FINAL THOUGHTS: IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION
According to former High Representative Paddy Ashdown, the “dismantling of the
Berlin Wall, the collapse of the twin towers of the World Trade Center, the toppling of
Saddam’s statue,” and “the deliberate destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar” have
been the critical destructive moments of the past two decades. 1 Iconic images of these
events have been widely circulated and grandiose symbolic associations have been
associated with these moments of architectural destruction. Each has been emblematic
of major shifts in the course of recent world history.
Among these, Berlin’s wall and Mostar’s bridge have served specifically as
architectural metaphors for division and unification within broad contexts. Just as the
opening of the wall epitomized the end of the division of Berlin, of Germany, and by
extension of Europe during the Cold War, the Old Bridge’s destruction - four years to
the day later - symbolized the division of Mostar into two sides, of Bosnia into two
autonomous entities, and of Yugoslavia into six separate states. Despite the fact that
both were small events within multi-year sequences of change, the complex social and
political phenomena of which they were a part have in each case been reduced to and
understood in terms of these symbolic architectural moments of destruction. In Berlin
the symbol of division “fell” before the actual physical barrier could be removed and
political unity could be administratively achieved, but in Mostar, the symbolic
separation continues despite the recreation of physical connections and political unity.
1
Paddy Ashdown, “Bosnia, the Balkans, Europe and Islam” (lecture, Oxford Centre for Islamic
Studies, Oxford, UK, November 18, 2004), http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/
default.asp?content_id =33523 .
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Ten Years since Dayton
Ten years after the Dayton Agreement ended the hostilities and established a
framework for peace and rebuilding throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina, the country has
one army, one customs and border administration, and one universal passport. In
addition, over a million prewar homes had been returned to their former owners.
Bosnia-Hercegovina has also moved forward on the path to economic and physical
recovery, and most of those responsible for the war are no longer in politics due to
death, retirement, or being indicted for war crimes. Mostar has returned to its position
as an internationally recognized historic city, made official with UNESCO’s
designation, and its Old Bridge and Old Town had been beautifully restored. Mostar’s
administrative partitions had been removed and its unified, multicultural government
successfully controls its entire territory.
On the other hand, ten years after Dayton, Bosnia’s unified state institutions remain
weak, unemployment is still at 43%, and nearly half of its population lives at or below
the poverty level. 2 Despite the billions spent on both state and identity formation in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, CBS News correspondent Morley Safer argued in 2003 that “so
far, there is barely a hint of a nation being built,” and summed up the international
community’s role in postwar Bosnia as in truth being “more ‘Mission Impossible’ than
‘Mission Accomplished.’” 3 Ten years after Dayton, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in
Bosnia-Hercegovina still voluntarily stress their differences in every possible capacity
and at nearly every opportunity. Despite its progress, inter-group tensions indeed
2
3
“Bosnia, Rebuilt but Still Divided,” The Economist, November 23, 2005, http://www.economist
.com .
“Nation-Building (Mostar),” 60 Minutes, CBS, October 19, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2003/10/17/60minutes/main578648.shtml .
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remain high in Mostar, and despite the extensive rebuilding and international funding,
it remains the most extensively devastated Bosnian city.4
This mixed report card for Bosnia-Hercegovina and Mostar after ten years of postwar
recovery in part results from the shortcomings of the Dayton Agreement itself, whose
“uneasy mix” of integrationist and separatist principles have been interpreted in
different ways by different constituencies.5 For the international community, as well
as for local Bosnian patriots, it was seen as an integrating agreement, in large part
because Bosnia-Hercegovina still existed within its former borders. But for separatists
among the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, the Dayton Agreement confirmed
their individual status and in some cases, their separate territory. Thus, while some
have advocated shared symbols in the past decade, others developed symbols
reflecting their distinctive identity
Architecture since Dayton has reflected these integrationist and separatist trajectories
and therefore how postwar reconstruction and competing national identities are
related.
This dissertation revealed how overtly unifying and inclusive postwar
projects, including the Old Bridge and the Bruce Lee Monument, can be seen as
divisive through the controversies they inspired and the varied reactions they evoked.
Conversely, this dissertation also revealed that potentially unifying aspects and
interpretations were present within even the most seemingly divisive projects and
sites. The Gymnasium and the Liska Street Cemetery, for example, betray the
existence of shared space in the city, however forced or begrudged.
4
5
“Zukić: Mostar is Still the Most Destroyed City in BiH,” FENA, December 9, 2005,
http://www.fena.ba/ .
Roger Mac Ginty, “Mobilizing for Destruction and Reconstruction: The Symbolic Power of
Buildings in Conflict Situations” (paper presented at the James Marston Fitch Colloquium Target
Architecture: The Role of Old Buildings in the Management of Global Conflict, Columbia
University, New York, February 22-23, 2002), 5.
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Figure 90: Graffiti on the parapet of the New Old Bridge, March 2006 and rocket
damage to the Jasenica Mosque, October 2006. (images: Bljesak.info, Mostar and
Oslobođenje, Sarajevo).
It remains to be seen whether the reunification of Mostar’s government and the
decreasing role of the international community in Bosnia-Hercegovina will change the
course of architecture and urbanism either towards more overtly unifying tendencies
or towards greater tolerance of different symbols and varied interpretations of those
symbols. So far, the more frequent postwar trend towards divisiveness and intolerance
and the propensity for heritage sites to be contested still appear central in Mostar.
Even as I am trying to conclude this dissertation in 2006, two attacks have indicated
continued conflict on the “architectural front” in Mostar, including graffiti on the Old
Bridge in March and a hand-propelled rocket shot through the façade of a recently
reconstructed mosque in October (fig. 90). 6 So while for some sites and in some
6
Reuters, “Missile Hits Bosnia Mosque ahead of Ramadan Meal,” October 10, 2006,
http://today.reuters.co.uk ; “Missile Hits Bosnian Mosque,” Islam Online, October 11, 2006,
http://www.islamonline.com/cgi-bin/news_service/world_full_story.asp?servcie_id=2554 ; F. Vele,
“Teroristički napad na Džamiju u Jasenici” [Terrorist Attack on Mosque in Jasenica], Dnevni Avaz,
October 11, 2006, 1; N. Dedić, “Zoljom na Džamiju” [With a Bazooka on a Mosque], Dnevni List,
October 11, 2006, http://www.dnevni-list.ba/?mdls=1&mdls_tip&nid=6785 ; D.P. “Teroristićki
Akt u Jasenici kod Mostara” [Terrorist Act in Jasenica near Mostar], Oslobođenje, October 11,
2006, http://www.oslobodjenje.com.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=49213 =&
Itemid=44; “Rocket Attack Targets Mostar Mosque,” SETimes, October 11, 2006, http://www.
setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2006/10/11/nb-02 .
413
minds the period of reconstruction is coming to a close, destruction continues at
others. Though the precise motives of the perpetrators of these recent crimes is
unknown, we can perhaps assume there is some connection to identity politics based
on the nature of the sites selected and the crimes committed. Like the destruction of
the Old Bridge itself, both recent attacks have been locally interpreted in this way.
The graffiti on the bridge includes the word “Zrinjsko,” the name of the new Croat
soccer team in Mostar – revealing something about the identity and allegiances of the
perpetrators. And though perhaps just an adolescent prank better classified as
vandalism than iconoclasm, the graffiti writers could have chosen to spray-paint their
message somewhere else. Their choice of target and willingness to deface the Old
Bridge reveals they do not respect and value it in the same way as others in the city.
The rocket attack on the mosque in the Mostar suburb of Jasenica was more explicitly
identity based, especially considering the history of the site, whose reconstruction had
been fiercely contested in 2005 by the mostly-Catholic Croats in the surrounding
neighborhood. Both the selected weapon and target indicate an iconoclastic motive.
The attack on the mosque, as well as the graffiti on the Old Bridge, demonstrate the
potential for renewed violence directed against Mostar’s heritage, as has been clearly
demonstrated in long contested cities such as Beirut and Jerusalem, where citizens
barely have an opportunity to resettle and repairs are barely completed before renewed
attacks occur. In a press conference after the damage to the Jasenica mosque, the
OHR condemned it as well as condemned damage inflicted on gravestones in a nearby
Catholic cemetery the following night. The OHR also appealed for calm, responsible
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media reporting, and quick investigations of these incidents “to ensure that they do not
degenerate into a tit-for-tat cycle of violence.” 7
Representing Competing Identities
The title of this dissertation was meant to call upon the interrelated concepts of
representing identities and competing identities. Different conceptions of self, attitudes
about one’s country, and interpretations of the recent war have competed within
Mostar in the past decade. But Mostar actually reveals a matrix of contestations: not
only do different identity groups compete, but conflicts also clearly exist within these
“sides.” This was revealed by the historical tensions between the Franciscans and the
Bishop, manifested recently through competing bell towers on the Mostar skyline.
This propensity for intra-group conflict was also apparent within the difficult to
distinguish positions of Bosnian Muslim nationalists and Bosnian nationalists. These
subtleties were perceptible in east Mostar’s tensions between increasing the number of
minarets on that same skyline versus maintaining the prewar status quo.
This dissertation also revealed how many historic sites are multivalent and how
contests for supremacy among the multiple interpretations of these sites and the
various visions of the city reflect yet another form of competition in Mostar. What I
have called contested or multivalent sites, Ashworth and Tunbridge described as
dissonant heritage, and as these two theorists have argued, all heritage is to some
extent contested. 8 But there are sites, especially those caught up in territorial or
7
8
OHR, “OHR’s Statement at the International Agencies’ Joint Press Conference in Mostar,” October
11, 2006, www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=38257 .
Gregory Ashworth and J.E. Tunbridge, Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a
Resource in Conflict (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1996). R. Jones and B.J. Shaw agree these
415
identity conflicts, for which disagreements about meanings have more serious
consequences. These are the conflicts that lead to violence – both against heritage and
against the human populations who value those sites.
Malcolm Miles, Tim Hall and Iain Borden note that representations of urban identity
are always reductive because of “the very size, complexity and ever-changing nature
of the city,” but argue that though all interpretations omit and simplify, “that does not
mean that representations are wrong.” 9 But it also does not mean that articulating or
privileging these interpretations as the defining way of understanding the city or a
particular site is a productive enterprise, especially in conflict-prone contexts where
the goal is reducing tensions. In Mostar, each side has not only suggested different
meanings for sites, but has tended to hold these as exclusively valid and argued
vehemently that other positions are illegitimate. For example, the Jubilee Cross on
Hum Hill and the bell tower of the Franciscan Church, two of the most controversial
sites in postwar Mostar, have been understood by Bosnian Muslims and the
international community as symbols of Croat nationalism and therefore as antagonistic
to reconciliation and multiculturalism in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
But is this in fact a contradiction? Is Croat nationalism diametrically opposed to a
multicultural Bosnia? Or is the construction of both churches and mosques in fact a
true reflection of the city’s and the country’s multiculturalism since it demonstrates
the simultaneous flourishing of multiple cultures? Indeed, are separatism and
reconciliation mutually exclusive? Can reconciliation not also be conceived of as
resulting from acceptance of the expression of different ideas and identities and the
9
terms are synonymous. Contested Urban Heritage: Voices from the Periphery (Aldershot, UK:
Ashgate, 1997), 2.
Malcolm Miles, Tim Hall, and Iain Borden, City Cultures Reader (London: Routledge, 2000), 193.
416
building of sites associated with them? If this potentiality is to be explored, instead of
condemning projects of the Croat Catholics as divisive, the validity of Croat fears of
being a minority imposed upon by hegemonic ideas they disagree with should be
recognized, and their desires to celebrate their identity should be respected. 10
At the same time, many factors about the cross and bell tower, especially including
their sites and scales, suggest they were indeed intentionally provocative. Though one
might hope that projects seeking validity, respect, and sensitive understanding would
also exude these same qualities, this is not always the case. Accepting that some
antagonism is undoubtedly present in any multicultural context is a possibility that
must be considered. David Lowenthal has argued that having a “national identity
requires both having a heritage and thinking it unique,” and that processes of
differentiation and distinction inherently include aggressive assertions of superiority or
primacy. 11 Anthropologist Robert Hayden has argued therefore that rather than
assuming cities such as Mostar are sites of “positive tolerance” the concepts of
“competitive sharing and antagonistic tolerance” better grasp their complicated
dualistic nature of tension and cooperation, conflict and harmony, sharing and
challenging. 12
This dissertation has actively sought to rethink dissonant heritage to demonstrate how
it is possible to reconceive a violently debated heritage site, such as the Old Bridge, so
10
11
12
Heiko Wimmen argues this point not only in terms of architectural projects, but more broadly
suggests the need for solutions (such as cultural autonomy, and power-sharing not based on
population percentages) that reduce Croat fears and bring them into the political and cultural
process of the country without assimilating them. Wimmen, “New Nations, Imagined Borders:
Engineering Public Space in Postwar Mostar / Bosnia & Herzegovina” (paper presented at the
“Berlin Conference for Public Spheres,” Beirut, Lebanon, October 22-24, 2004), 5.
Lowenthal, and “Identity, Heritage, History,” in Commemorations: The Politics of National
Identity, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 47, 53.
Hayden, “Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing of Religious Sites in South Asia and the
Balkans,” Current Anthropology 43 (2002), 217.
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that conflict is not inevitable. This is not accomplished simply by imposing rhetorical
and symbolic pleas for unity and peace or assigning multicultural symbolism to a site,
but rather by acknowledging the multiple readings and accepting the multiple
associations as equally valid. Appreciating and respecting the diversity of ways of
seeing these sites is a crucial, yet poorly studied and understood, component of the
reconciliation process. 13
Superficial understandings of particular contexts that ignore or gloss over multifaceted
realities are typically to blame for these quick-fix symbolic solutions, as
oversimplification can result from deliberate or accidental ignorance of the context in
which these projects are envisioned. This was true in the Bosnian case. For example,
according to one commander of the UNPROFOR forces deployed in 1994, “the last
thing that a peacekeeper wants to know is the history of the region he is going to. It
complicates the task of mediation.” 14
Intimate background knowledge may
complicate an international intervention, but knowing the various communities and
their interpretations of history is necessary for seeing how projects can contribute
either to the increase or to the reduction of tensions.
In reference to the Old Bridge, Michael Ignatieff has argued that since Bosnia was
“Europe and America’s premiere experiment in nation building in the 1990s” and
13
14
Though poorly implemented, this point has not been totally missed by international organizations.
According to an unheeded special USIP report from 1995, reducing “the commercialization and
symbols of the international community at the local level” was advised in order to improve the
effectiveness of NGOs in peacebuilding in divided cities like Mostar. Julia Demichelis, “NGOS
and Peacebuilding in Bosnia’s Ethnically Divided Cities,” USIP Special Report 32, June 1995,
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/ BosniaNGO.html .
Major-General MacKenzie, UNPROFOR Bosnia, c.1994, quoted in Tunbridge and Ashworth,
Dissonant Heritage, ix.
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since “everybody want[ed] to go home,” there could be no “better end credit than that
beautiful bridge” for the international community. 15 But Ignatieff continued:
the key thing that Mostar tells you about nation building is beware of fantasies.
Don’t think you can impose reconciliation. Bitterness runs very deep. You can’t
plaster over that stuff. And we, because we have short timetables, cause we’re in a
hurry, we often want symbolic results more than real ones. 16
Aspects of the much debated “national question” in the former Yugoslavia, and in
complicated Bosnia-Hercegovina, are illuminated by this study on how identities have
been created and reinforced through architectural and urban symbolism. National
identities have shaped perceptions about the built environment, but wartime
destruction, postwar reconstruction, and urban images have simultaneously shaped
national identities throughout the region. Mostar does not just represent or reflect
Bosnia’s multicultural identity, but according to the report nominating the city for
World Heritage status, Mostar’s multiculturalism is argued as “one of the earliest
sources for the identity and history of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.” 17
This ICOMOS report suggests that the idea of Bosnia as multicultural is in part based
on the image of its cities, including Mostar, as multicultural, but as this dissertation
has shown, Mostar’s image as multicultural is in part derived from the idea of Bosnia
as traditionally multicultural. Thus a chicken or egg question arises about which came
first. On the one hand, cities predate nations and the long histories of shared urban
spaces in Bosnia may indeed have led to an understanding of this country in this way.
On the other hand, the image of Mostar and other Bosnian cities as consciously
15
16
17
“Nation-Building (Mostar),”
“Nation-Building (Mostar),”
ICOMOS, “Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina),” Evaluations of Cultural Properties. Report
prepared for the 29th Session of UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee in Durban, South Africa,
10-17 July 2005 (April 2005), 180.
419
multicultural is in large part a wartime and postwar construction projected backwards
onto the prewar period. In either case, national and urban identities in BosniaHercegovina are clearly interrelated and mutually reinforcing and influential.
In Mostar, this relationship between these two types of identities is complicated by a
third level: architectural identity. Mostar’s image as a multicultural city is in part a
conflation of the meaning of individual architectural sites like the Old Bridge with the
newly conceived Bosnian national identity. The bridge, the city, and the nation
therefore all took on these celebratory multicultural associations quite recently, a fact
seldom recognized by those arguing the loudest for them. It is for this reason that I
began this dissertation by suggesting Mostar and its bridge offered an opportunity to
study the process of symbol-making. In turn, Mostar has also revealed the complex
ways these symbols influence that which they are meant to represent: in this case
national identities.
Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions
The ways in which architectural, urban, and national identities interrelate which are
raised in this dissertation beg for further theoretical exploration and explanation,
indicating one potential future direction for this study. There are other important
threads and limitations within this work that also point to possible ways it could
evolve in the future.
The identity debate made visible through architecture in Mostar offered an
opportunity to explore a wide range of symbolic issues, but at the same time
prevented examination of others. Mostar is a key city in Bosnia-Hercegovina, both in
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terms of its political, demographic, and cultural significance as well as its role as a
bell weather of inter-group tensions. The numerous sites in Mostar with which
symbolic associations have been made and the frequency of public discussion about
their potential meanings allowed for a thorough exploration of this one city, and
provided more than enough information to fill a dissertation. In addition, within
Mostar the relationship between architecture and identity is at once blatantly obvious
as well as nuanced and intricate: crosses and church towers make the presence of
certain identity groups clear to even the most casual visitor to the city, but at the same
time, the changed color of street signs more subtly reinforces and delimits difference
for the well-informed. Thus Mostar offered an opportunity to explore the layered
character of these interconnections between identity and the built environment.
Examining just Mostar allowed me to offer an in-depth study which discussed the Old
Bridge in full detail, but also allocated sufficient attention to the city’s numerous other
interesting sites. But competing identities are observable in the postwar architecture of
every Bosnian city, and studying only Mostar limited this dissertation to an
examination of only one of the many fault lines of the Bosnian conflict: the tension
between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian multiculturalism.
Exploring the postwar reconstruction process in other Bosnian cities would allow
deeper study of other competitions of national identity simultaneously taking place in
Bosnia-Hercegovina. For example, in Sarajevo the tension and ambiguity between
the identity categories of Bosnian and Muslim is the primary contest being played out
in the built environment. In Banja Luka, recent architectural projects and policies
have demonstrated the exclusiveness of contemporary Serb national identity and its
dominance over other identities in the Republika Srpska. In short, Bosnia’s three main
421
cities have all been envisioned as formerly multicultural places that have become
Croat (Mostar), Muslim (Sarajevo), and Serb (Banja Luka) during and since the war.
Therefore important aspects of the multifaceted identity conflict in BosniaHercegovina and major points of contention can not be addressed in a discussion of
only Mostar. This limitation indicates another important potential new direction for
this work.
As one of the few focused, scholarly studies on the complicated role of architecture
and cultural heritage in the overall reconstruction and reconciliation process of a postconflict society, this dissertation has implications for other similar contexts well
beyond Bosnia-Hercegovina. Since architecture has so often been targeted and
manipulated during recent wars, better understanding these connections could improve
the effectiveness of international interventions, which are increasingly being followed
by
long-term
commitments
to
peacekeeping,
nation-building,
and
social
reconstruction. The better understanding of the relationship between reconstruction
and identities that this dissertation described serves as an argument for why context is
crucial. By acknowledging both the role of architecture and the importance of intimate
contextual knowledge in conflicted societies, more informed decisions can be made by
both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations regarding which projects
to support and encourage in order to promote reconciliation and lasting-peace.
Because of the nature of the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, both as having
polarized identities and as having incorporated architectural symbolism into this
process, it is a tall order to ask that the rebuilding of sites destroyed in its course do
anything other than continue to reinforce division. Even if those responsible admit
their guilt, apologize, and/or are punished, even if the ‘truth’ becomes a matter of
422
public record, and even if today’s Bosnian Croat leaders separate themselves from the
bridge’s destruction, the New Old Bridge would probably still have difficulty serving
as a tool for reconciliation. But whatever potential this site, at one time beloved by all
Mostar’s, Bosnia’s, and the former Yugoslavia’s residents, might have had was
increasingly eclipsed as the international community co-opted both the project and its
meaning.
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