State Fragility in Somalia Mohameddeq Ali Abdi Expert Political Somalia Strategies for Overcoming State Fragility in Somalia 1. Introduction In general, it is well established that state fragility and state failure have direct links to national and international insecurity. Therefore, overcoming state fragility to build a stronger state and state resilience is a long but necessary and pertinacious undertaking to ameliorate Somalia's dire and volatile social and economical situation. Nonetheless, the authors' pessimistic premises are that peacebuilding efforts are complex and misguided if the root causes and the bold many challenges are either minimally assessed or overlooked. These challenges include the nature of the Somali Regional State and public goods crisis, the problematic state building mechanisms that besiege local structures, and state managerial capability. The latter was always curtailed by a tradition of political economy that systematically colonized small but excessive urban dwellers and welfare state lifetimes, wealth by a powerful elite, the greater exportation of warriors around the globe, and regional protection of their financial dominance. A natural outcome of the lack of inclusiveness and absence of political consensus in Somali state-building efforts meant that the state could not genuinely embody the basic principles and spirit of governance, public welfare existential purpose, resilience, and normalized afarsi. The same elite postponed the establishment of mechanisms such as an aligned sociopolitical economy, regionalism, security sector reforms, transparency, accountability, and assistance from reliable external actors that sustain the fragile political order. The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 led to a situation of statelessness which had characterized some parts of Somalia until 1991. Hence, the society was characterized by a protracted, complex, and self-propelled crisis emanating from vandalism, estrangement, dispersal, isolation from the international community, antagonism, infirmity, and powerlessness of both the people and the physical infrastructure. However, the gradual reemergence of the Somali state in 2000 induced cautious optimism at expectations of normalization and rapid reconstruction. Generally, state fragility refers to a condition of a state that cannot support human development, security, global socialization, and harmony across governance arrangements because social, political, and legal functions are either absent, fail intentionally, or are being overwhelmed in conflict-related violence. The country significantly de-territorialized and wizened relative to territorial extension and stature compared to Horn of African and Gulf neighbors. Due to a combination of events in the 90s, 00s, and 10s, the country invented its own version of "jihadist groups that wane or grow locally and interfere with neighboring countries, the international community, or global investors in Somalia. 1.1. Background on State Fragility It is obvious that the analysis elements, the consequences of the Somali conflict and the failure of the state, can also be used as a casus belli by some theorists of International Relations, such as the neorealism theory of Robert Gilpin, who claimed that "instability of the political system is harmful if the international system does not guarantee security to the declining state. This, which in the pen of the neorealist thoughts and in relation to the Somali case we can define as the basis for state failure, considering that during the rise of war, civil war states postponed public investments by allowing the infrastructure to deteriorate and therefore made it easier for predation, in terms of material assets, and aid that could strengthen military effort and legitimacy. This process, which is ultimately harmful and undermining the institutions and structures of the state and the stability of the country, leading to the collapse of the state. The Somali state – historical and recent – has been valued as weak and fragile. In 1998, just two years after the collapse of the state, the United Nations published the report "The United Nations Involvement in Somalia 1992-1996" by Ambassador David Stephen, in which he discussed the causes that led to the failure of the said operation. According to the author, these causes are due to, among other things, the lack of full awareness of the psychological, political, and economic consequences of the overthrow of the state by a "failed" policy, the lack of clear objectives, the ignorance of the environment at the intervention, and the lack of impartiality between the various "National Reconciliation". The reality that the United Nations intervention in Somalia could not be detached from the brief but disastrous intervention of the United States in 1992 is recognized in the Howard military doctrine in an operation conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, whose purposes were not universally shared and intended to demonstrate alleged new strategy. The challenges and disturbances that Somalia has endured since the early 1990s have taken a toll on the ability of its people, both at the individual and household level, and the administrative and political institutions that support them. This has converted the country into one of Africa's poorest performers on the Human Development Index. Moreover, Somalia has struggled with state fragility. The most concurrent enumeration for state fragility is the one by OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) and the World Bank: an index in which states get a score from 0-12, with higher values indicating weaker state capacity and higher likelihood of instability. It is important to mention that in the periods just following the collapse of the Somali Republic, the central government was not able to maintain security along with the various regions of the country. Instead, the civilian population championed a variety of mechanisms for organizing themselves and ensuring the safety and welfare of their communities, including the formation of traditional customary laws and arbitration systems, militia groups, and traditional councils. 2. Understanding State Fragility in Somalia Management of diversity: The historical formation of Somalia as an essentially competing, clan-based society has influenced much of its history as an independent state, and patterns of identity and authority within this hierarchy remain significant. The state seeks to dominate under the constraints invited by this historical trajectory, contributing to local community participation and sustainable local security arrangements. It is important to see peace building as an essential part of state-building and to be aware of the potential contribution that more traditional civil society actors and religious bodies have here, as they and non-state actors may have distinctive experiences of conflict prevention and resolution or have a comparative advantage. Furthermore, state-society relations, the accountability of the state to adaptive governance and the social contract are central here, although at the same time civil society needs to be strengthened through support for organization and facilitation. Peace building: This term is used here to refer to strategies to strengthen the internal capacity to maintain peace sustainably through locally based systems and mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflicts in a nonviolent manner and to address the potential causes of conflict. This process is conceptualized at two levels: the enabling environment level at which interventions focus on creating and strengthening mechanisms for peaceful conflict transformation that also address the root causes of violence and conflict, and the particular level of specific peacebuilding programs tailored to a given context. Fragility: A state is fragile when, although it has institutions and claims sovereignty over its territory, the government has lost the capacity to implement policies, not least to ensure a minimal level of security and to provide basic services such as education, health, and water supply. This monograph is concerned with fragility at the same time as highlighting the state-building tasks ahead for both the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and any future structures, and the dual track of state and peace building in Somalia. 2.1. Historical Context Rather than looking for ways to rebuild the Somali state, the international community must swiftly begin to create an international task force on Somalia. The task force should be composed of a small group of countries that are committed financially, politically, and legally for a substantial period of nation-building in Somalia. Discussions on a vision for Somalia should be conducted with Somalis to build a political framework for them – a framework that could be refined to reflect the political leadership and citizens of Somalia in their needs, aspirations, and circumstances in which they live. Create state fragility theorists do not directly address the recent proliferation of state sovereignty, nor do they question the modern invention of secular nationalism, which gave birth to the nation-state and established the basic principles of law and membership for each of the member states of the international political system. The Somalia case study draws attention to the political uncertainties that emerge when domestic and international efforts to build Western-modelled nation-states run afoul of the geographical and cultural dispositions of other people. In both cases, the response to the unwelcome effects of state building has produced major opportunities and challenges for law – both international and domestic – that are only just being addressed. Transnational law provides a rich, largely unexplored, analytical vocabulary for confronting these puzzles. To eradicate systemic obstacles that have turned the concept of the nation-state into an abstraction in Somalia, Somalis of various regions and polities should be genuinely included in an internationally backed and Somali-led process that defines a vision for a more responsible political compact. Somalia presents a challenge to established definitions of statehood and to the prevailing ideas of the international community on state-building. The complexity of its clan structures, the political disconnection of various regional polities from each other at the centre, the weak connection of the nascent government to citizens, the destruction of state institutions, and forty years of statelessness have rendered state-building a most difficult task in Somalia. The accommodations and reciprocities that allowed for the possibility of governance and some state formation have been destroyed. In Somalia, the nature of the state has been a frequent cause of political tension. 2.2. Key Factors Contributing to State Fragility Second and critically of importance is to devise strategies taking into consideration the porosity of Somalia's boundaries, but also the weak and perhaps non-existing functioning institutional arrangements designed and put in place during the postconflict and transition period but have not been supported to become vibrant, vigorous, and participatory effective and efficient Jordanian-type institutions. Such institutions that successfully emerged from the Iraqi invasion during the mid-1990s, in contrast to the collapse of Somalia, were fully supported by the citizens, civil society organizations, the private sector, and the regional and international community, in addition to the leadership that converted enormous challenges into peace-building, reconciliation, and reconstruction opportunities. As alluded to in different articles, policies, and formal and informal reports, conferences and meetings on Somalia, state fragility is visible. Insufficient and irregular supply and quality of help and disincentives not to fail, abuse, and engage in corrupt practices are unacceptable hallmarks of fragile states. Convening the Stockholm Forum for Peace and Development, the Minister for International Development Cooperation noted: "The more serious, long-lasting, and multi-dimensional the challenges that a state faces, the more context-specific and state-specific the response has to be." Concurring with this observation, Somalia is confronted with a myriad, intricate, and resilient set of problems that has resulted in both state fragility and transition itself becoming resilient. While acknowledging the numerous, non-exhaustive list of factors that contribute to state fragility and, in turn, are responsible for the deepening of malaise and the protracted nature of both conflict and crisis in states - failed, failing, and in transition - a discussion of the root causes of the fragility of Somalia is critical for designing strategies to overcome them. Until and unless the numerous underlying reasons are addressed, Somalia's descent into an arc and haven for all sorts of illicit, criminal, and piratical activities will continue to have far-reaching negative effects not only on the well-being and prosperity of its own citizens but also on regional and international peace, security, and prosperity. 3. International Approaches to Addressing State Fragility The paper argues that foreign policy elites should be more often encouraged to set modest expectations and then to focus on the practical steps required to achieve even these. Looking to the future, it is difficult to imagine a time when the developed democracies, collectively or individually, will withdraw from involvement in Somalia and similar aid-dependent states in the manner followed in the 1990s. Development concerns (especially with poverty and inequality), globalization, and a permeable world order mean that developed states will probably find it hard to turn a blind eye to the problems faced by the least developed. Turning to international peacebuilding efforts in fragile states more generally, the work focuses on the strategies and approaches adopted by states and international actors to address state fragility in Somalia. It problematises the liberal statebuilding agenda which has been pursued by the international community as the preferred approach to addressing the state fragility of weak and failing states. Contemporary peacebuilding practice is, in large part, based on the unique experiences of Somalia, Liberia, and East Timor following sudden large changes in these states. While the early efforts of the international community were less successful than initially hoped, it has developed new models that are less ambitious, more flexible, and adaptable. 3.1. Role of International Organizations International organizations can serve as institutions that are often fragmented, incomplete, and immature. Commensurate with current international standards, international organizations can provide countries more technical, comprehensive, and long-term support. Still, international institutions in fragile states should change their attitudes, institutions, and scopes in accordance with the economic stability and security criteria. The international community has the opportunity to promote the country's development and to rid the government of wrong turns, extractive institutions, and unequal society structures, intergovernmental financial aid. The goal of international cooperation should be to help countries restore autonomy, not to replace fragmented states. States are not capable of functioning in many areas because they often lack the necessary means or knowledge. Experts in a specialized field often work for international organizations. International organizations can provide management and implementation structure, knowledge, institutional capacity, and funding for fragile states, and also undertake several roles: 1) Development project implementer; 2) Program Implementation; 3) Policy Advisor; 4) Intermediary Authority; 5) Rule of law and legality maintainer; 6) Security guarantor and peacekeeper; 7) Economic resource unit; and 8) Information generator and public awareness campaigner. 4. Domestic Strategies for Building State Resilience As the Somalia Transition Plan is designed to more accurately reflect Somali Government priorities, this is an important moment for Somalis to own the plan. Now that the Somali federal government is known to be short on capacity and legitimacy, it can provide a stronger voice by giving greater weight to the priorities of non-state governance mechanisms. Customary authorities and political clans reach areas in the interior where the government is not active. Federalism is another arrangement where different power holders work to build a stronger and more politically legitimate form of reconciliation. Meeting with government representatives requires broader stakeholder consultation, including non-state actors. The domestic economic environment of the Somali state has important implications for the achievable state-society contract. Overcoming fragility in Somalia requires a domestic strategy that promotes state resilience. Strategic research has identified that domestic factors may be more important for state resilience than the influx of external resources. Somalis have little sense of ownership over their government. This is reflected in a lack of trust in state institutions, low participation, and inadequate government representation. Citizens are often participants in multiple forms of 'bargain' such as relationships with customary authorities and non-state democracies. Hence, the greatest challenge of Somalia's governance may be the need to carefully balance the existing forms of governance based on bargaining and representation with western liberal models. Ownership of the Somali federal government over the government budget is important for domestic revenue mobilization, which in turn reduces the external influence of donors. 4.1. Political Reconciliation and Inclusivity Topic: Strategies for Overcoming State Fragility in Somalia. What is needed to overcome state fragility and build a state in contemporary Somalia? While Somalia has experienced institutional decay and institutional dispersion over the last two decades, with high levels of political and economic uncertainty, the developmental state still comes forth as the most capable concept for the Somali context. With the appropriate modifications, it is believed that mechanisms for state-building can encourage institutional progress in Somalia by creating stability and security, encouraging political inclusivity, and promoting economic growth. The Somali developmental state, contrary to conventional thought, is post-liberal in that it encompasses elements of various state institutional frameworks while working proactively toward advocating the public institutions' common welfare. It encourages the ideological institutions' progression, protects the public sphere, acts effectively as a policy entrepreneur, corrects the market through law and regulation, and facilitates an interaction structure (political and economic) that functions as a feedback to the state. The Somali developmental state, based on the discussion in this paper, proactively facilitates political change in response to feedback, thereby creating legitimacy that is built upon popular engagement and is not shaped solely by the coercive use of public institutions. There is no clear idea as to who actually controls what among the many armed actors within Somalia. Individuals within an armed group may be state bureaucrats with invisible ties, or clan elites with militias, who use individuals within the armed group to support available patronage, or engage in delegitimizing actions against the clan proceeding to control a certain resource. Furthermore, it is often unclear if an individual is part of an armed group, militia, or national institution, and which aspect of the individual is vested with significant control. While it is often noted that the lack of inclusiveness is the cause of Somali conflict, the solution has largely been to focus on including more clan elites in the government. Yet, the country is home to diverse peoples with no clear majority. A more substantive form of inclusivity is essential. Steps have been taken in this direction but much more remains to be done. In the short term, it is suggested here that what is required is an elite pact. The precondition for this is an elite-level security compromise. While it is exceedingly difficult to move non-state ideological armed groups to put down their arms to fight another day in an inclusive powersharing arrangement, it may be far easier to gather a politically acceptable coalition of regional strongmen and armed groups through an elite-level security pact, and necessary pressure from international actors. Over time, it is hoped that this will develop into a social contract. 4.2. Security Sector Reform It is important not to think of SSR in isolation, but rather as one element of broader state-building efforts. The security sector, including the judiciary and the police, should be effective, transparent, and accountable. In turn, the stronger the state in providing security-related services to its citizens, the stronger the state will be. However, a direct review of Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategies with regard to addressing state fragility in Somalia largely lags behind theoretical discussion. Thus, the paper seeks to contribute to filling the theoretical literature gap with the practical case of security sector reform in Somalia. The topic of security sector reform has long been on the agenda as the main components of state building in Somalia. As Baldo (2018: 5) eloquently notes, "the reconstruction of the army is crucial for Somalia's long-term security, as well as restoring ties of public trust between citizens and the institution of the state." In 2012, the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution providing authorization to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until February 2021 to take all necessary measures to reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab. AMISOM has made a significant contribution to progress in the country and allowed the development of national security capabilities. However, AMISOM cannot pacify and stabilize the entire country alone. After years fighting Al-Shabaab, the Somali army is still weak, and government hold on territory is limited. The security sector reform certainly cannot solve all security problems in Somalia, but it has been and will be an essential part of this sophisticated and complex process. The security sector is a critical institution in enhancing the capabilities and institutional presence of the government, particularly in a fragile state such as Somalia. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is crucial in order to rebuild capable and accountable security institutions to be able to provide stability. However, a direct review of security sector reform strategies with regard to addressing state fragility in Somalia largely lags behind theoretical discussion. Thus, the paper seeks to contribute to filling the theoretical literature gap with the practical case of security sector reform in Somalia. The security sector reform certainly cannot solve all security problems in Somalia, but it has been and will be an essential part of this sophisticated and complex process. The paper argues that considering the current context of Somalia, it is particularly important to note that comprehensive security sector reform is an essential part of mitigating state fragility and enhancing statebuilding. A holistic and comprehensive security sector reform strategy contributes to reducing the fragmentation and regionalization of security forces and the subsequent security tensions among political actors. 4.3. Economic Development and Diversification Relating the potential growth of these sectors to sustainable, market-friendly, and poverty-reducing strategies requires creating a macroeconomic environment that will help dilute the shackles hobbling the non-agricultural sectors. This will involve lengthy discussions among the country's politicians regarding the future heavenly and earthly bodies, which will include the inter and intra administration assigned economic roles, the conducive industrial and services strategy, the design and management of federal trade and customs arrangements, a broad stable and investment-friendly monetary system, flexible labor market policies, and investment incentives and corporate governance reforms. One important factor to consider here is that, due to Somalia's unique lifesaving/international remittance frailty and foreign investment reservations, a substantial part of the projected strategic diversification effect may well be a target to redirect relocation from the contemporary dominated and weak domestic service sector to modern sectors outside livestock. A major challenge in developing the productive sector in Somalia lies in the country's dependence on the livestock sector. There is a growing recognition that mapping a comprehensive reconstruction strategy for Somalia requires a more diversified economic development approach. A strong livestock sector is not in itself enough to form the bedrock for a successful Somali economy. Livestock exports are often affected by exogenous price shocks, prone to seasonal variation, and exceedingly vulnerable to hereditary diseases and periodic droughts, all of which makes it impossible to guarantee long-term mass employment. The widespread effects of the 2011 famine underlined the collective risks if the economy remains over-reliant on such a mobile asset. Thus, there is ample scope for diversification, but this must be viewed and programmed in the right macroeconomic, institutional, legal, and regulatory context. Indeed, the ad hoc approach to the development of potential new sectors during the post-conflict period in the 1990s and during the 2000s has restricted the inclusion of a potentially very dynamic segment into the country's economic structure. 5. Conclusion and Recommendations This chapter started with the research question and rationale, as well as the aims, objectives, and limitations of the study. Given Somalia's high level of state fragility, it was relevant to underscore the necessity of implementing a context-specific strategy developed through inclusive engagement between Somalis and the international community. As a state still experiencing a governance crisis, many of the indicators support Somalia as a fragile state. In addition to the high number of human casualties, the political and economic costs of the violence associated with such incidents have created conditions of uncertainty and instability. One of the symptoms of political degradation and state fragility is the inability of state security forces to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and the reduced state capacity, which in turn increases the proliferation of small arms. This research found that Somalia has been plagued with state fragility for two decades after the collapse of the last central government. Given the severe impact of state fragility on the security, economy, and social fabric of the country, it was important to investigate the engagement of both the Somali people and international organizations, as well as explore what feasible strategies could help Somalia overcome state fragility. Therefore, this research reviewed case material and related literature, analyzed the engagement of citizens and international organizations, and investigated feasible strategies. The research was premised on the understanding that only through inclusive engagement from both citizens and international partners, as well as the implementation of context-specific strategies, could a successful developmental agenda emerge.