Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
2010, Vol. 99, No. 1, 162–173
© 2010 American Psychological Association
0022-3514/10/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0019797
Exercising Self-Control Increases Approach Motivation
Brandon J. Schmeichel, Cindy Harmon-Jones, and Eddie Harmon-Jones
Texas A&M University
The present research tested the hypothesis that exercising self-control causes an increase in approach
motivation. Study 1 found that exercising (vs. not exercising) self-control increases self-reported
approach motivation. Study 2a identified a behavior— betting on low-stakes gambles—that is correlated
with approach motivation but is relatively uncorrelated with self-control, and Study 2b observed that
exercising self-control temporarily increases this behavior. Last, Study 3 found that exercising selfcontrol facilitates the perception of a reward-relevant symbol (i.e., a dollar sign) but not a rewardirrelevant symbol (i.e., a percent sign). Altogether, these results support the hypothesis that exercising
self-control temporarily increases approach motivation. Failures of self-control that follow from prior
efforts at self-control (i.e., ego depletion) may be explained in part by increased approach motivation.
Keywords: approach motivation, ego depletion, reinforcement sensitivity theory, self-control, selfregulation
Success at self-control is essential for several important aspects
of life, from personal concerns such as losing weight and saving
money to societal concerns such as reducing drug abuse and
preventing violence (see Vohs & Baumeister, in press). Selfcontrol can be construed as a struggle between two competing
forces: the force that motivates the expression of an impulse (i.e.,
impulse strength) versus the countervailing force that overrides the
impulse (i.e., self-control strength). In this view, self-control succeeds when the impulse is relatively weak, when control is relatively strong, or through some combination of both of these factors. Conversely, failures of self-control may stem from strong
impulses, weak control, or a combination of both factors.
Research has suggested that a weakened control mechanism,
caused by the recent exercise of self-control, increases the likelihood of self-control failure (for a review, see Baumeister,
Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2007). The impact of recent acts of selfcontrol on the other element of the self-control struggle—impulse
strength— has received less attention. The research described in
this article provides the first evidence that acts of self-control that
have been shown to reduce self-control strength also increase
approach-motivated impulse strength.
The Strength Model of Self-Control
The strength model of self-control posits that the inner mechanism for self-control operates on the basis of a limited resource or
strength (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). The sufficiency of this
strength for overriding an impulse is determined in part by previous behavior. If the person has recently exercised self-control, then
strength may be depleted and further efforts at self-control may be
prone to failure.
Support for the strength model emerged from experiments in
which participants performed consecutive self-control tasks. One
experiment, for example, examined eating behavior in a sample of
dieters (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000, Study 3). Self-control strength
was manipulated by instructing dieters either to inhibit or to
express emotional impulses while watching a sad film clip. Afterward, self-control was measured on an unrelated task that involved
tasting and rating different flavors of ice cream. Dieters who had
inhibited their emotional reactions during the film clip ate more ice
cream during the subsequent taste-and-rate task, compared with
dieters who had freely expressed their reactions during the film
clip. Hence it appeared that dieters were less successful at inhibiting ice-cream intake (thus more likely to break their diets) after
exercising self-control on an unrelated task. This experiment and
several others (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice,
1998; Finkel et al., 2006; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998;
Vohs et al., 2008) have supported the strength model by finding
that initial efforts at self-control temporarily increase the likelihood of self-control failure.
The strength model is mute regarding the other element of the
self-control struggle: the strength of the impulse that opposes the
control mechanism. The present research tested the hypothesis that
exercising self-control temporarily increases the strength of
approach-motivated impulses. Results in support of this hypothesis
would suggest that prior efforts at self-control influence subsequent behavior by increasing impulse strength, by reducing selfcontrol strength, or by some combination of both factors.
Like most research on self-control (see Carver, 2005), research
based on the strength model has examined the control of approach-
Brandon J. Schmeichel, Cindy Harmon-Jones, and Eddie HarmonJones, Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University.
This research was funded in part by National Science Foundation Grant
BCS-0921276 awarded to Brandon J. Schmeichel and Eddie HarmonJones. Thank you to Jackie Anderson, Sofia Arrizaga, Eric Barber, Chris
Castanon, Daniela Cortez, Kristi Gold, Josh Hovland, Krystal Mata, Kara
Page, Cody Philips, Mark Polley, Julie Rians, Andrea Salamone, Lauren
Saporito, Katie Simpson, Amanda Stebbins, Travis Turner, and Aaron
Witler for helping to conduct this research. Thanks also to Dominique
Muller for providing stimuli for Study 3.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Brandon
J. Schmeichel, Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4235. E-mail: schmeichel@tamu.edu
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motivated behaviors. The study of dieters described previously, in
which ice-cream consumption increased after dieters had inhibited
their emotional reactions, is one example (Vohs & Heatherton,
2000). Other experiments have replicated the same basic pattern
using other approach-motivated behaviors as the dependent measure. For example, one experiment found that participants who had
resisted the temptation to eat delicious foods later reacted more
aggressively to an insult, compared with participants who had
eaten as much of the tempting food as they wanted (Stucke &
Baumeister, 2006, Study 1; see also DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman,
& Gailliot, 2007). In another experiment, social drinkers who had
attempted to suppress a forbidden thought later consumed more
alcohol when the opportunity arose, compared with other social
drinkers who had not attempted to suppress a forbidden thought
(Muraven, Collins, & Nienhaus, 2002).
These findings have been interpreted as evidence that exercising
self-control temporarily reduces self-control strength. Note, however, that each study described in the previous paragraph found
that initial acts of self-control caused an increase in subsequent
approach-motivated behaviors (i.e., food consumption, impulsive
aggression, alcohol consumption). Insofar as failure to control
approach-motivated behaviors stems from weak self-control
strength, strong approach-motivated impulses, or some combination of both factors, the previous findings may implicate reduced
self-control strength, but the same results would occur if exercising
self-control caused an increase in approach-motivated impulse
strength. When prior acts of self-control cause an increase in
aggression, for example, one cannot be sure that the aggression
reflects a reduced capacity to control aggressive behavior rather
than an increased motivation to aggress. Both explanations are
plausible, and the data do not distinguish between them. Aggression is commonly associated both with low self-control (e.g.,
Krueger, Caspi, Moffitt, White, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1996) and
with high approach motivation (Harmon-Jones, 2003; HarmonJones & Peterson, 2008; Smits & Kuppens, 2005).
Motivation, Self-Control, and Reinforcement
Sensitivity Theory
We propose that, in addition to reducing self-control strength,
exercising self-control causes an increase in approach motivation.
We based our hypothesis on a recent revision of reinforcement
sensitivity theory (RST; Corr, 2008; Gray & McNaughton, 2000).
According to revised RST, behavior is mediated by three underlying systems. The behavioral activation system (BAS) mediates
reactions to appetitive stimuli, the fight-flight-freeze system
(FFFS) mediates reactions to aversive stimuli, and the behavioral
inhibition system (BIS) resolves conflicts that arise within and
between the other systems. Two of the systems, BAS and BIS, are
most relevant for the current investigation.
The BAS governs approach-motivated impulses and appetitive
behavior. It has been referred to as a behavioral approach system
(Gray, 1981, 1987, 1990), behavioral activation system (Fowles,
1980, 1988), and behavioral facilitation system (Depue & Collins,
1999; Depue & Iacono, 1989). It has also been referred to as an
approach or appetitive motivational system (Davidson, 1998).
When an individual attempts to control an appetitive impulse (such
as resisting the impulse to eat cookies; Baumeister et al., 1998),
163
BAS provides the impulses that oppose the control mechanism.
Consistent with this view, individual differences in BAS are associated with attentional and emotional responses to incentives and
incentive-related cues (Carver & White, 1994; Gable & HarmonJones, 2008), physiological responses to appetitive stimuli (Hawk
& Kowmas, 2003; Peterson, Gable, & Harmon-Jones, 2008), and
aggressive responses at trait and state levels (Harmon-Jones, 2003;
Harmon-Jones & Peterson, 2008; Smits & Kuppens, 2005).
The BIS is a conflict-detection system. For example, whenever
an approach-motivated (BAS) impulse co-occurs with a
withdrawal-motivated (FFFS) impulse, BIS helps to tilt the balance in favor of one impulse over the other. BIS has also been
linked to the detection of response conflict in cognitive tasks such
as the go/no-go task (e.g., Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008).
BIS activation is associated with anxiety and is characterized by
caution and information gathering. When BIS is activated, behavior may be inhibited so that relevant response options can be
reassessed (Gray & McNaughton, 2000).
Revised RST proposes that BAS, BIS, and FFFS dynamically
interact to regulate behavior (see Corr, 2008). Most relevant for the
present investigation, response conflict activates the BIS and inhibits BAS-motivated impulses and appetitive behavior. Factors
that reduce response conflict or deactivate BIS therefore are likely
to increase approach motivation and appetitive behavior. Conversely, BAS activation can reduce response conflict and deactivate the BIS in favor of appetitive behavior (e.g., Leue, Chavanon,
Wacker, & Stemmler, 2009). Factors that increase BAS therefore
are likely to reduce response conflict and BIS activation (see also
Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009).
Research has indicated that exercising self-control temporarily
reduces BIS activation, as assessed by brain activity associated
with the detection of response conflict. More specifically, participants in a study by Inzlicht and Gutsell (2007) performed a Stroop
task after either inhibiting or expressing their responses to a
distressing film clip. Participants who had inhibited their responses
during the film clip exhibited reduced amplitudes in the errorrelated negativity (ERN) during the subsequent Stroop task. The
ERN is an event-related brain potential produced by the anterior
cingulate cortex that has been characterized as a neural index of
the detection of response conflict (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen,
2004). The ERN has also been linked to BIS (e.g., Amodio et al.,
2008). The study by Inzlicht and Gutsell thus suggests that exercising self-control reduces activity in the brain’s conflict-detection
center and, presumably, reduces BIS activation. If that is correct,
then an additional consequence of exercising self-control should
be increased BAS activation; according to revised RST, as BIS
becomes relatively deactivated, BAS activation may increase.
The interplay between BAS and BIS mirrors the self-control
struggle outlined earlier: BAS reflects approach-motivated impulse strength, and BIS reflects self-control strength. BIS is likely
to be an important component of self-control strength. Theory and
research clearly support the view that the detection of response
conflict is a necessary ingredient for successful self-control (e.g.,
Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Michie, Abraham, Whittington,
McAteer, & Gupta, 2009; Robinson, Schmeichel, & Inzlicht, 2010;
Wen Wan & Sternthal, 2008). It would hardly be surprising if
depleted self-control strength was a reflection, in part, of reduced
conflict detection or BIS deactivation. Indeed, evidence of reduced
ERN amplitudes following an emotion-suppression task supports
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SCHMEICHEL, HARMON-JONES, AND HARMON-JONES
this view (Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007). However, self-control
strength likely involves more than conflict detection alone.
Whereas conflict detection (a putative BIS function) is associated
with activity in the anterior cingulate cortex, additional brain
regions (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) are engaged to resolve
response conflict (e.g., Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, &
Cohen, 1999; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Selfcontrol strength is therefore likely to extend beyond BIS and
conflict detection to include conflict-resolution processes.
In summary, exercising self-control has been observed to reduce
subsequent conflict detection, a putative function of the BIS.
According to revised RST, a reduction in BIS may produce an
increase in BAS activation, resulting in increased approach motivation and appetitive behavior. In the terms of the strength model
of self-control, prior efforts at self-control may increase approachmotivated impulse strength. We conducted four studies to test this
hypothesis.
Distinguishing Impulse Strength From
Self-Control Strength
Several behaviors (e.g., eating, aggression) are influenced both
by the impulse that compels the behavior and by the inner mechanism that attempts to control the behavior. For these behaviors, it
may be difficult to distinguish the contributions of impulse
strength from the contributions of self-control strength. But other
approach-motivated behaviors may be unrelated to self-control,
because the person has no interest or inclination to control them.
To distinguish between approach-motivated impulse strength and
self-control strength in the current work, we chose to study
approach-motivated behaviors that are relatively uninfluenced by
self-control. We reasoned that, if exercising self-control causes an
increase in approach-motivated behaviors that entail little or no
self-control, then we can be confident that exercising self-control
temporarily increases approach motivation.
We began our investigation by testing the impact of prior efforts
at self-control on self-reported approach motivation (Study 1).
Then we identified a behavior— betting on low-stakes gambles—
that is associated with BAS but not trait self-control (Study 2a) and
tested the hypothesis that prior efforts at self-control cause an
increase in low-stakes betting behavior (Study 2b). Last, we tested
the hypothesis that exercising self-control facilitates attention toward a reward-relevant symbol but not a reward-irrelevant symbol
(Study 3), as would be expected if exercising self-control increases
BAS.
Our investigation focused on the effects of exercising selfcontrol and BAS or approach motivation, although it was possible
that exercising self-control also influences avoidance motivation
(i.e., FFFS activation). According to the strength model of selfcontrol, low self-control strength undermines efforts to control
both approach-motivated behavior and avoidance-motivated behavior, but evidence pertaining to the control of avoidancemotivated behavior is scarce. Because research based on the
strength model of self-control has focused mainly on BASmotivated behaviors, we also focused on BAS-motivated behaviors and the effects of exercising self-control on BAS.
Study 1: Exercising Self-Control Increases
Approach Motivation
On the basis of the conceptual model presented above, we
hypothesized that exercising self-control increases approach motivation. Study 1 tested the hypothesis that initial efforts at selfcontrol increase approach motivation by asking participants to
exercise self-control (or not) before completing the BIS/BAS
scales (Carver & White, 1994).
The BIS/BAS scales assess threat sensitivity and incentive sensitivity, respectively (see Carver, 2009; Carver & Harmon-Jones,
2009); we refer to these measures as threat sensitivity and incentive sensitivity for the rest of the article. We were particularly
interested in the incentive sensitivity scale, as it is a widely used,
well-validated self-report measure of approach motivation. People
who score high on incentive sensitivity are motivated by incentives
and related cues, actively pursue incentives, and respond with
positive feelings when incentives are obtained (Carver & White,
1994). We expected to find higher incentive sensitivity scores
among participants who had (vs. had not) exercised self-control
during the first part of the experiment. The BIS scale is a measure
of threat sensitivity, and as such, it does not directly assess the
conflict detection function of BIS proposed in revised RST (Torrubia, Avila, & Caseras, 2008). In fact, the BIS scale may be a
better measure of FFFS than BIS. We are aware of no reliable
self-report measure of the conflict detection function of the BIS, so
none was included.1
Method
Participants. Forty-one undergraduate students (15 men, 26
women) participated in a laboratory study that was described as an
investigation of emotion and personality. They earned credit toward a course requirement for their participation.
Materials and procedure. Participants first reported demographic information and then viewed a slideshow of 28 photographs. Participants viewed the following photographs from the
International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005): 2683, 3010, 3030, 3100, 3170, 3266, 3500, 3530,
6021, 6200, 6212, 6230, 6300, 6312, 6415, 6821, 6831, 9050,
9300, 9405, 9410, 9425, 9500, 9570, 9600, 9902, 9910, and 9921.
These photographs reliably elicit high arousal negative affect
according to norms reported by Lang et al. (2005). The photos
were presented singly for 5 s each, separated by 2 s of blank
screen.
The exercise of self-control was manipulated by assigning participants at random to one of two viewing conditions (similar to
Muraven et al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; Vohs &
Schmeichel, 2003). Participants in the express condition were
instructed to view the slideshow carefully and “if you feel anything
or have any emotional reaction as you watch, just experience it and
express it in whatever way is natural for you.” Hence these
participants were not required to exercise self-control. In contrast,
1
We included the BIS scale, Carver and White’s (1994) measure of
threat sensitivity, in Studies 1 and 2a. In Study 1, the suppression manipulation did not significantly alter BIS scores, t(39) ⫽ 1.56, p ⫽ .13, and in
Study 2, BIS did not relate to betting on low-stakes gambles, r(45) ⫽ –.02,
p ⫽ .92.
SELF-CONTROL AND APPROACH MOTIVATION
participants in the suppress condition were instructed to view the
slideshow and “try to keep your face perfectly expressionless. If
you have any emotional reactions, try not to show them on your
face.” These participants were expected to exercise self-control to
hide emotional expressions elicited by the aversive stimuli.
Following the slideshow presentation, participants completed a
measure of threat sensitivity and incentive sensitivity (the BIS/
BAS scales; Carver & White, 1994). The incentive sensitivity
scale was most relevant for the present study. Sample items include “If I see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right
away,” “I will often do things for no other reason than they might
be fun,” and “It would excite me to win a contest,” rated from 1
(very false for me) to 4 (very true for me). The possible range on
the incentive sensitivity scale was 13 to 52; the internal reliability
was ␣ ⫽ .79.
Results
Our hypothesis was that performing a task that required selfcontrol would increase BAS, relative to performing a task that did
not require self-control. A t test that compared scores from the
incentive sensitivity scale supported our hypothesis, t(39) ⫽ 2.11,
p ⫽ .04. Participants who suppressed their emotional expressions
during a slideshow of aversive photographs subsequently reported
higher BAS (M ⫽ 42.93, SD ⫽ 4.24) compared with participants
who simply expressed their responses to the slideshow (M ⫽
40.00, SD ⫽ 4.67).
Discussion
Study 1 provided the first evidence that exercising self-control
increases BAS. After suppressing (vs. expressing) facial expressions of emotion, participants reported a greater tendency to desire
and to seek out opportunities for reward (i.e., incentive sensitivity).
Hence, in addition to reducing self-control strength (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998), acts of self-control may also
increase approach-motivated impulse strength.
The BAS scale was designed as a trait measure. We used it as
a dependent measure, because we are aware of no widely accepted
state measure of incentive sensitivity or approach motivation. The
fact that our self-control manipulation affected scores on the trait
measure of BAS is particularly impressive, as a state measure
should have been even more sensitive at detecting the effect of the
manipulation.
Although the findings from Study 1 supported our hypothesis
that acts of self-control increase approach motivation, two limitations of the study should be noted. First, Study 1 examined the
motivational consequences stemming from only one type of selfcontrol effort, namely the suppression of negative emotional expressions. If our hypothesis is correct, then exercising other types
of self-control should also lead to increased approach motivation.
Second, we measured approach motivation using a questionnaire
in Study 1. Although we found that prior acts of self-control led
people to report higher incentive sensitivity on a well-validated
questionnaire, we thought it important to assess whether prior
self-control would affect approach-motivated behavior. We conducted Studies 2a and 2b to address these issues.
165
Study 2a: Relationship Between Approach Motivation
and Low-Stakes Betting Behavior
Study 2a served to lay the foundation for a subsequent test of the
hypothesis (reported in Study 2b) that exercising self-control increases approach-motivated behavior. In our view, previous research derived from the strength model of self-control may have
confounded the contributions of self-control strength and approach
motivation by assessing behaviors that were both approach motivated and frequent targets of self-control (e.g., eating, aggression).
The present study sought to identify a behavior that is approach
motivated but relatively unassociated with self-control.
We reasoned that behavior on a gambling game that promised
seemingly insignificant rewards would be related to approach
motivation, such that participants higher in incentive sensitivity
would bet more often than participants lower in incentive sensitivity. Because the gambling game did not encourage participants
to override or alter a predominant response tendency, we expected
little or no relationship between betting behavior and trait selfcontrol (see also Lakey, Campbell, Brown, & Goodie, 2007).
Participants and Method
Forty-five undergraduate students (14 men, 31 women) who
completed a battery of questionnaires in a mass survey at the
beginning of the semester reported to a laboratory study some 6 to
10 weeks later. They earned credit toward a course requirement for
their participation both in the mass survey and the laboratory
study.
The mass survey included two questionnaires that were directly
relevant to the laboratory study: the BIS/BAS scales (Carver &
White, 1994) and the brief version of the trait self-control scale
(SCS; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). The BIS/BAS scales
were described in Study 1. In the present sample, the average score
on the incentive sensitivity (BAS) scale was M ⫽ 40.67 (SD ⫽
6.28), ␣ ⫽ .79. The SCS is a 13-item scale that measures trait
self-control and has been linked to performance on behavioral tests
of self-control (Schmeichel & Zell, 2007). Sample items include “I
have a hard time breaking bad habits” (reverse scored) and “People
would say that I have iron self-discipline.” Participants rated how
much they agreed with each item on a scale from 1 (very false for
me) to 5 (very true for me). In the present sample, the possible
range of scores on the SCS was 13 to 65, the internal reliability
was ␣ ⫽ .87, and the mean score was 43.00 (SD ⫽ 8.34).
The laboratory study was described as a preliminary investigation of students’ decision-making tendencies. Participants first
completed a demographic questionnaire and then played 20 rounds
of a simple gambling game. At the beginning of each round of the
game, the experimenter handed participants a $50 bill from the
board game Monopoly. Participants then had to decide whether to
“bank” the fake money and proceed to the next round or whether
to “bet” the money. If they chose to bet, the experimenter flipped
a coin. A coin flip that landed heads-up won the participant an
additional $50 in fake money, whereas a coin flip that landed
tails-up cost the participant $50 in fake money. The goal of the
game was to accumulate as much fake money as possible. Banking
the money on each round guaranteed a final tally of $1000, but
betting could result in a much higher total. The number of rounds
participants chose to bet was the dependent variable.
SCHMEICHEL, HARMON-JONES, AND HARMON-JONES
166
After completing the gambling game, participants indicated (yes
or no) whether they had believed the coin flips were fair (i.e., not
biased to influence winning or losing). All participants believed
the coin flips were fair. Participants also rated how much they
enjoyed the gambling game on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much). We expected that self-reported enjoyment would reflect
the degree to which the task was rewarding and involving, and
as such, we predicted enjoyment to be positively correlated with
incentive sensitivity. Last, participants were debriefed concerning the purpose of the study, thanked for their participation, and
dismissed.
Results
The mean number of bets in this sample was 10.44 (SD ⫽ 4.51).
Figure 1 displays the scatter plot of the correlation between incentive sensitivity and betting behavior. As expected, incentive sensitivity, as measured at the start of the semester, correlated with
number of bets placed during a low-stakes gambling game played
approximately 2 months later, r(45) ⫽ .33, p ⫽ .03. The correlation between trait self-control and betting behavior was small,
negative, and nonsignificant, r(45) ⫽ –.14, p ⫽ .38. Even when
controlling for trait self-control, the relationship between incentive
sensitivity and betting remained significant, r(42) ⫽ .32, p ⫽ .03.
Furthermore, incentive sensitivity predicted enjoyment of the gambling game, r(45) ⫽ .30, p ⫽ .04, but trait self-control did not,
r(45) ⫽ .08, p ⫽ .59.
Study 2b: Exercising Self-Control Increases
Approach-Motivated Behavior
Study 2b examined the extent to which exercising self-control
increases subsequent approach-motivated behavior. Unlike the
approach-related behaviors examined in previous research (e.g.,
eating, drinking, aggression), betting behavior on our low-stakes
gambling game has proven to be related to incentive sensitivity but
relatively unrelated to self-control (see Study 2a). Therefore, insofar as initial efforts at self-control cause an increase in subsequent betting behavior on our gambling game, this would suggest
greater approach motivation.
To increase the empirical yield of Study 2a, we also manipulated
betting outcomes on the gambling game. In one condition, betting
behavior was likely to be rewarded, but in another condition,
betting was likely to produce losses and, hence, would not be
rewarded. We reasoned that betting and winning may increase
approach motivation and lead participants to gamble more often.
Conversely, betting and losing may reduce approach motivation
and lead participants to gamble less often.
We expected that exercising self-control would increase betting
behavior in both the win condition and the loss condition but in a
manner that was sensitive to the consequences of betting. That is,
participants who had previously exercised self-control were expected to bet at higher rates than other participants (suggesting
greater approach motivation), with betting more frequent in the
win condition than in the loss condition for both groups of participants. Two other betting patterns that could reflect increased
approach motivation were also considered. First, it was possible
that exercising self-control would increase subsequent betting behavior regardless of the consequences of betting. That is, equally
high rates of betting in both the win and loss conditions may
emerge among participants who had previously exercised selfcontrol, suggesting that these participants were both highly approach motivated and insensitive to the consequences of their
betting behavior. The second possibility was that exercising selfcontrol would increase subsequent betting behavior especially in
Figure 1. Relationship between self-reported incentive sensitivity (behavioral activation system [BAS]) and
betting behavior (Study 2a).
SELF-CONTROL AND APPROACH MOTIVATION
the loss condition, because in the win condition, all participants
would bet at high rates.
To increase the generalizability of our findings, Study 2b used
a different initial exercise of self-control. Whereas Study 1 manipulated the exercise of self-control by instructing participants to
suppress negative emotional expressions (as in Muraven et al.,
1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), Study 2b manipulated selfcontrol by instructing participants to inhibit common writing tendencies (as in Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely,
2009; Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, & Baumeister, 2009; Schmeichel,
2007).
Method
Participants. One hundred thirty-two undergraduate students
(46 men, 86 women) participated in a laboratory experiment that
was described as an investigation of emotion and decision making.
Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (writing
condition) ⫻ 2 (betting outcome condition) between-subjects factorial design, and they earned credit toward a course requirement
for their participation.
Procedure. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire and then were instructed to write a story on a blank sheet of
paper. To manipulate initial efforts at self-control, we assigned
participants at random to writing condition (see Schmeichel,
2007). Participants in the free writing condition were instructed
simply to “Write a story about a recent trip you have taken. It may
be a trip to the store, to Ohio, or to another country—wherever!
Please write until the experimenter asks you to stop.” Participants
in the controlled writing condition received an additional instruction: “Very important! Please do not use the letters a or n anywhere in your story.” Hence this group was required to control
their writing by avoiding the use of two commonly used letters,
whereas the other group wrote freely and without restrictions.
After participants indicated that they understood the task, they
began writing and were stopped 6 min later.
After the writing task, participants performed one of two variants of the gambling game used in Study 2a. All participants made
20 choices to “bank” or to “bet” $50 in Monopoly money. Partic-
167
ipants who chose to bet had to press a button on a computer mouse
to flip a coin. If the coin landed heads up, the participant won an
additional $50 in fake money. If the coin landed tails up, the
participant lost $50. In the win condition, the coin flips were rigged
so that participants won three of their first four bets and at least
75% overall. In the loss condition, the outcome of the coin flips
ensured that participants lost three of their first four bets and at
least 75% of their bets overall. As in Study 2a, the number of
rounds participants chose to bet was the dependent variable.
After the gambling game, participants were asked to indicate
(yes or no) whether the coin flips had been fair and unbiased. All
participants believed the coin flips had been fair. Participants also
rated how difficult the initial writing task had been and also how
difficult it had been to choose whether to bet on the gambling
game (from 1 ⫽ not at all difficult to 7 ⫽ extremely difficult).
Results
Betting behavior. On the basis of the evidence that prior
efforts at self-control increase incentive sensitivity (Study 1), plus
evidence that incentive sensitivity is associated with a tendency to
bet on low-stakes gambles (Study 2a), we predicted that prior
efforts at self-control would increase the tendency to bet on lowstakes gambles. This prediction was supported by a 2 (writing
condition) ⫻ 2 (betting outcome condition) analysis of variance
using total number of bets as the dependent variable. The results
are displayed in Figure 2.
In accord with the prediction that exercising self-control would
increase betting behavior, participants in the controlled writing
condition bet more often than did participants in the free writing
condition; that is, a main effect for writing condition emerged, F(1,
128) ⫽ 5.25, p ⫽ .02. Furthermore, participants in the win condition bet more often than participants in the loss condition; that is,
a main effect of betting outcome condition emerged, F(1, 128) ⫽
5.62, p ⫽ .02. Betting outcomes did not interact with writing
condition to influence betting behavior (F ⬍ 1). Thus, prior efforts
at self-control led to increased betting behavior in the win condition and the loss condition alike, and winning led to more betting
than did losing regardless of writing condition. Taken together,
14
Number of Bets
12
*
10
8
*
Free Writing
Controlled Writing
6
4
2
0
75% Los e
75% W in
Outcome Condition
Figure 2. Number of bets as function of writing condition and betting outcome condition (Study 2b). ⴱ p ⬍ .05.
168
SCHMEICHEL, HARMON-JONES, AND HARMON-JONES
these patterns indicate that participants who had previously exercised self-control bet more often than other participants, but they
were nonetheless sensitive to the outcomes of their betting behavior.
Subjective evaluation of tasks. As expected, participants
rated the controlled writing task as more difficult (M ⫽ 5.36, SD ⫽
1.79) than the free writing task (M ⫽ 1.51, SD ⫽ 1.44), t(130) ⫽
13.62, p ⬍ .001. This finding is consistent with prior evidence that
exerting self-control is experienced as more difficult than not
exerting self-control (e.g., Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003). Note also
that the mean difficulty rating for the controlled writing task was
clearly above the midpoint of the rating scale (i.e., 4) whereas the
free writing task was clearly below the midpoint.
Participants also rated the difficulty of choosing whether to bet
during the gambling game, and we found no effect of self-control
condition, betting outcome condition, or their interaction (all Fs ⬍
1). Moreover, the overall mean difficulty rating (collapsing across
all conditions) for the betting game was 2.86 (SD ⫽ 1.54). The
average difficulty rating of the gambling game was thus well
below the midpoint of the rating scale, indicating that participants
did not find the gambling game to be particularly difficult. Given
that self-control is typically experienced and rated as difficult to
accomplish, these results provide additional support for our contention that the gambling game is not primarily a self-control task.
Rather, as demonstrated in Study 2a, the gambling game gauges
approach motivation.
Discussion
Together, the results of Study 2a and Study 2b support our
hypothesis that exercising self-control causes an increase in approach motivation. Study 2a indicated that betting behavior on the
low-stakes gambling game was associated with incentive sensitivity but not with trait self-control (at least not significantly so).
Study 2b built on these results by finding that exercising (versus
not exercising) self-control increased approach-motivated behavior in the form of betting on a series of low-stakes gambles.
Exercising self-control increased subsequent betting behavior both
when betting was likely to be rewarded as well as when betting
was not likely to be rewarded. Hence self-control led to increased
approach behavior that was beneficial in some contexts but detrimental in others. Although previous self-control research has
tended to focus on contexts in which an increase in approach
behavior may be maladaptive or undesirable (e.g., more ice-cream
consumption, more aggression), increased approach is advantageous in some contexts (e.g., Dickman, 1990). In the present work,
prior efforts at self-control increased approach motivation, regardless of whether approach led to winning gambles or losing gambles.
The observed patterns of results are not easily explained by the
idea that exercising self-control causes a reduction in self-control
strength. The betting task posed relatively little response conflict
and did not otherwise encourage participants to exercise selfcontrol. Indeed, trait levels of self-control were weakly and nonsignificantly associated with betting behavior on this task (Study
2a), so it seems implausible that the betting patterns reflect poor
self-control. We therefore propose that the most parsimonious
explanation for the current results is that exercising self-control
increases approach motivation.
Study 3: Exercising Self-Control Increases Attention to
a Reward-Related Stimulus
Study 3 used a different dependent measure of approach motivation than the ones used in the previous studies. One principle of
motivation is enhanced processing of stimuli that are linked to
one’s prevailing motivational state (e.g., Neumann & Strack,
2000), and one core element of approach motivation is sensitivity
to incentives and incentive-related cues (e.g., Carver & White,
1994). Study 3 therefore tested the hypothesis that exercising
self-control facilitates the perception of a familiar reward symbol
(i.e., the dollar sign) but not the perception of a reward-irrelevant
symbol (i.e., the percent sign). We manipulated the exercise of
self-control with the same writing task used in Study 2b. Subsequently, participants viewed a series of fleeting images, and we
manipulated whether they had to indicate whether or not a dollar
sign or a percent sign had appeared in the image. We predicted that
participants who had exercised self-control would more accurately
perceive dollar signs, but not percent signs, compared with participants who had not exercised self-control.
Method
Participants. Forty-two undergraduate students (18 men, 24
women) participated in a laboratory experiment described as an
investigation of emotion and visual perception. They earned credit
toward a course requirement for their participation. Participants
were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (writing condition) ⫻
2 (symbol type) between-subjects factorial design.
Procedure. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire and then wrote a story on a blank sheet of paper. As in Study
2b, a 6-min writing task comprised the manipulation of selfcontrol. The same conditions—free writing and controlled writing—were included with the same instructions.
Following the writing task, participants performed one of two
perception tests on a computer. Participants in the dollar sign
condition viewed a series of pictures and had to decide whether a
dollar sign ($) was present or absent in each picture. Participants
in the percent sign condition viewed a series of pictures and had to
decide whether a percent sign (%) was present or absent in each
picture. The instructions encouraged participants to decide quickly
while making as few errors as possible.
Participants viewed 80 pictures in all (40 symbol-present and 40
symbol-absent). The pictures were patterned after stimuli used by
Triesman and Paterson (1984; see also Muller, Atzeni, & Butera,
2004) and were presented in random order. The pictures were
2.3 ⫻ 2.6 in. in size and were displayed one at a time in the center
of a computer screen. Four representative pictures are presented in
Figure 3. After a 1,000-ms fixation point, a picture appeared
onscreen for 70 ms, followed by a 1,700-ms pattern mask to
eliminate retinal persistence of the picture. Participants pressed a
green response key if they believed the picture contained the target
symbol or a red response key if they believed the picture did not
contain the target symbol. The number of correct responses in the
symbol-present and symbol-absent trials, respectively, served as
our primary dependent variables.
SELF-CONTROL AND APPROACH MOTIVATION
169
writing condition correctly identified a similar number of target
symbols, F(1, 38) ⫽ 1.06, p ⫽ .31.
For pictures that did not include a target symbol, the Writing ⫻
Symbol Type interaction term was not statistically significant (F ⬍
1). Participants in the controlled writing group (M ⫽ 17.10, SD ⫽
5.72) correctly identified the absence of dollar signs on a par with
participants in the free writing group (M ⫽ 16.83, SD ⫽ 10.08;
F ⬍ 1). Similarly, participants in the controlled writing group
(M ⫽ 26.81, SD ⫽ 6.31) correctly identified the absence of percent
signs on a par with participants in the free writing group (M ⫽
24.67, SD ⫽ 9.39; F ⬍ 1). The main effect of symbol type was
statistically significant, F(1, 38) ⫽ 12.07, p ⬍ .05, such that
participants more accurately detected the absence of percent signs
versus dollar signs.
Discussion
Study 3 found that exercising self-control subsequently facilitated the perception of a symbol associated with a prominent
reward—money— but did not facilitate the perception of a symbol
that was not associated with reward—a percent sign. Sensitivity to
reward-related cues reflects approach motivation (e.g., Carver &
White, 1994), so these results provide support for the hypothesis
that exercising self-control increases approach motivation. Moreover, the results suggest that exercising self-control does not
improve perception generally; rather, only the perception of the
reward-relevant symbol was improved. Additional work testing
other symbols, reward-related and otherwise, will help to clarify
the specificity of the perceptual effects.
The results from Study 3 are not readily explained by a reduction of self-control strength among participants who had previously exercised self-control. Virtually all of the previous studies
based on the strength model of self-control have found that exercising self-control causes subsequent decrements in performance
(see Baumeister et al., 2007). Study 3 revealed that exercising
self-control improves performance on a signal detection task that
uses a reward-related symbol as the signal.
Figure 3. Examples of symbol-present and symbol-absent stimuli (Study
3). a. Dollar sign present. b. Dollar sign absent. c. Percent sign present. d.
Percent sign absent.
Results
Our hypothesis was that participants who had previously exercised self-control would more accurately detect the presence of
dollar signs, but not percent signs, relative to participants who had
not exercised self-control. This hypothesis was supported by a 2
(writing condition) ⫻ 2 (symbol type) analysis of variance on the
number of target symbols correctly perceived. The predicted interaction term was significant, F(1, 38) ⫽ 4.22, p ⬍ .05. Results
are displayed in Figure 4. A simple effects test indicated that, when
the target symbol was a dollar sign, participants in the controlled
writing condition correctly identified more target symbols than did
participants in the free writing condition, F(1, 38) ⫽ 5.50, p ⬍ .05.
When the target symbol was a percent sign, however, participants
in the controlled writing condition and participants in the free
Symbols Correctly Perceived
40
35
30
*
25
Free Writing
20
Controlled Writing
15
10
5
0
Dollar Sign Present
Percent Sign Present
Symbol Type
Figure 4. Number of symbols correctly perceived as a function of writing condition and symbol type (Study
3). ⴱ p ⬍ .05.
170
SCHMEICHEL, HARMON-JONES, AND HARMON-JONES
General Discussion
After people exercise voluntary control over their behavior, they
appear to be less capable of exercising self-control subsequently.
The dominant interpretation of this well-replicated pattern has
been that initial efforts at self-control deplete the internal strength
required for subsequent self-control tasks. The research described
in this article provides the first evidence that initial efforts at
self-control also increase approach motivation. The implication is
that people may fail at self-control because a previous act of
self-control increased approach motivation, reduced self-control
strength, or both.
Study 1 tested the hypothesis that exercising self-control increases self-reported approach motivation. We manipulated selfcontrol by asking participants to suppress (vs. express) facial
expressions of emotion while watching a slideshow of pictures that
elicits negative affect. After exercising self-control, participants
reported greater incentive sensitivity.
Study 2a assessed betting behavior on a low-stakes gambling
game that did not require participants to inhibit a response tendency or otherwise attempt to control their behavior. We predicted
and found that betting behavior varied with trait incentive sensitivity but not trait self-control. Thus, unlike previous research that
examined behaviors that individuals try to control, such as eating
or aggressive behavior, we identified a behavior that was related to
approach motivation but relatively unrelated to self-control. Study
2b then sought a conceptual replication of Study 1 using a different
manipulation of self-control and a behavioral measure of approach
motivation. We manipulated self-control by asking participants to
complete a writing task that did or did not require self-control.
Then participants played the low-stakes gambling game that is
responsive to variations in incentive sensitivity. Participants who
had previously exercised self-control bet more often and hence
displayed more approach motivation than other participants.
Last, Study 3 tested the hypothesis that exercising self-control
increases attention to reward-related stimuli. We again manipulated self-control using a writing task. Then participants viewed
pictures for a very short period of time (70 ms) and had to
determine whether a dollar sign (i.e., a reward-related symbol) or
a percent sign (i.e., a reward-unrelated symbol) appeared in the
pictures. Participants who had previously exercised self-control
identified dollar signs, but not percent signs, more accurately than
did participants who had not exercised self-control, suggesting that
the exercise of self-control increases perceptual sensitivity to
reward-related stimuli.
Altogether, the findings from the present studies converge on
the idea that exercising self-control increases approach motivation.
These results extend self-control research in a novel direction by
revealing that prior acts of self-control may influence both sides of
the self-control struggle, reducing the capacity to control behavior
as well as increasing the impulse to behave.
Self-Control’s Impact on Motivation
The current results are consistent with research suggesting that
prior acts of self-control render individuals more responsive to
motivational incentives. Muraven and Slessareva (2003) found that
initial efforts at self-control undermine performance at a subse-
quent self-control task, consistent with the strength model of
self-control. When participants were promised a reward (e.g.,
money) for performing the second task, however, the detrimental
effect of prior self-control was eliminated. It is remarkable that the
promise of reward did not influence performance among participants who had not previously exercised self-control—they performed just as well on the second task regardless of whether a
reward was promised. To explain this pattern of results, Muraven
and Slessareva suggested that exercising self-control increases
responsiveness to motivational cues. The current research specifically tested this idea and found evidence that exercising selfcontrol increases approach motivation.
A relevant series of studies by Bruyneel, Dewitte, Vohs, and
Warlop (2006) found that making a series of choices rendered
participants more likely to purchase attractive but expensive candies. Making conscious choices temporarily reduces self-control
strength (e.g., Vohs et al., 2008), leading Bruyneel and colleagues
to conclude that the extravagant candy purchases revealed a reduced capacity to control purchasing behavior. In light of the
current findings, it seems plausible to suggest that participants in
the study by Bruyneel et al. were in fact more tempted by the
candies—more motivated to consume them. Hence, the purchase
of expensive candies may have reflected reduced self-control
strength, increased approach motivation, or both. This reasoning
also applies to several other studies that found an increase in
approach-motivated behavior after a depleting exercise of selfcontrol (e.g., DeWall et al., 2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006;
Vohs & Heatherton, 2000).
Why would exercising self-control cause an increase in approach motivation? Revised RST provides an answer. According
to revised RST, three systems—BAS, BIS, and FFFS—interact to
regulate behavior. The BIS is thought to be responsible for detecting response conflict, which is crucial for success at self-control.
Previous research has indicated that prior acts of self-control
reduce conflict detection and, presumably, BIS activation (Inzlicht
& Gutsell, 2007). Given that BIS is partly responsible for suppressing BAS activation, a reduction in BIS should lead to increased BAS activation and approach-motivated behavior. In this
view, approach-motivated impulses are relatively unconstrained
because BIS fails to detect response conflict following the exertion
of self-control.
Following most prior research on self-control, the present investigation focused on BAS and approach motivation, but one may
apply our reasoning to FFFS activation and withdrawal-motivated
impulses: If BIS activation is reduced by prior exercises in selfcontrol, then withdrawal motivation may increase because BIS
fails to detect response conflict and therefore fails to trigger
control mechanisms to inhibit withdrawal behavior. Indeed, evidence that ego depletion may cause participants to perceive more
death-related themes in an ambiguous image could be interpreted
in this light (Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006). Additional research on this possibility is warranted.
Further, research suggests that threats to self-esteem, such as
reminders of mortality or personal uncertainty, trigger a reactive
increase in approach motivation (e.g., McGregor, Gailliot,
Vasquez, & Nash, 2007; McGregor, Nash, & Inzlicht, 2009). It is
possible that threats to self-esteem cause individuals to exercise
self-control (e.g., to inhibit negative emotional reactions) so that
self-control may be implicated in reactive approach motivation.
SELF-CONTROL AND APPROACH MOTIVATION
Future research may profitably explore the relationships among
esteem threats, self-control, and increased approach motivation.
Considering Alternative Explanations
The most obvious alternative explanation for our findings is a
reduction in self-control strength. Indeed, we borrowed our selfcontrol manipulations from previous research that had used the
manipulations to reduce self-control strength. Several pieces of
evidence argue against this alternative explanation and lend support to the idea that exercising self-control increases approach
motivation. First, we found that suppressing emotional expressions
caused an increase in self-reported incentive sensitivity. This result
provides direct support for the view that exercising self-control
increases approach motivation. It is not clear how a reduced
capacity for self-control would better explain the increase in selfreported incentive sensitivity.
Second, the target behaviors in the current studies required
relatively little self-control. A reduction in self-control strength
should therefore be irrelevant or insignificant for such behaviors.
Research suggests that reduced self-control strength mainly influences behaviors that rely on self-control capacity, such that individuals in a state of low self-control (i.e., a state of reduced
self-control strength) behave similarly to individuals who are low
in trait self-control. For example, low pain tolerance is associated
with low trait self-control (Schmeichel & Zell, 2007), and situational manipulations to reduce self-control strength have been
shown to reduce pain tolerance (Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley,
2006; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). Further, one study found that
individuals with relatively low trait self-control were more likely
to perceive death-related themes in an ambiguous image; likewise,
a situational manipulation to reduce self-control strength caused
participants to perceive more death-related themes in an ambiguous image (Gailliot et al., 2006). By contrast, the present research
examined betting behavior that does not vary as a function of trait
self-control (but does vary with incentive sensitivity) and found
that prior efforts at self-control increased betting behavior. The
present research also found that prior efforts at self-control increase perceptual sensitivity to signals of reward. We believe this
is the first evidence to suggest that exercising self-control influences subsequent behaviors that require little or no self-control.
Another possible alternative explanation is that, because selfcontrol tasks are effortful, participants in the prior self-control
efforts conditions desired to reward themselves for having completed these tasks. This alternative could conceivably apply to
Studies 2a and 2b, where participants who had exercised selfcontrol placed more bets on a low-stakes gambling task. However,
it is difficult to see how this alternative explanation would apply to
Study 1, as we have no reason to believe that self-reporting higher
incentive sensitivity is rewarding. It is also difficult to see how this
alternative would apply to Study 3, in which participants who had
exercised self-control were more perceptually sensitive to symbols
of reward (dollar signs). Although dollar signs symbolize reward,
we would not expect viewing and attempting to detect dollar signs
imbedded in a field of other symbols to be particularly rewarding.
Conclusion
The current investigation suggests that the strength model of
self-control be amended to incorporate the other side of the self-
171
control struggle—impulse strength. Prior acts of self-control may
increase approach motivation in addition to reducing self-control
strength. This amendment to the strength model expands our
understanding of self-control failure and may help to explain why
prior acts of self-control increase aggression, eating, drinking, and
more.
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Received January 4, 2010
Revision received March 26, 2010
Accepted April 12, 2010 䡲
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