Yagil Henkin
IDF Command and General Staff College, Military Hisroty, Faculty Member
On 29 October 1956, the first day of the Suez War, detachments of the Israeli Border Police massacred forty-seven Arab men, women, and children in the village of Kafr Qasim. Although the government and army denounced the atrocity, some... more
On 29 October 1956, the first day of the Suez War, detachments of the Israeli Border Police massacred forty-seven Arab men, women, and children in the village of Kafr Qasim. Although the government and army denounced the atrocity, some historians have since argued that the massacre was planned by high-level military and government circles. The government's goal, according to this view, was to drive the Arab villagers across the border in line with a contingency plan known as Operation Mole. We present an alternative view based on new documents: rather than being either part of a preconceived plan of expulsion or an aberrant individual crime, the massacre was in fact a result of an Israeli deception plan that got out of hand.
Research Interests:
Following armed conflicts, most armies would embark on a lesson-learning mission. However, many times the lessons would be learned time and again following the next conflict, giving place to the feeling that militaries always prepare for... more
Following armed conflicts, most armies would embark on a lesson-learning mission. However, many times the lessons would be learned time and again following the next conflict, giving place to the feeling that militaries always prepare for the last war, or don't learn. This article, originally published in Hebrew, examines the case of the IDF following several wars and argues that lesson-implementing is much harder than lesson-learning; it is often ignored; and there are some things to do that would improve the learning and implementing.
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This article discusses the repercussions of Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021) and Israel’s preparation for the potential of a reoccurrence. It contends that internal instability and the fight against external foes should be... more
This article discusses the repercussions of Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021) and Israel’s preparation for the potential of a reoccurrence. It contends that internal instability and the fight against external foes should be handled as part of the same campaign, and not as different problems that happen to occur in the same time.
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The purpose of this policy paper is to present a concept for dealing with nuclear blackmail. Although this case deals with Russia’s nuclear threats in Ukraine, it also offers an approach in principle to deal with nuclear threats intended... more
The purpose of this policy paper is to present a concept for dealing with nuclear blackmail. Although this case deals with Russia’s nuclear threats in Ukraine, it also offers an approach in principle to deal with nuclear threats intended to obtain political or military concessions. It also explains why it is necessary to take Russian nuclear threats seriously; what they mean for Europe and the rest of the world, now or in future scenarios; and how to deter Russia from carrying out these threats or ensure that if it does carry out its threats, it will not win concessions. All this without increasing the risk of an all-out nuclear war.
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The sudden collapse of the Afghan army in August 2021 brought public attention to a well-known phenomenon again: western countries invest time, resources, and money in building local militaries. Yet, those forces collapse as soon as the... more
The sudden collapse of the Afghan army in August 2021 brought public attention to a well-known phenomenon again: western countries invest time, resources, and money in building local militaries. Yet, those forces collapse as soon as the western power leaves and they come under pressure, and in one case – even before the western country left. This article will analyse one aspect of hybrid war: the attempt to use local forces, and the question why western forces that attempt to shift responsibility to local forces as part of their ‘exit strategy’ fail time and again to do so, while countries such as Russia or Iran succeed more, or at least fail less, in their attempt to create and use local forces to advance their aims, as part of their hybrid strategies/
Research Interests:
IgenThe issue is published under the priority project PACSDOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001 “Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance”.NemPACSDOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001 “Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance
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This article deals with the tactical lessons of the first six months of the Russian war in Ukraine. The war, which has sent seismic shocks throughout the world, was conceived by many to be a new kind of conflict, with innovative,... more
This article deals with the tactical lessons of the first six months of the Russian war in Ukraine. The war, which has sent seismic shocks throughout the world, was conceived by many to be a new kind of conflict, with innovative, high-technology weapons and equipment bringing a sea change to the history of warfare. However, a closer look shows a more nuanced picture. While there are many lessons to be learned from this war, it is not as much a break with the past as it is a continuation of it. For all the technology being introduced, not only do tactics remain important, but the war itself is closer in many aspects to the “classic” wars of the twentieth century than to any futuristic concept of warfare.
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Rhodesia, a breakaway British colony, was engulfed in an insurgency through much of its short history. African guerillas, rebelling against the white minority government, have killed many more African civilians during the war—the same... more
Rhodesia, a breakaway British colony, was engulfed in an insurgency through much of its short history. African guerillas, rebelling against the white minority government, have killed many more African civilians during the war—the same group that formed their base of support—than either government soldiers or European civilians. The violence was not only intended to punish enemies of the guerilla—traitors or collaborators with the government. Nor was it the result of lack of popular support. Violence forced guerilla sympathizers to actively support the insurgency or participate in it, despite the considerable risks this participation carried. Political support should not be mistaken with mobilization. Without violence, the lack of benefits and the danger of government reprisal may have kept many from actively assisting the insurgency, despite politically identifying with the guerillas and hoping for their victory.
Research Interests: African Studies, Political Science, Political Violence and Terrorism, Insurgency/Counterinsurgency(COIN), Counter terrorism, and 12 moreZimbabwe, African-American Political Thought, Rhodesian Bush War, Peace and Conflict Studies Terrorism and Media, Liberation movements, Postcolonial Politics, Mobilization, Rhodesia during UDI, Rhodesia During UDI, History of Zimbabwe and South Africa, Memory and Commemorations, and African Identities
A chapter in a Book: Meir Hatina and Meir Litvak (Eds.), Martyrdom and Sacrifice in Islam: Theological, Political and Social Contexts (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016) When one speaks of martyrdom in modern Islam, an almost uniform popular... more
A chapter in a Book: Meir Hatina and Meir Litvak (Eds.), Martyrdom and Sacrifice in Islam: Theological, Political and Social Contexts (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016) When one speaks of martyrdom in modern Islam, an almost uniform popular image comes to mind — of suicide bombers, blowing themselves up, whether among non-Muslims or, more likely, other Muslim sects, or of raging crowds during funeral processions of martyrs. In Chechnya, which is often seen as the site of interfaith conflict, one would expect to find a similar phenomenon. However, while Chechnya has had its fair share of suicide bombers and martyrs (some self-proclaimed, others not) it has followed its own unique path, owing much to the differences between traditional Islam in Chechnya and Middle Eastern Islam, and to the fact that the wars in Chechnya do not fully fit the familiar pattern of conflicts that have a significant religious dimension.
Research Interests:
In recent years, the idea of ‘swarming’ – that is, simultaneous multidirectional attack or maneuver by large number of independent or semi-independent small units – became a subject of a heated debate. Some believe this is the future of... more
In recent years, the idea of ‘swarming’ – that is, simultaneous multidirectional attack or maneuver by large number of independent or semi-independent small units – became a subject of a heated debate. Some believe this is the future of warfare, while others see this belief as ridiculous and dangerous. In the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), specifically, swarming was heralded as the new way of war before the 2006 Second Lebanon War. But during and after the war, the word itself was turned into a derogatory term, symbolizing all that was wrong with the IDF’s performance: relying on new, untested and unrealistic concepts to pretend that the Army has a silver bullet which will solve its problems quickly and easily, ignoring reality in the process. This article draws on six historical case studies, from the American airborne operation in the Normandy Invasion to the Second Lebanon War, to examine the method of swarming, its relevance and its uses. Finally, the article concludes that Swarming is not a revolutionary method, and not ‘The future of conflict’. However it is a very useful method in certain situations, provided that commanders know and understand its possibilities and limitations.
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Final draft of a chapter, From a book edited by Prof. Amir Goldstein and Prof. Yael Zerubavel, detailing the events of the Seminal Battle of Tel-Hai in 1920, a cornerstone of Zionist Ethos, and its aftermath
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This study argues that White Supremacist Terrorists are much more similar to School attackers than to Islamic Terrorists, and therefore countering them requires not adapting the methods used against Islamic extremists but a different... more
This study argues that White Supremacist Terrorists are much more similar to School attackers than to Islamic Terrorists, and therefore countering them requires not adapting the methods used against Islamic extremists but a different approach altogether.
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A dataset of white supremacists killers since Andres Brevik (2011) and school attackers since Columbine (1999). The dataset was compiled for my article in Quillette, "Studying the Links Between White Supremacist Terrorists and School... more
A dataset of white supremacists killers since Andres Brevik (2011) and school attackers since Columbine (1999). The dataset was compiled for my article in Quillette, "Studying the Links Between White Supremacist Terrorists and School Shooters",
https://quillette.com/2020/01/14/studying-the-links-between-white-supremacist-terrorists-and-school-shooters/
https://quillette.com/2020/01/14/studying-the-links-between-white-supremacist-terrorists-and-school-shooters/
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In addition to the familiar military doctrine that was mainly crafted to meet the challenge of enemy states, Israel has an additional policy regarding threats that do not fit the full-scale war rubric: harassments inflicted by hostile... more
In addition to the familiar military doctrine that was mainly crafted to meet the challenge of enemy states, Israel has an additional policy regarding threats that do not fit the full-scale war rubric: harassments inflicted by hostile non-state actors.
This is an edited English version of a Hebrew-language article which was published on "Between the Boundaries - the IDF's Operational Art Journal", 15 (2018), https://www.idf.il/media/32812/%D7%99%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%9F.pdf
This is an edited English version of a Hebrew-language article which was published on "Between the Boundaries - the IDF's Operational Art Journal", 15 (2018), https://www.idf.il/media/32812/%D7%99%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%9F.pdf
Research Interests:
The ongoing Egyptian military buildup is an enigma. It is an impressive effort in terms of budget, acquisition of modern weaponry, and training. But why is Egypt investing so heavily in its military? Israel has to be wary, even though a... more
The ongoing Egyptian military buildup is an enigma. It is an impressive effort in terms of budget, acquisition of modern weaponry, and training. But why is Egypt investing so heavily in its military? Israel has to be wary, even though a military confrontation with Egypt is not expected.
Online at https://jiss.org.il/en/henkin-egyptian-military-buildup-enigma/
Online at https://jiss.org.il/en/henkin-egyptian-military-buildup-enigma/
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A look into the tactical and strategic aspects of the Verdun and Somme campaigns of 1916, and their long-lasting legacies.
Originally published in Hebrew as a series of essays on the "Mida" Website.
Originally published in Hebrew as a series of essays on the "Mida" Website.
Research Interests:
Israel has fought against non-state enemies almost constantly since its creation in 1948. It experienced, among others, the Fedayeen infiltrators of the 1950s, the PLO in the 1960s to the 1990s, Hezbollah and Hamas in the 2000s, and... more
Israel has fought against non-state enemies almost constantly since its creation in 1948.
It experienced, among others, the Fedayeen infiltrators of the 1950s, the PLO in the 1960s to the 1990s, Hezbollah and Hamas in the 2000s, and 2010s, and the so-called “uncoordinated attacks” wave of 2015–2016. Doing so, Israel has gained much experience and learned valuable lessons – but also made its fair shareof mistakes, and many times lessons were either ignored or forgotten.
This article will outline several lessons from the Israeli experience, lessons this author deems most important, both strategically and tactically.
The paper was published in , Álmos Péter Kiss (Ed.) "Asymmetric Warfare
Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future: Proceedings of the Conference
in Budapest, Hungary, 9–10 November 2016", Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2017
It experienced, among others, the Fedayeen infiltrators of the 1950s, the PLO in the 1960s to the 1990s, Hezbollah and Hamas in the 2000s, and 2010s, and the so-called “uncoordinated attacks” wave of 2015–2016. Doing so, Israel has gained much experience and learned valuable lessons – but also made its fair shareof mistakes, and many times lessons were either ignored or forgotten.
This article will outline several lessons from the Israeli experience, lessons this author deems most important, both strategically and tactically.
The paper was published in , Álmos Péter Kiss (Ed.) "Asymmetric Warfare
Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future: Proceedings of the Conference
in Budapest, Hungary, 9–10 November 2016", Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2017
Research Interests:
Israel captured Jerusalem in 1967 not because it had a concrete plan to do so, but despite the fact that Israel was not sure if it wanted to capture the old city in Jerusalem at all. Why was the 1967 battle for Jerusalem so different... more
Israel captured Jerusalem in 1967 not because it had a concrete plan to do so, but despite the fact that Israel was not sure if it wanted to capture the old city in Jerusalem at all.
Why was the 1967 battle for Jerusalem so different
from the way it was planned? Was the heroic
capture of Ammunition Hill necessary? And why
did General Uzi Narkiss tell IDF chief rabbi Shlomo
Goren to bring a shofar into battle?
The reasons go back not to 1967, but to 1948.
Why was the 1967 battle for Jerusalem so different
from the way it was planned? Was the heroic
capture of Ammunition Hill necessary? And why
did General Uzi Narkiss tell IDF chief rabbi Shlomo
Goren to bring a shofar into battle?
The reasons go back not to 1967, but to 1948.
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מאה שנה חלפו מאז כבשו הבריטים את באר שבע במסגרת קרב עזה השלישי. הגנרל אלנבי שלח את כוחות אנזק הרכובים על סוסים לאיגוף דרך המדבר, הכריע את הטורקים ופתח את הדלת לכיבוש ארץ ישראל
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Part II of a trilogy about the great battles of 1916 on the western front. This part deals with the reasons the Somme campaign took place, the tactical and strategic problems which the British faced, and the logic of their actions. Part... more
Part II of a trilogy about the great battles of 1916 on the western front. This part deals with the reasons the Somme campaign took place, the tactical and strategic problems which the British faced, and the logic of their actions. Part III will deal with the offensive itself and its military and cultural aftermath
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Marking 100 years of General Allenby's WWI October 31st 1917 Conquer of Beer Sheba, the article shares the story of this incredible battle. Outflanking the Ottoman-German held city from the less expected desert route collaborating with... more
Marking 100 years of General Allenby's WWI October 31st 1917 Conquer of Beer Sheba, the article shares the story of this incredible battle. Outflanking the Ottoman-German held city from the less expected desert route collaborating with ANZAC Cavalry and infantry, the British outwitted their enemies and took Beer Sheba and Gaza and opened the southern gate to Palestine.
Article published originally in Hebrew at Segula journal July 2014
(unfortunately some typos were made in translation...)
Few corrections to typos:
a. There were three Jewish battalions of the Royal Fusilliers, not three brigades.
b. The Beersheba Stream is actually the dry Beersheba wadi.
Article published originally in Hebrew at Segula journal July 2014
(unfortunately some typos were made in translation...)
Few corrections to typos:
a. There were three Jewish battalions of the Royal Fusilliers, not three brigades.
b. The Beersheba Stream is actually the dry Beersheba wadi.
Research Interests:
First Part of a trilogy about the great battles of 1916 on the western front. This part deals with the Verdun Campaign, parts 2 and 3 deal with the Somme offensive and the aftermath of both battles.
Research Interests:
A chapter in a Book: Meir Hatina and Meir Litvak (Eds.), Martyrdom and Sacrifice in Islam: Theological, Political and Social Contexts (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016) When one speaks of martyrdom in modern Islam, an almost uniform popular... more
A chapter in a Book: Meir Hatina and Meir Litvak (Eds.), Martyrdom and Sacrifice in Islam: Theological, Political and Social Contexts (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016)
When one speaks of martyrdom in modern Islam, an almost uniform popular image comes to mind — of suicide bombers, blowing themselves up, whether among non-Muslims or, more likely, other Muslim sects, or of raging crowds during funeral processions of martyrs.
In Chechnya, which is often seen as the site of interfaith conflict, one would expect to find a similar phenomenon. However, while Chechnya has had its fair share of suicide bombers and martyrs (some self-proclaimed, others not) it has followed its own unique path, owing much to the differences between traditional Islam in Chechnya and Middle Eastern Islam, and to the fact that the wars in Chechnya do not fully fit the familiar pattern of conflicts that have a significant religious dimension.
When one speaks of martyrdom in modern Islam, an almost uniform popular image comes to mind — of suicide bombers, blowing themselves up, whether among non-Muslims or, more likely, other Muslim sects, or of raging crowds during funeral processions of martyrs.
In Chechnya, which is often seen as the site of interfaith conflict, one would expect to find a similar phenomenon. However, while Chechnya has had its fair share of suicide bombers and martyrs (some self-proclaimed, others not) it has followed its own unique path, owing much to the differences between traditional Islam in Chechnya and Middle Eastern Islam, and to the fact that the wars in Chechnya do not fully fit the familiar pattern of conflicts that have a significant religious dimension.
Research Interests:
The consensus in Israel is that Hizbollah was deterred as a result of the Second Lebanon War, that because of the damage sustained by the group and its supporters, it refrained from fighting against Israel, and that quiet that has reigned... more
The consensus in Israel is that Hizbollah was deterred as a result of the Second Lebanon War, that because of the damage sustained by the group and its supporters, it refrained from fighting against Israel, and that quiet that has reigned on the northern border was a result of the war. In fact, most of the arguments supposedly proving that Hizbollah was deterred are less clear-cut than they appear. The majority of Hizbollah’s actions, both before and after the war, can be explained by other factors—domestic Lebanese and international—over which Israel has a very limited degree of control or influence. It is thus necessary to carefully examine the assumption of deterrence, and in particular, to avoid complacency based on this assumption.
Research Interests:
In recent years, the idea of ‘swarming’ – that is, simultaneous multidirectional attack or maneuver by large number of independent or semi-independent small units – became a subject of a heated debate. Some believe this is the future of... more
In recent years, the idea of ‘swarming’ – that is, simultaneous multidirectional attack or maneuver by large number of independent or semi-independent small units – became a subject of a heated debate. Some believe this is the future of warfare, while others see this belief as ridiculous and dangerous. In the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), specifically, swarming was heralded as the new way of war before the 2006 Second Lebanon War. But during and after the war, the word itself was turned into a derogatory term, symbolizing all that was wrong with the IDF’s performance: relying on new, untested and unrealistic concepts to pretend that the Army has a silver bullet which will solve its problems quickly and easily, ignoring reality in the process. This article draws on six historical case studies, from the American airborne operation in the Normandy Invasion to the Second Lebanon War, to examine the method of swarming, its relevance and its uses. Finally, the article concludes that Swarming is not a revolutionary method, and not ‘The future of conflict’. However it is a very useful method in certain situations, provided that commanders know and understand its possibilities and limitations.
Research Interests:
Ben-Gurion could never have declared a state in May 1948
without first painstakingly transforming Palestine’s ragtag Jewish militias into an army. This should be considered his greatest achivement.
without first painstakingly transforming Palestine’s ragtag Jewish militias into an army. This should be considered his greatest achivement.
Research Interests:
The first Russo-Chechen War ended in a clear Chechen victory and Russian Withdrawl (tough the russians re-invaded the breakaway republic in 1999). Why did it end that way? Analysing Russian and Chechen strategy, the article concludes... more
The first Russo-Chechen War ended in a clear Chechen victory and Russian Withdrawl (tough the russians re-invaded the breakaway republic in 1999). Why did it end that way?
Analysing Russian and Chechen strategy, the article concludes that although numerically inferior, the Chechens demonstrated superior military leadership and the ability to adapt to the exigencies of war, while the Russians fought the war according
to what they believed the Chechens were doing, not according to what they actually did.
In other words, the Russian failure of strategy and the Chechens understanding of Russians shortcomings enabled the rebels, finally, to overcome the disparity between their forces and the Russian army, and bring the later to an untenable situation - not only politically, but militarily as well.
Analysing Russian and Chechen strategy, the article concludes that although numerically inferior, the Chechens demonstrated superior military leadership and the ability to adapt to the exigencies of war, while the Russians fought the war according
to what they believed the Chechens were doing, not according to what they actually did.
In other words, the Russian failure of strategy and the Chechens understanding of Russians shortcomings enabled the rebels, finally, to overcome the disparity between their forces and the Russian army, and bring the later to an untenable situation - not only politically, but militarily as well.
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Algiers, Vietnam, Iraq, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and the secret strength of democratic peoples. The Author argues against the common notion of democratic people growing tired from "Small Wars" (insurgencies, guerilla conficts and the... more
Algiers, Vietnam, Iraq, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and the secret strength of democratic peoples.
The Author argues against the common notion of democratic people growing tired from "Small Wars" (insurgencies, guerilla conficts and the like) and forcing their government to abandon its goals.
In actuality, as long as the government has a clear view of its goal and manages to convince the people that it believes that goal is important, the people may be supportive or at leat tolerant even when the conflict goes on for years and the price is significant. However, when the government doesn't have any clear-cut policy or tries to buy time for a face-saving solution, then support erodes very quickly. Even in some of the most famous cases, in truth the government changed its mind or ceased to belive in its goals, and then the people quickly followed suit.
The Author argues against the common notion of democratic people growing tired from "Small Wars" (insurgencies, guerilla conficts and the like) and forcing their government to abandon its goals.
In actuality, as long as the government has a clear view of its goal and manages to convince the people that it believes that goal is important, the people may be supportive or at leat tolerant even when the conflict goes on for years and the price is significant. However, when the government doesn't have any clear-cut policy or tries to buy time for a face-saving solution, then support erodes very quickly. Even in some of the most famous cases, in truth the government changed its mind or ceased to belive in its goals, and then the people quickly followed suit.
Research Interests:
How Israel's record in preventing civilian casualties stacks up against operations in Grozny, Kosovo, and Mogadishu.
Research Interests: Criminology, Ethics, Philosophy Of Religion, Terrorism, Middle East Studies, and 23 moreInternational Law, International Security, NATO, War Studies, Political Violence and Terrorism, Israel/Palestine, Philosophy Of Law, Lebanon, Insurgency/Counterinsurgency(COIN), Syria, Middle East Politics, Economic Law, Administrative Law, National Security, Existentialism, Rules of War, Cyber Security, Chechnya, Ethnicity and National Identity, Urban Warfare, New War, Hybrid War, and UIK
Rhodesia, a breakaway British colony, was engulfed in an insurgency through much of its short history. African guerillas, rebelling against the white minority government, have killed many more African civilians during the war—the same... more
Rhodesia, a breakaway British colony, was engulfed in an insurgency through much of its short history. African guerillas, rebelling against the white minority government, have killed many more African civilians during the war—the same group that formed their base of support—than either government soldiers or European civilians. The violence was not only intended to punish enemies of the guerilla—traitors or collaborators with the government. Nor was it the result of lack of popular support. Violence forced guerilla sympathizers to actively support the insurgency or participate in it, despite the considerable risks this participation carried. Political support should not be mistaken with mobilization. Without violence, the lack of benefits and the danger of government reprisal may have kept many from actively assisting the insurgency, despite politically identifying with the guerillas and hoping for their victory.
Research Interests: African Studies, Political Violence and Terrorism, Insurgency/Counterinsurgency(COIN), Counter terrorism, Zimbabwe, and 8 moreAfrican-American Political Thought, Rhodesian Bush War, Liberation movements, Postcolonial Politics, Rhodesia during UDI, History of Zimbabwe and South Africa, Memory and Commemorations, and African Identities
Research Interests:
Eyal Eyal Weizman set out to describe the "Architecture of occupation". While his book contains useful and interesting information - especially on the Israeli tactical way of war in "operation Defensive Shield" in 2002 - it suffers not... more
Eyal Eyal Weizman set out to describe the "Architecture of occupation". While his book contains useful and interesting information - especially on the Israeli tactical way of war in "operation Defensive Shield" in 2002 - it suffers not only from a very politically skewd view, which causes him to mininterpret many facts, but from a theoretical approach which neglects and denies reality when it does not fit that well with the theory.
Research Interests:
A review of a book about the second Lebanon war of 2006. "The work does give us—if unintentionally—an insider’s view into something no less disturbing: How the Israeli political and defense hierarchy behaves after a military failure; how... more
A review of a book about the second Lebanon war of 2006.
"The work does give us—if unintentionally—an insider’s view into something no less disturbing: How the Israeli political and defense hierarchy behaves after a military failure; how the members of this hierarchy sink into recriminations, denial of accountability, and personal grudges and paybacks; how,
without doubt or hesitation, they are willing to leak operational orders, confidential military documents, andrecords of government meetings, all for the sole purpose of clearing themselves of responsibility"
"The work does give us—if unintentionally—an insider’s view into something no less disturbing: How the Israeli political and defense hierarchy behaves after a military failure; how the members of this hierarchy sink into recriminations, denial of accountability, and personal grudges and paybacks; how,
without doubt or hesitation, they are willing to leak operational orders, confidential military documents, andrecords of government meetings, all for the sole purpose of clearing themselves of responsibility"
Research Interests:
The review strongly criticises some new theories of war, and believes the book - which was based on an IDF think tank work, led by former COS Major-General Dan Halutz - is over-estimating the impact of technology, neglects strategy and... more
The review strongly criticises some new theories of war, and believes the book - which was based on an IDF think tank work, led by former COS Major-General Dan Halutz - is over-estimating the impact of technology, neglects strategy and ignores the enemy.
(The review was published before the 2006 Lebanon war).
(The review was published before the 2006 Lebanon war).
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Comprehensive economic sanctions can backfire; they tend to consolidate regimes, as in Rhodesia, Iraq. So, what kind of economic sanctions SHOULD be applied against Hamas, if Any? Link to Jerusalem Post article:... more
Comprehensive economic sanctions can backfire; they tend to consolidate regimes, as in Rhodesia, Iraq. So, what kind of economic sanctions SHOULD be applied against Hamas, if Any?
Link to Jerusalem Post article:
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/How-to-effectively-sanction-Hamas
(An 2013 note: It seems that in the four years since writing this piece, Israeli policy vis-a-vis Gaza adopted much of the suggestions. Of course, I can't know if this article had any influence).
Link to Jerusalem Post article:
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/How-to-effectively-sanction-Hamas
(An 2013 note: It seems that in the four years since writing this piece, Israeli policy vis-a-vis Gaza adopted much of the suggestions. Of course, I can't know if this article had any influence).
Research Interests:
When everything is a crime, nothing is a crime: how international human rights organizations has damaged their own agenda, and how it is related to the difference in firepower the IDF employed between operation "Defensive Shield" in 2002... more
When everything is a crime, nothing is a crime: how international human rights organizations has damaged their own agenda, and how it is related to the difference in firepower the IDF employed between operation "Defensive Shield" in 2002 and "Cast Lead" in 2008-2009
The file has been reformated to aid readability.
A link to the article in the Jerusalem Post:
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/When-everything-is-a-crime
The file has been reformated to aid readability.
A link to the article in the Jerusalem Post:
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/When-everything-is-a-crime
Research Interests:
Before the American battle for Baghdad in the 2003 Iraq war, I've suggested several lessons to be learned from the then-recent Israeli experience. I'm happy that I didn't make predictions as to WHAT will happen, only suggested what to do... more
Before the American battle for Baghdad in the 2003 Iraq war, I've suggested several lessons to be learned from the then-recent Israeli experience. I'm happy that I didn't make predictions as to WHAT will happen, only suggested what to do IF a scenario happens. After all, neither me nor most experts thought Baghdad will fall so soon. Nevertheless, because I avoided predictions, I think the point in the article remain valid a decade after they were written.
The Original NYT article can be found here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/03/opinion/the-best-way-into-baghdad.html
The Original NYT article can be found here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/03/opinion/the-best-way-into-baghdad.html
Research Interests:
This is a May 2009 Op-Ed I've wrote as part of Adelson Institute's "On second thought" newsletter. Then an abridged version was sent to the Jerusalem post. However, apparently I wasn't the only person thinking along this line, so Yoav... more
This is a May 2009 Op-Ed I've wrote as part of Adelson Institute's "On second thought" newsletter. Then an abridged version was sent to the Jerusalem post. However, apparently I wasn't the only person thinking along this line, so Yoav Tenenbaum has managed to publish an article on the same subject (http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Obama-and-Eisenhower-Some-parallels) and mine remained unpublished. This is the original version from May 2009.
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The 1956 Suez War, fought between Egypt and the improbable coalition of Britain, France, and Israel, was a key point in the history of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. A blitzkrieg-style Israeli victory proved that Israel's... more
The 1956 Suez War, fought between Egypt and the improbable coalition of Britain, France, and Israel, was a key point in the history of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. A blitzkrieg-style Israeli victory proved that Israel's victory in the 1948 war was not an accident to be swiftly fixed by Arab armies, and gave the country eleven years of relative peace until the next major conflict. An Anglo-French blunder marked the decline of British and French influence in the Middle East, to be replaced by Soviet and US involvement. Egyptian defiance of the great powers of the past marked the high point of Arab nationalism.
Despite the importance of the Suez conflict, almost no comprehensive military history of it exists. This book changes this by presenting a clear, comprehensive narrative of the conflict with a special emphasis on the military decisions and the short- and long-term results of the conflict, both tactical and strategic, military and political.
Despite the importance of the Suez conflict, almost no comprehensive military history of it exists. This book changes this by presenting a clear, comprehensive narrative of the conflict with a special emphasis on the military decisions and the short- and long-term results of the conflict, both tactical and strategic, military and political.
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This self-guided trip guide to a mile-long stretch of "Omaha Beach" in Normandy, takes the reader from the somber American military cemetery at St. Laurent, to the "Colleville Draw," past the American 1st Infantry Division monument, the... more
This self-guided trip guide to a mile-long stretch of "Omaha Beach" in Normandy, takes the reader from the somber American military cemetery at St. Laurent, to the "Colleville Draw," past the American 1st Infantry Division monument, the German fortifications at Wiederstandsnest 62, then along the beach and back up to the cemetery. Along the way, American invasion plans are explained, as well as the failures in planning and execution; the German attempts to stop the invasion; the carnage on the beach, and then; the Allied breakout – using almost exclusively recorded descriptions of events by the men who made history at these places. They'll explain from their own perspective what happened and why. That includes Private Franz Gockel of the German Army who'll tell what it was like to face the greatest invasion force in history. The guide traces the route taken by the famous photographer Robert Capa and what happened in his vicinity; and finally we'll accompany Lt. John Spalding and his small band of brothers from Easy Company on their lonely fight to reach the top of the cliffs overlooking one of the most famous beaches in history. And that's exactly where our tour ends. Many others will be mentioned, as the reader goes past the places where they fought and some died. And since the events that took place along this route were representative of the whole Omaha Beach landing, it is possible to tell the story while keeping it strongly connected to its surroundings – what happened here explains very well how and why the battle was fought and why it ended with a secure beachhead and a solid allied foothold in Normandy.
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The Battle of Ein Jalut, on September 3rd, 1260, is considered a turning point in the history of the Middle East - the first time in which the seemingly unstoppable Mongol armies were defeated in battle by Muslim forces. This article... more
The Battle of Ein Jalut, on September 3rd, 1260, is considered a turning point in the history of the Middle East - the first time in which the seemingly unstoppable Mongol armies were defeated in battle by Muslim forces. This article describes the battle and its ongoing historical legacy, which continues to this day.
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The article argues that militaries are vulunrable not only to Colonel Blimp-style reactionism but also to over-reliance on new, revolutionary concepts in their ever-present attempt to gain an edge over current and future enemies.
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A Hebrew-Language briefing prepared for the students of the IDF Command and Staff College.
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A Hebrew language working paper, prepared for the Infantry Command in the IDF in 1999-2000 and updated 2005, about Clothing for Combat Soldiers.
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For the full article see: https://www.academia.edu/20831000/The_Death_of_the_Strategic_Corporal
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The IDF operations in Judea and Samarea/West Bank and the Gaza strip is often attacked on moral, political or legal reasons. However, many times arguments masquerading as legal are not really about the Law. Therefore, attempts to add more... more
The IDF operations in Judea and Samarea/West Bank and the Gaza strip is often attacked on moral, political or legal reasons. However, many times arguments masquerading as legal are not really about the Law. Therefore, attempts to add more and more regulations in order to prevent misconduct - usually miss the mark. The belief in the damage one soldier can cause - the Israeli version of the term "The Strategic Corporal" - should lead not to more regulations, but to more mission-command orders. Commanders would be better making sure soldiers know what they want to achive, than trying to micromanage them.
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A Hebrew-Language Article at the "Segula" magazine about the Galipoli Campaign in WWI.
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An introduction to the subject of Jews and war/Judaism and war, and an annotated bibiliography of books on Jewish law concerning military Issues; History books on Jews and the Military; Biographies and Autobiographies etc. The... more
An introduction to the subject of Jews and war/Judaism and war, and an annotated bibiliography of books on Jewish law concerning military Issues; History books on Jews and the Military; Biographies and Autobiographies etc.
The bibiliography covers titles in several languages.
This is an ongoing project and would be updated periodically. Please make sure you are using the latest revision.
for additions and corrections please mail henkinyagil@gmail.com
The bibiliography covers titles in several languages.
This is an ongoing project and would be updated periodically. Please make sure you are using the latest revision.
for additions and corrections please mail henkinyagil@gmail.com
Research Interests: Jewish Law, War Studies, History of the Jews, Jews in France during the Second World War, History of Halakha and Jewish Law, and 9 moreJudaism and Jews following the Destruction of Jerusalem and the Bar Kokhba War, Jews and World War I, Jewish War 66 73. AD, Ethics of War and Judaism, Ethics of War In Judaism, Warsaw Ghetto, Holocaust, Jews 1939-1945, Josephus Jewish Wars, War and Peace in Judaism, and First Jewish–Roman War
A Hebrew-Language paper concerning the Reichswehr's involvement in German politicas from 1920 to 1934, arguing that the Reichswehr was an active political player while trying to portray itself as a-political, and that the German army... more
A Hebrew-Language paper concerning the Reichswehr's involvement in German politicas from 1920 to 1934, arguing that the Reichswehr was an active political player while trying to portray itself as a-political, and that the German army readily bowed before hitler since it hoped that hitler will pursue common goals - namely, a strong Germany, with different borders, that has a central place in Europe, without any of the Versailles limitations.