INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALIDITY, EFFICACY
AND COERCIVENESS
Geçerlilik, Etkililik ve Cebrîlik Arasindaki İlişki
Yahya Berkol Gülgeç*
ABSTRACT
Validity, efficacy and coerciveness are all central concepts in legal
theory. Every major legal theoretician has somehow touched upon in each of
these concepts. However, their meaning and interrelationship remain
problematic. Some of these problems originate from the adopted definitions
of these concepts, some others from the ambiguous tone of legal philosophers.
This article can be viewed as an effort to reconcile these three concepts and
re-discover their central position in legal theory. In this regard, the article
examines the work of three important positivists, each leading a different
understanding of positivism: Austin, Kelsen and Hart. The article reaches the
conclusion that the concepts of efficacy and validity are intertwined as the
efficacy of the legal system has always been conceived of as the pre-condition
for its validity. On the other hand, an individual norm's efficacy should have
no effect on its validity. The connection of sanctions as the tool of
coerciveness to these two concepts depends on the adopted definition of
sanction. There are two understandings of sanctions: Normative and factual.
In case the normative understanding or definition is adopted, sanction and
coerciveness have very little to do with either validity or efficacy. If sanction
is considered to be a factual "evil", however, its effect on the system's efficacy
and validity increases.
Keywords: Validity, efficacy, coerciveness, sanctions, legal positivism.
*
Makalenin geliş tarihi: 04.05.2017
Makalenin kabul tarihi: 05.12.2017
Uludağ Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Anayasa Hukuku Anabilim Dalı
Yahya Berkol Gülgeç
Ankara Üni. Hukuk Fak. Dergisi, 66 (4) 2017: 677-729
ÖZ
Geçerlilik, etkililik ve cebrîlik kavramlarının hepsi hukuk teorisinde
merkezî bir role sahiptir. Bütün büyük teorisyenler bir şekilde bu kavramlara
değinmiştir. Ancak, bu kavramların anlamı ve bunların karşılıklı ilişkisi hâlâ
sorunludur. Bu sorunlardan bazıları kavramlara ilişkin benimsenen
tanımlardan, diğer bir kısmı ise hukuk felsefecilerinin belirsiz üsluplarından
kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu makale bu üç kavramı bağdaştırma ve bunların hukuk
teorisindeki merkezî konumunu yeniden keşfetme çabası olarak görülebilir.
Bu bağlamda, makale her biri farklı bir pozitivizm anlayışına sahip olan üç
önemli pozitivistin çalışmalarını incelemektedir: Austin, Kelsen ve Hart.
Makale, etkililik bütün bir hukuk sisteminin geçerliliğinin ön koşulu olarak
görüldüğü için, bu iki kavramın iç içe geçmiş olduğu sonucuna ulaşmaktadır.
Öte yandan, birel bir normun etkililiğinin onun geçerliliği üzerinde bir
etkisinin olmaması gerekir. Cebrîliğin aracı olarak yaptırımların bu iki
kavramla bağı benimsenen yaptırım tanımına bağlıdır. Yaptırıma ilişkin iki
anlayış bulunmaktadır: Normatif ve olgusal anlayışlar. Normatif anlayış veya
tanım benimsendiğinde, yaptırım ve cevrîliğin etkililik ve geçerlilik, özellikle
de geçerlilik kavramıyla pek az ilgisi bulunmaktadır. Eğer yaptırım olgusal
bir "kötülük" olarak algılanırsa, bir hukuk sisteminin etkililiği ve geçerliliği
üzerindeki etkisi artmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Geçerlilik, etkililik, cebrîlik, yaptırım, hukukî
pozitivizm.
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to examine the relationship between the concepts of
validity, efficacy and sanction. Though the nature of the relationship between
validity and efficacy has been elaborated in detail in jurisprudence, the
function of the latter is not clear. Even though legal positivism has focused on
the effect of the legal system's (or an individual norm's) efficacy on its
validity, questions with regards to the role of sanctions and the coercive
character of law have not been directly associated with the concepts of validity
and efficacy.
Question of efficacy as an external condition of the legal character of a
system is an issue tackled in detail by positivist writers. Natural law theorist
concentrate on the morality of law as an external condition and therefore, the
issue of efficacy is mostly untouched in their legal theory. Due to this fact we
will inevitably concentrate on the writing of the positivist writers. Therefore,
the question of efficacy will be examined mainly in line
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
with the thoughts of Austin, Kelsen and Hart, and a critique of each
author will be presented in order to clarify the relationship of efficacy with the
questions of validity, legal existence and sanctions.
The article does not claim to suggest a new understanding of the concept
of validity. What is important in our case is to determine a constant meaning
of the term validity. Therefore, different reasons for validity stipulated in
different theories will not be challenged as long as the meaning of validity
does not differ. Whatever effect efficacy has on the validity of the legal system
or an individual norm depends on this determined meaning of validity. With
regards to the concept of efficacy, the importance rests on its effect on the
validity of the “legal system” or its possible impact on the validity of
individual norms. This is mostly due to the fact that efficacy has been created
and used by legal theorists in order to constitute the validity of the legal system
or to determine which social order is the legal one. It shall be defended
furthermore that the concept of sanction or the coercive character of the legal
order can only be directly related to the efficacy of a legal order and not the
system's or individual norms' validity. Sanctions' effect on validity can only
be indirect. Therefore, validity is, in a way, our ultimate notion. Impact of
other concepts on validity and each other is the truly disputed matter. Once
this impact is determined, the interrelationship between these concepts will be
much easier to formulate.
A. THE CONCEPT OF VALIDITY
Validity stands as a crucial concept in positivist legal thinking. It is of
upmost importance to examine how different positivists have defined and
determined the pre-conditions of validity as this concept is most of the time
related to a legal norm's existence. Nevertheless, the concept of validity is
equally important for the natural law theorists. The difference between these
two leading theories is that they determine the pre-conditions of validity based
on ontologically separate grounds. Natural law theories require that the
positive norms and legal systems conform to certain extra-legal and normative
criteria such as morality, reason or religion. On the other hand, positivist
theories generally require the extra-legal condition of efficacy for the validity
of the legal norms or legal systems.
Nevertheless, as aptly pointed out, the discussion on the concept of
validity concentrates on the pre-conditions of being valid whereas there is a
general agreement even amongst natural law theorists and legal positivists on
the fact that “valid” means legally binding.1 Therefore, one may conclude that
1
Sartor, 2000, pp. 585-586.
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the meaning of the term “valid” is largely undisputed. Nonetheless, in order
to assess the relationship of validity to the concept of efficacy, one needs to
have resort to positivists.
I. Validity According to Austin
The sovereign and sovereignty are essential concepts in Austin's theory
regarding the concept of validity. We will see below, that the pre-condition
for the validity of legal norms in Austinian theory depends on the will of the
sovereign. Therefore, we need to, in a few words, touch upon the sovereign.
According to Austin, the sovereign is the person or group of persons who
are commanded by no one although they withhold the power to command all
in a society.2 In this perspective, it is fair to say that Austin's sovereign is pretty
much similar to the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbesian Leviathan is a
legally unlimited sovereign created by the social contract against which its
subjects have no rights other than the ones granted by the sovereign.3
Likewise, Austin's sovereign is not legally limited4 as the aforementioned
definition suggests. Considering that the sovereign is not limited by law, it is
not difficult to see why he will serve as the basis (pre-condition) of legal
validity. He is not legally limited first and foremost because he makes the law
and determines what is legal.5 In this regard, Austin's sovereign will fulfill the
function of Kelsen's “fathers of the constitution” or the constituent power. The
constituent power, too, is legally unlimited since there is no positive legal
norm empowering and thus limiting the will of the constituent power.6
According to Austin, a law can be defined as the sovereign's general
command to the subjects.7 In this regard, commands lacking the quality of
generality are not laws at all.8 This definition therefore makes one wonder
what those particular commands are if they are not laws. We are of the opinion
that such distinction between legal “commands” based on their generality or
particularity cannot be justified. As correctly stated,9 such a distinction can be
made between rules and particular norms but it cannot be used to separate
what is legal from what is not especially considering the fact that no
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Austin, 2001, pp. 166-167.
See Hobbes, 1998, pp. 115-121.
See Fuller, 1958, p. 634; Raz, 1980, p. 16 (that the sovereign does not habitually obey anyone); Austin,
2001, pp. 166-167(independence of the sovereign).
Consider for example the situation of the constituent power. It cannot be limited by the provisions of the
constitution because it is the entity creating that constitution.
Gözler, 1998a, p. 53.
Raz, 1980, p. 11; Fuller, 1958, p. 633.
Raz, 1980, p. 11.
Ibid.
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
justification for such a separation has been proposed. Therefore, we will
assume that particular commands can also be considered as law as long as they
have been issued by the sovereign.
Although all law needs to originate from the sovereign they do not need
to be directly issued by the sovereign. Accordingly, any command issued on
the basis of the sovereign's authorization is also a valid legal norm.10
Therefore, although subordinated to any command issued directly by the
sovereign, laws enacted by other entities authorized by the sovereign are also
valid, i.e. they legally exist. We can conclude that in Austinian view of
validity, those laws enacted directly by the sovereign derive their validity from
the fact that they have been issued by the sovereign who is not legally bound
or limited in any way but can command anyone within that society. Any
indirect law issued by other entities, on the other hand, is only valid insofar
they conform with the authorizing enactment of the sovereign. Any enactment
so issued by the sovereign or originating from the authority delegated by the
sovereign is valid, i.e. it has binding force.11
Austin perceives unsanctioned expressions of will as deficient:12
“Though the author of an imperfect law signifies a desire, he manifests no
purpose of enforcing compliance with the desire.”.13 He also states that the
expressions of will or desire which do not also indicate an additional desire to
enforce such wills or desires are laws improperly so called and they do not
have binding force.14 These are not considered to be commands, and therefore,
laws in the proper sense of the word. It should be noted therefore that sanctions
and the fact that an expression of will or desire is expressed with an additional
desire to enforce such wills or desires are essential elements of what is law
and legal. The details of this issue will be examined below where we focus on
the concept of sanction and its relation to validity and efficacy.
The concept of the sovereign also needs some attention as the basic
definition provided above may not be adequate in determining who the
sovereign(s) in a legal system is. Austin writes the following regarding the
sovereign: “If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a
like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that
determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including
10
11
12
13
14
Austin, 2001, pp. 191-192.
See ibid., pp. 190-195.
Raz, 1980, pp. 10-11.
Austin, 2001, p. 32.
Ibid.
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the superior) is a society political and independent”.15Accordingly, Austin's
sovereign has to fulfill two essential conditions, one positive and the other
negative: The sovereign needs to receive the obedience of the majority in the
society (the positive condition) and that the sovereign is independent, meaning
he does not obey anybody else.16 This analysis also shows that independence
of the political society depends on the independence of its sovereign. Although
Austin's sovereign is largely dependent on the sovereignty defined by
Bentham, his definition differs from that of Bentham by indicating that the
sovereign also needs to be independent, i.e. he should not obey anyone else
within or outside that society.17
Austin's insistence on the role of the sovereign and its commands in a
legal system has received many criticisms and been seen as the general defect
of this important philosopher's theory. It may be argued that Austin's theory is
deficient with a certain inadequacy in explaining the contemporary legal
systems. Austin's sovereign as defined by him seems to have disappeared in
our contemporary systems. Principles such as Rechtsstaat or its
correspondence in Common Law systems, rule of law, express that the
authority and power of the state is also limited by law. Most of the modern
constitutions determine the “people” or the “nation” as the sovereign powers
in a society.18 However, one must bear in mind that such constitutional
determinations regarding whom sovereignty belongs to do not necessarily
mean that a sovereign in Austinian sense does not exist in our contemporary
systems. Consider for example the notion of the constituent power enacting
the constitution of any legal system. It is also legally and its command, the
constitution, binds everyone else including the legislator of the legal system.19
The main difference between Austin's time and our times is not one of quality
but of quantity. Austin has also accepted that legal authority to legislate may
be delegated to other entities. In our case, the bulk of the legislative powers
have been delegated to the legislators to be elected by people. The execution
15
16
17
18
19
Ibid., p. 166.
Raz, 1980, p. 7.
Ibid., pp. 8-9.
See, e.g., “Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation.” (Article 6/1 of the Turkish Constitution),
“Sovereignty belongs to the people...” (Article 1/2 of the Italian Constitution), “The Spanish Nation...
in the exercise of its sovereignty...” (First Preamble of the Spanish Constitution) or “Popular sovereignty
is the foundation of the government.” (Article 1/2 of the Greek Constitution).
There are different theses defending that the constituent power is legally limitable. This may only be
true in case international law is considered to be binding on the constituent power. This also requires a
monist understanding with regards to the relationship of international law and municipal law. We simply
believe that there is not sufficient proof to assume that a monist construction is viable and the rules of
international law are legally binding on the constituent power. For a detailed discussion please see
Gözler, 1998a, pp. 24-54.
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
and implementation of the general rules created by the constitution and the
legislator are carried out by the executive branch. However, the most
important difference is that the constituent power, or the sovereign, has
decided not to intervene in the determination regarding the delegated
legislation's conformity with its direct command, the constitution, by
authorizing independent courts with regards to this matter. It has even
authorized a qualified majority of the Parliament to amend its original
command, albeit the possibility of including unchangeable provisions,
provided that it conforms to the originally set constitutional criteria.
Therefore, the constituent power has “sunk into sleep”20 and no one knows
when or if it is going to wake up. The trace of its last will before dropping
asleep, the constitution, though still has impact on the contemporary legal
systems. As a result, although Austin may not have addressed the specific
problems caused by the state of the contemporary legal systems, as they were
not present at the time, we do not believe that his theory has necessarily lost
its importance or effect in contemporary times.
II. Validity According to Kelsen
Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law is undoubtedly a major contribution not
only for the positivist theory but also for the theory of law in general. Adopting
Kant’s dualism of is and ought (“Sein/Sollen”),21 Kelsen has developed a
theory of legal validity which is unique, although it admittedly holds
similarities with the Austin's theory especially with regards to coercive
character of law. Dualism of is and ought means that normative statements
cannot be followed by or lead to factual determinations or vice versa. From
the point of view of legal science this means that a legal norm may only be
valid due to another legal norm.22 In other words, legal norms derive their
validity from another legal norm, validity of which needs to stem from a still
superior norm.23 Consequently, no legal norm can be valid due to an
extraordinary necessity or any other factual consideration.
The norm which determines the conditions for the validity of the other
norm, a.k.a the superior norm, fulfills this function in a twofold way. It either
determines the procedure to be followed for the formation of the other rule or
it delimits the content thereof.24 In pure theory of law, the first is called the
dynamic aspect of law and the second is named as the static aspect of law.25
20
21
22
23
24
25
Gözler, 2012, p. 50.
See Delacroix, 2006, p. 27.
Kelsen, 2008, p. 9; Raz, 1974, p. 96.
Kelsen, 1949, p. 110; Kelsen, 2008, p. 193.
See Kelsen, 1949, p. 123; Haase, 2004, p. 39; Heckmann, 1997, pp. 138-139, 146.
Kelsen, 2008, pp. 195-196.
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Since each norm derives its validity from another, i.e. some norms determine
the reason for validity of the other norms, the legal system can be
characterized as a hierarchical chain or ladder of validity.26 Examination of
this hierarchical structure fall outside the scope of our inquiry.
Until now, we have only touched upon how and why a norm is valid.
Accordingly, a legal norm is only valid because it has been created in a way
previously envisaged by another legal norm belonging to the same system.27
We are yet to understand what “valid” means. To put it in a different way, we
have determined what is needed in order for a legal norm to be deemed “valid”
according to Kelsen, however, this does not mean that the concept of validity
is clarified. These are simply pre-conditions of validity which may be
determined differently by different legal theories.28 In order to understand
what “legally valid” means one has to determine the legal result of being
legally valid.
According to Kelsen's theory a valid norm means that it has binding
force. The fact that a legal norm has binding force connotes that it legally
exists.29 Legal existence and binding force in this case entails that the
addressees of the norm are legally obligated to conform to the rule or
command indicated by the norm.30 That the content of the norm constitutes an
“ought” for the addressees.31 Therefore, valid norms need to be taken into
consideration in the juristic thinking as well as by the courts and other law
applying officials. However, in Kelsen's theory, it is assumed that a posited
norm is valid until the competent organ declares the invalidity and therefore
non-existence thereof.32 The competent organ's (usually a court's) decision
renders the norm in question invalid. It is asserted in this regard that the
expectation of the inclusive legal positivism is to declare the norm's invalidity
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
See Haase, 2004, p. 39; Heckmann, 1997, p. 141; Gustafsson, 2007, p. 85.
See Raz, 1974, p. 97.
See Sartor, 2000, pp. 607-608.
Raz, 1980, p. 45.
However, the meaning of the “legally binding” cannot be the same with regards to power conferring
rules as they do not impose a duty to be followed by its addressees, but empowers them to perform
certain actions. Therefore, a norm such as “Every Turkish citizen is free to express their ideas and
opinions” cannot be regarded as a standard to comfort to. See Sartor, 2008, 217.
We do not encounter the same problem when we use this phrase instead of implying that the behavior
of the addressees must conform to the standard envisaged by the norm. Although Kelsen essentially
thought that “ought” always implies a duty whether it is directed at the legal officials or citizens,
eventually he has recognized the existence of power-conferring rules in a legal system and used the term
“ought” in a sense to comprise such norms. See Hart, 1983, p. 328; Raz, 1980, pp. 109-110. However,
we do not believe that this is due to a distortion or expansion of the meaning of “ought”. Kelsen simply
thought that power-conferring rules are not independent norms but dependent norms related to the taking
of a coercive measure. See Kelsen, 2008, pp. 51-52. Also see MacCormick and Raz, 1972, p. 78.
Kelsen, 2008, pp. 276-277.
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ab initio.33 One criticism originated in this assertion is that, in case the norm
is invalid starting from the time it has been posited, this means that an invalid
norm has been applied in the legal system, though it was invalid and therefore,
a norm's legal existence and its validity cannot have identical meanings,34 for
those rules that were applied existed but were invalid. We simply do not think
that this criticism is applicable to Kelsen's theory or any jurisdiction in the
continental legal tradition. We will take the role of the constitutional courts as
an example. Once a constitutional court examines the validity of a statute,
meaning its conformity with the constitution, in case it determines that the
statute is contrary to the constitution either in its procedure of creation or
content, it invalidates the statute prospectively. Mentioning this act of
annulment as a “declaration of nullity” is fallacious since the court's act has a
constitutive and not a declaratory effect.35 Therefore, the statute cannot be
regarded as invalid ab initio. Also, the assertion that the positivist theory has
such a demand does not embrace all branches of positivism, but only inclusive
legal positivism and Kelsen's account thereof sufficiently indicates that ab
initio invalidity of any legal norm, although usually thus expressed in the legal
reasoning of the courts and work of many scholars, is misleading.
Pre-condition of validity is the fulfillment of the requirements envisaged
by the superior norm. However, this requirement is only for the enactment of
the legal norm and it is not sufficient for a norm to stay valid. In other words,
there is a sine qua non condition for the validity of the legal norm. Kelsen
claims that unless the legal system to which a specific norm belongs is
generally efficacious, no legal norm in that system can be valid.36 The details
of this reasoning will be examined further in the next section. However, he
further indicates that an individual norm also needs to have “minimum
efficacy” if it is to stay valid. Exact words of Kelsen are as follows:
A general legal norm is regarded as valid only if the human
behavior that is regulated by it actually conforms with it, at least
to some degree. A norm that is not obeyed by anybody anywhere,
in other words a norm that is not effective at least to some degree,
is not regarded as a valid norm. A minimum of effectiveness is a
condition of validity.37
33
34
35
36
37
Grelette, 2010, p. 28.
Ibid.
Kelsen, 2008, p. 277.
Kelsen, 1949, p. 119.
Kelsen, 2008, p. 11.
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In case a particular norm completely lacks efficacy, that norm is invalid
due to the doctrine known as desuetude.38 We have elsewhere criticized this
conclusion due to the fact that we find it inconsistent with the core of Kelsen's
theory which rests upon the dualism between is and ought. Accordingly, the
fact that norms can only derive their validity from other norms means that
such validity can only be lost on the basis of another norm.39 Factual
considerations such as the efficacy of a norm should not be considered while
determining whether that norm is valid unless such consideration has been
envisaged by one of the superior norms. We simply think that this postulate
damages the internal consistency of the pure theory and should be avoided.
Kelsen's reasoning for the existence of such a sine qua non condition is also
weak due to the fact that he relied on the concept of desuetude as an
unchallenged fact and formulated his theory accordingly. This issue will be
further examined below.
On the other hand, general efficacy of the legal system is a pre-condition
not only for the validity of the system as a whole but also for individual norms
thereof. Accordingly, legal systems and the legal norms within this system are
no longer valid once the system loses its efficacy. This requirement of general
efficacy for the legal system has a crucial role in distinguishing the legal order
from other social orders or legal orders from each other. Moreover, it also
determines for which kinds of social normative orders the basic norm can be
presupposed. This issue also falls under the scope of the next section where
we examine the concept of efficacy and, therefore, no further detail needs to
be addressed here.
There remains one last point to discuss in relation to Kelsen's
understanding of validity.40 If all legal norms derive their validity from
another legal norm validity of which also needs to rest upon a still higher
positive norm, in order to contend that any norm is valid, there needs to be a
final terminal in the chain of validity. Kelsen was aware that any search for “a
still higher norm” would continue forever therefore preventing the any legal
38
39
40
Kelsen, 1949, pp. 119-120.
Gülgeç, 2016, pp. 22, 117.
Obviously, there are numerous other issues connected with the concept of validity such as the basic
norm and Kelsen's understanding of validity as a criterion of membership in the legal system. However,
our purpose is not to present a total account of Kelsenian validity but to understand it in broad strokes
in order to be able to establish its connection with the concept of efficacy and finally with the concept
of sanctions. As a result, we evade from presenting any further account of discussions regarding
Kelsenian validity. The problem regarding the basic norm's and Kelsenian validity's adequacy as a
criterion of membership in a legal system though should be stressed as a crucial issue in order to
understand Kelsen. For a detailed discussion see generally Raz, 1980, pp. 95-109; Hart, 1983, pp. 334339; Raz, 1974, pp. 98-99.
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
scientist to consider the said system as a valid system of norms.41 In order to
view a legal system as valid and enable the legal science to fulfill its function,
the search for a “still higher” norm needs to be ended at a certain point where
the validity of the last positive norm is presupposed. This presupposition is
the basic norm. Accordingly, the basic norm can be understood as a
presupposed and not a posited norm of the legal system42 which establishes
the validity of the constitution of the legal system. It needs to be stressed that
the basic norm, unlike the rule of recognition which will be examined below,
is not for the officials to determine. The basic norm is only presupposed and
exists in the mind of the jurist and it enables him/her to comprehend the
normative system as a valid one. The content of the basic norm is determined
by the facts related to the creation and application of the legal system in a
particular society.43 The concept of the basic norm has lead to many
discussions regarding its adequacy to explain the concept of validity, identity
of a norm in a legal system and its content. However, an account of these
discussions will not be given here, as it is ample for the purposes of this article
to show that the basic norm serves as a final knot in the chain of validity.
It is fair to say that Austinian and Kelsenian versions of validity are very
similar. In both understandings of validity, legal norms need to be issued
according to the higher norm conferring validity on it. However, what
distinguishes Kelsenian validity from the Austinian version is the Kantian
dualism between is and ought. Accordingly, Kelsen could not simply accept
any sovereign's will as the cause of validity due to the fact that such will is a
fact and facts cannot lead to normative validity. Therefore, Kelsen developed
the concept of the basic norm in order to render the will of the constituent
power a law creating fact. However, based on the fact that the basic norm is
only a presupposition created in order to be able to view the legal system in
Kelsenian terms, i.e. without breaking the dualism of is and ought, it may be
argued that this difference does not constitute any significant change in
understanding of the concept of validity. From a Kelsenian view too, if the
fictional basic norm44 is neglected, the validity of the norms of a legal system
eventually originates from a legally unlimited constituent power.
III. Validity According to Hart
H.L.A. Hart has founded his theory on the criticism of Austinian
command theory of law. The core of the criticism originates from the different
Kelsen, 2008, p. 194.
Gustafsson, 2007, p. 86; Raz, 1974, p. 97.
43
Kelsen, 1949, p. 120.
44
See Gustafsson, 2007, pp. 99-100.
41
42
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view Hart adopts with regards to the nature of the legal obligation. He refuses
Austin's command theory on the basis that the fact that somebody is powerful
enough to make others obey his commands through the use of threat or force
does not amount to be an obligation.45 On the other hand, his theory may also
be viewed as a criticism of the pure theory of law, even though the concept of
validity in Hartian sense is also very similar with the Kelsenian understanding.
In order to understand how Hart perceives validity, we should first
provide an account of some basic terminology used by Hart. Accordingly, a
legal system is formed of two kind of rules: primary and secondary rules.46
Primary rules are those rules which directly aim to regulate human behavior.47
These kind of rules are very similar to Austin's commands. However, these
kind of rules, directly relating to the behavior of the individuals, cannot
adequately constitute a legal system. In Hart's theory, existence of the second
set of rules, secondary rules is required in order to talk about a legal system.48
These secondary rules are simply “rules about rules”.49 In other words, they
do not relate to the behavior of the individuals directly, but rather determine
how other rules can be created, changed or adjudicated. Based on their
function, there are three different categories of secondary rules: rules of
recognition, rules of change and rules of adjudication. Rule of change is a rule
authorizing a person or body to change the existing primary rules of
obligation, introduce new ones or abrogate the old ones.50 Rules of
adjudication authorize a person or body to make authoritative determinations
regarding whether a particular primary rule of obligation has been violated in
a concrete case.51 Rules of recognition, on the other hand, play a central part
in Hart's concept of validity.
A rule of recognition is the legal norm enabling the legal officials of that
system to determine whether a particular rule belongs to that legal system or
not.52 Rules of recognition, provide certain criteria for the primary or other
secondary rules without fulfillment of which the tested norm cannot be valid.53
The first function is the epistemological and the second is the ontological
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
Hart, 2012, pp. 27, 43-44.
See Raz, 1980, p. 195.
Hart, 2012, p. 91.
Ibid., p. 95.
Marmor, 2011, p. 48. But see Hart, 2012, p. 94 (where Hart defines secondary rules as rules about
primary rules of obligation). However, elsewhere, Hart also implies that the ultimate rule of recognition
can be about other secondary rules. See Hart, 2012, p. 107. Therefore, since the rule of recognition is
also a secondary rule, we have chosen to define secondary rules as rules about other rules. After all,
primary rules of obligations are never about other rules.
Hart, 2012, p. 95.
Ibid. at 96.
Surlu, 2008, p. 55; Hart, 2012, p. 100.
Barber, 2000, p. 135.
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
function of the rule of recognition.54 Therefore, the concept of rule of
recognition will play a significant part in Hart's account of validity. However,
since rules of recognition are also secondary rules, this means that there can
be rules of recognition for a rule of recognition. In this case, it is revealed that
there exists a hierarchy between different rules of recognition. This hierarchy
ends with an ultimate Rule of Recognition, an ultimate criterion of validity.55
Although Hart generally associates validity with existence, the existence of
this ultimate Rule of Recognition does not relate to its validity.56 In fact, it is
not valid according to any other posited norm of the legal system, but is a
social rule.57 Therefore, its existence can only be factually showed.58
The Rule of Recognition for any system must be determined, i.e. adopted
from the internal point of view, by their legal officials.59 The ultimate Rule of
Recognition basically serves two functions: To determine the legal norms to
be applied and taken into consideration by the law applying organs and to
provide the validity of the whole legal system. The first function answers the
question of sources of law in a system while the second function provides for
the existence, in other words validity of such sources.60 Therefore, the Rule of
Recognition is the ultimate source of validity in a legal system. This second
function makes the Rule of Recognition resemble Kelsen's basic norm. The
comparison between the basic norm and the Rule of Recognition has been
provided by Hart himself;61 however, an account thereof does not concern us
at the present.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
Coleman, 1982, 141.
See Marmor, 2011, p. 50. Note, however, that there is little suggesting in Hart's account of the concept
that there might be numerous rules of recognition in a single legal system. Still, we believe that this
interpretation by Marmor makes Hart's theory more coherent and intelligible. Since we will not be going
into the details of Hart's account of the Rule of Recognition, we have avoided any discussion regarding
the possibility of multiple rules of recognition in a legal system. Suffice it to say however that at least
some of these rules of recognition are not social rules. They are positive legal norms created by a
procedure previously determined by another legal norm.
Hart, 2012, p. 110.
Raz, 1972, p. 851.
Hart, 2012, p. 101.
Hart uses different terms to express what we here choose to call “legal officials”. Officials and courts
are among these expressions. There is discussion regarding whom Hart refers to with these terms
although it is clear that he is referring to the group of persons who will determine the ultimate Rule of
Recognition. We are of the opinion that these terms do not only refer to the judges in a legal system but
to the law appliers in a system as general. For detailed discussions see Shapiro, 2008, pp. 6-7(especially
note that Shapiro introduces an interesting solution. Accordingly, rule of recognition exclusively
addresses the courts while rules of change and adjudication address different group of officials
empowered by these rules. Nevertheless, we do not adopt this view, however innovative and
advantageous it might be as there is nothing suggesting such interpretation in Hart's writing.).
See Coleman,1982, p. 141.
Hart, 2012, pp. 292-293.
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Hart has brought about many criticisms regarding Kelsen's theory of law
in general, however, what concerns us here is Hart's rightful criticism of
Kelsen's comments on desuetude. Hart thinks that there is no necessary
connection between the validity of an individual norm and its efficacy.62 This
is why he criticizes the idea that a norm which loses its efficacy through disuse
also loses its efficacy. According to Hart, this is only possible if the Rule of
Recognition of the system comprises such a principle envisaging that
inefficacious norms are invalid.63
On the other hand, efficacy is important when it comes to the existence,
i.e., validity of a legal system. Hart indicates that the validity of the legal
system requires the fulfillment of two conditions. First: “...those rules of
behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of
validity must be generally obeyed...”.64 The second condition is that: “...its
rules of recognition specifying the legal criteria of validity and its rules of
change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public
standards of official behaviour by its officials.”.65 Hart specifically states that
the first condition is to be fulfilled by the citizens irrespective of their motives
for obedience and the second condition is one that is to be fulfilled by the
officials of the system with what he calls the internal point of view.66 As in
Kelsen's theory, the concept of efficacy is inherently related only to the
validity of the legal system and not any single norm. Further details will be
provided below where we examine the concept of efficacy.
Hart's account of validity is mainly the same with Kelsen's understanding.
In both theories, legal norm must fulfill the criteria determined by a
hierarchically higher norm in order to be valid. Both theories present the
general efficacy of the legal system as a pre-condition of validity and as a meta
legal condition (since the general efficacy of the legal system is not required
by any positive legal norm). Hart differs from Kelsen by not establishing a
direct bond between the efficacy of a single norm and its validity. Lastly, the
ultimate point of origin regarding the validity is not the basic norm but the
Rule of Recognition, which is ontologically different from the basic norm in
that it is not postulated as a presupposition, but a social fact, existence of
which may be proved or disproved.67
62
63
64
65
66
67
Hart, 2012, p. 103. Also see Munzer, 1972, p. 26.
Hart, 2012, p. 103.
Ibid., p. 116.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 116-117.
Also see Marmor, 2011, p. 50.
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We have examined the concept of validity according to three leading
positivist writers. It has been shown that there is a much or less agreement
between different positivist traditions with regards to the preconditions and
the result of validity. Accordingly, the validity of a legal norm depends on its
compliance with the criteria set in a hierarchically superior norm (superior
norm, secondary rule or authorizing rule of the sovereign) and it requires the
general efficacy of the legal system it belongs to. The result of a norm's
validity is its existence. If a legal norm exists, it has binding force. Finally, the
legally binding force of a norm means that the content of the norm must be
taken into consideration by the legal authorities whenever it is relevant68 and
that individuals are legally obligated to behave as the norm prescribes. Now
we move on with the examination of what efficacy is and how it relates exactly
to the question of validity, i.e. existence of law.
B. THE CONCEPT OF EFFICACY
We have briefly addressed the question of efficacy above in the context
of its relation to the concept of validity. We have tried to avoid any discussions
regarding the content of efficacy, its definition and meaning etc. Here our
inquiry starts with what efficacy means. While trying to find an answer to this
question we will show utmost effort to avoid adopting definitional
perspectives. Different meanings of the concept of efficacy appears in the
writing of legal philosophers; however, it is not seldom that they evade from
presenting a definite account of how they perceive efficacy.
Legal efficacy may be defined as the capacity of the legal norms to
achieve the envisaged results.69 Therefore, it is a function of obedience of the
individuals and implementation of sanctions by relevant authorities on the
disobedient individuals, for the envisaged results cannot be achieved in case
the individuals in a legal system disobey the legal norms or in case of
obedience effective sanctions are not applied to ensure future compliance.
Accordingly, the first condition of an efficacious legal system is that its norms
are by and large obeyed by the individuals.70 The second condition is that
relevant authorities apply the required sanctions in cases of disobedience. It is
possible to understand an efficacious legal system as a system in which legal
rules are by and large obeyed by the individuals and, if not, sanctions are
applied. Then the question is whether a legal system norms of which are not
by and large obeyed by the individuals but in which legally envisaged
68
69
70
Sartor, 2008, p. 217.
Munzer, 1972, p. 5.
Raz, 1980, p. 203.
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sanctions are effectively applied is an efficacious legal system. This question
can only be answered in the context of the legal theory concerned. However,
the main problem with the concept of efficacy is that the theoreticians do not
provide sufficient detail on the question of efficacy. Inevitably, efficacy is
going to be defined by the legal theory itself and this makes it mandatory to
examine how certain positivist traditions treat and define the concept of
efficacy.
Austin's theory associates existence of a legal system mostly with the
problem of efficacy. Accordingly, there are four conditions for the existence
of a legal system and three conditions point to the principle of efficacy as a
prerequisite of existence. These conditions are: 1) laws of the system are by
and large efficacious, 2) the supreme legislator does not habitually obey
anyone else and 3) the supreme legislator is superior to the subjects.71 The
second and third conditions merely ensure that the supreme legislator of a
system is sovereign. The principle of efficacy in Austin's theory is expressed
by the condition that the supreme legislator needs to be habitually obeyed and
the result of this requirement is the first condition.72 As seen, Austin's
understanding of efficacy points to the obedience of the subjects to the legal
rules. Austin does not seem to point at the sanctioning of disobedient behavior,
at least not directly. We will demonstrate below that this is due to the
categorization of unsanctioned expressions of will by the sovereign as “nonbinding” in Austin's theory. What this perspective provides is a very basic
understanding of efficacy - that citizens and other individuals whose behavior
is intended to be regulated must obey the requirements of law regardless of
the motives behind their compliance. Therefore, compliance of the courts or
other law applying organs with the relevant legal rules is not relevant to the
concept of efficacy. In Austinian terms, “...the efficacy of the system is
relevant only in so far as it contributes to the personal obedience of the
population to the supreme legislator.”.73
Question of efficacy demands more attention in Kelsen's theory. The
issue is two dimensional: the efficacy of the whole system and the efficacy of
any individual norm. The first is postulated as a sine qua non condition for the
validity of the individual norms of a system.74 Kelsen's thoughts regarding the
effect of general efficacy of the system on the validity of that legal system and
its individual norms rest on the change of basic norm through revolution or
Ibid., p. 216.
Ibid.
73
Ibid., p. 17.
74
Kelsen, 1949, pp. 118-119.
71
72
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
other forceful methods of altering the legal system. He observes that legal
orders created by successful revolutions which manage to receive obedience
from the population are considered to be valid systems.75 Should these
revolutions fail, on the other hand, the acts of the revolutionaries are not
considered as law creating facts but as illegal undertakings.76 This is because
in Kelsen's understanding, successful revolutions are law creating facts and
they cause a change in the basic norm.77 Consequently, any legal order losing
its efficacy as a whole, due to the change in the basic norm, also loses its
validity as a whole.78 Since the legal order has lost its validity, individual
norms belonging to that system cannot be considered as valid any longer.79
However, Kelsen carefully distinguishes between the reason for validity of a
norm and its efficacy: “The efficacy of the total legal order is a condition, not
the reason for the validity of its constituent norms. These norms are valid not
because the total order is efficacious, but because they are created in a
constitutional way.”.80
The problem with the effect of efficacy on the validity of the legal system
is that efficacy is a factual consideration. Moreover, it is a factual
consideration not required by any normative source. The conditions for
validity of a norm contained in the superior norm will also require factual
considerations such as whether the norm has been created by the competent
authority or whether the majority requirements determined by the superior
norm have been complied with. Unless there is a superior norm envisaging the
effect of such considerations upon the validity of the legal system, such as the
basic norm, it is difficult to see why these assertions should hold true in a
Kelsenian understanding. The content of the basic norm is such that it confers
validity on the constitution of a national legal system. Any further elaboration
would endanger the purity of the pure theory, as it would make it possible to
include transcendental elements in the content of the basic norm.81 This risk
is deteriorated by the fact that the basic norm is a mere presupposition, an
epistemological tool in order to conceive of the legal order as valid and
binding. Elsewhere, where Kelsen includes the role of international law in
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
Ibid., p. 118.
Ibid.
Kelsen, 2008, pp. 209-210. Note however that it is not the revolutionaries that change the basic norm.
The basic norm is not a positive norm and therefore it is not posited and cannot be changed by anyone.
With this in mind, Kelsen speaks of the basic norm “changing simultaneously” with the overridden
former constitution (ibid.).
Kelsen, 1949, p. 119.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Delacroix, 2006, p. 54.
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considering the validity of the national legal orders, he postulates that a norm
of customary international law, called the principle of efficacy, determine that
only those national legal orders that are efficacious are valid.82 Although this
view is also doubtful,83 it at least is in compliance with the basics of Kelsen's
theory.
Kelsen's answer to our question above is as follows: efficacy of the legal
order is an important tool to distinguish legal order from other social orders
which may also have normative character.84 It is a criterion to distinguish any
mafia leader's orders and commands from the state's legal rules. If the
principle of efficacy was not incorporated into Kelsen's theory, legal scholars
could determine the chain of orders within a mafia family as a legal order after
presupposing a basic norm which confers validity on the orders of the leader.
Accordingly, orders of the lesser leaders in the family would be valid if they
were consistent with and created in a way prescribed by the supreme leader's
original order. Suppose that SL is the supreme leader of a mafia family and
LL1 and LL2 are two lesser leaders while LM is the legman. Any order given
by SL is presupposed to be valid due to the basic norm and SL legislates the
following: “Any order to be given by the lesser leaders regarding the drug
trafficking requires the joint will of the lesser leaders.”. In this case, only the
joint will of LL1 and LL2 could create a valid order such as “LM is to cross
the border and deliver the weapons to the buyer.”. LL1 would not be legally
authorized to order LM to perform any action on the matter of weapons
trafficking. What really distinguishes a true legal system from the order based
82
83
84
Kelsen, 2008, p. 215; Bernstroff and Dunlap, 2011, pp. 93-94.
This view is doubtful because there are serious suspicions regarding the existence of such a rule of
customary international law. State and its legal order are synonymous according to Kelsen (Kelsen,
1949, pp. 181-183) and that states formed after successful revolutions, Coup d'Etat or wars are
recognized as valid legal orders (See Ibid., pp. 368-369). We will leave the question of recognition as
the necessary condition of a state's existence aside. However, states do not always recognize a newly
formed state although their legal system is undoubtedly efficacious. The Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus has been founded in 1983 and there is no doubt regarding the efficacy of their legal system.
Nevertheless, the only act of recognition has been performed by Turkey. Does this mean that all those
states which do not recognize The Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent state violate a rule of
customary international law? Moreover, although we must accept the difficulty in proving the existence
of a rule of customary international law, Kelsen does not get involved in any sensible effort of showing
the existence of such a rule. He simply states that if such a rule of customary international law did not
exist, it would not be possible to perceive the Russian Federation as the continuation of the Soviet Union
and that the fact that we can do so points at the existence of an international rule recognizing revolution
as a law creating act( Ibid., p. 368.). Following such an argumentation Kelsen resembles a scientist
claiming that water exists so that humans could drink it. If factual considerations do not lead to normative
conclusions, they should neither “point at” the existence of norms. As far as we are concerned, the
recognition of effective legal orders as valid legal orders merely constitutes a statistical fact and it is not
sufficient to prove the existence of a customary rule.
For the discussion of this topic and Kelsen's examples please see Kelsen, 2008, pp. 48-49. Below we
have provided our own example.
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
relationship in a mafia family? It is the general efficacy of the system. A
supposedly stronger entity (the state) renders such acts of the mafia family
illegal and envisages strong sanctions against the activities and the members
of the mafia group. Moreover, the bulk of the population would comply with
the norms of the state rather than the commands of the mafia. Here, we are not
suggesting that mafia cannot complete any operations with success; we are
suggesting that such a system will most probably not exist for long and its
members (in fact its officials) are going to be arrested eventually by the
governmental forces. In Kelsen's theory nothing can distinguish between the
mafia family and the state if the principle of efficacy is neglected. Another
example from the mafia family can be given in order to illuminate our point.
Suppose that the SL legislates the following: “Any member who deliberately
challenges the authority of the SL by not carrying out a given order shall be
punishable by death upon the decision of the lesser leaders.”. In case LL1 and
LL2 decides that LM has committed such offence, the death penalty may very
well be carried out. However, then the ones carrying out such order and the
SL himself will be guilty of murder according to the legal system of the state
they live in and the offenders will be captured and penalized by the officials
of the legal system of the state. In such a case, the question is which of the
normative orders is efficacious. The efficacy of the legal system of the state
would win this contest in landslide. And if not, then the efficacy of the legal
system is in question and most probably it has lost its efficacy. Thus is the
legal order distinguished from any possible normative order constituted by the
mafia or terrorist organizations. Mafia's order is not a legal order because it is
not efficacious. Since it is not efficacious, its basic norm cannot be
presupposed. Without the presupposition of a basic norm, the legal order is
deprived of legal validity, and therefore legal existence.
The concept of efficacy does not only distinguish legal order from other
social orders but it also serves to delimit the legal orders' spheres of validity.85
In an article, Hart claims that according to Kelsen's understanding of validity
which is claimed to be merely a relationship of validity purport, cannot explain
why English law is not valid in Soviet territory.86 In fact, the concept of
efficacy, as a factor delimiting the sphere of validity of the legal orders,
provides the answer to Hart's question. Not even in Kelsen's theory can the
laws of England be valid in Soviet territory. This is simply because English
legal system (and therefore any norm thereof) cannot be effective in Soviet
lands no matter what their contents are, even if they claim to confer validity
on the norms of Soviet law.
85
86
Kelsen, 1949, pp. 350-351.
Hart, 1983, p. 319.
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The same role of delimiting the spheres of validity of legal systems also
makes it possible for new states to emerge during times of conflict. Assume
that Country A is a dictatorship ruled by the political party X. For several years
now there has been a civil war in A's territory between once legitimate
government and its opposition Y and Z which also happen to be fighting
against each other. During the several years throughout which the civil war
lasted, X has lost military and political control over 70 % of its territory. Its
military and political command continue in 30 % of its former territory. The
remaining territory is shared between the forces of Y and Z which exercise
effective control over the said territory. Accordingly, normative orders of Y
and Z become the legal orders of the controlled territories the moment norm
subjects start to by and large comply with the norms issued by Y and Z rather
than the norms belonging to the legal order of X. On the other hand, no matter
what the content of its norms are, the legal order of X continues to the legal
order of the territory which is still under control thereof.
We have already seen how Hart rightly criticizes Kelsen's acceptance of
desuetude. We will not discuss this issue any further but declare our support
for Hart's account of efficacy's affect on the validity of individual norms:
desuetude has no affect on the validity of a single norm unless the Rule of
Recognition of that legal system (or any posited norms of the system for that
matter) recognizes that a disused norm loses its validity.87 What we want to
focus on in this part of the paper is how Hart relates the efficacy of the legal
system to its legal validity.
We have mentioned above that according to Hart's account the validity
(legal existence) of a system depends on the fulfillment of two conditions: 1)
individuals must by and large obey the rules of the system and 2) the rules of
recognition and other secondary rules of the system must be treated as binding
rules regarding official behavior by the officials of that system.88 This shows
that the first condition of the existence of the legal system reflects efficacy
without a doubt. A legal system only exists, i.e. it is only valid, on the
condition that citizens generally obey the primary rules of obligation which
directly address the behavior of the individuals. Obedience here must be
understood as conformity of the facts which are the behaviors or actions of the
individuals with the prescription of the ought statement expressed by the
norm. Hart also stresses that it is irrelevant whether individuals obey the rule
due to the threat of sanctions or for any internal reasons.89 It is not required
87
88
89
Hart, 2012, p. 103.
Ibid., p. 116.
Ibid.
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that individual citizens recognize the binding force of the primary rules of
obligation from an internal point of view. Internal point of view is required in
the second condition for the existence of a legal system. Accordingly, in order
for a legal system to exist, officials of a legal system need to treat the Rule of
Recognition and other secondary rules as binding and valid standards for their
behavior. While the first condition is directly and purely related to the concept
of efficacy, what the second condition requires is not mere conformity with
the rules but the thought or belief that such rules are legally binding on the
officials functioning in a legal system. It might seem appropriate not to
associate this second condition with the concept of efficacy due to the fact that
all secondary rules are power-conferring in Hart's theory.90 It is postulated that
the power-conferring norms cannot be efficacious or inefficacious since they
do not prescribe a certain behavior in the factual realm through which the
“conformity rate” of the norm can be measured.91 Here it is possible to raise
certain questions. First is related to the identity of the officials Hart speaks of.
The second concerns the presentation of all secondary rules as powerconferring rules by Hart92 and the assessment that efficacy is immaterial to
power-conferring rules. We will start by examining the first question.
Throughout his opus magnum “The Concept of Law”, Hart makes no
definition of the term “officials”. With regards to the adoption of the rules of
recognition, though, he sometimes uses the expression “officials” or
exclusively talks about the courts.93 Shapiro suggests that it is possible to
concede that the rule of recognition is to be adopted exclusively by the courts
while the rules of change and adjudication are to be adopted by the relevant
official bodies which lay down rules or resolve legal disputes.94 However,
since rules of recognition provide the criteria by which the norms in a legal
system are determined, or in other words, since such rules lay down the criteria
by which the validity of other norms are tested, concluding that the rules of
recognition are exclusively adopted by the courts leads to a certain problem.
The courts are not obligated or authorized to apply certain rules in a legal
90
91
92
93
94
Regarding the power conferring nature of the secondary rules see ibid., p. 81.
Munzer, 1972, p. 23, 27-28 (Kelsen's and Hart's account of efficacy cannot be extended to powerconferring rules).
It is argued that although Hart's writing seems to suggest that all secondary rules are power conferring,
the Rule of Recognition is an exception as it is a customary rule which must be regarded as a duty
imposing norm while the power conferring nature of the other secondary rules is affirmed. See Raz,
1971, pp. 807-808Joseph. For a critique of Raz's position regarding the duty imposing nature of the Rule
of Recognition please see Mullock, 1974-1975, pp. 29-33. We will not argue here that a Hartian reading
of the ultimate Rule of Recognition is power conferring. But rather, we aim to show that other secondary
rules may also be duty imposing.
Shapiro, 2008, pp. 6-7.
Ibid., p. 7.
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system.95 If the courts are not authorized to apply a certain posited norm, are
we to conclude that such norm is not a legal norm as its Rule of Recognition
cannot be legally adopted by the courts? An example from Turkish law is
provided below.
According to the first paragraph of Article 148 of the Constitution,
statutory decrees created by the Council of Ministers chaired by the President
of the Republic during times of state of emergency or martial law cannot be
reviewed by the Constitutional Court or any other court for that matter.
However, the third paragraph of Article 121 and the second and third
paragraphs of Article 122 of the Constitution are clearly rules of recognition
determining the conditions of validity for the statutory decrees enacted during
times of state of emergency or martial law. These articles are rules of
recognition taking the form of constitution. The paragraph reads as
The Council of Ministers chaired by the President of the
Republic may enact statutory decrees during the state of
emergency and with regards to the matters necessitated by
the state of emergency. Such decrees will be published in
the Official Gazette and submitted for the approval of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly on the same day; the
time and procedure for the approval of these decrees by the
Assembly will be determined by the Standing Order.96
Such decrees can only be enacted during state of emergency or martial
law and it is required that the President of the Republic chairs such meetings
of the Council of Ministers. Additionally there are legal requirements
regarding the publication and submission of the statutory decree for the
approval of the National Assembly. No norm can be regarded as a state of
emergency or martial law statutory decree unless it fulfills the conditions laid
down in these paragraphs and articles. However, who is to apply these norms
of the Constitution which envisage certain conditions of validity for the state
of emergency and martial law statutory decrees? Based on the prohibition of
Article 148, the Constitutional Court is not competent to review the validity
of such decrees by applying Articles 121 and 122 of the Constitution.
However, this does not mean that these decrees are not legal rules as their rule
95
96
Ibid. (Shapiro gives the example of the “political question doctrine” in the United States).
Combination of the second and third paragraphs of the Article 122 basically repeats the same conditions
for the statutory decrees enacted during martial law with a single difference: The Constitution does not
state that statutory decrees issued during martial law need to be related to the situations necessitated by
the martial law. Such statutory decrees are also applied during martial law and they need to be submitted
to the Parliament on the day of publication.
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
of recognition has not been and cannot be adopted by the courts from internal
point of view. Instead, we may perhaps say that relevant paragraphs of Articles
121 and 122 will be applied by the Council of Ministers or by the National
Assembly which is authorized to repeal the statutory decree. We believe that
this example shows how rules of recognition may be addressed to organs other
that courts. In such a case, it is the legislative organ or the Council of Ministers
itself which must adopt the Rule of Recognition for the mentioned articles of
the Constitution from the internal point of view. When it is considered that
Hart also talks about the practice of the legislatures with regards to the Rule
of Recognition,97 it becomes even more difficult to accept that the rules of
recognition must exclusively be adopted by the courts98.
It is really difficult to determine whom the rule of recognition addresses
and whether any categorical distinction is possible. We will confine ourselves
to the assumption that adoption of the secondary rules from internal point of
view as required by the second condition for the existence of a legal system is
to be performed by all law applying and legislating officials of that legal
system.99 Such general terminology definitely comprises the legislator, the
courts and also the executive or the administration. The examination of the
second question is much more crucial to our concerns in this paper.
Hart makes general statements about the secondary rules as powerconferring rules.100 The Rule of Recognition however, that is the ultimate rule
of recognition in a legal system, one that exists as a social fact, is (or must be)
an exception to this generalization.101 We will not challenge this argument.
What we rather want to examine is whether rules of change and adjudication
are all power-conferring rules. The importance of this assessment lies in the
fact that if such other secondary rules can be duty-imposing, the second
condition for the existence of a legal system may also be related to the concept
of efficacy.
The assertion that secondary rules of change are power-conferring stems
from the fact that they authorize a certain organ or body to create new primary
rules or change and abolish the existent ones. However, it is also recognized
that rules of change may envisage certain procedures for the enactment,
Raz, 1971, p. 807.
It might be argued that the Constitutional Court can actually apply articles 121 and 122 while
determining whether a norm falls under the restriction of Article 148. We suspect if the Constitutional
Court truly applies articles 121 and 122 in such cases. However, even if this is the case, it cannot be
argued that the legislature cannot apply and therefore adopt the Rule of Recognition for these articles.
99
Raz, 1971, p. 807.
100
HART, 2012, p. 81.
101
See Raz, 1971, pp. 807-808; Shapiro, 2008, pp. 5-6.
97
98
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amendment or abrogation of rules while also determining the authorized
body.102 At this point, it is difficult to understand how a norm envisaging that
a certain authority will be exercised in accordance with a certain procedure
can be identified as purely power-conferring. Obviously, the same norm could
be power-conferring and duty-imposing at the same time since it requires the
usage of an authority in a certain way. Moreover, even if the rule of change
does not envisage a certain procedure for the enactment of a rule, it may be
argued that it still entails a certain obligation as it determines “a certain body”
to enact the rule. Since the norm is not the text itself, but its meaning in the
mind of the interpreter,103 any rule of change envisaging the enactment of a
certain rule by the Parliament would also mean that no other body or organ is
authorized to enact that rule. Although the rule of change may grammatically
seem to confer powers, the interpretation of the text reveals that it also entails
certain obligations even where no specific procedures for the enactment of the
rule has been envisaged. Any provision of the constitution authorizing the
Parliament to enact statutes forbids the enactment of the statutes by the
administrative bodies. This is due to the fact that legal texts require
interpretation and interpretation is not free as the legal realists would suggest,
but bound by certain logical principles.104 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
is such a logical principle applicable to the given example. State organs do not
have authorities intrinsically. These powers are post facto conferred on the
state organs.105 This makes such authority accidental and accidentalia is
subject to strict interpretation as required by dichotomy.106 In other words,
Parliament has been counted numerus clausus as the organ authorized to issue
statutes. Other organs are forbidden to issue statutes. Therefore, it is most of
the time107 apt to conclude that power-conferring rules are also duty-imposing.
The same logic applies to the authority granted to the courts in resolving legal
disputes. The fact that a certain kind of dispute resolution authority has been
given to a specific court means that other courts are forbidden to resolve such
disputes unless expressly authorized by another norm. The result is that
secondary rules are not purely power-conferring but they are most of the time
both duty-imposing and power-conferring.
Shapiro, 2008, p. 4.
See Kelsen, 2008, pp. 3-4.
104
See Gözler, 2013, pp. 27-32.
105
Ibid., pp. 73-74.
106
Ibid., pp. 59-60.
107
We do not aim to prove or disprove that all power-conferring rules in fact are also duty-imposing. For
our purposes it will be sufficient to show that at least certain kind of rules which are thought to be powerconferring are in fact also duty-imposing and that Hartian secondary rules may also be efficacious or
inefficacious based on the conformity of the norms' addressees. For a very fruitful discussion regarding
whether legal rules can be purely power-conferring see MacCormick and Raz, 1972, passim.
102
103
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The importance of this determination lies in the claim that purely powerconferring rules cannot be declared efficacious or inefficacious based on
Hart's definition of efficacy, as power-conferring rules are said not to enjoin
behavior.108 Based on the above explanation it can be seen why we would want
to oppose such an assertion. Those rules labeled as “power-conferring” do not
seem to enjoin behavior in a textual analysis. However, the meaning of the
text will mostly entail a duty. Therefore, if it is acknowledged that the purely
power-conferring rules in the Hartian sense only exceptionally exists in a legal
system, it must be rejected that the secondary rules do not enjoin behavior.
Consequently, we need to re-assess the meaning of the condition that the
secondary rules of a system must be regarded as the standards of official
behavior by the system's officials. Hart's own words are as follows:
“[secondary rules] must be effectively accepted as common public standards
of official behaviour by its officials.”.109 The expression “effectively” attracts
attention. How can some standard be accepted effectively? Hart provides an
answer in the next page: “They [the officials] must regard these [secondary
rules] as common standards of official behavior and appraise critically their
own and each other's deviations as lapses.”.110 Where the officials deviate
from the requirements of the secondary rules or do not conceive a critical
approach to such deviations, it means that the secondary rules have not been
effectively accepted. Therefore, it can be argued that the second condition for
the existence of a legal system which pertains to the acceptance of the
secondary rules by the officials also relates to the concept of efficacy and that
Hart, just like Kelsen, perceives efficacy as a condition for the existence of a
legal system. Then why does Hart have two different sub-categories for what
must be presented as the efficacy of a legal system in general? I believe that
this is due to Hart's conceptualization of the secondary rules as purely powerconferring rules. Therefore, he could not correlate the behavior conformity
criterion used for the efficacy of the duty-imposing rules and had to invent a
different criterion. Hart has introduced the acceptance from an internal point
of view as the distinguishing criterion for the efficacy of the secondary rules.
Although, much of these inferences are mere speculations due to the lack of
textual basis, we are convinced that the criterion of secondary rules' being
accepted from internal point of view by the officials is also related to the
concept of efficacy, in that, Hart's expression regarding the “effective
acceptance” entails nothing different from the officials' actual compliance
with and application of the secondary rules.
Munzer, 1972, p. 27.
Hart, 2012, p. 116 (emphasis added).
110
Ibid., p. 117.
108
109
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What is even more surprising is that Hart perceives secondary rules as
standards of behavior deviance from which should lead to criticism by fellow
officials. Standards can be defined as “a required or agreed level of quality or
attainment”.111 How can a purely power-conferring rule be a standard
requiring a certain level of quality or attainment? If the power-conferring rules
do not entail any obligations or duties to be fulfilled, how can one deviate
from them and be criticized by others? Either Hart recognizes that powerconferring rules are simultaneously duty-imposing or he inadvertently calls
the secondary rules as standards and expects criticism where officials deviate
from the standards provided. Because, even if the power conferred by the
secondary rules are obligatory to be exercised in certain cases, it should be
acknowledged that no power-conferring rule is pure since at least the exercise
of the duty conferred is conditionally obligatory.
So far, the question of efficacy still hangs in the air. The unresolved part
of the question of efficacy stems from the fact that none of the above thinkers
have come up with a clear definition of what efficacy is and how a legal system
is effective. They have concentrated on the role of efficacy for the legal system
or individual norms of that legal system while refraining from clearly defining
or at least exemplifying what efficacy is, thus treating it as a crystal clear fact.
We do believe that there still is a certain ambivalence regarding what efficacy
truly requires.
There are different ways to understand efficacy. One understanding of
efficacy can only be “measured” in case certain norms are violated. In this
alternative, the efficacy of the system - or individual norms - concerns whether
the related system envisages certain sanctions against violations and if the said
sanctions are applied by the authorities. Another separation within this
category may appear as to the meaning of the sanction. Is sanction a norm or
a mere factual retribution for the violation of the legal norm? The details of
this discussion and distinction will be provided in the next section. The other
understanding of efficacy relates to the compliance rate of the legal system or
individual norms. In this alternative, legal system is effective if the addressees
of such legal system or an individual norm comply with the prescription of
these norms. In this view, the measurement of the legal system's efficacy is
solely based on factual considerations. Such consideration does not need to
take the internal point of view suggested by Hart into account as the
addressees may or may not comply with the prescription of the norm based on
the fact that they feel legally obligated to do so. They may also comply out of
111
Oxford Dictionary, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/standard (last visited
2.18.2016).
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fear of sanctions or moral and even religious considerations. The condition for
the efficacy is the compliance of the norm addressees regardless of the motives
they might have for such compliance. The first question regarding this second
alternative is whether power-conferring legal norms can be complied with.
Above, we have suggested that the majority of the norms considered to be
power-conferring are, to a certain degree, also duty-imposing. The same logic
applies here. Majority of the power-conferring rules also impose duties.112
Any norm envisaging the Parliament's law making authority also prescribes
certain procedures for the exercise of such authority. Even if no sanction for
the violation of such procedures has been regulated by the legal system, it may
still be observed whether the Parliament abides by the determined criteria of
lawmaking more often than not. Numerous other examples can be shown
supporting the idea that no legal norm is purely power-conferring; however,
we do not aim to prove this point here. This question only interests us insofar
it relates to the relationship between efficacy and sanction. On the other hand,
even if we settle for the possibility of purely power-conferring legal norms,
we believe that they can still be considered in “measuring” the efficacy of a
legal system or norm. Objection to this statement stems from the belief that
“efficacy” can only be a matter of compliance with a duty-imposing rule. We
are not qualified to start a linguistic discussion. However, if compliance is the
correlation between an “ought” and “is”, “compliance” for the purely powerconferring norms, existence of which we seriously doubt, can be perceived as
the correlation between a “can or may” and an “is”. Just as not every “is” is
what the “ought” prescribes, not every “can” results in an “is” or vice versa.
Therefore, if the power given is exercised by the relevant authorities or
individuals and if the legal results tied to the exercise of the power conferred
occur, the purely power-conferring norm would be efficacious. In other words,
“Such a rule is efficacious if and only if, if the rule is used in order to secure
a certain result, that result is actually secured in the way specified by the
rule.”.113 Munzer also stresses the relationship between the efficacy of the
power-conferring rules and the efficacy of certain duty-imposing rules.
Accordingly, if a power-conferring rule is efficacious, certain duty-imposing
rules will also be efficacious.114 Since power-conferring rules are efficacious
in case certain legal results are really attained through the exercise of the
We do not mean to assert that all norms purporting to confer a power are duty imposing. This is not our
concern here. However, even those norms which seem like pure power conferring rules impose some
kind of duty since the norm is not the text or the structure of the text itself, but the meaning thereof
reached through interpretation. We are, therefore, inclined to think that all power conferring rules are
somewhat duty imposing.
113
Munzer, 1972, p. 33.
114
Ibid.
112
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power conferred, this exercise of power will result in certain changes in the
rights and duties of the individuals and such changes can be formulated as
duty-imposing rules.115
Between these two alternatives the second one is more appropriate. The
first alternative referring to the violations and sanctions applied against such
violations is not by itself a credible criterion. For instance, it is possible to
decide that a legal system is inefficacious because some exceptional violations
have not or could not be retaliated. In fact, such approach would most of the
time result in labeling of highly efficacious legal systems as inefficacious and
therefore invalid since it disregards the majority of the legal norms of that
system which are followed by the population. In fact, such a legal system
would be the ideal despite the fact that certain violations or even all of the
breaches could not be retaliated. The second alternative is superior to the first
in that it enables the measuring of the system's efficacy by taking all legal
norms into consideration. Association of efficacy with compliance - and
perhaps with an even broader concept which also includes the possibility of
measuring the efficacy of purely power-conferring rules should their existence
be accepted - does not only provide a more reliable basis for the determination
of the legal systems' efficacy. It also better explains the validity of individual
norms in Kelsen's theory should it be preferred over Hart's. Since, according
to Kelsen, individual norms should also have a minimum degree of efficacy
in order to be valid, the efficacy of an individual norm would most of the time
not be measurable if it has not been violated. However, we have above denied
the relationship between the efficacy of a single norm and its validity and
therefore do not sponsor this advantage of the second alternative where the
efficacy of a single norm can be measured in cases where it has not been
violated. This argument only shows the functionality of the second alternative.
However, a hybrid solution for the question of efficacy is also possible
and even more appropriate. As Joseph Raz simply puts it, “It [a legal system]
is in force if it is effectively followed, observed and enforced within the
community”.116 Therefore, enforcement of law is also a factor in its efficacy.
Enforcement of law comes into question once a legal norm has not been
complied with on a specific occasion. Therefore, the fact that sanctions for the
breaches of norms has been envisaged and that they are effectively applied
contributes to the efficacy of the legal system. The second alternative concerns
cases where legal norms of a legal system are voluntarily (or due to the threat
of use of force for that matter, but without the involvement of any evil imposed
115
116
Ibid., pp. 33-34.
Raz, 1977, p. 344 (emphasis added).
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
on the individual in any case) obeyed. In case they are not, the efficacy is
adversely affected. Nevertheless, with the consideration of a hybrid
formulation between the first and second alternatives, non-compliance with a
norm of the legal system does not directly cause a negative impact on the
efficacy. Rather, it needs to be observed whether sanctions have been
effectively applied as the consequence of the breach in which case the efficacy
of the legal norm and the system is not adversely affected. However, as we
will suggest below, there are two understandings regarding the concept of
sanction. Sanction is either a norm specifically prescribing the imposition of
an evil on the violator or it is the factual evil itself which is merely a legally
envisaged action or behavior of the legal officials. In case the normative
understanding is adopted with regards to the concept of sanction, the second
alternative does not really become altered as sanction is still a norm
compliance with which is expected from the individual. We think that
“effective application of sanctions”, where the hybrid solution to the question
of measuring the efficacy is concerned, should not only involve creation of
sanctions as norms, but their forceful imposition if necessary. In other words,
since the criterion of compliance with legal norms includes compliance with
sanctions, the second factor incorporated to the hybrid solutions needs to
concern the physical evil, Austin's ultimate sanction. Otherwise, the solution
offered would not be a hybrid solution, but merely a repetition of the second
alternative. One would eventually have to refer to some kind of use of force
while observing whether a sanction has effectively been applied. This
relationship between the concepts of efficacy and sanctions will be elaborated
further below.
Concepts of validity and efficacy have been handled above and many
problems regarding the relationship between these two have been tackled.
Here we would like to summarize our findings so far before going onto the
next section. Validity can be simplified as the legal existence of a norm.
Invalid norms cannot exist and therefore the usual expression of “invalid
statute” is a contradiction, for a statute is that which is valid according to the
criteria provided by the superior norms (or rules of recognition providing the
test of validity for these statutes) and it is a logical fallacy to acknowledge that
there can be something like an “invalid statute”.117 Efficacy does not play a
role in the validity of individual norms despite what is asserted by Kelsen. On
the other hand, efficacy is perceived as a necessary condition for the validity
of the legal systems as a whole in every positivist tradition examined above.
The question why efficacy of the legal system carries importance in Austin's
117
See Kelsen, 1949, p. 263.
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theory is clear: the person or body whose orders are not effectively
implemented cannot be regarded as sovereign and nothing that is enacted by
anyone other than the sovereign is not law, meaning they do not have legal
existence, i.e. they are invalid. Austin places importance on efficacy because
it is an inseparable quality of the sovereign around which the whole Austinian
theory revolves. The same cannot be said for the theories of Kelsen and Hart.
Kelsen bases his theory on a strictly normative understanding according to
which the efficacy of the legal system could only be envisaged by another
legal norm, or at least the basic norm of the said system, in order to play a part
related to validity. This is not the case in the pure theory. Kelsen's explanations
in this regard is merely the repetition of the result generated by the linkage of
the legal system's validity to its overall efficacy. The situation is even more
obscure in Hart. Hart's two conditions regarding the validity of the legal
system (namely, the observance of the norms by the citizens and the adoption
of the ultimate Rule of Recognition by the officials and observance thereof)
seem to be meta-legal elements in his theory. It is as if these conditions stem
from the “nature” (!) of law. It is obvious for us that this relationship between
the general efficacy and the legal system's validity as a whole is accepted due
to practical reasons of separating the legal system from other social orders or
legal systems. As rightly stressed, “If legal science is to be a useful activity, it
can only apply a basic norm to efficacious systems, so as to interpret them as
a consistent field of meaning.”.118 For the purposes of this article, we do not
contest the idea that law needs to be effective overall.
C. SANCTIONS: COERCIVENESS OF THE LEGAL ORDER
In this section our purpose is to determine whether concepts of validity
and sanction or efficacy and coerciveness are somehow interconnected. In
order to achieve this target, we need to start off with what sanction is. Simple
as it may seem, the definition of sanction demands some clarification. Is
sanction an action taking place in the factual realm, a factual evil imposed on
the violator or is it simply a norm in relation to another, that is a norm to be
created where another has been violated? The answer to this question lies at
the heart of our inquiry as the results to be reached afterwards depends on the
answer to this specific question.
I. Definition of Sanction: A Definitional Crisis of Law?
We have determined above that in order to be valid, legal systems are
supposed to be efficacious. Efficacy here means that individuals who are the
118
Nino, 1978, p. 369.
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addresses of the norms of a specific legal system by and large conform to the
prescriptions of the norms. In other words, a legal system is efficacious “if the
individuals by and large by their behavior fulfill the conditions of the rewards
and avoid the conditions of the punishments...”.119 Sanctions are one way of
motivating individuals to follow the prescriptions of law.120 Let us have a
closer look at Kelsen's notion of sanction. His perception will be illuminating
in the discussion we plan to have.
According to Kelsen, the first characteristic of the legal order (or law) is
that it is a social order.121 What concerns us more here is the second
characteristic of law. Accordingly, law is a coercive social order. Being a
coercive social order means that compliance with the norms of a legal system
will be assured through coercive measures imposed against the individual's
will.122 Such measures taken against the individual's will are legal sanctions.
Kelsen stresses that there are hardly any legal norms without sanctions and
that in order to provide compliance without sanctions legal rules need to exist
in such a way that their mere existence is advantageous for the individuals.123
This coercive character of the legal systems ensured via sanctions is what legal
systems from different eras, legal orders of societies with different cultural
backgrounds have in common.124 They all take advantage of coercive
measures in order to ensure compliance with their norms.
However, are these sanctions Kelsen speaks of norms of an individual
character created by relevant authorities in order to ensure compliance with
the violated norm or to provide retribution due to the violation of the norm, or
are they physical beings, actions taken in accordance with or as required by a
positive norm of that system. Let us consider an example to simplify the
situation. Assume that X and Y have entered into a contract C. Y has submitted
a case to the court claiming that X has acted in breach of C. The court has,
after hearing the case, found that X has breached C and therefore orders X to
pay damages to Y in accordance with the statute S. Now there are two possible
scenarios. X either pays damages to Y or s/he does not and therefore Y makes
a submission to the relevant execution office EO. Let us assume that X did not
pay the relevant amount and Y has applied to the EO. EO, in accordance with
Kelsen, 2008, pp. 26-27. Above we have argued that effective coercive measures against the breaches
of legal norms also have an impact on a legal system's level of efficacy albeit a lesser factor. Here we
intend to cover Kelsen's side of the story.
120
Ibid., p. 35.
121
Ibid., pp. 25, 31, 33.
122
Ibid., p. 33.
123
Kelsen, 1949, p. 15.
124
Ibid., pp. 19-20.
119
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the decision of the court, sends a notice to X, stating that the payment needs
to be made in a certain period of time and otherwise X's assets will be
sequestrated in order to compensate for the damages of Y. In case X avoids
the notice and does not pay the damages to Y, Y's damages will be
compensated via sequestration procedures. Which of the above mentioned
acts is the sanction? Where does the coercive character of law, which Kelsen
thinks is so dominant and distinctive, steps in?
Kelsen does not seem to associate sanction with physical force, a factual
occurrence. At one place he states that it is also possible to associate rewards
and positive motivations with the term of sanction, though this is not the usual
case.125 He further indicates that “...physical force is not the sanction itself,
because it is only necessary in case there is resistance.”.126 In that case,
sanction exists regardless of mere physical force, which only occurs in case
the coercive act is resisted by the concerned.127 What Kelsen understands from
coercion is that the sanction can be applied without taking the consent of the
concerned.128 Therefore, if X had willfully paid the damages to Y, sanction
still would have existed. In such a case the decision of the court ordering X to
pay damages should be considered as the existing sanction. Therefore,
sanction, in this case, is a norm.129 Moreover, while evaluating certain
criticism with regards to the perception of law as a coercive order, Kelsen's
remarks that he, without a doubt, considered sanctions to be legal norms
prescribing coercion.130 Similarly, the notification of EO based upon the
application by Y and the decision of the court is another norm sanctioning the
non-fulfillment of the court decision. Only when what is prescribed by this
notification, the “ought” statement expressed by such notification, is not
complied with does the merely factual (although legally envisaged)
imposition of evil take place. Therefore, we can infer that any decision taken
by EO in relation to non-compliance with the notification can be considered
as another norm sanctioning the violation (or avoidance) of the notification.
Whatever happens afterwards is related to the officers of the relevant
authorities complying with the last decision of EO regarding seizure of X's
assets. In this last decision X is not the addressee of the norm. She is not the
Kelsen, 2008, pp. 24-26; Kelsen, 1949, p. 17.
Kelsen, 2008, p. 34.
Kelsen, 1949, p. 19.
128
Kelsen, 2008, p. 108(Coercion does not necessarily entail use of physical force.
129
Kelsen thinks that court decisions are norms (see ibid., pp. 236-237. Also see Gülgeç, 2016, pp. 108110.). We share the same idea and following his footsteps we conclude that any legal act that is not
purely factual, regardless of their generality, abstractness or objectivity which are the criteria for a norm
to constitute a rule, is a norm and it takes its place in the hierarchy of norms of the relevant legal order.
130
See Kelsen, 1949, pp. 28-29.
125
126
127
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concerned party. Legally authorized EO takes a decision addressing its own
officers and the assets of X is the subject-matter of this decision. The fact that
execution proceedings are performed against the will of X stems from the fact
that X is not party to or concerned with the last decision of EO.131
From this follows that sanction is a norm created as a response to the
violation of another norm and applied even against the will of the concerned
individual. Therefore, sanctions do not appear as acts or practices subject to
factual considerations and evaluations. They are, as Hauser states, norms,
however, not every norm is a sanction.132 In other words, “sanction is a norm
at the service of another norm”.133 Clark also concludes that the term sanction
has never meant and does not mean today the actual punishment or evil
inflicted but the norm envisaging the infliction of such evil or imposition of
such punishment.134 We shall refer to this understanding and definition of the
sanction as the normative understanding.
Is the normative understanding of the term sanction the only alternative?
Can the sanction not be defined as the factual retribution act and not as the
norm created due to the violation? Certainly, there are definitions seeming to
adopt a factual understanding of the concept of sanction. Kemal Gözler
defines sanction as “... a coercion imposed as a reaction to the violation of a
norm.”.135 However, one should not make haste for the conclusion that this
“coercion” signifies the factual sanction. He later concedes that sanction is a
norm.136 This interpretation is in line with the Kelsenian understanding of a
sanction where sanction is not the physical force itself, but still a coercive act
and a norm since the creation of such norm is realized against the will of the
concerned, that the norm related to the individual is issued unilaterally and is
generally perceived as an “evil”.
This understanding of coercion as “being against the will of the
concerned or the addressee” is a fundamental characteristic of almost all acts
Despite, according to our view, Kelsen considers sanctions to be norms created against the will of the
concerned, that is coercively, he uses expressions that would suggest otherwise. See for instance, the
examples he gives for the sanctions as civil execution. (Kelsen, 2008, p. 109.) We tend to think that such
impression is caused by the expression he uses (such as “forcible taking away” and “forcibly bringing
someone before the court” and not the decision - or the norm - prescribing such forcible actions) and it
can be interpreted to comply with the normative understanding of the concept of sanction (for uses of
language supporting our interpretation see ibid., p. 110 where Kelsen refers to the decisions of courts as
sanctions). However, such an interpretation may be considered as a distortion of his writing. This is why,
to be studious, we will have to consider that a factual understanding of the concept is also possible.
132
Hauser, 1968, p. 9 (“...jede Sanktion is ein Sollen, aber nicht jedes Sollen eine Sanktion.”).
133
Perrin, 1979, p. 93 (quoting Gözler, 1998b, p.43).
134
Clark, 1883, p. 133.
135
Gözler, 1998b, p. 44.
136
Ibid., p. 45.
131
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in the domain of public law. Unilaterality is even a distinctive quality of
administrative acts: they are issued and give rise to legal obligations upon the
will of the public authority alone. Therefore, it is doubtful whether it functions
as a distinctive criterion for sanctions, other than indicating that sanctions have
public law roots and that they indicate the exercise of public authority. All
statutes and majority of the administrative acts are or may be, in this sense,
created coercively and against the will of the concerned.
Austin has also viewed sanction as a use of force, as an evil imposed on
the individual for violating the command of the sovereign.137 A further
characteristic of the sanction is that it is annexed to law, that is to say that it
needs to be envisaged by the legal order.138 However, this definition is not
sufficient to conclude that Austin thought sanction is not a norm but the final
act of evil carried out in order to punish the violation of a norm.139 Austin
distinguishes physical compulsion from sanction considering that individuals,
with the fear of greater evil, may feel obliged to consent to the sanction (the
evil inflicted as a reaction to the violation) although no physical compulsion
exists.140 Austin mentions that physical suffering (physical compulsion?) is
the ultimate sanction.141 We understand that Austin has considered both,
creation of a norm as a reaction to the violation and acts performed in the
actual fulfillment of the sanctioning norm against the will of the concerned, as
“necessary evils” and therefore sanctions. If we go back to our example, not
only decision of sequestration taken by EO but also actual acts of the officers
while seizing X's assets are sanctions. The ultimate sanction is not a norm, but
a fact. It is not an “ought”, but an “is”. At some point, a factual sanction needs
to exist as otherwise sanctions would continue to be violable “ought
statements” making way for inefficacious legal systems.142 Austin's
understanding seems to be a combination of two alternative definitions of
sanction. Except for this last point, on which Kelsen is far from clear, there
seems to be a correlation between Kelsen's and Austin's understanding of
sanction. Sanction does not need to exist against the will of the violator.
Sanction is a reaction, although normative in character, to the violation of a
norm.
Austin, 1875, p. 217. The violated command needs not to be issued directly by the sovereign as any
command issued based on a delegation of power by the sovereign is valid and binding according to
Austin. See Austin, 2001, pp. 191-192.
138
Austin, 1875, p. 253.
139
Felix Somló seems to think that Austin stumbles into holding sanction as something independent from
the norm envisaging it. Somló, 1917, p. 65, fn. 2.
140
Austin 1875, pp. 222-223.
141
Ibid., p. 223.
142
Ibid.
137
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
We do not believe that theories perceiving sanctions as factually inflicted
evil would necessarily be wrong. In fact, in terms of its relation to the concepts
of efficacy and validity, how sanction is defined is not crucial. After all,
different definitions focus on different concepts. They are reverse
denominations for different things and concepts. What matters is not how
different things are named the same. What matters is whether the definition,
meaning of this thing is consistent with the role assigned thereto in the relevant
theory. Therefore, without further discussion, we will concede that although
there is a strong inclination in legal theory to define sanctions as norms and
we show the same tendency, this does not have to be the situation.
Consequently, while analyzing the role sanctions play in relation to the
concepts of efficacy and validity we will try to consider the other, although
distinctly, possible definition of sanction.
II. Role of Sanctions in Legal Theory
In this sub-section we aim to discuss what role is associated with
sanctions in legal theory, whether they are considered as a compulsory
element of legal norms or legal systems. Since we have concluded that there
are two possible perceptions with regards to the concept of sanction, such as
normative and factual understandings, while evaluating the role associated
with the sanctions in legal theory, we will take into account both possibilities
where relevant.
Law is a social order. Social orders may in general prescribe sanctions or
not. Where they prescribe sanctions, the nature of the sanctions prescribed
may be different.143 What distinguishes law from other social orders is that it
is coercive, that is to say it prescribes sanctions and these sanctions are socially
immanent, not transcendental sanctions.144
Since law is conceived of as a coercive order Kelsen thinks that the basic
norm of any national legal order could be formulated as “Coercion of man
against man ought to be exercised in the manner and under the conditions
determined by the historically first constitution.”.145 The basic norm is
presupposed with such content because the legal order is perceived as a
coercive order and coercion, therefore, sanction is an essential and inseparable
element of what is legal.146 According to him, legal obligation with regards to
Kelsen, 2008, pp. 27-28.
Ibid., p. 33.
145
Ibid., p. 50.
146
Ibid.
143
144
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a certain behavior only arises when the opposite of that behavior is made the
condition of a sanction.147
Kelsen recognizes two basic objections against the definition of law as a
coercive order. The first stipulates that the legal orders are not merely formed
of duty-imposing norms and that there are also power-conferring rules which
do not attach any sanctions to the non-performance of the authorized behavior.
The second claims that non-compliance with the sanctioning norm itself is not
sanctioned.148 Kelsen believes that this second objection is invalid and it is
important that his words are directly referenced here:
The second objection is not valid, because the definition of law
as a coercive order can be maintained even if the norm that
stipulates a coercive act is not itself essentially connected with a
norm that attaches, in a concrete case, a sanction to the nonordering or non-executing of the coercive act - if, therefore, the
coercive act stipulated in the general norm is to be interpreted
objectively not as commanded but only as authorized or
positively permitted...149
From this passage it is inferred that Kelsen is primarily concerned with
perceiving the legal order as a coercive order in general and that individual
norms do not have to be sanctioned, i.e. commanding. This indicates that the
legal norms comprising a sanction is not itself coercive, but it is what makes
the general norm, to which the sanction is connected, a coercive norm. As a
result, all sanctions non-application of which has not been set as the condition
of another sanction are to be conceived of as authorizing norms. Let us
concretize the situation: According to Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution
of 1982, the Constitutional Court is to annul any statutes contrary to the
Constitution either in method or principle. This is envisaged as a sanction
against the laying down of statutes in a way contrary to the constitutionally
prescribed procedure or statutes with a content contrary to the constitution.
However, what would happen in case the Constitutional Court does not annul
a statute which is either in method or principle contrary to the Constitution?
The Constitution itself does not provide any sanction against the nonapplication of Article 148 in which case the sanction against the
unconstitutional statutes is not a commanded but an authorized action.
147
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 51.
149
Ibid.
148
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
The first objection can be refuted based on the concept of “dependent
norms”. Accordingly, dependent norms are those norms which do not
themselves stipulate a sanction, however, are connected to a sanction
stipulating norm in that the stipulated sanction is either a reaction to the nonfulfillment of the seemingly unsanctioned norm or the unsanctioned
permissive norm is related to limiting the scope of any sanction to be applied
otherwise. Therefore, Kelsen believes that the conception of law as a coercive
order can still be maintained insofar as the unsanctioned norm is a dependent
legal norm.150
Legal norm is not a text, but the meaning of a certain text. Therefore, it
is natural that norms are not limited with the text of a certain article. It is
perfectly in order to present the generally commanded behavior in one article
(or any particular “piece” of the legislation) and the sanction in another. Since
constitutional norms are generally considered to be unsanctioned, let us
consider another example related to the lawmaking authority of the parliament
from the Turkish Constitution: Article 87 of the Turkish Constitution grants
lawmaking power to the parliament which needs to be used via statutes. In
appearance, this norm does not include any sanctions in case of nonfulfillment; it does not even include any particular procedure to lay down the
statutes. This is only because the norm is perceived to be limited with the text.
In another article (Article 96/1) the Constitution provides for that all decisions
in the parliament (including those relating to the enactment of statutes) shall
be taken by the simple majority of the votes cast unless the constitution
specifically provides otherwise. Moreover, Article 95/1 envisages that further
procedures relating to the internal organization and operation of the
parliament shall be laid down by the house regulations. We have so far
mentioned three norms complementing one another and have not heard of a
sanction. This is where Article 148 pitches in. In case the parliament enacts a
statute in a way contrary to the procedure provided in the previous articles, the
Constitutional Court is to annul such statute upon application by certain
parties.151 The norm related to the lawmaking activity of the parliament is not
comprised of a single article, but is the meaning inferred from the text of
several articles. Consequently, it is not precisely correct that the three articles
mentioned above are “unsanctioned norms”.
150
151
Ibid.
As per Article 150 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic, parliamentary groups of the
majority and the main opposition party, in addition to the one fifth of the total number of the members
of the parliament are entitled to apply for the annulment action in the Constitutional Court with claim of
unconstitutionality.
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Sometimes, however, a certain prescribed action in an article really does
not entail any sanctions in case they are not performed, i.e. the conditions set
in the article are not fulfilled. Kelsen suggests that even in this case the
coercive character of law in general may not be affected if it is possible to
perceive the concerned article as a limitation of an otherwise applicable
sanction's scope. Kelsen shows natural obligations fulfillment of which cannot
be enforced in a court as an example.152 For example, according to Turkish
law gambling debts or debts which have lapsed due to statute of limitation are
natural obligations fulfillment of which cannot be enforced in any court. In
Kelsen's view, the norm preventing the enforcement of gambling debts in
courts is a norm restricting the validity of the sanction applicable in case a
contractual obligation has not been fulfilled.153
Lastly, there may be cases outside the scope of the first two categories
where the sanction is stipulated in another article (or another norm as Kelsen
puts it) or the concerned article does not constitute a limitation to already
existing sanction. In such cases, Kelsen asserts that the norm's subjective
meaning cannot be considered as its objective meaning and that the norm is
legally irrelevant.154 One important point is that Kelsen does not claim such
norms are invalid, but legally irrelevant. It is not clear what legal irrelevance
entails. One possibility is that such norms do not have a content to be taken
into consideration in legal reasoning. They do not impose legal obligations.
For instance, Articles 121/3 and 122/2 of the Turkish Constitution regulates
the enactment of statutory decrees during state of emergency or martial law.
Accordingly, such norms may only be laid down in relation to the situations
necessitating the state of emergency or martial law and they can only be
implemented for the duration of emergency and martial law. Nevertheless, the
constitutionality of such statutory decrees enacted during the state of
emergency or martial law by the Council of Ministers chaired by the President
of the Republic cannot be reviewed by any court. There is no sanction the
condition of which is non-compliance with the requirements set in Articles
121/3 and 122/2 regarding the conditions required for the issuance of these
statutory decrees. Since no other norm attaches a sanction to the opposite
behavior and natural obligation does not come into question this provision is
legally irrelevant according to Kelsen.155 But is this truly so?
Kelsen, 2008, pp. 51-52.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 52.
155
We will not go into detail, however, this inference may not be entirely true. Statutory decrees issued
during state of emergency or martial law need to be submitted to the parliament. The Parliament
possesses the power to abrogate such decrees. However, judicial review of these decrees is prevented
152
153
154
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
First of all, as we have mentioned above, Kelsen is primarily concerned
with defining law as a coercive order and regardless of the pertinence of this
concern, the perception of law as a sanctioned social order is naturally crucial.
However, does the fact that law is a coercive order require each and every
single norm to be somehow related to a sanction prescribing norm? Does the
same fact necessitate the labeling of unsanctioned norms or norms that are in
no way related to other norms prescribing sanctions as legally irrelevant?
Honestly, it is not possible to see the connection between the coercive
character of law in general and the necessity of each and every single norm to
relate to a sanction in Kelsen's pure theory.156 In our opinion, it is perfectly
possible to conceive law as a coercive order even if certain norms in the
system do not contain, prescribe or in any way relate to sanctions. This is
partly due to the fact that our ideas in relation to the concept of law in general
must depend on meta-legal, factual or non-factual observances. Kelsen does
his part of factual observation while trying to distinguish law from other social
orders. Law must be perceived as an efficacious order if we are to distinguish
law from other social orders or the system constituted by a gang of robbers or
mafia family.157 This inference is not a result of the techniques provided by
the normative science of law, but an initial consequence of an external
observation. We are inclined to think that despite such initial meta-legal
observation and the inference as a result thereof, the subject of legal norms
should have been elaborated restrictively with reference to the normative
science of law. If the condition for validity of legal norms can only be
determined by other legal norms (except for the constitutional norms perhaps
which are presupposed to be valid according to the basic norm) and if validity
is the equivalent of legal existence, how can a perfectly valid legal norm be
legally irrelevant? Below we attempt to demonstrate that the norms falling
under this third category can also be considered as legally relevant and
constitute the legal basis of actions performed by the state officials.
by Article 148/1 of the Constitution. It might be asserted, therefore, that the Parliament has the authority
of authentic interpretation regarding the conditions set for these kind of statutory decrees in Articles
121/3 and 122/2. In any case, however, the authentic interpretation power does not belong to the courts
due to the fact that judicial review of such decrees is not legally possible. We assume that any decision
of the Parliament with regards to these kind of statutory decrees cannot be considered as sanctions or
we simply disregards that the Constitution has laid down such requirement. Similarly, a certain minority
in Turkish legal literature thinks that the Council of State is entitled to perform the judicial review of
such statutory decrees based on Article 125/1 which envisages that all kinds of acts and actions of the
administration will be subject to judicial review (see, e.g., Tülen, 2004, pp. 91-93. We have previously
sided with the view that statutory decrees issued during martial law or state of emergency are not subject
to judicial review (see Gülgeç, 2016, pp. 202-206.).
156
See Raz, 1980, p. 81.
157
Kelsen, 2008, p. 54.
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Legal realism has stemmed from the fact that in legal systems certain
organs (actually courts) have an authentic interpretation authority. It is
undeniable that every legal text requires a certain degree of interpretation in
order to be perceived as an “ought”, to be understood as a norm.158 Authentic
interpretation authority means that the interpretation of the interpreter cannot
be changed by any other organ and has an ultimately binding effect. Supreme
courts authority of which cannot be challenged by any other organ exemplify
authentic interpreters. In Turkish Law, the Constitutional Court, Court of
Cassation (“Yargıtay”) and the Council of State (“Danıştay”) are amongst
organs possessing authentic interpretation power. However, organs other than
courts may also possess this power. In some cases, courts are not the final
chain with regards to the application of law. In our example above, regarding
the statutory decrees issued by the Council of Ministers chaired by the
President of the Republic, the authentic interpretation authority with regards
to the disposition of Articles 121/3 and 122/2 belongs to the Council of
Ministers and the President of the Republic.
Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution envisages that the Constitutional
Court is authorized to perform judicial review of constitutionality with regards
to the house regulations of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, statutes and
statutory decrees. Statutory decrees issued during state of emergency or
martial law is an exception. Constitutionality review of these norms cannot be
performed by the Constitutional Court due to the disposition of Article 148/1.
However, in case Kelsen's postulate regarding sanctions are accepted, the
limitation of the Constitutional Court's power of judicial review with statutes,
house regulations and statutory decrees is legally irrelevant. Because such
limitation is not a dependent norm sanction for which has been envisaged in
another article. There is no sanction against the Constitutional Court's
decisions contrary to the Constitution. Therefore, this limitation cannot be
considered as a condition restricting the scope of another sanction. Neither can
the existence of a natural obligation be postulated. It is not only that natural
obligation exists in relation to matters of private law159 but also that it exists
in relation to obligations non-fulfillment of which is normally the condition
for the application of a sanction. Although the first part of the article granting
the Constitutional Court to issue an act of annulment seems permissive, such
permission is not unlimited. Therefore, two norms can be mentioned with the
first being a permissive norm and the latter being a duty-imposing norm
limiting the scope of this permission.
158
159
Gözler, 2013, p. 17.
See Kelsen, 2008, pp. 52-52 (civic execution).
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
We cannot accept such an understanding of legal obligation. The
legislator may choose to confer the legality review of a norm to an organ other
than the one enacting such a norm. This is the usual inclination of the liberal
legal systems of our contemporary world. However, we see no legal reason
requiring this to be the situation. It may well be that the constitutional fathers
wished to leave the consideration of the legality of the decisions of the
Constitutional Court to the judges of the same court. Or, as for our other
example, the legality of the statutory decrees issued during state of emergency
or martial law is to be performed by the Council of Ministers chaired by the
President of the Republic just as only judges of the Constitutional Court, may
review the legality of the Court's decisions. If the Constitutional Court is
legally obligated to reject reviewing the constitutionality of norms other than
the ones stated in Article 148, so are the Council of Ministers and the President
of the Republic required to limit the application of the statutory decrees with
the duration of the situation necessitating the martial law or state of emergency
and enact statutory decrees only in relation to the matters required by the
emergency.
These examples also suggest that factual understanding of sanction may
not entirely be appropriate. The decisions of the Constitutional Court in
Turkey are sanctions prescribed against the legislator's enactment of a norm
contrary to the constitution. However, this sanction does not entail any change
in the factual realm.160 The sanction itself is a norm and there is no reflection
of this norm in the factual realm, that is there is no Austinian ultimate sanction
constituting a physical compulsion in this case. The sanction imposed by the
Constitutional Court creates a change only in the normative realm. The
relevant statute is annulled and no longer valid or legally existent. Therefore,
a pure factual understanding of sanction would not categorize such acts as
sanctions. It may be concluded that normative understanding of sanction or at
least a hybrid version of the two understandings is more explanatory of how
the word sanction is used in legal language. However, even this does not
ultimately prove that sanction should be defined in a certain way and not the
other, fundamentally because definitions are, as previously stated, reverse
denominations.
Austin is another positivist who placed great importance on sanctions in
his theory. This importance follows directly from Austin's understanding of
law. We have mentioned above in related sections that Austin considers law
160
But see Hart, 2012, pp. 33-35 (Hart explains that nullity is not a sanction. We will not discuss this in
detail; however, we see no reason why declaration of nullity or annulment actions should not be
considered as sanctions applied against the creator of the norm.).
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to be the product, the command of a sovereign or products and commands
issued by those authorized by the sovereign. Sanctions are perceived as the
evil imposed on those disobeying a valid command of the sovereign.161 Since
he perceives sanction as an evil, Austin's understanding diverges from those
of Locke and Bentham who include rewards within the meaning of the term
sanction.162 According to Austin, “this extension of the term is pregnant with
confusion and perplexity”163 and “...to talk of commands and duties as
sanctioned or enforced by rewards, or to talk of rewards as obliging or
constraining to obedience, is surely a wide departure from the established
meaning of the terms”.164 The term command expresses that 1) a wish or desire
is expressed by the sovereign in relation to a subject of the sovereign which is
2) backed by a threat of sanctions in case of non-compliance and 3) expressed
by use of vocal or written language or other signs.165 Accordingly, sanctions
are inherent in Austin's understanding of law and legal norm. According to
him, unsanctioned expressions of will of the sovereign are lex imperfecta.
Austin states that since the issuer of such wishes or desires does not imply that
it wishes to enforce it, these are not binding.166 Unsanctioned expressions of
will or desires are not law properly so called even though they are issued by
the sovereign or issued upon an authorization by the sovereign. Moreover,
only general commands are considered to be law.167
Austin and Kelsen perceived legal order as an essentially coercive order
and this definition found its reflections in every corner of their legal theory.
Hart on the other hand, did not understand law as a mere coercive order. He
considered “sanctions” only as the plan B of the legal systems. The plan A
consisted of the vision that subjects would willingly abide by the requirements
of law.168 Accordingly, Hart thought that there are easily noticed fields of law
where understanding of law as a coercive order fails.169 First of all, there are,
in every legal systems, some norms that are not coercively enforced.170 This
lack of coercive action against the breaches of the norm is not due to the nonapplication of the prescribed sanctions by the governmental authorities or
courts but due to the fact that sanctions have not been legally envisaged. Any
Austin, 1875, p. 217.
Austin, 2001, p. 23.
163
Ibid.
164
Ibid.
165
Ibid., p. 24.
166
Ibid., p. 32.
167
Raz, 1980, p. 25.
168
Green, 2012, p. xxx.
169
Hart, 2012, p. 27.
170
Green, 2012, p. xxx.
161
162
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
restriction imposed on the Turkish Constitutional Court exemplifies duties
without sanctions. Similarly, the house regulations of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly envisage certain procedures regarding the lawmaking
procedure. However, violation of these procedural requirements is not the
condition for any sanction. According to Article 148/2 of the Constitution, the
statute can be annulled only in case the majority required in the final voting
procedures is not reached. Secondly, Hart does not adopt Kelsen's
individuation of norms or Austin's assertion with regards to the duty-imposing
character of seemingly permissive norms. Hart is disturbed by the fact that
legal theory barrenly presents two alternatives in relation to the concept of
sanction: it either is a natural necessity of the terms law and legal order or the
fact that legal systems are mostly sanctioned orders.171 Hart's theory affords a
third alternative where sanctions are not the necessary, natural or
indispensible component of that which is legal.
We share the opinion that not all norms of a legal system are sanctioned
and coercively enforced. Examples of such cases might be rare and difficult
to detect; however rare they may be, their existence demands an explanation.
We do not think that labeling of such norms as “legally irrelevant” or reducing
them to “non-binding expression of wills or desires improperly called as law”
help jurisprudence in any way. They still exist in legal material, created by
legally envisaged organs or persons and according to legally prescribed
procedures. However, we do not share Hart's idea that power-conferring rules
cannot be coercively enforced. Power-conferring norms can be summarily
defined as those legal rules granting rights or authorizing certain individuals
or groups. There is no doubt that such rules are at first sight power-conferring
and they do not impose any obligations or legal duties. However, this is only
the case for the direct addressees of the power-conferring norms. “Granting a
right” implies that the legal order means to protect and legalize certain
behavior of the individuals subject to that legal order. In case such rights and
freedoms are breached by others, whether by government officials or private
individuals, the legal order may react against such breach if the appropriate
legal mechanism, i.e. a sanctioning mechanism, has been envisaged. As
previously indicated, authorizing a certain individual, group or body,
especially in the field of public law where powers are accidental, means that
the said authority can only be exercised by the mentioned individual, group or
body.172 Therefore, it is possible to interpret power-conferring rules as norms
171
172
Hart, 2012, p. 199.
Because in the field of public law, expressio unius est exclusio alterius is the valid principle of
interpretation unless otherwise is clear from the letter of the provision. See Gözler, 2013, pp. 70-71.
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which confer powers (or grant rights) to certain individuals, groups or organs
while imposing a duty of observance on others (or even to the same
individuals, groups or organs to which the powers or rights are granted). It is
irrelevant whether the sanction is provided in the same article or even in the
same legal material because legal norm does not have to be made up of a single
article, material or text. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the so-called
power-conferring rules, just like any other legal norm, may or may not be
coercively enforceable depending on whether the sanctioning mechanism has
been provided for or not.
Hart reiterates the fact that sanctions are not an essential component of
what is legal while discussing the legal quality of international law. Hart
evaluates the criticism directed at international law's legal character based on
the fact that it does not have an effective sanctioning mechanism and,
therefore, any coercive nature at all. For the sake of argument, Hart ignores
the sanctions that can be applied by the Security Council within the context of
the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. If international law
cannot be considered as a binding order, i.e. an order which truly gives rise to
obligations, due to the absence of centrally organized sanctions, this indicates
that “having an obligation” or “being bound” is identified with “likeliness to
suffer the sanction or punishment threatened for disobedience”.173 This
identification is a direct result of the assumption that law is a coercive order.
If this assumption is based on an observation, it is generally true and “...not
all rules give rise to obligations or duties; and ...the rules which do so generally
call for some sacrifice of private interests, and ... generally supported by
serious demands for conformity and insistent criticism of deviations.”.174
However, there are exceptions to this observation which generally holds true.
These exceptions are norms fulfilling the criteria of validity provided by the
legal theories conceiving of sanctions as an essential feature of law and legal
norms. In case efficacy is understood, as we have suggested above, as a
combination of rate of conformity with the norms of a legal system and
effective application of sanctions against the breaches, there is no reason none theoretically - suggesting that a completely unsanctioned system of
norms cannot be efficacious as long as its norms are by and large observed by
the individuals subject to that legal system.
As a result, the idea that coercion and sanctions are essential elements of
the legal system and the legal norm respectively must be abandoned. We do
not deny here that majority of the legal systems are coercive orders nor do we
173
174
Hart, 2012, p. 217.
Ibid., p. 218.
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
deny that most of the legal norms in such systems are sanctioned: legal texts
or individual sections thereof either envisage the sanction to be applied
themselves or such sanction is determined by another text or section.
However, this should not be made an absolute characteristic of that which is
legal. Why does Kelsen not categorize unsanctioned norms (those norms
which are neither permissive, thus limiting the scope of an applicable sanction,
nor individuated) as “invalid” but as “legally irrelevant”? What does legal
irrelevance entail? If legal validity means legal existence,175 why would
something that is legally existent be legally irrelevant where at least its
existence is of legal relevance? Why does Austin not expressly declare that
unsanctioned norms are invalid expressions of an unlimited, supreme
sovereign? If validity of the norms stems from the will of the sovereign,176
why does Austin say that norms without sanctions are not binding? If it is
possible to comply with legal norms without or before the application of any
sanctions, why should the mere fact that the sovereign has not expressed the
will to enforce its desire abolish the binding force of the desire? Answers to
these questions have not been satisfactorily provided by the defenders of the
theories embracing sanctions and coerciveness as the absolute elements of the
legal system and/or the legal norm. An understanding of sanctions as an
auxiliary concept of jurisprudence on the other hand cracks the door open for
new possibilities where more light can be shed on the qualities of what is legal.
III. Validity - Efficacy and Sanction
The concept of validity or coercive character of law does not have any
direct relation to validity. Validity is the legal existence of a legal system or a
legal norm. The validity of the legal order as a whole has usually, i.e. in Kelsen
and Hart, been associated with an ultimate norm, validity of which cannot be
questioned, and the general efficacy of the system. Coerciveness does not
appear as a separate condition for the validity of the legal order in legal
positivism. It might, however, be related with the general efficacy of the legal
system. The validity of individual norms in a legal system, on the other hand,
means that the norm is existent, that it must be observed, or its meaning needs
to be considered in juridical thinking. In other words, the valid norm has
binding force.177 Although the result of validity is somewhat agreed upon, preKelsen, 2008, p. 10.
Raz, 1980, p. 14.
177
We are not using the term “binding force” as “the imposition of a duty or obligation”. This identification
seems to be problematic especially with regards to rules conferring powers. Here norms with “binding
force” only means that the relevant organs of the legal system or the individuals subject thereto needs to
take these norms into account while trying to predict the legal consequences of their actions. Norms with
binding force are capable of producing legal results.
175
176
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conditions of validity for individual norms may display differences in
different theories. In Kelsen's and Hart's theories, sanction does not constitute
a pre-condition for the validity of individual norms.178 In Austin, however, the
existence of a connection between being sanctioned and valid is apparent, if
validity is identified with binding force. While mentioning the improper use
of the term “law” Austin asserts that unsanctioned norms do not have binding
force and therefore are not commands.179 Not only that such expressions are
not commands, but since command and law are identical in Austin's theory,
they cannot be considered as law or legal in the correct sense of the term. We
have, however, previously concluded that such an understanding identifying
law with command and obligation with the likeliness to be sanctioned as
unsatisfactory and will not go into detail here in order to avoid repetition.
Validity is a pre-condition, in fact the only pre-condition, for the legal
existence of a sanction, as long as the normative understanding of the concept
is concerned. In normative understanding, sanction is a norm which is to be
created when another norm has been breached and application (or even mere
creation) of which constitutes an evil for the violator. Therefore, just like any
other norm, sanction prescribing act needs to be created in a way prescribed
by the relevant criteria of validity. On the other hand, there is no such
relationship between validity and the existence of sanction in case the factual
understanding of sanction is concerned. In this alternative, sanction is a factual
occurrence. It is a behavior, usually of the state officials, which is required by
a valid norm of the legal system. Therefore, the question cannot be the validity
of this behavior but its conformity with the norm envisaging such behavior.
Above, following Hart, we have rejected the idea suggested by Kelsen
that minimum efficacy is a condition for the validity of an individual norm.
However, it is, of course, still possible to speak of the individual norms'
efficacy. Therefore, the relationship between the efficacy of the individual
norms and the concept of sanction needs some attention. We have decided that
efficacy essentially means the observance of the norms of a legal system by
the individuals subject thereto. An efficacious legal system means that the
norms of the legal system are by and large observed. Similarly, an efficacious
norm would mean that the prescription of the norm is observed more often
than not. However, this is only one aspect of efficacy. Another factor related
to the efficacy of the legal system and the individual norms would be the
effective application of sanctions or other coercive measures in case the norms
Although Kelsen declares norms which do not prescribe any sanctions or which are not in any way
related to sanction prescribing norms as “legally irrelevant”, we do not think that he tries to mean they
are invalid.
179
Austin, 2001, p. 32.
178
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
are breached. Sanctions are not in any way related to the first aspect of the
concept of efficacy where individuals willingly abide by the norms of a
system. They only pitch in once the norm is breached regardless of whether
normative or factual understanding of the concept is concerned. Consequently,
it is apt to conclude that sanctions and the fact that they are enforced in case
of breaches have a positive impact on the legal system's or the individual
norm's rate of efficacy.
Nevertheless, it needs to be reiterated that normative understanding of
the concept of sanction would unify the factors affecting the rate of efficacy.
In case the sanction is a norm, “effective application of sanctions” would mean
nothing more than creation of certain norms and the concerned individuals
compliance therewith. Therefore, in the normative understanding of sanction,
the second factor of the rate of efficacy needs to refer not to the sanction
(norm) itself but its coercive enforcement.
The concept of sanction and validity are only indirectly interrelated.
Validity comes into question regarding sanctions only when the normative
understanding of sanctions is accepted. Moreover, this is not any different
from what validity means for any other norm. Sanction is a norm and it only
exists as a sanction if it is valid. From the point of view of factual
understanding, validity is irrelevant. On the other hand, sanctions have a direct
effect on the rate of efficacy of a system or norm. Nevertheless, any
unsanctioned norm or system would not amount to be an inefficacious norm
or system since the concept of efficacy has two determinants. The first, and in
our opinion more important,180 determinant is the rate of compliance where
sanctions have not yet come into question. Thus, an identification of efficacy
with the existence and application of sanctions would be a mistake. Even a
completely unsanctioned legal system could be efficacious in case the rest of
the norms are by and large complied with. However, sanctions, as the plan B
of the legal system, act as the guarantors of future compliance in case the plan
A fails. This seems to be the only way sanctions can be coherently
incorporated into a theory of legal positivism.
CONCLUSION
Majority of our inferences regarding the relationship between the
concepts of validity, efficacy and sanction (or coerciveness) has been stated
above. We will simply reiterate and combine these results.
The concept of validity is the focus and the building block of legal
positivism. This is mostly because positivism cannot derive norms from
180
This is not a statistical inference; however, only a few would deny that legal norms are generally obeyed,
observed and complied with. Instances of compliance are more than breaches.
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sources untouched by human creation and will. We have concluded that in
theories examined above, the meaning of validity is mostly the same although
the pre-conditions for the validity of the legal system and individual norms
may differ. In our case, the fact that pre-conditions of validity are determined
differently in different theories does not inhibit us from adequately
considering the interrelation between validity, efficacy and sanctions. The
important thing is that a more or less constant meaning is determined for
validity and “valid norm”.
In case efficacy is merely considered to be the rate of observance of the
norms of a legal system or of a single norm, any norm which is not observed
makes a negative contribution to the efficacy of a legal system or norm.
Nevertheless, we also need to consider the suggestion that sanctions applied
in case of such breaches also play a part in the determination of a legal
system's or norm's efficacy level. Every breach of a norm is a negative impact
on the total level of efficacy. However, if coercive sanctions are effectively
applied as a reaction to such breaches, the norm's efficacy level should not be
as low as an unsanctioned norm's. The same applies to the efficacy of a legal
system which envisages sanctions for the breaches of its norms and sanctions
of which are effectively applied. Therefore, we have suggested to conceive of
efficacy as formed of two components. One is the rate of observance. The
other is the effective application of sanctions. Only a combination of these two
factors may determine the total efficacy of a legal system or efficacy level of
an individual norm.
The concept of efficacy is a meta-legal, but still a jurisprudential concept.
It is meta-legal because, as far as legal positivism is concerned, no legally
authorized organ has enacted a norm envisaging that legal systems must be
efficacious on the whole in order to be valid.181 It is still a jurisprudential
concept, though, since it is established as a condition for the validity of a legal
system as a whole. As the condition for the validity of the legal system, the
concept of efficacy may be said to fulfill two important functions: firstly, it
serves to separate the legal system from other social orders in a society. In
other words, it defines the legal system as the most efficacious social order in
181
Here we need to note that one exception to the meta-legal conception of efficacy appears in Kelsen's
monist theory of international law where Kelsen considers this relationship between the general efficacy
of a legal system and its validity as prescribed by a norm of customary international law. This norm is
called the principle of efficacy. An assessment of this assertion would require much detail and attention
such as consideration of propriety of a monist construction between international and municipal law.
Moreover, the existence of such a norm of customary international law would have to be questioned.
Such an inquiry is certainly possible, nevertheless, it is also outside the scope of our endeavors in this
article. This is why, for now, we need to disregard this possibility and continue to treat the concept of
efficacy as a meta-legal concept.
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Interrelationship Between Validity…
a given society. Secondly, it explains the rise and fall of the legal systems and
their geographical delimitation. A legal order may be invalidated by the rebel
or revolutionary forces or by Coup d'Etat. Consequently, its importance for
jurisprudence cannot be underestimated. Since efficacy is a meta-legal
concept and at the same time a condition for the validity of the legal system,
any consideration with regards to the validity of a legal system also demands
reference to factual considerations that are not subject to normative
dispositions.
The same cannot be said with regards to the validity of individual norms.
The evaluation of validity of such norms does not require inclusion of metalegal concepts.182 A norm belonging to a legal system is valid, if it is created
in a way conforming to the requirements set by the superior norm(s). Validity
of the legal system cannot be based on legal grounds. This is because the
boundaries of what is legal is determined by the legal system, validity of which
cannot stem from another legal system as in such case there would not be two
legal systems but only one. The same cannot be said for the validity of
individual norms belonging to a legal system. Requiring individual norms to
possess a minimum level of efficacy is an impurity within the pure theory of
law and it needs to be cleansed of it. Therefore, above we have adopted a view
favoring Hart's point of view on the subject which perceives efficacy as a
condition for the validity of the legal system but not for individual norms.
Efficacy can only affect the validity of individual norms in case a superior
norm envisages such a condition of validity. For instance, constitutionally
envisaging desuetude as a method of rule abrogation would mean that legal
norms, other than the constitution itself, have to possess a minimal efficacy in
order to remain valid. As a result, we can conclude that the concept of efficacy
and the validity of the legal system are directly related. Efficacy of an
individual norm and its validity, on the other hand, may only be related if
expressly regulated by the norms of a legal system.
The assumption that law is a coercive order may hold true in many
aspects. It may statistically be verified that legal norms are sanctioned. We
follow Kelsen's idea that sanctions need not to be stated in the same legal text
182
Perhaps the constitution is the only exception to this assertion in Kelsen's pure theory as its validity
stems from the presupposed basic norm which is not a positive norm but a meta-legal concept
(Delacroix, 2006, p. 49.). However, even if this view is acknowledged, there is no logical reason for the
consideration of the efficacy of a constitutional norm in order to determine whether it is valid. Kelsen's
views regarding the basic norm of national legal systems indicates that it confers validity on the
constitution as a whole (Kelsen, 2008, pp. 198-199.). Requiring in addition that the constitutional norms
need to have a minimum efficacy would amount to incorporating the efficacy requirement into the basic
norm.
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or material with the duty imposing norm. However, declaration of norms
which do not prescribe any sanctions and which also are not related to the
validity and scope of other sanctions as legally irrelevant is problematic. Legal
norms can be said to impose obligations even if breaches are not the condition
for the application of sanctions. Otherwise, not only is it impossible to explain
how organs with the power of authentic interpretation generally conform to
the prescriptions of legal norms but it is also illogical to conclude that a legally
valid, therefore legally existent norm is nevertheless legally irrelevant.
Therefore, unsanctioned norms can and actually do lead to legal obligations.
The relationship between validity and sanctions or coercive character of
law only exists in a limited way in case the sanction is understood as a norm
and not the physical force applied as Austin's ultimate sanction as a result of
the resistance to the last chain of normative sanctions. Accordingly, the
relationship of validity and sanctions is not any different from that of validity
and norms: validity is the legal existence of sanctions and sanctions may only
exist, i.e. be valid, according to the determined pre-conditions of validity in
the relevant legal theory. The only consideration with regards to the concept
of validity and sanction defined according to the factual understanding - since
factual sanction also needs to be legally envisaged - relates to conformity, in
that the factual sanction needs to conform to the sanction prescribing norm
just like any other behavior.
Sanctions and the fact that the legal system envisages coercive measures
against the breaches of its legal norms have a more direct effect on efficacy.
The majority of a system's efficacy stems from the willful observance of its
norms by the individuals subject to that system. In case the normative
understanding of the concept of sanction is adopted, the phrase “effective
application of sanctions”, in other words, the second factor impacting the
efficacy rate of a legal system, does not have a different meaning than
“compliance with the system's norms” as the sanction mentioned is also a
norm which demands the compliance of the norm addressees. Therefore, in
order to be able to comment on a legal system's efficacy, “effective application
of sanctions” needs to be considered as a factual observation. In this case, it
needs to be observed, in addition to the rate of compliance with the system's
norms, whether factual coercive measures have been taken against the
breaches.
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