Peer-Reviewed Review Article
China-NATO Relations:
History and Reality
Yi Shaoxuan *
Yang Chen **
Master’s Student
Shanghai University
Assoc. Prof.
Shanghai University
*Yi Shaoxuan is a master’s candidate majoring in Political Science at the College of Liberal Arts and a
research assistant at the Center for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University. Her research fields include
China-Türkiye Relations and Turkish Election Politics.
**Yang Chen is an Associate Professor in the Department of History of Shanghai University’s College
of Liberal Arts and Executive Director of the Centre for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University. He
has published two books about Türkiye and several papers in journals such as Critical Sociology,
Sociology of Islam, Belt & Road Initiative Quarterly, and Arab World Research. His main research
areas are political Islamic movements in Türkiye, party politics in Türkiye, Türkiye’s foreign policy,
and China-Türkiye relations.
E-mail: ycwf2008@163.com
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4840-6427
Recieved: 11.04.2023
Accepted: 30.04.2023
How to cite: Yi, S. X. & Yang, C. (2023). China-NATO relations: history and reality.
BRIQ Belt & Road Initiative Quarterly, 4(3), 26-37.
Yi Shaoxuan, Yang Chen - China-NATO Relations: History and Reality
ABSTRACT
Over the past 70 years, the relationship between China and NATO has undergone the following
stages: isolation and hostility (1949-1972), strategic collaboration (1972-1989), political opponents
(from 1989 to early 21st century), and engagement and dialogue (2002-2020). After the Cold War,
NATO continued to develop towards globalization. Its policies and actions gradually extended
from the Euro-Atlantic region to the Middle East, Central Asia, and Asia Pacific, intervening in
Asian affairs. With the United States’ strategic contraction from the Middle East and withdrawal
from Afghanistan, the “Asian version of NATO” has become a tool created by the United States to
curb China’s rise. However, EU countries, India, ASEAN, Japan, and others may not necessarily
remain united with the United States. China will continue to develop itself, but at the same time, it
will also maintain cautious contact, dialogue, and cooperation with NATO.
Keywords: China, great power competition, NATO, United States, Asia version of NATO
Introduction
AFTER THE COLD WAR, DUE TO THE
disintegration of the Soviet Union as its biggest
rival, NATO faced a crisis of legitimacy. To this
end, NATO began to shape new legitimacy through
transformation. In this process, NATO began to
attach importance to member expansion and nontraditional security challenges, hoping to transform
from a security community to a political community
in the new international environment. In addition
to military cooperation, it also provides a platform
for political exchanges and consultation between
the two sides of the Atlantic, with the intention of
seeking new sources of legitimacy for itself.
In 2014, the relationship between NATO and
Russia became tense, and in this context, China’s
rise also sparked tension between the United States
and its allies. The rupture of NATO-Russia relations
and the intensification of Sino-US frictions have
sparked debates about a “new Cold War”. Within
this context, the United States hopes that NATO
can be a powerful tool to resist China’s rise,
especially to create an “Asian version of NATO”
to contain China. Following this, the relationship
between China and NATO has become a question
worth exploring.
Under this background, this article includes
the following parts: firstly, the four stages of the
development of China-NATO relations; secondly,
NATO’s intervention in Asian affairs; thirdly, the
creation of the “Asian version of NATO”; and
fourthly, the impossibility of the “Asian version of
NATO”.
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Historical Evolution of the Relationship
between China and NATO
Of the five permanent members of the Security
Council of the United Nations, China has the most
distant relationship with NATO since they have
been hostile to each other since their birth in 1949.
What’s more, since they are geographically distant
from each other, China and NATO have long lacked
direct interaction and contact. But as two important
international players, China and NATO have also
influenced each other explicitly or implicitly. Over
the past 70 years, the two sides have had their
share of hostility, collaboration, fierce clashes and
communications (Ze & Wei, 2020). Yet, currently,
the two face a more serious confrontation. The
history of the relationship between the two sides
can be broadly divided into the following phases:
Phase One: Isolation and Hostility
(1949-1972)
NATO was established in April 1949 with the aim
of “keeping the Germans down”, “keeping the Russians
out”, and “keeping the Americans in” (Wei, 2013). But
the primary aim of the US in forming NATO was to
unite the Western European countries and contain
the growth of the communist movement in Europe,
represented by the Soviet Union. Similarly, NATO
also regarded the newly established China as a proxy
for the Soviet Union in East Asia, especially since the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Then, the US
declared China a ‘hostile country’ and imposed a total
ban on all US exports to China, forbidding US ships
from docking at Chinese ports and restricting Chinese
exports to the US.
At the same time, the NATO-controlled Coordinating
Committee for Export to Communist Countries formed
the “China Committee” in 1952, which imposed an
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embargo on China that was twice as strong as the one
imposed on the Soviet Union, which was only lifted
in 1957. After the founding of the People’s Republic of
China, its foreign policy was “one-sided” and allied with
the Soviet Union. Hence, its view on NATO was entirely
negative, considering it an “aggressive North Atlantic
bloc” and condemning its actions.
Phase Two: Strategic Collaboration
(1972-1989)
The international situation changed significantly
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Firstly, the US and
the Soviet Union had reached a terrifying balance
of military power. Secondly, China and the Soviet
Union parted ways due to ideological differences,
and there was even a possibility of war between the
two sides. Thirdly, the United States was stuck in the
mire of the Vietnam War and forced to implement a
strategic contraction. Against this background, the
visit of President Richard Nixon to China in 1972
opened the door to Sino-American contacts and
brought about a major change in Sino-AmericanRussian relations.
At this time, China even considered that the
Soviet Union had replaced the US as the greatest
security threat, and its diplomatic strategy changed
from “Fight with two fists” (namely, fighting the US
and the Soviet Union simultaneously) to “One Battle
Line, One Large Area”. One Battle Line refers to the
United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Türkiye
and Europe. At the same time, one large area refers
to the United States, Japan and all the countries that
can be united against Soviet Union’s expansionist
momentum.
In 1974, Chairman Mao Zedong proposed the
Three-World Theory, arguing that Europe and
NATO member countries such as Canada belong to
the Second World, with which China could unite.
Yi Shaoxuan, Yang Chen - China-NATO Relations: History and Reality
The common need to confront the Soviet Union
led China and NATO to form a de facto strategic
collaboration during this period. At this time,
NATO members became China’s main suppliers
of foreign weapons, although there was no formal
correspondence between the two sides.
Phase Three: Political Opponent
(1989-2002)
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
common ground for cooperation between China
and NATO was disappearing, while a huge gap in the
ideological sphere came to the fore. Sino-American
and Sino-European relations cooled sharply. The US
began to ban arms exports and military technology
transfers to China. In particular, the NATO bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia on 8 May
1999, in which three Chinese journalists died, was
the first frontal conflict between China and NATO.
This incident provoked strong protests among the
Chinese people and caused China’s relations with
NATO to fall (Xiong, 2000). In addition, low-level
official contacts that had been maintained until
then were broken. Russia also changed its Soviet-era
hostility to the West and began to seek membership
in NATO. Eventually, a ‘cold peace’ between Russia
and the West emerged as NATO expanded eastwards.
Russia, as a result, gradually shifted from being
entirely pro-Western to an East-West ‘double-headed
eagle’ policy. Against this backdrop, it became
a consensus between Russia and China to work
together strategically to safeguard their interests.
Phase Four: Engagement and Dialogue
(2002-2020)
After 9/11, the United States changed its perception
of security threats, with terrorism and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ranked as
the number one security threat to the United States.
As a key tool of the US, NATO’s strategy has also
undergone significant adjustments. In particular, the
Prague Summit of NATO in November 2002, known as
the “Reform Summit”, identified three main directions
for reform. The first was to define a new mission,
varying from a defensive military organization
to a military alliance targeted against terrorist
organizations. The second was to continue NATO’s
eastward expansion by admitting new members,
including Lithuania, Bulgaria and seven other Central
and Eastern European countries, into NATO in 2004.
The third was to explore new capabilities and improve
NATO’s deployment capacity and flexible response
capability. Since then, the Europeanizing, globalizing
and loosening characteristics of NATO have become
increasingly evident.
Using the US’s anti-terrorism goals, Russia expressed
goodwill to the US and improved its relations with
NATO. Russia and NATO signed the Rome Declaration
on 28 May 2002. The two established the NATO-Russia
Council, with NATO offices in Moscow and Russian
officials working in the NATO headquarters. After
9/11, the US changed the terms of its positioning of
China as a strategic competitor and instead considered
China a key partner in the fight against terrorism (Xue,
2021). The US-led NATO has repeatedly expressed its
willingness to engage in security dialogue with China.
Given that diplomacy with the US is of top
priority, China and NATO have begun to engage and
communicate. This is conducive to boosting trust
between China and the US, preferable to China’s
security and stability to its west, and beneficial to
China for playing a greater role through multilateral
diplomacy. As of 2020, the two sides have held their
ninth China-NATO political consultation meeting. Of
course, China’s association with NATO in this period
is still in its infancy.
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As a result of NATO's four enlargement waves,
the number of member countries reached 31 as of April 2023. (NATO, 2023)
The Transformation of NATO and
NATO’s Involvement in Asian Affairs
After the end of the Cold War, NATO faced a
crisis of legitimacy with the disappearance of
the Soviet Union. To maintain NATO as a tool
of US supremacy, adding new defense functions
and geographical defense areas was necessary to
eliminate the legitimacy crisis brought about by the
decline of traditional threats (the Soviet Union or
Russia). In the aftermath of 9/11, non-traditional
security issues such as terrorism and drug-related
crime occurred frequently. Such incidents are not
only concentrated in Europe and the United States,
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thus providing an opportunity for NATO operations
to move beyond the traditional NATO defense areas
and to realize the concept of “globalization”. This
manifested in two ways. Firstly, NATO member
states or partnership countries gradually extended
beyond Europe to the neighboring non-European
countries. Secondly, NATO’s extra-territorial
operations changed from “Europe’s homeland
defense” to “dealing with global crises”.
NATO is a transatlantic alliance; hence its Asian
policy is not aimed at creating or reshaping Asia’s
political and security architecture. Rather, it is
aimed at responding to various problems arising
in Asia and forming certain rules and mechanisms.
Those are essentially complementary to the Euro-
Yi Shaoxuan, Yang Chen - China-NATO Relations: History and Reality
Atlantic political and security framework. Therefore,
based on NATO’s security strategy and the level of
significance of different parts of Asia to NATO’s
security interests, NATO’s Asian policy is mainly
focused on three sectors: the Middle East, Central
Asia and the Asia-Pacific.
NATO’s Central Asia policy is more
out of geopolitical consideration
than a real threat.
NATO’s involvement in Asia is mainly reflected in
two major areas: On the one hand, to participate in
peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and reconstruction
missions in Afghanistan under the mandate of the
United Nations. On the other hand, to establish
and strengthen security cooperation with its Asian
partners through multiple mechanisms, for instance,
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council mechanism,
the Mediterranean Dialogue mechanism, the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative mechanism and the
Global Partnership Mechanism (Dong, 2020).
For the Greater Middle East, NATO has proposed
the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative. It was because the Middle
East has historically been the greatest source of
instability along the Mediterranean coast, the
Arabian Peninsula and the Eurasian continental
plate. It is also the region with the highest number
of conflicts globally. Particularly since the Arab
Spring, the Middle East has been plagued by refugee
problems, illegal immigration, terrorist attacks
and international criminality. The above problems
directly affect peace and stability in the Middle East
and indirectly constrain NATO’s efforts to build a
Euro-Atlantic regional security order. Therefore,
NATO needs to contain the contradictions and
conflicts in the Middle East region and control
and reduce the security threats that fundamentally
challenge NATO.
To this end, NATO’s policy for the Middle East
region mainly includes the following elements.
First, continue solidifying the security alliance
between NATO and Middle East allies, partner
countries and dialogue countries, such as Israel,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other countries, utilizing
economic and military assistance to maintain an
effective political and military presence. Second,
to minimize or weaken the heterogeneous forces
in the Middle East, including Syria, Iran and other
countries, various terrorist organizations and
extremist religious organizations. So that in that
case, they cannot directly or indirectly threaten
NATO and interfere with certain major strategic
decisions of NATO in the Middle East. Third, it will
continue to combat traditional and non-traditional
security threats in the Middle East and eradicate the
breeding ground for terrorism, refugee problems,
illegal immigration and piracy from the source. In
other words, to eliminate the various conflicts in
the Middle East.
For the greater Central Asian region, NATO’s
policy can be concluded as such: to actively combat
various terrorist forces in Central Asia, to form a
strategic hold on Russia, to form a deterrent to Iran,
and to form a strategic constraint on the western
region of China. Therefore, NATO’s Central Asia
policy is more out of geopolitical consideration
than a real threat and focuses on two aspects. On
the one hand, it has started a war against terrorism
in Afghanistan and cooperated with Central Asian
countries to combat various extremist and terrorist
forces. On the other hand, it has used the war in
Afghanistan to establish military bases in many
Central Asian countries and maintain a long-term
military presence in Central Asia.
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Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea were invited to the NATO
Summit held in Madrid in June 2022. (China Daily, 2022)
For the Asia-Pacific region, as it is far away
from NATO and NATO’s core security interests,
its previous policy towards the Asia-Pacific
region is more cautious and restrained. Rather
preventive security policies are formulated due
to this reason. For one thing, Japan, South Korea,
Australia and New Zealand were included in the
“Partnership for Peace” program, making them
NATO partner countries. These countries have
also interacted frequently with NATO and have
gradually become the driving force behind the
implementation of NATO’s Asia-Pacific security
strategy. Their actions have made a difference in
the strategic shape of the Asia-Pacific region. On
the other hand, NATO has also established close
cooperation with China’s neighboring countries,
such as supporting Mongolia to become a NATO
partner country and holding military exercises
with Mongolia, with the obvious intention of
exercising strategic restraint against China and
Russia.
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It is clear from the above that NATO’s
Asian policy is still fragmented and does not
form a complete and mature system but only
a complement to the Euro-Atlantic regional
security policy. Nonetheless, although NATO’s
Asian policy ostensibly advocates political and
security cooperation, it has always emphasized
competition and confrontation. The policy and
its practice have had a certain impact on Asia’s
political and security landscape and, to a large
extent, have contributed to the continued local
adjustment of the Asian strategic landscape.
“China as Primary Rival” and the Creation
of an Asian Version of NATO
Since 2010, Sino-US relations have been
characterized by ups and downs, with more
competition than cooperation. The Obama
administration launched a series of strategies
to contain China, including the “Return to
Yi Shaoxuan, Yang Chen - China-NATO Relations: History and Reality
Asia-Pacific” and “Asia-Pacific Rebalance”. It
had given the cold shoulder to China’s proposal
for a “new type of major power relationship
between China and the US”. A major debate
took place in the US about the threat of China
and how to contain its rise, and an anti-China
strategic consensus gradually emerged in the
US. After taking office, Donald Trump launched
a new wave of accusations and attacks on
China, launching a trade war and introducing
documents and bills that explicitly refer to
China as the main threat to the US. It has been
trying to position China as a “revisionist state”
and treating the US-China relationship as a
strategic rivalry (US Department of Defense,
2019). Under the new Biden administration, the
US launched a concerted campaign of repression
against China, with a four-pronged approach:
human rights, security, economy, science and
technology, further continuing the competitive
dynamic between the US and China (Feng &
Hua, 2022).
With a strategic retreat from
the Middle East and a hasty
withdrawal from Afghanistan in
August 2021, the US is focusing
on creating an Asian version of
NATO to contain China.
The deterioration of US-China relations as a
tool for the US pursuit of world hegemony has
also led NATO to increase its hostility towards
China. In June 2021, NATO members listed
China as a security threat for the first time in
a communiqué, saying its “overt ambitions
and overconfident behavior as a systemic
challenge to the rules-based international order
and security-related areas of the alliance”. In
an interview, NATO Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg reiterated that countries, including
China, are challenging NATO interests, security,
and values. He also stated that Beijing uses
economic leverage, coercion, and mixed means
to advance its regional interests (Wei, 2022). On
11 April 2023, Jens Stoltenberg also said that
China refused to condemn Russia, responding
to Russian “propaganda” and helping Russia
boost its economy. This is a tendentious political
discourse that attempts to equate China with
Russia and ties it to Russia, NATO’s “main rival
for the decade”.
With a strategic retreat from the Middle
East and a hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan
in August 2021, the US is focusing on creating
an Asian version of NATO to contain China. In
contrast to the previously fragmented nature of
NATO’s involvement in Asian affairs, the current
process of NATO’s Asianization has entered a
phase of organization building.
Since 2020, the four-nation security dialogue
organized by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(QUAD) has been escalating. Interactions at
the level of foreign and defense ministers were
established and gradually extended to bilateral
and multilateral coordinated military exercises
in the security field. The aim is to highlight the
military presence and deterrence and gain more
geopolitical benefits by bringing the Philippines
and Vietnam into the South China Sea and
establishing the “QUAD+” mechanism. In nontraditional security, especially in science and
technology security and bio-pharmaceuticals,
they are trying to establish supply chains and
industrial chains that exclude China (Xing,
2022).
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On March 5, 1946, the United States and the United Kingdom signed the UKUSA, known as the Five Eyes Agreement, which
includes electronic intelligence cooperation between the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2023)
The Australia-UK-US “Trilateral Security
Partnership” (AUKUS) program claims that the US, UK
and Australia will strengthen cooperation in nuclear
submarines and promote information and technology
sharing in high-end military areas. This regards
areas such as hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities,
artificial intelligence, quantum technology and other
undersea technology cooperation (The Chinese
Embassy in the UK, 2023). The US, UK and Australia’s
submarine program clearly intends to provide an
underwater blockade of China’s maritime power
against China’s increased influence in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. This is a breach not only of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
but also of maritime peace in the Asia-Pacific region.
It is no coincidence that the Five Eyes Alliance
has a clear anti-China bias in information security.
For example, the US, UK, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand have all banned Huawei and ZTE from
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their 5G communications networks and pressured
other countries to make similar decisions. At one
point, there was talk of the intelligence-sharing group
forming a “three-eyed alliance” between the US,
Japan and South Korea in East Asia (Beijing Daily,
2023). It was reported that the president of South
Korea and the Unwited States will sign a document
in Washington on April 2023 to strengthen cyber
security cooperation between the two countries, build
a U.S.-Korea intelligence alliance, and discuss the
inclusion of Japan in the future. This means a “threeeyed alliance” between South Korea, the United
States, and Japan is on the agenda, according to South
Korean media. If the US succeeds in mobilizing the
intelligence agencies of Japan and South Korea to
serve the US strategy and form an alliance with them,
the first thing they will investigate is the confidential
information of the neighboring Asian countries, and
the implications for China are self-evident.
Yi Shaoxuan, Yang Chen - China-NATO Relations: History and Reality
The essence of the United States trying to establish
the “Asian version of NATO”, or “NATO Asia”, is to
require the relevant countries and regions to serve
its own strategic planning. Furthermore, it allows
the United States to intervene in their internal affairs
and interfere with their sovereign independence.
The most common means of achieving this are
exploiting Japan’s fear of the Chinese threat, Taiwan’s
desire for independence, the hostile dynamics
between North and South Korea, and establishing
military cooperation agreements to tie more Asian
countries to the US chariot.
For example, the “factual list of U.S.-Taiwan
relations” on the US State Department website has
been substantially updated to remove phrases such
as “Taiwan is part of China” (Lei, 2022). It also
promotes the deepening of relations between Japan
and Taiwan. In addition, it has used the Sino-Indian
border dispute to draw India into confrontation
with China and renamed its Asian strategy the
“Indo-Pacific Strategy”, highlighting the importance
of India. In the end, South Korea and Singapore are
seen as potential allies and a “new NATO” in Asia is
established with the US allies as the core.
Will the “Asian Version of
NATO” be Successful?
At the Madrid summit in June 2022, NATO
leaders formally adopted a new Strategic Concept,
which is second in importance only to the North
Atlantic Treaty. The document states that the core
assumptions underlying the 1991, 1999 and 2010
NATO Strategic Concepts have been broken down.
In particular, the view that the Euro-Atlantic
region is at peace, that there is no global power
competition and that the international security
order is predictable and cooperative no longer fits
the current security environment (Cai, 2022).
The main factors posing a shock to NATO’s
security are the following: First, the rise of China
is driving the shift of global power from the EuroAtlantic region to the Indo-Pacific region. Second,
accelerating scientific and technological innovation
will affect NATO’s collective defense capabilities.
Third, climate change, food security and other nontraditional security challenges impact NATO’s crisis
management. Fourth, the Russia-Ukraine conflict
has led to various complex challenges facing NATO.
For this reason, NATO has the drive and demand to
globalize, especially in Asian affairs, and has formed
many small groups, such as QUAD and AUKUS.
However, following this, the question becomes, will
the US be able to do what it wants with an “Asian
version of NATO”? There are several factors to
consider when answering this question.
First, European countries lack a unified view
of dealing with the situation in the Asia-Pacific
region, especially on issues related to China
(Ming & Zheng, 2020). Unlike the strategic rivalry
between China and the US, China and Europe
cooperate more closely and share many common
interests. China is an important market and major
trading partner for Europe, and the two economies
are highly complementary. In the context of its
sluggish economic growth, the ongoing crisis
and the UK’s exit from the EU, closer economic
cooperation with China is important for Europe.
In addition, China and Europe have common
interests in maintaining stability in the Middle
East, nuclear non-proliferation, cyberspace and
other international security issues, as well as in
upholding multilateralism, combating climate
change and providing international public goods.
More importantly, Europe also advocates strategic
autonomy from NATO and US control, which is
crucial for Europe to become a strategic force in the
international landscape.
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Secondly, changing the US “Asia-Pacific Strategy”
to the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” signals that relying
on previous allies alone will not achieve the goal of
containing China and that India must be brought into
the picture. However, India is precisely the shortest
part of the US Indo-Pacific strategy, and RussianIndian relations constitute an important constraint
if it is to truly pursue the goal of “Breakaway from
Asia and stand with the US” (Juan, 2022).
Japan, India, and Australia, whose
number one trading partner is
China, have no real fears of a
military invasion by China.
Besides, India’s views and interests do not coincide
with those of the United States, Japan, Australia and
other countries on many issues. India is not deeply
involved in issues such as the South China Sea
and Taiwan. Regarding climate change, India and
China, both developing countries, have very similar
positions. On high-end technologies, while India is
reluctant to adopt Huawei’s 5G technology, it is also
unwilling to see US technology dominate the Indian
market. More importantly, India still has a tradition
of non-aligned diplomacy. Although the US has
brought India into the “four-nation mechanism”,
there are conflicts between the US and India around
economic and arms deals, which will also impact the
US in building alliances.
Thirdly, China’s growing economic and trade
cooperation with neighboring countries means
the US will face greater resistance to the so-called
“Asian version of NATO” in this region. ASEAN,
which has overtaken the EU as China’s largest
trading partner, is no longer the ASEAN of the 1998
financial crisis and has achieved rapid economic
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development in a peaceful and stable environment.
It will not willingly agree to US attempts to target
China, increase regional tensions and thus weaken
ASEAN’s central position (Han, 2021).
Furthermore, Japan, India and Australia, whose
number one trading partner is also China, have no
real fears of military invasion by China. Japan and
India have historical territorial disputes with China,
and it is more in their national interest to manage
their differences than to confront China (Global
Times, 2021). From China’s perspective, it will also
strengthen its full cooperation with ASEAN, Japan,
India and other Asian countries, contrasting with
the US pressure on Asian countries.
Fourth, the multiple sub-groups the US uses
to contain China, such as the Five Eyes Alliance,
AUKUS and QUAD, may link up and create a
mutually offsetting effect (Xiang & He, 2023). The
NATO alliance system is hierarchical, of which the
Anglo-Saxon states, namely the UK and the US,
are the core. The UK and the US can help Australia
develop nuclear submarines, but not India, Japan
and South Korea, reminding them that they are not
the core force but merely helpers or fighters. For
India, Japan and Australia, the fundamental reason
for their participation in the US-led “Asian version
of NATO” is also to contain China, whose rise has
substantially changed the distribution of power in
the region. In time, if China’s strength far exceeds
the overall strength of these countries, it may be
time for the four-nation mechanism to end.
Conclusion
The international environment facing China is
not ideal, especially as the competition between
China and the United States is intensifying. This
is fundamentally due to the “zero-sum game”
mentality of the US in dealing with relations
Yi Shaoxuan, Yang Chen - China-NATO Relations: History and Reality
with the rising powers. In the face of Western
repression, China cannot retreat and must “dare
to fight and fight well”. Therefore, China’s attitude
towards NATO is clear: it considers NATO to be a
product and remnant of the Cold War, a military
and political bloc under US hegemony, and one of
the cornerstones of the US-dominated world order.
China opposes NATO’s eastward expansion and
its constant squeezing of Russia’s security space,
which it sees as the root cause of the outbreak of the
Russia-Ukraine conflict. China is concerned that
NATO wants to include Mongolia as an alliance
partner, which would increase the possibility of
Western countries conducting military training
close to China’s borders. China has expressed
misgivings about NATO’s military presence in the
Middle East and Central Asia, which threatens the
security of China’s western borders. China is wary of
and strongly opposes the “Asian version of NATO”,
a trap for peace and stability in Asia. At the same
time, however, China and NATO have maintained
cautious engagement, dialogue and cooperation.
While conflicts are more pronounced in traditional
security areas, there is also considerable scope for
cooperation in jointly addressing various nontraditional security threats.
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