsággal, hanem a magyar forradalom leverésével kapcsolatban.

This essay demonstrates the connection between power, space and the political by drawing on two dimensions of spatial reordering in Egypt: international and local. It argues that there is a need to move beyond the statist understanding of power and its distribution to take into consideration private and colonial influences. To do this, the essay will first offer a conceptual framework based on Mitchell’s understanding of structural reordering of space and will then introduce the case study of the Suez canal as the context for explaining how European colonialism transformed spatial arrangements of power in Egypt (Mitchell 2002). The example of nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the subsequent attempts by colonial nations and the Egyptian state to exert control and power is used to demonstrate the impact this had on the people of Egypt, as well as on the international arena.

Europe as an idea as well as a political and cultural project has been a vast subject of scholarly interest, but in the British context this attention has often been restricted to the analysis of the diplomatic policies that accompanied the UK's reluctant approach to the process of European unification. According to the recent historiography, intellectuals and intellectual public discourse have been an essential condition for forging, shaping and (re)creating the idea of 'politics' and 'identity' in Britain during the post-WWII phase. After the Suez crisis and the first referendum about European membership (1975), the international roles of Britain changed dramatically (from world-imperial power and main actor in the Concert of Europe to middle-ranking European state), while the international scene as well as the European economic miracle forced intellectuals to rethink themes and categories by which public discourse perceived and interpreted Europe – perceived here as a historical as well as a political subject. This article draws attention to the debate on Europe in Britain from 1957 to the 1970s, fostered by intellectuals – understood as cultural actors engaged in public and/or political debates developed in journals or newspapers. It considers, on the one hand, how intellectuals narrated Europe as an autonomous cultural subject; on the other, it deals primarily with the response to the profound transition taking place in the intellectual environment. The article illustrates how British intellectuals pursued a new international role for Britain as a champion of freedom and as an example of democracy. In this discourse British identity and the idea of the European political project are central, and the contradictory debate about the role of Britain in Europe is a striking example of how national and European identities can interact and, eventually, collapse.

The Suez Crisis, called in Israeli historiography the Sinai Campaign,
represented the first serious examination for Israel as an independent state with international recognition. Despite the fact that sides used military means, the main struggle was carried out by diplomats in diplomatic cabinets and in the UN. Here Israeli diplomacy was to defend its national interests in terms of huge international pressure. How Israeli diplomats did it, what did they think about, what were their plans and proposals? That is why this research studies the role of the Israeli diplomacy during the Suez Crisis.