Peer Reviewed Review Article
The Shattering Dominance of the
US Dollar and the Establishment
of a New Financial System
Serhat Latİfoğlu*
Hedge Fund Manager
*Serhat Latifoğlu is a hedge fund manager. In the first eleven years of his career, he worked in managerial
positions in various banks and stock brokerage companies. He also worked on the derivatives desks of
various brokerage companies. Over the last ten years of his career, he founded and managed various
funds and business in several sectors. Particularly, Mr. Latifoğlu founded the first Turkish derivatives
arbitrage fund in Switzerland. In addition, he is the co-founder of a London-based boutique wealth
management firm Versum Wealth, which concentrates on multiple business areas. He recently cofounded a hedge fund trading in international financial markets, applying AI technology and picking
patterns with behavioral finance approach. Moreover, Mr. Latifoğlu advises several firms among the
top 100 Turkish companies ranked in terms of their position in the financial markets. He earned a
bachelor’s degree in Public Finance from Marmara University and holds a Certificate in Behavioral
Finance from Yale University and several certificates from various financial authorities worldwide. He
served in the board of a number of civil society organizations such as Rumeli Türkleri Derneği/Rumeli
Balkan Federasyonu, RUYİAD and Karadeniz Vakfı.
E-mail: serhat@versumwealth.com
Recieved: 21.02.2023
Accepted: 10.07.2023
How to citef: Latifoğlu, S. (2023). The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the
Establishment of a New Financial System. BRIQ Belt & Road Initiative Quarterly, 5(1), 66-85.
*Translation: Tolga Dişci
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
ABSTRACT
After the financial crisis in 2008, developed Western countries entered a protracted period of stagnation. The
economies of the over-financialized Western countries had difficulty compensating for the damages caused
by this financialization. During and after the crisis, countries that emphasized production, such as China,
overcame the crisis by growing and strengthening. The international institutions of the West have worked hard
to compensate for the damage caused by the international financial system established at the behest of the
United States. However, priority was given to the US and Western countries. In the post-2008 period, the US
dollar and the financial system dominated by it suffered a major loss of confidence. Some organizations started
to work as an alternative to this system. Organizations such as the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization)
and BRICS, composed of members of independent developing countries, have taken a series of concrete steps
and created the basis for a new financial system. The aim of the new financial system is to minimize dollarization,
establish alternative international financial institutions, and eliminate the financial hegemony of the US. There
are four main components for the breakdown of US financial dominance: the utilization of national currencies
in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, the establishment of new international investment banks, the
establishment of national credit card systems on the consumption side, and the widespread usage of currencies
alternative to dollar and gold in central bank reserves. The subject of this article are the steps taken by the
BRICS in the processes of the decline of the US financial hegemony and the establishment of the new financial
system, the importance of SWAP agreements in bilateral and multilateral trade relations, and the course of the
financial groundwork established by China and Russia starting from the mid-2010s. All these topics represent
the cornerstones of the New Financial System.
Keywords: BRICS, digitalization, dollarization, 5R, New Financial System.
THE MOVES THAT THE US MADE RIGHT
after 1945 and in the following process enabled
it to dominate the world financial system. In
economic terms, US financial domination
is characterized by serving the interests of
international monopolies and enabling them to
achieve high profitability. Four main sources
feed US financial dominance:
1. Profits are made on the speculation of
the US dollar.
The US dollar is the world’s most important
barter, payment, and reserve currency. The
monetary systems of most countries are
heavily dependent on the US dollar. High
profits are generated, and the continuous
manipulation of the US dollar dominates
financial markets.
2. The US exports its economic crisis
through the dollar hegemony.
The US debt crisis gets deeper every day. By
adjusting the dollar supply through the Fed, the
US exports its debt and other financial problems
to countries dependent on it. The Fed’s ultraexpansionary policies before the COVID-19
pandemic reduced dollar assets and caused
many countries to import inflation.
67
BRIq
•
Volu me 5 Issue 1 Winter 2023 - 2024
3. It provides control of international trade
and access to economic intelligence.
CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payment System)
monitors the traffic of US dollars on an international
scale. The SWIFT (Society for International Interbank
Financial Telecommunications) system, established
in 1973, ensures the security of US dollar
transactions. The SWIFT system, which
connects more than 11,000 financial institutions
in more than 200 countries, transmits about 1.8
billion messages annually and sends payment
orders worth about $6 trillion daily, is the
world’s largest monopoly (SWIFT, 2023). The
US has strong control over the SWIFT system.
Therefore, SWIFT can process transaction
information quickly and make it suitable
for the “long-arm jurisdiction” policy of the
United States. Most of the world’s international
exchanges and payments in US dollars are made
through SWIFT and CHIPS. The US, therefore,
has control over the flow of US dollars and gains
important economic intelligence from them.
US can isolate sanctioned countries
from the international dollar
system, thereby severely damaging
their international financing and
trade.
4. The US can impose financial sanctions
through its financial hegemony.
Most of the financial institutions worldwide
are frequently discouraged by the US. They
are compelled to comply with the US policy
of “extraterritorial jurisdiction” and freeze the
assets of sanctioned countries according to US
instructions. By imposing specific sanctions on
financial information transmission systems, the
68
US can isolate sanctioned countries from the
international dollar system, thereby severely
damaging their international financing and
trade. The US Treasury Department’s Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) maintains
three types of financial sanctions lists: Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
List (SDNs), Consolidated Sanctions List, and
additional OFAC Sanctions List. US companies
must freeze the assets of, and not engage in any
transactions with, individuals and entities on
the Specially Designated Nationals List without
OFAC approval (OFAC, 2023). After 2000, the US
imposed “smart sanctions” in the financial sector
that hurt Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, and other countries. In September 2014,
the European Parliament passed a resolution
prohibiting SWIFT’s software provider Finastra
from suspending its services to two Russian banks
in September 2017. In November 2018, the US
Treasury Department announced that SWIFT
would be subject to US sanctions if it provided
services to Iran. SWIFT was forced to cut its
interface with Iranian financial institutions. In
December 2020, the United States announced
sanctions against 14 vice-chairmen of the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress
(China) in an attempt to intervene in the Hong
Kong issue, and the Chief Executive of Hong Kong
became the target of US financial sanctions. After
taking office, the Biden administration pushed
for new Western sanctions against Russia, citing
the Navalny case as the reason for placing many
senior Russian officials on the financial sanctions
list. This list has grown longer and wider against
Russia since the start of Russia’s operation in
Ukraine in 2022. The sanctions against Russia
have reached a point that threatens the stability of
the world economy.
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
The Process of De-dollarization
Accelerates in the world
The US abuse of its financial hegemony seriously
threatens the stability of the world monetary
system and leads to escalating international
frictions. High dollarization and the problems it
causes have led many countries to expand the use
of national currencies internationally. More than
40 countries, including China, Russia, Türkiye,
Japan, and some EU countries, have started the
process of “de-dollarization”. The post-World
War II status quo favored “petrodollars”. Since
the US was the world’s largest oil importer,
exporting countries supported the dollar’s
dominant status. But now that the US is an oil
exporter, the petrodollar has lost its meaning
for other oil-exporting countries. Therefore, oil
exporters like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
will be important for ending dollarization.
Indeed, in 2022, Saudi Arabia announced that it
would accept the yuan as payment for its exports
to China. However, the world’s “de-dollarization”
process presents itself in three ways:
1. US dollar reserves and US dollar debt
are being reduced.
The share of the US dollar in central bank
reserves has fallen to historic lows. Türkiye,
China, France, Germany, Russia, India, and Iran
have reduced their dollar reserves in the last
decade. The Fed’s SWAPs with the central banks
of these countries have fallen significantly (Perks,
Rao, Shin & Tokuoka, 2021). Consequently,
international investors’ demand for US bonds
has also declined.
2. The role of the US dollar in international
economic cooperation is declining.
The agreement between China and Russia
to reduce the use of the US dollar and its
implementation are typical examples. In 2015,
nearly 90 percent of Russia-China trade was
conducted in US dollars. By the end of 2020,
this ratio had fallen to 46 percent (Global Times,
2021).
3. The role of the US dollar in international
monetary traffic is being diminished.
Getting rid of SWIFT, an important instrument
of US financial hegemony, is at the top of many
countries’ agendas. In 2012, Russia started using
its SPFS (Financial Message Transfer System)
as an alternative to SWIFT. In early 2018, SPFS
was extended to the Eurasian Economic Union
member states. At the time of writing, it is
actively used by 52 international organizations
and hundreds of financial institutions in
12 different countries. CIPS (Cross-Border
Payment System), officially launched by China
in October 2015, is used for cross-border yuan
settlement by financial institutions inside and
outside China, enabling real-time funds transfer.
Another feature of CIPS is that it also provides
cross-border settlement custody services. As of
June 2022, 1341 institutions were using CIPS,
including 76 “direct members” and 1265
“indirect members”. Among indirect members,
965 are from Asia (547 from China), 185
from Europe, 46 from Africa, 29 from North
America, 23 from the Pacific Ocean, and 17
from South America, covering 106 countries
and territories worldwide (CIPS, 2022).
The China Foreign Exchange Trade System
(CFETS) has launched a PVP payment system
between the yuan and the ruble. It plans
to expand PVP systems with other foreign
currencies within the Belt and Road Initiative’s
framework (Reuters, 2017). Another money
transfer system is the EU-developed INSTEX
(Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges).
69
BRIq
•
Volu me 5 Issue 1 Winter 2023 - 2024
INTEX, established by Germany, France, and
the UK for oil and commodity trade with Iran,
is a system of collecting clearing documents that
allows Iran to supply oil and other products to
Europe. But instead of being remitted to Iranian
banks, payments are remitted to European
companies that supply industrial products,
pharmaceuticals, and foodstuffs to Iran.
Commodities flow to and from Iran, but all the
money stays in the EU. In addition, Russia, China,
and India are working on a project to maintain
emergency electronic communications in the
event of a SWIFT link failure. The central banks
of the three countries have developed a system
to transfer financial information transfer systems
and transaction information (Chaudhury, 2019).
The Distribution of Reserves in Central
Banks Are Evolving
After the crisis in 2008, central banks began
to change their reserve policies in two main
directions: reducing the dollar’s weight and shifting
to alternative currencies, particularly the yuan,
and increasing the share of gold in reserves. After
the crisis, the sum of the US dollar’s reserves in
emerging markets began to decline slowly. 25 years
ago, the US dollar accounted for 71 percent of the
total reserves of the world’s central banks. By June
2022, it had fallen to 58.8 percent. In 2022, central
banks’ net gold purchases amounted to 1135 tons.
The central banks that made the purchases were
those of developing countries such as Türkiye,
China, and Russia. As of January 2023, central
banks purchased the largest amount of gold in 55
years. In 1999, central banks held about 27,780
tons of gold, but their gold reserves had fallen to
24,380 in 2008. By 2022, the total gold reserves of
central banks have reached 29,770 tons (World
Gold Council, 2023). In 2022, after the arbitrary
freezing and virtual looting of the reserves of the
Central Bank of Russia and the assets of Russian
businessmen, the tendency of central banks to
increase their gold reserves strengthened. This
trend will continue until a more secure financial
system is established.
Figure 1. Net change in gold buying/selling by world central banks.
In 2022, central bank purchases were the highest in history (Graph: Goldhub, 2023).
70
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
A Key Actor in the New Financial
System: BRICS
BRICS, which accounts for at least 25 percent
of the global GDP, pioneers alternative reserve
currencies. The organization is simultaneously
the world’s largest producer power, consumer
market, and source of raw materials. This
economic power is also visible in the reserves
of their central banks. Collectively, the central
banks of the BRICS countries hold close to 4.5
trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves
(World Bank, 2023). In other words, BRICS has
the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves.
The gold reserves of BRICS members stand at
5,288 tons. As of December 2022, Russia holds
2,299 tons of gold reserves, China holds 1,949
tons, India holds 785 tons, Brazil holds 130 tons
and South Africa holds 125 tons. The BRICS
members’ overall gold reserves represent the
world’s second-largest reserves (World Gold
Council, 2023). By increasing the diversity
of their reserves and gold positions, BRICS
central banks will increase their weight as the
world’s largest reserve power. They will be the
biggest driving force in ending the dominance
of the US dollar.
5R: Reserve Currency of the Alternative
Financial System
The New Development Bank (NDB), established
by the BRICS, is the institution that will design
the new reserve currency and export it to the
international financial system. For now, the new
reserve currency is called the 5R. 5R stands for the
initials of the currencies of the BRICS countries:
real, ruble, rupee, renminbi, rand. The 5R is
expected to be a basket containing the currencies
of these countries. According to the design, the
5R will not be a currency that replaces national
currencies (like the euro). Rather, the 5R will
complement national currencies and support the
position of the currencies of developing countries
as reserve currencies. In the first phase, the 5R
will be used as an accounting unit to facilitate
transactions between national currencies. In the
medium and long term, the main expectation
from the 5R is that it will be used in the central
banks of the BRICS and neighboring countries for
settlement transactions, payments, and reserves.
The 5R is strengthened by the fact that
BRICS is the world’s largest economic union.
In the first phase, 5R use will start with foreign
trade transactions. Over time, 5R will be used
for investments in both BRICS members and
non-BRICS neighbors. BRICS members, spread
across Eurasia, Latin America, and Africa, have
a great advantage in being active in regional
development banks. In particular, the AIIB (Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank) is an investment
bank that will greatly support the NEB in Eurasia.
This bank has a positive development pace and
has reached great potential. The practices that 5R
will launch on the investment scale are expected
to make great progress with the influence of the
AIIB. These regional development and investment
banks will play a major role in implementing the
5Rs and developing joint projects on a regional
scale.
The currencies in the 5R basket have separate
volatilities. Currently, the yuan has the lowest
volatility. In addition, the yuan’s share in the
5R basket will initially be high due to China’s
large foreign exchange reserves. Over time, as
other BRICS members and BRICS candidate
countries join, the diversity of currencies in the
basket will increase.
71
BRIq
•
Volu me 5 Issue 1 Winter 2023 - 2024
Figure 2. 2021-2023 yuan GARCH volatility.
The currencies in the 5R basket have separate volatilities (Graph: V-Lab, 2023).
Slow and Steady Rise of the Yuan
China’s economy is currently the leader of the
world economy. It is the world’s largest economy by
PPP (purchasing power parity) and second-largest
by nominal GDP (Trading Economics, 2023).
China is the world’s largest trading nation and the
world’s largest consumer market. However, the yuan
is not widely used at a scale commensurate with
China’s economic power. Given the development
potential of China and its neighboring countries, it
is inevitable that the international use of the yuan
will grow rapidly in the coming years.
After launching a pilot cross-border trade
scheme in China in 2009, the yuan’s cross-border
use has gradually expanded, and its pricing
function in international markets has steadily
72
improved. In October 2016, the yuan was
included in the IMF’s SDR. The yuan has become
the third largest currency in the weight ranking
of the SDR, and its weight continues to increase.
Data published by SWIFT in December 2022
showed that the yuan rose to fourth place in the
ranking of global payment currencies based on
monetary statistics, with a share of 2.7% (SWIFT,
2023). Russia announced that yuan bonds have
been issued, and the yuan has been included as
a reserve currency. The yuan’s share in Russia’s
foreign exchange reserves rose from 2.8% in 2018
to 13.8% in 2021 (The Wall Street Journal, 2023).
The gradual rise of the yuan is obvious from the
data, and this steady rise further increases the
chances of success of the 5R as an alternative
reserve currency.
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
Swaps as an Instrument of the New
Financial System
SWAP agreements made by central banks greatly
contribute to the widespread use of the yuan
and national currencies. In this context, the
People’s Bank of China used SWAP agreements
widely after 2008. By the end of 2021, China’s
central bank had signed SWAP agreements
with 41 countries (Atlantic Council, 2022).
Türkiye, Pakistan, Russia, Nigeria, Algeria, and
Iran use the yuan as a swap currency. Countries
with SWAP agreements based on national
currencies include Russia, Japan, South Korea,
Argentina, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,
and Brazil (The People’s Bank of China, 2023).
stabilized. When the US dollar crisis spread
across Europe, SWAP agreements were
signed with European countries such as the
UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany,
Italy, Austria, Belgium, and Canada. The size
of the successive deals reached 900 million
dollars. When the Bretton Woods system
was in place, SWAP agreements were made
to stabilize the US dollar due to rapidly
rising inflation in the US. As a final measure
against rising inflation, the US unilaterally
exited the Bretton Woods system, which it
had built itself. Thus, the link between the
US dollar and gold was broken. After August
1971, SWAP agreements continued unabated.
In the mid-1970s, deals reached $20 billion
(Bordo et al., 2015).
The History of Swaps
In the international financial system,
SWAP transactions at the central bank level
have been conducted since the 1880s. Until
the 1920s, SWAP transactions were goldbased transactions. Central banks needing
gold temporarily exchanged their gold
reserves through SWAP agreements. SWAP
transactions based on today’s fiat currency
or foreign exchange began after the 1960s.
The central banks of the United Kingdom,
Canada, and the United States pioneered foreign
currency-based SWAP transactions (McCauley
& Schenk, 2020: p.4).
On February 28, 1962, the central banks
of the United States and France signed a
SWAP agreement. At that time, 50 million
US dollars were exchanged for 500 million
francs. The duration of the SWAP transaction
was three months. However, the swap was
extended since the US dollar could not be
Given the development potential
of China and its neighboring
countries, it is inevitable that the
international use of the yuan will
grow rapidly in the coming years.
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system, demand for strong currencies increased
in international markets. This was because the
unilateral decision of the US had pushed the
markets into a new crisis. The support provided
by the IMF did not meet the demand in the
markets. In this process, SWAP agreements
made by central banks came to the rescue of
countries demanding foreign currency. SWAP
agreements had two main characteristics: the
volume of the agreements was small, and their
maturities were short (McCauley & Schenk,
2020: p.3).
73
BRIq
•
Volu me 5 Issue 1 Winter 2023 - 2024
Figure 3. World Foreign Exchange Reserves
IMF data were used for the graphic (Graph: BRIQ, 2023).
Swaps After the 2008 Crisis
The 2008 crisis led to a new era in SWAP
agreements. Immediately after the 2008 crisis,
the Fed (US Federal Reserve) signed $20 billion
in SWAPs with the ECB (European Central
Bank) and $4 billion with the Swiss National
Bank. By September 2008, seven more SWAPs
were signed with the ECB and the Swiss
National Bank. In a short period, the size of
SWAPs with these central banks reached USD
240 billion. The Fed’s SWAPs with Canada
($30 billion), Japan ($120 billion), the UK ($80
billion), Denmark ($150 billion), Norway ($15
billion), Australia ($30 billion), and Sweden
($10 billion) reached a total of $620 billion.
The SWAPs matured in February 2010 and
74
have not been renewed since the crisis ended
(IMF, 2021).
However, after the maturity, due to the
debt crisis in the EU, new SWAP agreements
were signed in May 2010 with the central
banks of Canada, the UK, the ECB, Japan, and
Switzerland. The maturity of the SWAPs was
until November 2013. After these SWAPs, the
nature of the transactions started to change
because central banks started to prefer to hold
their foreign exchange reserves by making
SWAPs with certain maturities rather than
holding them. After 2013, the ECB, Switzerland,
Japan, Canada, and the UK changed their
SWAP agreements with the Fed to ‘indefinite
and unlimited amounts’ and were used as
needed (IMF, 2021).
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
Since the US dollar is a reserve currency
widely used in foreign trade, SWAPs are mostly
used to meet the demand for US dollars.
However, this trend started to change after
the 2008 crisis. When the 2008 crisis shook
confidence in the US dollar and the EU debt
crisis hit the euro, central banks focused on
alternative currencies. The tendency to spread
risk by holding different currencies as reserves
has continued until today. In addition, the
tendency of central banks to make SWAPs by
exchanging their currencies for the currencies
of other countries has strengthened. One of
the first examples of this practice in Western
countries was the Swiss National Bank’s SWAP
agreement with the Central Bank of Poland in
June 2012. The agreement was for the Swiss
franc against the Polish zloty. Similarly, in
December 2012, India and Japan concluded
a 3-year SWAP transaction of $15 billion in
national currencies (Wiggins et al., 2023: s.4088). Simultaneously, China’s bilateral SWAP
deals within the Belt and Road Initiative
framework began to spread.
The Great Transformation of Swaps
The chart on page 15 of the IMF report “The
Evolution of Bilateral SWAP Agreements”
provides a dramatic picture of the course of
SWAPs. At the end of 2009, SWAPs clustered
in three main focal points: the US, the EU, and
Japan. At the end of 2020, this picture changed
dramatically. The distribution of SWAPs
according to their size is as follows: US, China,
EU, and Japan. In other words, the People’s
Bank of China has become a powerful player
in the international financial system with its
widespread SWAP agreements.
In the debate on SWAPs, neoliberal
economists argue that SWAP transactions
among Western central banks ensure
international stability (Rosalsky, 2020). What
should not be overlooked here is the following:
For these central banks, maintaining the
existing financial system and preserving the
hegemony of the US dollar is the priority.
Therefore, it is a common practice for them to
denigrate and try to undermine the emerging
alternative financial system and instruments.
In fact, they also implicitly or indirectly admit
that the consequences of the West’s methods
of solving internal problems are the main
source of instability in the world economy.
The problems created by the West’s SWAP
transactions are the following:
The 2008 crisis led to a new era in
SWAP agreements.
1. The US dollar always follows a course
that suits the needs and interests of the US
economy. The over-financialized US economy
is frequently in crisis. It is, therefore, impossible
to avoid possible crises and shocks.
2. Since exchange rates follow a course in
line with the interest rates set by the Fed, they
cause liquidity problems and instability in
international financial markets.
3. There are still no clear standards for the
international balance of payments. These
problems create a structure that
exclusively
ties the international financial system to the
West.
By 2022, the yuan was the 5th most traded
currency in foreign exchange markets.
75
BRIq
•
Volu me 5 Issue 1 Winter 2023 - 2024
Figure 4. Swap Cycle at the End of 2009
Chart showing end-2009 bilateral swap agreements
(Graph: Perks et.al., 2021).
China accounts for more than 15 percent of
world trade and is the most important trading
partner of the world’s largest economies, yet the
proportion of trade transactions in yuan is close
to 2 percent of total trade volume. The yuan is
now held in reserve by 70 central banks, although
its share in foreign trade transactions remains
low (SCIO, 2022). The disadvantage arising
from the problems related to convertibility in
international financial markets is covered by
the SWAP transactions of the Central Bank of
China. Since SWAP transactions do not have
long maturities, such as 5 to 10 years, it is
possible to avoid risks such as possible extreme
fluctuations and the risk of non-repayment.
76
One of the methods used by central
banks to buy yuan is bond issues. Bonds
issued in Hong Kong and other offshore
locations are more laborious and costly than
SWAPs. SWAP transactions with China
have contributed to the wider than expected
use of the yuan in international financial
markets. China started implementing SWAP
agreements in 2009, right after the crisis.
The first SWAP agreement was made with
the Central Bank of South Korea. T
he
People’s Bank of China has concluded SWAP
agreements worth 3.5 trillion yuan ($554
billion) with 41 countries (Atlantic Council,
2022).
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
Figure 5. Swap Cycle at the End of 2020
Chart showing end-2020 bilateral swap agreements
(Graph: Perks et.al., 2021).
The Quality of China’s Swap Deals
Neoclassical (neoliberal) or mainstream
economists have highlighted some drawbacks
of the Fed’s SWAPs. If SWAP agreements
are extended for an unlimited amount and
duration, we may observe the following
problems:
1. The central bank’s independent monetary
policy will be jeopardized.
2. Suspicions may arise about the financial
institutions of countries using SWAPs.
3. A few Western central banks will become
the sole arbiters of lender of last resort on the
international scale.
When we look at the characteristics of
China’s SWAP agreements, we see that
the agreements meet certain standards.
Economic, political, and institutional
features play a role in these agreements.
SWAP agreements are made primarily with
countries that have strategic partnership
agreements and free trade agreements.
Factors such as the size and volume of
the trade with the country with which
the agreement will be made and the trade
agreement affect the size and form conditions
of SWAP agreements. It is observed that
agreements are mostly made with a maturity
of 3 years (IMF, 2021).
77
BRIq
•
Volu me 5 Issue 1 Winter 2023 - 2024
China’s agreements with other central banks
have numerous positive effects on international
financial markets. Most importantly, it contributes to
breaking the dominance of the US dollar. Especially
in times of crisis, when countries with high US dollar
debt and demand experience balance of payments
problems, the demand for the US dollar increases.
Since SWAP agreements made by Western central
banks and institutions are insufficient in crises,
SWAP agreements in national currencies relieve
developing countries.
The crises that have taken place
so far have shown that Western
central banks and institutions
(especially the IMF) solve their
problems primarily in times of
liquidity crises.
There is a fundamental difference between the
SWAP agreements made by the Fed and those made
by China and other developing countries. While
the Fed makes deals to maintain and preserve the
existing dollar dominance, Chinese and emerging
market central banks make SWAPs to strengthen
their national currencies and mutual trade relations.
This is where the second important contribution of
these SWAPs comes in: improving trust between
central banks and enhancing the international
credibility of the currency they use.
The SWAPs provided by the People’s Bank of China
promote trade in national currencies and finance
infrastructure investments in BRI countries. In this
context, SWAPs are an important source of financing
for possible loan payments and postponements. SWAP
agreements support China’s EPC-F (engineering,
procurement, construction, finance) loans with BRI
countries (Silk Road Briefing, 2022).
78
Swaps in the New Financial System
Western central banks, particularly the US,
started to raise interest rates rapidly in 2022, leaving
developing countries with high levels of external debt
in a difficult situation. In previous years, the Fed’s
interest rate increases and the crises caused liquidity
problems in the US dollar. SWAPs provided by the
IMF and the Fed were not enough to overcome the
liquidity crunch in developing countries. Therefore,
countries that borrowed mainly in dollars started
looking for ways to eliminate dollarization. Central
banks of developing countries are reducing
dollarization through SWAPs among themselves.
China’s SWAPs and yuan-based borrowing are
another alternative for these countries. Factors such
as the fact that China does not impose political
conditions in SWAP and loan agreements, the
absence of liquidity problems related to the yuan,
and the price stability of the yuan make SWAPs with
China widespread in developing countries. Another
effect of this trend is to pave the way for the yuan
to spread internationally. As a result, central banks
are reducing the US dollars in their reserves and
increasing the yuan. (Global Times, 2022).
China has proven to be a reliable partner in
recent years, providing liquidity to countries in need
during crises. The China-Pakistan SWAP agreement
increased from 10 billion yuan (US$1.42 billion) in
2014 to 20 billion yuan (US$3.1 billion) in 2022.
Similarly, Argentina increased its 70-billion-yuan
SWAP agreement with China in 2009 to 130 billion
yuan (USD 18.47 billion) in 2019. This SWAP
agreement is still in force. China has continued to
be a strong and reliable financial partner through its
SWAPs and has greatly improved its trade relations
with both countries (Global Times, 2021).
The new pursuits of China, some advanced
economies, and the central banks of emerging
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
Figure 6. Distribution of foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Russia in 2021
The chart showing the distribution of the Central Bank of Russia's foreign exchange reserves in 2021
(Graph: Bank of Russia, 2022).
economies show that the ground under the Fed’s
and the US dollar’s feet is starting to shift. Russia’s
operation in Ukraine at the beginning of 2022 and
the subsequent embargo imposed on Russia further
accelerated this process. The West, and the US in
particular, has now begun to think about preserving
the system and adapting to the new system
established against its will. The IMF’s promotion of
the SDR as the new reserve currency indicates this.
The crises that have taken place so far have
shown that Western central banks and institutions
(especially the IMF) solve their problems primarily
in times of liquidity crises. The rest of the countries,
especially developing ones, are “sacrificed” in this
process. Having learned from past experiences,
central banks of developing countries (and even
some developed countries) have started diversifying
their reserves and using SWAP agreements more
frequently.
After the 2008 crisis, China-led transformation
of SWAP agreements triggered similar SWAP
agreements among developed and developing
countries. These agreements support the exchange
of deficient currencies and trade in national
currencies. In the new financial system established
in the coming years, this characteristic of SWAP
agreements will predominate and
continue to
be the biggest supporter of developing countries in
crises. SWAPs will be an important tool in the new
financial system.
79
BRIq
•
Volu me 5 Issue 1 Winter 2023 - 2024
China-Russia
Financial Cooperation and Yuan
At this stage, the concrete steps taken bilaterally
by China and Russia parallel to the ongoing
search in BRICS give hope to the world for the
establishment of an alternative financial system.
The joint steps started in 2015 have become
largely effective after the comprehensive embargo
imposed on Russia in 2022. As the cooperation
channels between the two sides have further
developed, significant experience has been
gained in using mutual national currencies
in extraordinary circumstances and other
applications of the new financial system.
Demand for the yuan in the Sino-Russian
clearing and settlement system is growing rapidly
due to the following reasons:
1. The yuan’s strength lies in its low
volatility.
Exchange rate stability is one of the important
factors influencing the decision to choose a
payment currency. The yuan is relatively stable
against the US dollar, the euro, and other
major world currencies. The yuan against the
ruble is more volatile than against other major
currencies. Most Chinese enterprises and financial
institutions are unwilling to bear the exchange rate
risk caused by the volatile ruble exchange rate and
prefer to use the yuan for local currency swaps. It
is expected that derivatives will be used to insure
foreign exchange in the coming period.
On November 22, 2010, and December 15,
2010, the ruble and yuan entered the Chinese
Interbank Foreign Exchange Market and the
Moscow Foreign Exchange Trade Center, opening
up spot interbank foreign exchange transactions
between the two countries (The Economic Times,
80
2010). The yuan’s trading volume on the Moscow
Foreign Exchange surpassed the volume of the US
dollar for the first time in October 2022, reaching
$1.17 billion. Before the operation in Ukraine,
the average trading volume was $200 million per
day (Global Times, 2022). More than 170 banks
and brokerage houses are trading yuan on Russia’s
Moscow Stock Exchange. Bank of China, ICBC,
and China Construction Bank also trade in yuan
in Russian financial markets.
2. The yuan accounts for a significant
portion of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves
and state-owned wealth funds.
In 2016, the Bank of Russia included the yuan
in the country’s foreign exchange reserves. In
July 2021, the yuan became Russia’s third largest
foreign exchange reserve, accounting for 13.1% of
the Bank of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves. By
the end of 2022, according to the decision of the
Russian Ministry of Finance, the distribution of
assets in the NWF’s portfolio will be as follows:
60% yuan and 40% gold. As of February 1, 2023,
19.6% of the cash reserve is held in euros and
79.2% in yuan. The NWF has 557.2 tons of gold
in its non-cash portfolio (Global Times, 2023a).
3. There is rapidly developing SinoRussian trade and rising yuan demand.
Before COVID-19, China and Russia had set
a goal of increasing bilateral trade volume to
US$200 billion by 2024. In 2020, the bilateral trade
volume between China and Russia amounted to
107.77 billion US dollars, exceeding 100 billion
US dollars for the third consecutive time. In
2022, with the decline in imports from the EU
after the operation in Ukraine and the redirection
to China, the trade volume between China and
Russia reached 195 billion dollars. With the
increasing trade volume, Russian President
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
In 2015, 90 percent of Sino-Russiantrade was conducted in US dollars, while in 2022,
it had fallen to 30 percent (Photo: CGTN, 2023).
Vladimir Putin announced that the new bilateral
trade target was renewed to 250 billion dollars.
In 2020, Sino-Russian trade and economic
cooperation withstood the pandemic and showed
strong resilience, strengthening the foundations
of cooperation between the two sides. China’s
share in Russia’s foreign trade has
increased,
steadily becoming Russia’s largest trading partner
for the 13th consecutive year (Reuters, 2023).
In addition to the traditional energy and
mining sectors, which still have great potential for
cooperation, agriculture, investment, contracting,
and science and technology cooperations are
developing rapidly. Cooperation in science
and technology innovation has deepened
comprehensively: the Sino-Russian Joint Science
and Technology Innovation Fund, totaling USD 1
billion, has been put into operation, and the two
sides have made positive progress in cooperation
in emerging high-tech fields such as 5G and cloud
services (Russia Briefing, 2019).
Developing Sino-Russian economic and trade
cooperation has led to a major improvement in
Sino-Russian payment and settlement transactions.
In 2015, 90 percent of Sino-Russian trade was
conducted in US dollars, while in 2022, before the
operation, it had fallen to 30 percent. These data
show that Russia and China are steadily reducing
“dollarization” (Global Times, 2023b).
4. Demand for Chinese yuan-based
investments is growing in Russia.
Due to Western economic sanctions, Russian
companies cannot obtain financing from the
West. China has become a key country for
international financing in Russia, and the scale of
yuan financing to Russia is expanding.
81
BRIq
•
Volu me 5 Issue 1 Winter 2023 - 2024
5. There is significant progress in using
national currencies in Russia and China.
In 2017, ICBC launched yuan clearing bank
operations in Moscow. Several Russian banks have
joined the Yuan Cross-Border Payment System
(CIPS) launched by the People’s Bank of China
(SWIFT, 2017). Russian and Chinese gas, oil, and gold
transactions can be settled in yuan as the settlement
currency.
Digital currencies can accelerate
the settlement of national
currencies, provide a partial
replacement for SWIFT, and
enable the globalization of
payment systems.
In 2014, at the 16th meeting of the China-Russia
Subcommittee on Financial Cooperation, it was
decided that the yuan would be paid for by matching
ruble transactions to implement the proposed “One
Belt, One Road” strategy. The Committee formally
established the mechanism of simultaneous settlement
of the yuan into foreign currencies, thereby eliminating
settlement risks arising from the time difference
between the two currencies in the settlement of foreign
exchange transactions and improving the timeliness of
funds flows in the national currency between Russia
and China (Bank of Russia, 2014).
Chinese and Russian financial institutions are
strengthening cooperation in issuing and accepting
UnionPay cards. In 2009, the Agricultural Bank of
China cooperated with the Russian side to issue
a debit card that allows users to withdraw cash in
yuan and rubles from Russian ATMs. In 2014, China
UnionPay cooperated with the Russian side to issue
ruble and yuan UnionPay cards. By the end of April
82
2019, Russian card issuers had issued more than 2.5
million UnionPay cards. More than 100,000 ATMs of
major banks, such as Sberbank and VTB Bank, can
accept UnionPay cards (Yurou, 2019).
Technological Dimension of China-Russian
Financial Cooperation
The China Foreign Exchange Trade System
(CFETS) has established a new payment system
(PVP) for the settlement of roubles and yuan, which
reduces settlement risks and the risk of trading in
different time zones and improves foreign exchange
efficiency (CFETS, 2010). This system allows China
and Russia to avoid using SWIFT, ensure privacy
of information, and, as a result, avoid US financial
sanctions when trading in national currencies
between China and Russia.
Harbin Bank’s practices have been good examples
of Sino-Russian cross-border e-commerce online
platform practices. With the China-Russia crossborder e-commerce online payment platform,
the bank has established a simple and efficient
integrated online gateway system and multi-channel
platform to solve the difficult, protracted, and costly
problems of exports (Shen & Westbrook, 2023). The
Harbin Bank example is expected to extend to other
Chinese and Russian banks.
The rapid development of digital technology
opens up alternative channels. Digital currencies
can accelerate the settlement of national currencies,
provide a partial replacement for SWIFT, and
enable the globalization of payment systems. China’s
advanced stage in implementing CBDCs (central
bank digital currency) provides an important
advantage for further Sino-Russian financial
cooperation. China and Russia have a broad field of
cooperation in
researching and implementing
digital currencies.
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
Blockchain technology is already used in finance,
lending, smart manufacturing, and logistics in
China. According to CAICT (China Academy of
Information and Communications Technology)
data, there are around 1,400 blockchain companies
in China. According to MIIT (China’s Ministry
of Industry and Information Technology),
approximately 84 percent of global blockchain
patents belong to companies in China. China and
other countries accelerate research on decentralized
systems based on blockchain technology, which
could be an alternative to SWIFT. Compared to
centralized systems such as SWIFT, decentralized
blockchain systems can increase the pace of realtime transactions and avoid third-party interception
of international payments (CAICT, 2022).
Suggestions for Deepening
China-Russia Financial Cooperation
The success of the Sino-Russian experience is
crucial for establishing the new financial system.
The Sino-Russian clearing and settlement
systems’ efforts to reduce dollarisation and
promote the use of the yuan and the ruble are
a move to enhance the security and facilitation
of bilateral trade and economic cooperation
between China and Russia. The cooperation is
also important for encouraging and developing
the internationalization of the ruble and yuan.
The internationalization of national currencies,
such as the ruble and the yuan, will be a factor
in developing an alternative reserve currency
and realizing an alternative, such as the 5Rs, in a
shorter period. We can summarise the problems
encountered in the financial cooperation
that
has intensified since the early 2010s and the
solution recommendations under the following
headings:
1. The strengthening of alternative payment
channels should be accelerated.
The integration and development of SPFS, CIPS, and
PVP should be accelerated. The integration of SPFS and
CIPS should be continuously updated and improved
in prevalence and efficiency. These systems are still
the strongest alternative payment systems to SWIFT.
2. Sino-Russian financial cooperation should
be expanded geographically.
It is expected that China will expand its commercial
activities inside Russia, and Russia will expand its
commercial activities inside China. Currently, both
sides’ direct investment and commercial activities are
concentrated at the borders and are not widespread in
big cities. Sino-Russian commercial activities, which
are stuck in the borders, need to move to big cities on
a larger scale. The status of Hong Kong is an important
candidate for this process. Regional Chinese banks are
suitable for financing and financial infrastructure of
border
trade. In Russia, Russian banks should be
encouraged to increase the number of corresponding
bank accounts, expand the geographical coverage of
corresponding bank accounts, encourage Chinese
banks to open additional offices, and focus on planning
settlements in regions where more Chinese enterprises
are investing.
3. The Sino-Russian governments should
deepen their cooperation.
To take more rapid steps to overcome the
practical problems in the merger of CIPS and SPFS,
technological compatibility, and problems related to
settlement services, both countries should implement
incentive policies and make arrangements to overcome
bureaucratic obstacles encountered in implementation.
Mutual acquisitions or mergers of financial institutions
and companies may also be encouraged. Another
dimension of the work is accelerating the digitalization
processes of these companies and harmonizing the
digital platforms of both sides.
83
BRIq
•
Volu me 5 Issue 1 Winter 2023 - 2024
4. Commercial bank cooperation should
be deepened.
The commercial banks of both countries should
strengthen investment and financing cooperation,
promote new cooperation models such as private
investment funds and investment-credit links,
and establish comprehensive corresponding bank
relationships. More efforts should be made to
resolve technical problems encountered in trade
in national currencies. More emphasis should
be placed on the diversification of the products
provided by banks and the development of new
products in line with financial cooperation.
The use of new instruments such as letters
of indemnity, bank cards, and foreign trade
factoring should be strengthened. Using China
UnionPay cards in Russia and MIR cards in China
should be encouraged. Infrastructure should be
developed for the use of these cards in commercial
transactions.
References
Bank of Russia (2014). On financial cooperation subcommittee meeting of Russia-China committee. Retrieved
February 5, 2023 from http://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/
PR/?file=30062014_113336eng2014-06-30T11_11_00.
htm
Bank of Russia. (2022). Bank of Russia Foreign Exchange
and Gold Asset Management Report. Retrieved February 7, 2023 from https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/
File/39685/2022-01_res_en.pdf
Bordo, M. D., Humpage O. F. and Schwartz, A. J. (2015).
U.S. Intervention during the Bretton Woods Era, 1962–
1973. National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved February 10, 2023 from https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c13540/c13540.pdf
CAICT. (2022). Report on the Development of China’s
Digital Economy (2022). Retrieved May 12, 2023
from http://www.caict.ac.cn/english/research/whitepapers/202208/t20220819_407677.html
84
CFETS. (2010). Public Announcement of China Foreign Exchange Trade System on Launching the Trading between RMB and Ruble in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market. Retrieved February 10, 2023
from https://www.chinamoney.com.cn/english/svcnrl/20101122/160.html
CGTN. (2023). Yuan overtaking dollar signals China's
increasing financial influence. Retrieved August 20,
2023 from https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-07-30/
Yuan-overtaking-dollar-signals-China-s-increasing-financial-influence-1lPS38K1NDO/index.html
Chaudhury, D. R., (2019). India-Russia-China explore alternative to SWIFT payment mechanism.
The Economic Times. Retrieved April 22, 2023
from
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
economy/foreign-trade/india-russia-china-explore-alternative-to-swift-payment-mechanism/articleshow/72048472.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
CIPS. (2022). CIPS Participants Announcement No.78.
Retrieved March 8, 2023 from https://www.cips.
com.cn/en/participants/participants_announcement/58049/index.html
Global Times. (2021). China, Russia expand trade settlements in local currencies to counter US dollar hegemony. Retrieved February 4, 2023 from https://www.
globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1233386.shtml
Global Times. (2022). Chinese yuan becomes most traded
foreign currency on the Moscow Exchange, surpasses
the US dollar. Retrieved March 7, 2023 from https://
www.globaltimes.cn/page/202210/1276588.shtml
Global Times. (2023a). Russia to remove euro, only keeps yuan and gold in National Wealth Fund. Retrieved
February 5, 2023 from https://www.globaltimes.cn/
page/202302/1285209.shtml
Global Times. (2023b). Over 70% trade between China,
Russia is settled in local currencies: Russian finance
minister. (2023). Retrieved April 13, 2023 from https://
www.globaltimes.cn/page/202304/1289761.shtml
Goldhub. (2023). Gold Demand Trends Full Year 2022.
Retrieved May 7, 2023 from https://www.gold.org/
goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demandtrends-full-year-2022/central-banks
McCauley, R.N., Schenk, C.R. (2023). BIS Working Papers No:851. Retrieved February 14, 2023 from https://
www.bis.org/publ/work851.pdf
OFAC. (2023). Office of Foreign Assets Control - Sanctions Programs and Information. Retrieved February
17, 2023 from https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-control-sanctions-programs-and-information
Serhat Latifoğlu - The Shattering Dominance of the US Dollar and the Establishment of a New Financial System
Perks, M., Rao, Y., Shin, J. and Tokuoka, K. (2021). Evolution of Bilateral Swap Lines. International Monetary
Fund. Retrieved March 27, 2023 from https://www.
imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/08/06/Evolution-of-Bilateral-Swap-Lines-463358
Reuters. (2017). China establishes yuan-ruble payment
system. Retrieved May 4, 2023 from https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-china-yuan-rouble-idUSKBN1CH0ML
Reuters. (2023). China's 2022 trade with Russia hit record
$190 bln – customs. Retrieved April 22, 2023 from https://www.reuters.com/world/china-customs-says-trade-with-russia-hit-new-high-2022-2023-01-13/
The People’s Bank of China. (2023). Swap Agreements.
Retrieved February 12, 2023 from http://wzdig.
pbc.gov.cn:8080/search/pcRender?pageId=9ec5bab6153e41c4b50556e7fa3c09d2
The Wall Street Journal. (2023). Russia Turns to China’s
Yuan in Effort to Ditch the Dollar. Retrieved February 20, 2023 from https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-turns-to-chinas-yuan-in-effort-to-ditch-the-dollar-a8111457
Trading Economics. (2023). China GDP Growth Rate.
Retrieved February 10, 2023 from https://tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth
Rosalsky, G. (2020). Why Is The Fed Sending Billions
Of Dollars All Over The World. Retrieved February
17, 2023 from https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2020/04/21/839374663/why-is-the-fed-sendingbillions-of-dollars-all-over-the-world
Tran, H. (2022). Internationalization of the renminbi via
bilateral swap lines. Atlantic Council Retrieved February 5, 2023 from https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/media-center/working-papers/pdf/2018_April_
Bank-Lending-Post-Crisis_AIIB-Working-Paper.pdf
Russia Briefing. (2019). Russia, China, Set Up US$1 Billion Technology Innovation Fund. Retrieved April 7,
2023 from https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/
russia-china-set-us-1-billion-technology-innovation-fund.html/
V-Lab. (2023). Chinese Renminbi GARCH Volatility
Analysis. Retrieved February 17, 2023 from https://
vlab.stern.nyu.edu/volatility/VOL.CNY%3AFOREX-R.GARCH
SCIO. (2022). RMB. becomes 4th most active currency for
global payments: SWIFT. Retrieved April 18, 2023 from
http://english.scio.gov.cn/chinavoices/2022-01/21/
content_78003282.htm
Shen, S., & Westbrook, T. (2023). Chinese banks seize on
Russia, oil trade to internationalise yuan. Reuters. Retrieved May 17, 2023 from https://www.reuters.com/
markets/currencies/chinese-banks-seize-russia-oil-trade-internationalise-yuan-2023-04-28/
Silk Road Briefing. (2022). China Using Currency Credit
Swaps To Help Re-Finance Errant BRI Projects. Retrieved June 26, 2023 from https://www.silkroadbriefing.
com/news/2022/12/13/china-using-currency-credit-swaps-to-help-re-finance-errant-bri-projects/
SWIFT. (2017). Will the Belt and Road revitalise RMB internationalisation?. Retrieved June 15, 2023 from https://www.swift.com/swift-resource/125726/download
Weijia, H. (2022). Blaming swap lines futile in face of
yuan internationalization. Global Times. Retrieved May 5, 2023 from https://www.globaltimes.cn/
page/202212/1281725.shtml
World Bank. (2023). Total reserves. Retrieved June 6, 2023
from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FI.RES.
TOTL.CD
Wiggins, R. Z., Hoffner, B., Feldberg, G., Metrick, A.
(2023). Central Bank Foreign Currency Swaps and
Repo Facilities Survey. Journal of Financial Crises,
5(1), 25-111. Accessed 15 February 2023. Retrieved
from https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol5/iss1/2
World Gold Council. (2023). 30 years of Gold Demand
Trends. Retrieved June 5, 2023 from https://www.gold.
org/goldhub/research/30-years-gold-demand-trends
SWIFT. (2023). Swift Raffic Highlights. Retrieved February 5, 2023 from https://www.swift.com/about-us/
swift-traffic-highlights
Yurou. (2019). Moscow metro users can now use China UnionPay cards to pay fare. Xinhuanet. Retrieved
May 18, 2023 from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/11/c_138464664.htm
The Economic Times. (2010). Russia China kick off yuan
rouble trade. Retrieved June 12, 2023 from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/forex/russia-china-kick-off-yuan-rouble-trade/articleshow/7109328.
cms
Zharikov, M. V. (2023). Digital Money Options for the
BRICS. International Journal of Financial Studies,
11(1). Retrieved February 11, 2023 from https://doi.
org/ 10.3390/ijfs11010042
85