Hiroki P Kotabe
University of Chicago, Psychology, Post-Doc
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology, Emotion, Judgment and decision making, Decision Making, and 12 moreBehavioral Neuroscience, Self Control, Self Regulation, Media, Behavioral Science, Culture, Motivation (Psychology), Memory (Cognitive Psychology), Motivation, Environmental Psychology, Self-regulation, and Desireedit
- My personal site: home.uchicago.edu/~hkotabeedit
Research Interests:
Natural environments have powerful aesthetic appeal linked to their capacity for psychological restoration. In contrast, disorderly environments are aesthetically aversive, and have various detrimental psychological effects. But in our... more
Natural environments have powerful aesthetic appeal linked to their capacity for psychological
restoration. In contrast, disorderly environments are aesthetically aversive, and have various
detrimental psychological effects. But in our research, we have repeatedly found that natural
environments are perceptually disorderly. What could explain this paradox? We present three
competing hypotheses: The aesthetic preference for naturalness is more powerful than the
aesthetic aversion to disorder (the nature-trumps-disorder hypothesis); disorder is trivial to
aesthetic preference in natural contexts (the harmless-disorder hypothesis); and disorder is
aesthetically preferred in natural contexts (the beneficial-disorder hypothesis). Utilizing novel
methods of perceptual study and diverse stimuli, we rule in the nature-trumps-disorder
hypothesis and rule out the harmless-disorder and beneficial-disorder hypotheses. In examining
perceptual mechanisms, we find evidence that high-level scene semantics are both necessary and
sufficient for the nature-trumps-disorder effect. Necessity is evidenced by the effect disappearing
in experiments utilizing only low-level visual stimuli (i.e., where scene semantics have been
removed) and experiments utilizing a rapid-scene-presentation procedure that obscures scene
semantics. Sufficiency is evidenced by the effect reappearing in experiments utilizing noun
stimuli which remove low-level visual features. Furthermore, we present evidence that the
interaction of scene semantics with low-level visual features amplifies the nature-trumps-disorder
effect—the effect is weaker both when statistically adjusting for quantified low-level visual
features and when using noun stimuli which remove low-level visual features. These results have
implications for psychological theories bearing on the joint influence of low- and high-level
perceptual inputs on affect and cognition, as well as for aesthetic design.
restoration. In contrast, disorderly environments are aesthetically aversive, and have various
detrimental psychological effects. But in our research, we have repeatedly found that natural
environments are perceptually disorderly. What could explain this paradox? We present three
competing hypotheses: The aesthetic preference for naturalness is more powerful than the
aesthetic aversion to disorder (the nature-trumps-disorder hypothesis); disorder is trivial to
aesthetic preference in natural contexts (the harmless-disorder hypothesis); and disorder is
aesthetically preferred in natural contexts (the beneficial-disorder hypothesis). Utilizing novel
methods of perceptual study and diverse stimuli, we rule in the nature-trumps-disorder
hypothesis and rule out the harmless-disorder and beneficial-disorder hypotheses. In examining
perceptual mechanisms, we find evidence that high-level scene semantics are both necessary and
sufficient for the nature-trumps-disorder effect. Necessity is evidenced by the effect disappearing
in experiments utilizing only low-level visual stimuli (i.e., where scene semantics have been
removed) and experiments utilizing a rapid-scene-presentation procedure that obscures scene
semantics. Sufficiency is evidenced by the effect reappearing in experiments utilizing noun
stimuli which remove low-level visual features. Furthermore, we present evidence that the
interaction of scene semantics with low-level visual features amplifies the nature-trumps-disorder
effect—the effect is weaker both when statistically adjusting for quantified low-level visual
features and when using noun stimuli which remove low-level visual features. These results have
implications for psychological theories bearing on the joint influence of low- and high-level
perceptual inputs on affect and cognition, as well as for aesthetic design.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Disorderly environments are linked to disorderly behaviors. Broken windows theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), an influential theory of crime and rule-breaking, assumes that scene-level social disorder cues (e.g., litter, graffiti) cause... more
Disorderly environments are linked to disorderly behaviors. Broken windows theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), an influential theory of crime and rule-breaking, assumes that scene-level social disorder cues (e.g., litter, graffiti) cause people to reason that they can get away with breaking rules. But what if part of the story is not about such complex social reasoning? Recent research suggests that basic visual disorder cues may be sufficient to encourage complex rule-breaking behavior. To test this hypothesis, we first conducted a set of experiments (Experiments 1–3) in which we identified basic visual disorder cues that generalize across visual stimuli with a variety of semantic content. Our results revealed that spatial features (e.g., nonstraight edges, asymmetry) are more important than color features (e.g., hue, saturation, value) for visual disorder. Exploiting this knowledge, we then reconstructed stimuli contrasted in terms of visual disorder, but absent of scene-level social disorder cues, to test whether visual disorder alone encourages cheating in a second set of experiments (Experiments 4 and 5). In these experiments, manipulating visual disorder increased the likelihood of cheating by up to 35% and the average magnitude of cheating by up to 87%. This work suggests that theories of rule-breaking that assume that complex social reasoning (e.g., about norms, policing, poverty) is necessary, should be reconsidered (e.g., Kelling & Coles, 1997; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Furthermore, these experiments show that simple perceptual properties of the environment can affect complex behavior and sheds light on the extent to which our actions are within our control.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
As the science of self-control matures, the organization and integration of its key concepts becomes increasingly important. In response, we identified seven major components or “nodes” in current theories and research bearing on... more
As the science of self-control matures, the organization and integration of its key concepts becomes increasingly
important. In response, we identified seven major components or “nodes” in current theories and research bearing
on self-control: desire, higher order goal, desire–goal conflict, control motivation, control capacity, control effort, and
enactment constraints. To unify these diverse and interdisciplinary areas of research, we formulated the interplay of
these components in an integrative model of self-control. In this model, desire and an at least partly incompatible
higher order goal generate desire–goal conflict, which activates control motivation. Control motivation and control
capacity interactively determine potential control effort. The actual control effort invested is determined by several
moderators, including desire strength, perceived skill, and competing goals. Actual control effort and desire strength
compete to determine a prevailing force, which ultimately determines behavior, provided that enactment constraints
do not impede it. The proposed theoretical framework is useful for highlighting several new directions for research on
self-control and for classifying self-control failures and self-control interventions.
important. In response, we identified seven major components or “nodes” in current theories and research bearing
on self-control: desire, higher order goal, desire–goal conflict, control motivation, control capacity, control effort, and
enactment constraints. To unify these diverse and interdisciplinary areas of research, we formulated the interplay of
these components in an integrative model of self-control. In this model, desire and an at least partly incompatible
higher order goal generate desire–goal conflict, which activates control motivation. Control motivation and control
capacity interactively determine potential control effort. The actual control effort invested is determined by several
moderators, including desire strength, perceived skill, and competing goals. Actual control effort and desire strength
compete to determine a prevailing force, which ultimately determines behavior, provided that enactment constraints
do not impede it. The proposed theoretical framework is useful for highlighting several new directions for research on
self-control and for classifying self-control failures and self-control interventions.
Research Interests:
Real-world scenes contain low-level visual features (e.g., edges, colors) and high-level semantic features (e.g., objects and places). Traditional visual perception models assume that integration of low-level visual features and... more
Real-world scenes contain low-level visual features (e.g., edges, colors) and high-level semantic features (e.g., objects and places). Traditional visual perception models assume that integration of low-level visual features and segmentation of the scene must occur before high-level semantics are perceived. This view implies that low-level visual features of a scene alone do not carry semantic information related to that scene. Here we present evidence that suggests otherwise. We show that high-level semantics can be preserved in low-level visual features, and that different high-level semantics can be preserved in different types of low-level visual features. Spe is preserved in edge features better than color features, whereas the converse is true These findings suggest that semantic processing may start earlier than thought before, and integration of low-level visual features and segmentation of the scene may occur after semantic processing has begun, or in parallel.