The trajectory of Conflict and state failure in Somalia

The trajectory of Conflict and state failure in Somalia By GIBSON BANDA For over two decades, the Somalia Republic has received massive amounts institutional building assistance from the UN, US and several other states. Nonetheless, the country remains one of the world’s poorest. In fact it is often cited as a “failed state” by many scholars and political analysts even after the announcement of a post-transitional federal government in 2012 (Menkhaus, 2014). At present Somalia is wracked by famine and drought and has for several decades been epitomized by civil war ever since the collapse of its central government in 1991. The country has faced profound challenges in instituting meaningful structures of governance over the last couple of years even after having received huge amounts of external institution-building aid. Furthermore, faced with extreme poverty and famine, the country has experienced severe clan conflicts over limited resources, especially those over land and water resources. The instabilities partly emerged from conflicts between the state structures imposed during the colonial era and the clan structures which traditionally played a crucial role in the pastoral lives of Somalis. However, the main causes of the conflict in Somalia are competition for resources and/or power, the colonial legacy, and repressions by the military regime. Clan identity, availability of weapons, and the presence of large numbers of unemployed youth are usually cited as contributing factors to the conflict. Keywords: Somalia; failed state; hybrid governance; state building initiatives; conflict CONFLICT RESOLUTION The Somali Republic was established in the year 1960 through the Date: 18 November, 2016 amalgamation of the British Somaliland with the colony of Italian Somaliland. Irrespective of the colonial boundaries, ethnic Somalis, whose livelihoods are predominantly pastoral, broaden out to four distinct parts; the ex-French Republic of Djibouti, which became independent in 1977, the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, Somaliland and the North-Eastern region of Kenya, where they have also lived for a considerable number of centuries. The presence of these Somali ethnic populations has repeatedly been used by Somalia’s neighbors to justify irredentist claims on Somalia’s territory which has often been met with opposition. Having said this, Somali people have endured long-standing cruelty and violence at the hands of their fellow Somalis. And regardless of being the most homogeneous country in Africa, Somalia has witnessed a civil war for over two decades. Furthermore, the overthrow of President Siad Barre in the year 1991 also played a vital role in steering a new era of conflict and chaos in the country. For instance, while the coup was welcomed by the masses, the lack of strong administrative structures as well as law and order steered the country into anarchy, as opposition factions failed to fill the power vacuum, especially that no faction (including the United Somali Congress that expelled Siad Barre from Mogadishu) had the power to dominate the other groups militarily (Koko, 2007). As a result most factions have over the years been fighting for political and economic dominance, whereas the smaller factions spearheaded by warlords have been fighting for their survival. Even though it is true that peace and state building initiatives have largely been unsuccessful, there have also been a few success stories of institutional building in Somalia and sometimes with external assistance. Nonetheless, most have been local and some are relatively non-Western, thence stretching the very concept of what constitutes an institution in modern conceptual terms. This paper thus aims to interrogate the trajectory of the longstanding conflict as well as the failed peace and state building initiatives in Somalia. It investigates the competing explanations for the failed institution-building advances in Somalia and also analyzes prospects for the post transitional state in Somalia. The paper is structured into four parts. First, it reviews the background of the Somali conflict, followed by state collapse and unsuccessful state building interventions. Secondly, it discusses some of the explanation for the protracted state failure. While discussing state failure, the paper further outlines the peace initiatives undertaken to ameliorate conflict and institute functioning government structures. Thirdly, it addresses the challenges that Somalia encounters in its quest to resolving conflict. The paper closes with a discussion on external funding for institution building at the national level (i.e., Somalia being faced with steep impediments, mostly due to the deeply rooted political and economic interests of actors). Within the same argument the paper also outlines a few recommendations on a way forward for Somalia. BACKGROUND OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT Before the arrival of Europeans, Somalis lacked a central state in the sense of a Western, Weberian bureaucratic state. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of the region employed home-grown conflict resolution strategies of Heer (traditional law) and Islam for resolving disputes in their communities. Socioeconomically, the citizens of Somalia have for centuries depended on livestock rearing and farming and many are pastoral-nomads (Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey, 1997). 1 Following their arrival, Somalia was partitioned into five parts by colonial countries. Britain took control of two parts while France, Italy and Ethiopia shared the remainder of the country amongst themselves. Somalis however, fought back in attempts to reclaim their country following the partition and colonization. To illustrate, while Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan spearheaded recurrent struggles against Britain, countless groups fought against rule of France, Italy and Ethiopia in several parts of Somalia (Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey, 1997). Even though Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan’s struggle lasted between 1899 and 1921, the most crucial organization was the Somali Youth League (SYL), which was established in the year 1943. From the subsequent defeat of Italy in the Second World War, the United Nations put Southern Somalia into trusteeship for about 10 years. Officially, Northern and Southern Somalia got their independence in 1960 following which they merged under one state. Somalia’s first state was determined to unite all clans and people of the region under one democratic state, ‘Greater Somalia’. While the unification of country was central on the Somali agenda, the Cold War politics and the winds of change in Africa affected Somalia. For instance, the military coup that occurred on 21 October 1969 turned Somalia into a communist state (Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey, 1997). And despite the fact that the Siyad Barre military regime was engaged in many infrastructural projects, such as building many schools and roads, it suppressed the Somali people for more than 20 years. For this reason, several clan-based armed groups rebelled against the military regime. Among these were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and the United Somali Congress (USC) (Hagi, and Hagi, 1998). As part of the rebellion, military officers from the Majeerteen clan tried to overthrow the then incumbent regime in 1978. In response the Siyad Barre government using the state military force punished civilian members of the Majeerteen clan. Moreover, and the army further by committing mass abuses, killing civilians and also destroying properties and areas inhabited by the clan. As more clans resisted and or challenged the military oppression, the more regime became abusive. As a result, politicians of the Isaaq clan initiated an opposition movement (the Somali National Movement) in London in 1981 (Hagi, and Hagi, 1998). The Siyad Barre regime again began to punish innocent civilians, killing thousands of people after the SNM had attacked the cities of Hargeysa and Bur'o in 1988 (Hagi, and Hagi, 1998)). According to the Human rights 2 Watch, it was reported that more over 50,000 people were killed as a result of these conflicts (Rotberg, 2007). After Siyad Barre was toppled in 1991, most of the country's institutions, as well as law and order, were destroyed. Anarchy spread in the country. While successful in overthrowing the regime, opposition factions failed to unite Somali especially since no opposition group had the power to dominate the other groups militarily (Rotberg, 2007). They also failed to reach a negotiated settlement. As a result, the factions kept fighting against each other for different motives. SOMALI STATE FAILURE Formally, the collapse of the Somali state occurred in January 1991, while international efforts to restore the effectiveness of the central government institutions commenced in December 1992, with peace enforcement operations dubbed “The United Nations Operation Somalia”(UNOSOM). According to Menkhaus (2014) however, state failure in Somalia happened way before 1991 and so did the external aid programs meant to build institutional capacity. Following, the Ogaden war with Ethiopia from 1977-1978, Siyad Barre’s regime which had established strong albeit repressive, political institutions in the security sector, the government as well as a parts of the civil service focused largely on regime survival. Essentially, it was a narrow set of clan interests that directed political calculations. Not surprisingly, corruption became widespread and the ruling circle systematically de-institutionalized the state, reducing the large civil service to only the collection of moderate monthly paychecks and engaging in “project hopping” with aid agencies to make ends meet (Menkhaus, 2014). In short, Siyad Barre’s regime was wracked with endemic corruption and the subjugation of not only the masses but also people within the civil service. For instance, decision making on virtually all matters of the state was restricted to a small circle around Siyad Barre, while ministerial positions were frequently rotated as a mechanism to prevent probable rivals from establishing a power base. To make matters worse, a once powerful and also professional security sector turned into a predatory force that advanced the interests of empowered clans and their leaders. 3 At the same time that these inefficiencies were rife, thanks to the Cold War politic, Somali was essentially a hub of foreign aid, to a point that 57% of the country’s GNP was composed of aid money. In the words of Menkhaus (2014) “Somali state in that form was, in retrospect, a castle built on sand, destined to collapse once foreign aid dried up, as it did in the late 1980 with end of the Cold War.” Prior to this outcome, donor states ignored the kleptocracy within Siyad Barre’s regime, they ignored the hollowed-out civil service, the state sponsored land grabs and also the predatory behavior of state security forces. This was done partly because of a combination of calculated benefits in the maintenance of good relations with the regime and the “baseless optimism of donors who were repeatedly taken in by the studied ambivalence of Siyad’s zig-zag tactics of promising reform and then failing to deliver” (Rawson, 1993). Furthermore, due to the above mentioned occurrence, external assistance assigned for state institutional capacity was diverted and siphoned out of the country by political elites, close relatives and clansmen of the president. Additionally, even professionalization of the military which has often been successful in other parts of the continent has produced dire results in Somalia. An illustration of this is the US officer training program that created repressive leaders such as general Ali Hersi Morgan (Wam, Per Egil, and Shonali, 2005). After undergoing advanced military training at Fort Leavenworth general Ali Hersi subsequently carried out brutal government attacks on civilians in the North in 1988. Later in 1991, he grew into one of Somalia’s most feared warlord. While this might sound disturbing of which it should, the reality is that family dynamics still exist in Somalia today, bedeviling both Somalis and foreigners trying to erect functional and accountable state institutions. What however, needs to be realized is fact that the protracted nature of the crisis in Somalia has contributed to the emergence of a political subculture among much of the country’s small political elite who are deeply entrenched in impunity, collusion and corruption, reducing the national political life to the art of embezzlement irrespective of who is ostensibly in power. Moreover, the extent to which this behaviour has become normalized in Somali politics and deeply embedded in the shared values of the privileged few will be difficult to turn around. 4 To add further, over two decades after state collapse Somalia has been a recipient of excessive external assistance directed towards state building. An interesting or rather confounding example of this is the UNOSOM intervention right about two years after the state collapse. UNOSOM with its ambitious peace enforcement mission that included among others the United Nations Security Council resolution aimed at boosting state recovery and reconciliation with the involvement of all sectors of the Somali society (UN, 1993). The mission was however challenging and made worse by the UN’s weak political capacity and similarly, the mission was made impossible by the exceedingly idealistic timeline (Wam, Per Egil, and Shonali, 2005). Put precise the execution of the plan lacked pragmatism. For instance, within a period of two years, UNOSOM envisioned to achieve reconciliation, to draft a new constitution, to select the district and regional council, to hold a provisional national assembly, to hold a referendum on the constitution, to have a census and undergo voter registration and respectively hold elections (Menkhaus, 2014). While the mission was aimed at positive outcomes, the execution especially with regards to time was destined to fail. Therefore, it was not surprising that UNOSOM found itself torn by a troubling decision of whether to promote peace and state building from the top-down or bottomup approach. As you can guess, the organization ended up adopting an ill-match of both approaches, leaving all parties involved disgruntled. Besides, the district council hastily formed by UNOSOM faced several challenges including resistance from humanitarian agencies that accused it of being illegitimate as they claimed it was solely concerned with collection of resources from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Menkhaus, 2014). The selection of the mission’s own Somali leaders was not welcomed by some groups of the Somali communities. In fact, it according to (Turton, 2003) led to aggressive responses from military commanders whose power base was under threat. As a result, military commanders like general Mohammed Farah Aideed carried out attacks on the UN leading to a four-month battle that eventuated into the pronounced “Black Hawk Down” disaster. In desperate move, the UNOSOM command relinquished the bottom-up approach and respectively attempted to lodge a quick power-sharing deal among three of Somalia’s strongest warlords. The deal however did not materialize and following its collapse UNOSOM was in march 1995 withdrawn from Somalia, 5 ending what most people attributed to as the most ambitious of a series of attempts to revive the collapsed states in Somalia. At the time that UNOSOM undertook its state and institutional building initiative in Somalia in the 1990s, the first 10 ten years in which state building was the focus of foreign assistance were inclined towards efforts to promote democracy, civil society and human rights. These efforts essentially echoed a preoccupation with the need to restrain governments in previous authoritarian arrangements. And this was demonstrated in foreign assistance committed to building institutional capacity outside government especially in civil society organizations (Hammond, Laura and Ibrahim, 2012). While governmental capacity building initiatives such as those in Somaliland focused on democratization, electoral commissions, legislatures and political parties, institutional capacity building initiatives for the security sector was germanely confined to training police in human rights and in due process. And due to the prolonged collapse of Somalia, subnational polities such as Puntland, Somaliland and other municipalities became the paramount targets of institutional building after 1995 (Menkhaus, 2014). Further still, while some people viewed the move as a “building block” strategy of state building region by region, others considered it the only alternative especially with regards to the absence of a functional central government. Whichever way the initiatives were looked at, both local and regional level government structures constituted some of the few success stories in Southern Somalia regarding institutional building. And ever since 2001, institution building has taken a shift towards securitization approaches. More attempts at institution building have now been directed towards the establishment of state capacity to monitor, prevent and effectively respond to security threat posed by al Qaeda and its allies (Mugisha, 2011). Moreover, the fact that east of Somalia has frequently been a site of major violent extremist groups especially al-Shabaab has quickened the process and likewise expanded the spectrum of donors and implementing agencies among others; the UN peace keeping operations and private defense contractors. In view of (Mugisha, 2011) these processes have empowered the security branches of governments across the region and correspondingly directed the resources and energies towards a narrow focus of capacity building other than democracy or human rights. 6 THE IMPACT OF THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON STATE BUILDING According to Menkhaus (2014) post 2001 securitization of institution building strategy served as a driving impulse in the attempts to revive the central Somali state by the UN and the donor community. This in part reflected a new global understanding that state weakness was the underlying cause of both underdevelopment and conflict, leading to persistent efforts towards reinvigorating failed states. For this reason, the Somali Transition Federal Government (TFG) was formed in 2004 with heavy international pressure. Foreign aid for instance was steered at strengthening this central government. As a means to legitimize the central government (i.e. TFG), members of parliament and those of the security sector received direct payments and salaries regardless of several accusations of human rights abuses by the latter. Additionally, in a similar move of reinforcing the legitimacy of the central government, humanitarian agencies were pressured to channel their aid funds through the TFG. But since the TFG was considered one of the most corrupt regimes in the world, several development and humanitarian agencies opted to work around rather than with it (Malito, 2015). As a result, the actions by the agencies somewhat prompted chronic and at times open tensions among TFG officials , donors and the humanitarian community. In the same vein , the protracted emphasis by donors on “whole of government “approaches and the UNs joint initiatives all fashioned for the purpose of directing international programming towards similar goals rather than at cross purpose had the effect of tying humanitarian actors to political objectives that they initially dreaded would scupper their neutrality and erode their efficiency. Even though “jumpstarting” the TFG with foreign funds to make it effective enabled an excellent flow of money to and through the TFG, the lack of donor presence in Somalia mostly due to security concerns made it increasingly difficult to ensure accountability over the use of funds or prevent corruption (Malito, 2015). Then again, the fact that the international community seemed too interested in a revived central government more than the actual Somali populace, implied that external actors essentially had little or no leverage over the central government leadership. Therefore, while institution building was a profitable project, it was not a goal on the TFG’s agenda. 7 As a result, even after several years (7) of existence, the TFG was all the same unable to exercise control over huge areas of Mogadishu. In a nutshell, it failed to carry out key transitional tasks, that it was essentially created for. Serving as an example, the TFG’s incapacity to death with the 2011 famine led to 260 000 Somali deaths, while millions of others were displaced (Malito, 2015). In the same light, the TFG leadership full of unscrupulous politicos who diverted food aid and demanded bribes before aid from seaports could eventually be released. In view of this, it could be argued that foreign funds aimed at institution building in Somalia were plagued throughout the 1990s by an unfortunate understanding and in several instances by a willful ignorance of looters, local governance structure and other crucial contextual factors that operated against institution-building. COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA There are several factors that have contributed to state failure in Somalia. The following sections will illustrate some of the competing explanations for this prolonged failure of the Somali state. Clannism and Culture The Somali political culture is one of the foremost impediments to the success of a central government. Put precisely, the country’s history of statelessness, nomadism and clannism at best works against the building of formal political institutions (Lewis, 2011). In reference to this point, it has been argued that Somalis prefer informal, negotiated political arrangements to formal rule of law. According to Menkhaus (2003) Somalis have for several decades demonstrated a capacity to govern themselves properly via hybrid, mediated governance structures at the local level. For instance, government institutions in the Eastern Horn tend to be muffled, decision making is centred around informal top leaders, civil services are thin their competence and most importantly, no government division is independent or free from the powerful social forces of clannism. Furthermore, state institutions within the same region are considered weak when compared to society (Menkhaus, 2007). To add further, several of the most important functions of the state are executed by non-state actors, “pluralistic” systems that numerous Somalis tend to favor at least in the short term. In this system, clan elders and Sharia 8 courts mediate disagreements and adjudicate criminal cases through customary or sharia law, coexisting with weak form of judiciaries; private security forces are perceived as a better source of protection than uniformed police. By the same token, business and nonprofit organization have assumed the role of providing fee-based social services and utilities ranging from pipped water, wireless phone service to electricity. As a result, attempts directed at replicating western style political institutions in such settings have often produced dire results. In light of this, some authors such as (Hagmann and Markus, 2009 and Burgess, 2013) have pointed out that Somali preference for informal, negotiated governance arrangements could to a certain extent produce a more organic political arrangement that incompatible with the conventional, institution-laden post-colonial state. Other people have also argued that aid is carefully tailored to encourage “hybrid” political setups stands a better chance of producing good governance. I however do not subscribed line of thought, as this kind of institutionalization perpetuates a cycle of dependency and which in effect cannot be attributed to good governance. A similar argument related to the cultural explanation of state failure maintains that the key obstacles to institutional building in Somalia is not necessarily about the country’s history of stateless pastoralism, rather the emergence of a new and overtly dysfunctional political culture that is predominant among much of the country’s elite that has arisen since the 1980s. Advocates of this school of thought argue that the generations of political elite of modern day Somalia have been socialized into a destructive practice of politics in which clan identity is callously fashioned for personal gain, reducing politics to a grab-fest of shortterm profit-taking and violence (Abebe, 2011). As a result, institutionalization and the corresponding norms it endeavors to promote, that is accountability and rule of law are in the Somali dominant political culture abhorrent. Competition over resources and power Just like in any country, different clans in Somalia are in constant contestation over resources such as water, livestock and grazing land. In the past Somali nomads, have often fought over ownership of camels due to their utility for survival in dry areas of Somalia. In this context, clan identity is useful because to obtain and keep a large number of camels one heavily relies on the 9 support of one’s clansmen. Following urbanization for instance, the type of assets seen as important changed. State power, weapons, jobs and foreign aid became important resources for which clans and other groups competed (Burgess, 2013). To access these, again one had to rely on the relationships that clan identity provided. And in relying on clan identity, clan lines were strengthened. During the first round of the civil war that occurred between 1988 and 1992, militias were organized along major clan lines. In fact, during this period, it was common to hear from the media, and Somalis that this particular faction had captured a this or that city or was occupying an important location within Mogadishu. Militias from the Hawiye clans for instance expelled other Somali clans from the capital and other towns in the central and southern regions (Burgess, 2013). Militia groups that belonged to the Darod clan also controlled the Lower Jubba and Puntland regions while Digil and Mirifle took charge of the Bay and Bakool regions. Soon this changed, and the sub-clans of the major clans began to compete for the control of major cities. Additionally, in Mogadishu, the Habar-Gidir and Abgal militias fought for four months and destroyed what was left of the city. Likewise, the militias of Absame and Harti clans of the Darod clan clashed a number of times for control of Lower Jubba, particularly the city of Kismayo (Burgess, 2013). The Marehan and Harti sub-clans' forces have also fought over the same issue. These illustrations were repeated as the militias of Digil and Mirifle clans fought over control of the city of Baidoa. Even the break-away region of Somaliland was not spared from this intra-clan warfare, as the militias of Isaaq clans (i.e. the Garhajis and Habar Awal clans) fought a bitter civil war in north 'Somaliland' over grazing land. Inequality and the Somali conflict According to a British anthropologist Lewis (2002) , the Somali society could be described as fundamentally egalitarian and democratic. And just as has been explained in the earlier paragraph on clannism and culture, Lewis (2007) argues that “Traditionally, decisions in several Somali societies have historically been made by councils of men”. These councils have been egalitarian. And this egalitarianism permeates all aspects of society. For example, in Somalia, it 10 was not uncommon for a poor and uneducated nomad to approach a high government official as an equal and engage him in a discussion concerning affairs of the state. In contradiction to the Lewis’s postulation regarding Somalia’s political culture being fundamentally egalitarian, social and political changes have led to the emergence of new patterns of social life. In recent years, a new urban group educated in Western-type schools and working as merchants or in government has emerged. These urbanites enjoy more wealth, better access to government services, and greater educational opportunities for their children than do other sectors of society. According to Lewi (2010), the arena in which Somalia’s inequality and social exclusion function, is mainly through the underpinnings of clannism and or tribalism. For instance, the Somali political and economic arena has been dominated by the nomadic clans of the Mudug and Majertinia regions since independence. The members of these clans made up most the ruling class throughout the short-lived Somali state (1960-1990). As has been contended in the previous paragraph, Somalia’s elites are prodigiously from Mudug and Majertinia regions despite the fact that these clans are minorities in number (Malito, 2015). In 1960 Somalia established a unitary government with a parliament that had 123 members from all the regions of the country at the time (eight, including two regions from British Somaliland). According to Malito (2015), the government had a President and a Prime Minister who in turn appointed the cabinet. During the years between 1960 and 1969 the dominance of the Mudugian clans was clear. For instance, members of these clans who assumed the posts of president and cabinet ministers between 1960 and 1969 were roughly two-thirds compared to the one-third occupied by all the other clans. On October 21, 1969, army units took over the control of the government. The commander of the armed forces Brigadier General Mohamed Siad Barre assumed leadership (although he is not regarded as the author of the military takeover) of the officers who deposed the civilian government. President Siad Barre, himself from Mudug region and a member of the elite clans, installed a governing body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), and became its president. The SRC arrested and detained leading members of the government, including the late Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Igaal (Malito, 2015). The SRC banned all political parties, abolished the National Assembly and suspended the constitution. 11 Furthermore, the regime’s identification with the Marxist ideology enabled it to adopted the radical transformation of Somali society through the application of ‘scientific socialism’. The regime promised, among other things, an end to tribalism, nepotism, corruption and misrule. And the new motto became; maxaa taqaan and not ayaa taqaan, which essentially translated into ‘it is what you know’, and not ‘who you know’. However, in the late-60s Barre established a totalitarian regime complete with indisputable absolutist power. His regime constituted an even more polarized clan-based structure when compared to the previous regimes. To illustrate, Barre’s first cabinet in 1969 consisted of 14 ministers of which seven (or 50%) were members Barre’s Darood clan. However, as time progressed this domination became gloomier. Fundamentally nevertheless, the domination of the Mudugian clans in the Somali politics has been very clear through the years. Between 1960 and 1990 for example, there were 26 governments that nominated a total of 567 posts. The Darood clan took 216 posts, Hawiye 125, Isaaq 102 and Digil and Mirifle 31 respectively. This domination was also clear in the individuals that were nominated for government posts. For example, there were 155 individuals that made up the ruling elite in Somalia’s government including president, vice-president, prime minister, and ministers (Menkhaus, 2015). The members from the Darood clan and their subclans made up 62 ministers, followed by the Hawiye with 36 and Isaaqs with 30. This domination of the nomadic clans continues in post-1991 Somalian politics. 11 out of the 15 warlords that attended the talks in Addis Ababa, including the late General Mohamed Farah Aideed, for example, are from the Mudug region. Additionally, the leaders of the current political formation in Somalia, the Islamic Courts under Shekh Dahir Hassan Aweys and the transitional government under Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, are members of the Mudug clans. Notwithstanding the apparent inequality that continues in Somalia, social inequality alone does not explain why conflict and state failure in Somalia started and continues to bring misery to its people. Political economy 12 Over the past two decades, there has been an emergence of a political economy of failure in Somalia. Powerful local actors with vested political interest and economic interests that have emerged in Somalia have further exacerbated state failure, making the issue self-perpetuating. Just as argued before in the essay, a strong business community has arisen in Somalia, bringing about fears that a revised central state will tax it heavily, and threaten it with predatory demands, heavy regulations and even nationalization. This business community has often preferred to maintain basic law and order informally, relying mainly on their own security. There is also another faction of people commonly known as “black cats” by Somalis who tax and divert humanitarian aid to target populations. These essentially include among others corrupt government officials, warlords and the al Shabaab terrorist members who generally thrive in what Menkhaus (2015) refers to as ‘accountability free zone”. Collectively these people constitute a very powerful set of interests of opposing successful institution or state building initiatives in Somalia. Nevertheless, these sets of interests do not oppose the enterprise of staterevival totally, rather they see tangible benefits in the establishment of a recognized central government, which can attract foreign aid and produce lots of contracts and rental opportunities. What they however want is for that state to remain very weak. This is because many of these people do not perceive state weakness or low levels of institutionalization as a problem that requires to be solved but as an opportunity to ensure their amassing of wealth. In the words of Menkhaus (2015), “while institution building is an attractive project, it is however not an outcome”. This prolonged nature of state failure with regards the political economy arrangement perhaps reveals an interesting lesson that needs to be carefully taken into consideration. Put precisely, institution building initiatives would conceivably have to counterbalance or co-opt the powerful spoilers else it will not succeed. Risk aversion Risk aversion is perhaps one of the main reasons for protracted state failure in Somali. While many Somalis recognize the possible benefits of a revived state, they fear the risks that may come with institutional capacity building. Considering their history, the survival culture that dominates post war Somalia works against risk taking at the political level (Menkhaus, 2015). Because several of the civil wars that have happened in the past in their country have often occurred on the basis of clan rivalries, they fear that a revive state would be captured by a rival clan which they believe would likely engage in predatory behaviour. As a result, they prefer the 13 ‘devil they know’ that a collapse state rather than have a well-functioning central government. Therefore, we can vividly see that trust-building would be a crucial aspect that would have to be addressed in institution-building. Equally germane, risk aversion factor brings to the realization that in order to be effective, capacity building needs to incorporate arrangements that limit state power. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES Building of state capacity in Somalia ought to be understood within the broader context of the region, wherein Somalia is regularly the battleground for divisions between its African and Arab neighbors. Regional actors have been known to support clan groups in Somalia that may extend their influence. In fact, incompatible regional interests have been critical in delaying a political resolution to Somalia’s problems. Interference by external states is further complicated by crossboundary clan relations. Just like any other African country, Somalia borders were imposed externally without any regards for clan configurations, thus dividing associated clans across boundaries. This situation has thus resulted in several armed conflicts and diplomacy among states being shaped as much by interactions between governments as by cross-border relationships among clans (Burgess, 2014). Furthermore, external institution building programs have at certain times been accused of a wide range of errors, among others the imposition of universal templates on Somali without considerations to the cultural and political context; hence reinforcing the very problems they are trying to solve. The resulting consequences are violation of neutrality, institutionalization of clannism, the empowerment of one constituency at the expense of another, undermining national-level state-building, fueling fraud and corruption in government by failing to insist on accountability for funds spent on capacity building. While Somalia is a member of the African Union (AU), its long-standing historic ties based on common cultural and religious affinity give it membership in the League of Arab States (LAS). This dual membership it is argued that makes it captive to divergent interests of both African and Arab states, which have their own interests in the political arrangement of Somalia. In Southcentral Somalia, for instance, peace efforts are consistently impeded by rival regional ambitions. Likewise, the current peace process is overwhelmed by regional rivalries. To illustrate, while 14 Djibouti and the Arab states supported the TNG and are reported to favor a strong central authority in the capital Mogadishu, Ethiopia on the other is said to have supported the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council to further the establishment of regional entities in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2014). Hence, regrettably, the political fate of Somalia is caught between this tug-of-war. Since the demise of the Barre regime, ties between South-central Somalia and the Gulf states have been reinforced. For instance, nearly US$800 million of Somalia’s trade exchange has moved from Europe to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and innumerable numbers of citizens of Somalia have fled the civil war seeking refuge and employment in the Arab states. Additionally, in the absence of social services in South-central Somalia, Arab states have rendered social assistance through Islamic charities. There are however accusations that these charities are fronts for the promotion of a brand of Wahaabism (Osman, 2006). In reference to Osman (2006), these allegations are overtly overstated and that extreme forms of Islamic ideologies have limited appeal to Somalis. Ethiopia is considered to have a strong interest in developments in Somalia and has consistently supported clan groups that are willing to protect its interests. In contrast to South-central Somalia, Puntland lacks close ties with the Arab states. Instead, it appears to enjoy a close relationship with Ethiopia, which competes with the Arab states for influence on the outcome of the peace talks. Captivatingly, while relations between Somaliland and Puntland are strained, Somaliland enjoys a favorable relationship with Ethiopia, which has steadily improved since the collapse of the Somali state (Malito, 2015). This is probably because Ethiopia’s positive stance toward Somaliland ensures that both a potentially expansionist pan-Somali nationalism and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism are kept at bay. It seems that the Somaliland regional administration has made a concerted effort to prevent Islamic fundamentalists from increasing their power and, by following the principle of separation of state and religion, has excluded religious fundamentalists from the regional administration. As it stands, Ethiopia which is landlocked has intensified its trade with Somaliland. Following the 2000 war with Eritrea and its inability to count on Assab port, Ethiopia increasingly channels 15 exports and imports through the port in Berbera. It also cooperates with Somaliland on shared issues of concern, such as security. On the contrary, Somaliland’s relations with its other neighbor, Djibouti, have been uneven, particularly given Djibouti’s perceived support of the TNG and its stance in defense of reconstituting a unified Somali state (Malito, 2015). Moreover, Djibouti is thought to perceive Somaliland as a potential rival because its Berbera port could be an alternative seaport for the region. The efforts of African states and organizations have been pivotal in the peace process in Somalia. For instance, peace talks spearheaded by IGAD have successfully executed by Kenya. And the African Union is expected to play an essential role in providing support to peacekeeping in Somalia. Several regional states, both African and Arab also appear committed to shoulder the responsibility in reviving Somalia. Outside the region, Western donors, particularly the European Community and US, have supported the Somali leaders to negotiate a peace process. They have also provided much economic support and assistance to the peace process (Abebe, 2011). The international community now has had to re-adjust its own support mechanisms/coordination modalities to support the new Transitional Federal Government and manage the transition phase. In the context of the war against terror, the United States has showed a renewed willingness to engage. In view of the above discuss, it could be argued that external states through varied capacities continue to affect the evolution of the Somali state. They take sides in Somali conflicts by allying with clans who are sympathetic to their aspirations and strategic interests. The opposing interests of these states negatively impact Somalia. On the positive side, however, the African Union, IGAD and several African states are playing a critical role in the peace process. Similarly, the EU, Arab states, and other countries and organizations are also providing development assistance to Somalia. SUCCESSES Despite the protracted failure of the state, there have also been some success stories in Somali region. And these successes have been in particular regions and at different levels. One of them 16 includes functional failed states. As can be recalled from some paragraphs on international influence, the two polities in Northern Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland have formal administrative structures are present, with modest implementation capabilities. As a result, they somewhat enjoy variable levels of legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. These states are only considered failed states in the sense that government capacity is fragile, institutionalization is low and that their budgets are relatively low. Nevertheless, they are still considered “functional failed states” in the sense that they have managed to restore public order and maintained stability. They also have a degree of economic recovery in areas they have control over, such as in Boroma, Hargeisa in Somaliland, Bosaso in Puntland and several parts of Mogadishu. According to Menkhaus (2015). Somaliland has demonstrated an impressive record of political, economic and security achievements. For instance, the police service and other security forces in Somaliland are effective, well respected and constrained than anywhere else in the region. And with regards to the political sector, Somaliland has been cited to have succeeded in multiple constitutional transfer of power following elections or the death of a leader. In Somali municipalities, where the Transnational Federal Government or AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) have been able to overcome or drive out al Shabaab have been more impressive sites of formal governance. In Borama and Jowhar partnerships between businesspeople and municipalities has resulted in the installation of pipped water systems from user fees for the purpose of maintenance of pipes and pumps are collected. Markets too are successfully operated and organized by local committees usually with heavy involvement of women and town authorities. The reasons for this success according to Menkhaus (2014) is because government at local level is largely seen as a positive-sum game for local actors, who interests are served by organized markets, rule of law as well as public order. On the contrary and just as has been discussed in the essay, government at higher political level are viewed mainly as “channels of rent” such as foreign aid, customs revenue and oil revenues collected mainly by elites in order to maintain their political dominance over relative poor clans. As a result, institution-building at higher levels tends to face resistance from commoners as their interest are threatened. CONCLUSION 17 Based on the above discussion, we can argue that Somalia serves as a reminder that institution building is more likely to garner successive results when local partners are willing but not able to govern. When the problem is about lack of political will to govern, and when political elites only seek to perpetuate a context of weak institution for their own benefit and correspondingly perceive state-building as an initiative to attract funds but not a goal to be achieved, external institution-building will in effect only produce success on the margin. While foreign aid is crucially needed to make possible the institution-building initiatives, the absence of frameworks to ensure accountability creates conditions where spoilers are dominant and corruption is high and thus propels an impulse which de-institutionalizes the state which aid is set out fix. The essay has also argued that hybrid governance, which has occurred at local, municipal level has at least enabled institution-building at these levels to be a success since spoilers at this level are few. At this level, successful foreign aid has been based on close contextual knowledge, flexibility, patience and also a long time frame especially when compared to template-driven institution-building programs that have yielded fewer successes. Furthermore, while Somalis have at the above mentioned levels managed the perils of state failure by drawing on informal governance arrangements, evidence from several scholars suggests that the country or region must establish more robust institutions and put in place formal rule of law if it is to attract and regulate new levels of private sector investment (Mugisha, 2011). As it stands, Somaliland and other Somali polities are currently faced with a challenge of protecting informal governance arrangements that are essential to the maintenance of local while at the same time building formal political institutions and process that will in due course supplant informal governance. However, how this will be addressed can only be left to speculations. Having said that, the issues discussed in the paper point to a conclusion that external funding for institution-building in Somalia at least at national level faces sheer impediments. 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