Roe Fremstedal Rational Hope Against Hope? A Pragmatic Approach to Hope and the Ethics of Belief The aim of this paper is to explore a pragmatic approach to hope and the ethics of belief that allows rational hope against hope. Hope against hope is hope that goes beyond what the evidence supports by hoping for something that is both highly unlikely and highly valuable. Cf. Adrienne Martin, How We Hope. A Moral Psychology, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014, 5; James Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope. The Conceptual Foundations of Religion, Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1979, 13, 136. However, this could take different forms. One could either hope against the evidence or merely go beyond it; the evidence could be inconclusive or conclusive, conflicting or clear, misleading or plain, absent or neutral. Hope against hope then convers everything from hoping for something that appears unlikely to hoping for something that appears impossible, judging by the available evidence. However, there is a very long tradition of criticizing hope for being false or irrational. Claudia Blöser and Titus Stahl, “Hope,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2017 Edition, ed. by Edward Zalta, in [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/hope] (last accessed: 26/4/2019). But hope can only be false or irrational if it is subject to rational assessment. This presupposes that it is appropriate to ask for a reason or a justification for hoping, since one can be answerable or responsible for hoping. Moreover, this typically assumes that hopes can be changed in response to reasons. False hopes, notably, should be given up (if possible). However, if hope is subject to rational assessment, it is also possible for hope to be rational or justified. Indeed, I will explore how practical reasons or pragmatic considerations may justify hope against hope, sketching criteria for rational hope that allow hope against hope. Section I introduces evidentialism and pragmatism regarding belief. Sections II and III discuss whether or not rational hope against hope is compatible with evidentialism, favoring a pragmatist approach to hope and belief. Section IV discusses evidentialism and pragmatism, whereas sections V–VII sketch constraints on pragmatism and rational hope. To simplify matters, I will largely abstract from questions of whether or not hopes and beliefs can be willed, either directly or indirectly. I also abstract from whether our actual hopes and beliefs result from reasoning, since this is a contingent psychological issue separate from the question of whether such reasoning is good. I am indebted to Marcus Willaschek here. I. Evidentialism and Pragmatism Regarding Belief Strict evidentialism regarding belief is based on W. K. Clifford’s principles: Andrew Chignell, “The Ethics of Belief,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2018 Edition, ed. by Edward Zalta, in [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ethics-belief] (last accessed: 26/4/2019). (Synchronic Principle) “[I]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.” William Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” Contemporary Review, vol. 29, 1876-1877, 295. (Diachronic Principle) “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to ignore evidence that is relevant to his beliefs, or to dismiss relevant evidence in a facile way.” Peter Van Inwagen, “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence,” in Faith, Freedom and Rationality, ed. by J. Jordan and D. Howard-Snyder, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1996, 145. Note that evidentialists or pragmatists need not endorse substantive views of evidence. Cf. Andrew Reisner, “Pragmatic Reasons for Belief,” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, ed. by Daniel Star, Oxford University Press 2018, 705-728. Non-evidentialism, by contrast, is the view that not all rational beliefs require sufficient evidence (or that one knows that one has such evidence). This view is known as pragmatism regarding belief, since it was developed by American pragmatists, and the practical reasons that support non-evidentialist belief often involve pragmatic arguments for belief. Cf. C. Stephen Evans, “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2014 Edition, ed. by Edward Zalta, in [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/moral-arguments-god] (last accessed: 26/4/2019); Jeff Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2018 Edition, ed. by Edward Zalta, in [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/pragmatic-belief-god] (last accessed: 26/4/2019). Such arguments aim to show that we have practical reasons for believing despite lacking evidence. I will refer to such belief as practical belief. The ethics of belief concerns the normativity that governs the formation, maintenance, and relinquishment of beliefs. Chignell, “The Ethics of Belief.” Although the ethics of belief concerns belief in general, it is nevertheless particularly important to religious belief. Indeed, as Peter Forrest notes, “Contemporary epistemology of religion may conveniently be treated as a debate over whether evidentialism applies to religious beliefs, or whether we should instead adopt a more permissive epistemology.” Peter Forrest, “The Epistemology of Religion,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2017 Edition, ed. by Edward Zalta, in [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/religion-epistemology] (last accessed: 26/4/2019). Generally, strict evidentialism supports the “agnostic imperative” to suspend “belief whenever the evidence is insufficient.” Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.” II. Hope Without Evidence? A Hybrid Account and Its Problems A hybrid account of hope and belief combines strict evidentialism regarding belief with a permissive view of hope. More specifically, it claims that rational belief requires sufficient evidence, although rational hope does not require any such evidence. John Stuart Mill sketched this hybrid view in “Theism” (1874), and Einar Bøhn, Sharon Ryan, and Carl-Johan Palmqvist each defend contemporary variants. John Stuart Mill, Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, ed. John M. Robson, in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1969, vol. 10, 429-489, esp. 430f., 482ff.; Sharon Ryan, “Evidentialism, Hope, and Wisdom: Are Evidentialist Theories of Wisdom Hopeless?,” in Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. New Essays on Evidentialism, ed. by Kevin McCain, New York: Springer 2018, 279-291; Einar Bøhn, “The Logic of Hope: A Defense of the Hopeful,” Religious Studies, vol. 54, 2018, 107-116; Carl-Johan Palmqvist, “Faith and Hope in Situations of Epistemic Uncertainty,” in Religious Studies, first view (online), 2018, 1-17. Although Mill, Bøhn, and Palmqvist tend to focus on religion, this hybrid account concerns hope and belief in general. Mill writes: The whole domain of the supernatural is thus removed from the region of Belief into that of simple Hope; and in that, for anything we can see, it is likely always to remain; for we can hardly anticipate either that any positive evidence will be acquired of the direct agency of Divine Benevolence in human destiny, or that any reason will be discovered for considering the realization of human hopes on that subject as beyond the pale of possibility. Mill, Essays on Ethics, 483. Those who defend the hybrid account may therefore suggest that it is rationally permissible to center one’s life on the proposition that there is a God, by virtue of the propositional attitude of hope rather than belief. Cf. Bøhn, “The Logic of Hope.” Mill writes: [T]o any one who feels it conducive either to his satisfaction or to his usefulness to hope for a future state as a possibility, there is no hindrance to his indulging that hope […]. [T]he indulgence of hope with regard to the government of the universe and the destiny of man after death, while we recognize as a clear truth that we have no ground for more than a hope, is legitimate and philosophically defensible. The beneficial effect of such a hope is far from trifling. Mill, Essays on Ethics, 466, 485. Mill points out that hope and belief are not the same. He then argues that the constraints on belief are stricter than the constraints on hope. Cf. Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, 46f. Mill takes hope to be permissible if and only if: (1) “for all one knows or justifiably believes, the object of one’s hope could obtain”; and (2) “one believes that hoping contributes to one’s own happiness, or to the well-being of others.” Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.” Ryan argues that evidentialism that is permissive regarding hope (but not regarding belief) “allows for all [...] hopes that do not clash with one’s evidence.” Ryan, “Evidentialism, Hope, and Wisdom,” 289. This permissive view allows hope against hope, based on the following assumptions: S hopes that/for p iff (i) S lacks adequate evidence for believing p, (ii) S believes it would be very good if p were to obtain, (iii) S wants p to be true, (iv) S believes p is possible, and (v) S is positively personally invested in p being true. Ibid., 282. Mill suggests that we have practical reasons for hoping if hope contributes to well-being or utility. Mill, Essays on Ethics, 466. Something similar is suggested by conditions (ii) and (iii) above, since rational hope seems to require practical reasons for assuming that it would be good if p obtained or were true. However, these practical reasons need not be limited to happiness or well-being. Kant, for instance, argues that we have moral reasons for hoping. Cf. Martin, How We Hope, 101ff. Initially, this hybrid account seems attractive, although I think it is somewhat unstable and problematic. First, it suggests that hope is not a doxastic attitude, since one must be able to hope for something without believing it. Ryan, “Evidentialism, Hope, and Wisdom”. But it seems that it must be possible to defend or justify rational hope discursively. Cf. Martin, How We Hope, 20ff. Even if agents do not form beliefs initially, they may very well form beliefs later on, when they reflect on their hope and defend it against possible objections. At the very least, hoping requires that one would believe that what one hopes for is possible if one were to form a belief on the matter. It is not unlikely, however, that hopeful persons would or should form beliefs on the matter if their hopes were central to their projects, actions, or practical identity. Second, what one hopes for must be seen as realizable in some possible world (see section VI). One cannot therefore rationally hope for something one believes is impossible. Blöser and Stahl, “Hope”; Philip Pettit, “Hope and Its Place in Mind,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 592, 2004, 153. The hybrid account acknowledges this by disallowing hope that clashes with evidence. Still, belief in possibility (iv) requires evidence, according to evidentialism. In addition, rational hope may require that we only hope for that which is probable or that which attains a certain probability threshold. Luc Bovens, “The Value of Hope,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 59, 1999, 673; Martin, How We Hope, 8ff. Even if this were not always the case, it would nevertheless raise the evidential burden significantly in many cases, something the hybrid account seems to overlook. Third, both hope and belief come in degrees. Einar Bøhn therefore formulates the following plausible hypothesis about the rational permissibility of hopes and beliefs: [T]he stronger your belief that p is, the less permissible it is to hope that not p; conversely, the more permissible it is to hope that not p, the weaker your belief that p must be […] the stronger your belief that there is no God is, the less permissible it is to hope that there is a God; and, conversely, the more permissible it is to hope that there is a God, the weaker your belief that there is no God should be. So, the stronger your atheism is, the less permissible it is to hope that there is a God. But, it is still only a matter of degree; it doesn’t seem completely impermissible to hope that there is a God unless you transparently know or are certain that there is no God. Bøhn, “The Logic of Hope,” 110, 112. Firm belief requires sufficient evidence; Bøhn assumes that weaker evidence only warrants weaker belief. Yet such weak belief may contradict strict evidentialism, since it involves belief without sufficient evidence. In any case, many beliefs and hopes come in degrees, although this is traditionally not the case with religious belief and hope. Cf. Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, 119. To many, lukewarm, conditional, or occasional belief is even worse than firm disbelief. Pace Palmqvist, “Faith and Hope.” Much the same seems to be the case in the moral context, since morality seems to require categorical commitment. Cf. Anthony Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative. A Kierkegaardian Approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012, chapters 2, 6-7. III. The Connection Between Hope and Belief—Against the Hybrid Account In the hybrid account, it seems problematic to build either practical or religious commitments on hope, at least if one is to act upon one’s hopes (by acting as if what one hopes for is true). Using Mill’s example of theistic hope, Jeff Jordan explains: Suppose […] that one seeks to build a theistic commitment on hope. The acceptance of theistic hope provides reason to act as if theism were true, not because one believes that it is true, but because one hopes that it is. What is it to act as if theism is true? It is to put into practice behaviors characteristic of a particular religious tradition [...]. Acting as if a certain religious tradition were true would include reorienting one’s values, priorities, and life-projects in order to reflect a commitment to a particular tradition. It would also involve engaging in the rituals and behaviors associated with the particular tradition; and investing a significant portion of one’s time and money in support of causes associated with the tradition. Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.” However, this leads to a particular problem, which has been described in social psychology. The problem is that behavior can alter, influence, and generate attitudes, including beliefs […]. By regularly engaging in behaviors and practices characteristic of a particular religious tradition, one engages in actions that tend to inculcate religious belief. Belief is catching, as associating and imitating the faithful is an effective way of self-inducing the beliefs of the faithful. Those who seek to replace belief with hope will find themselves taking steps to build a theistic commitment on hope, while holding that they ought to avoid theistic belief. Yet, the very steps involved in fostering a commitment on hope—immersive role-playing as a theist, or acting as if theism were true—tend to generate theistic belief. Those who habitually or chronically imitate the actions and rituals of theists find eventually that those are not just tasks they perform, but are at the heart of who they are and what they believe. Yet, theistic belief is off-limits. Ibid. At this point, the hybrid account seems conflicted or double-minded, since it is divided between hope and belief: “One would have to take steps that inoculate against the contagious theistic belief. Yet, the reasons one has to build a theistic commitment on hope and not belief, would conflict with one’s reasons to inoculate against catching belief. One is pushed to act as if theism were true, yet pulled to act to ensure that one does not come to believe that it is.” Ibid. Bøhn resists this conclusion on the grounds that hope does not entail belief, although there is an empirical tendency for hope typically to lead to belief. He concludes that hope is justified if it does not lead to non-evidentialist belief. Still, we may raise the following objection: First, Bøhn points to a conceptual possibility that is of limited relevance empirically. Even if rational hope is conceptually possible without belief, it still seems limited and unstable in reality, due to the strong empirical tendency Jordan describes. Many hopes are then unlikely to be justified precisely because they do lead to non-evidentialist belief. Second, rational hope entails belief in possibility (or even probability), at least counter-factually. Finally, Bøhn’s argument rests on the problematic assumption that hope does not aim for truth as belief does, something Darrell Moellendorf and others deny. Moellendorf argues that “[h]ope is certainly truth sensitive [...]. Hope in what is impossible to realize is false hope. Hope seems closest in character to a particular subset of beliefs, namely beliefs about the future, including predictions and imagined possibilities. But although the presence of doubt is destructive of belief, it is not destructive of hope.” Darrel Moellendorf, “Hope as a Political Virtue,” Philosophical Papers, vol. 35, 2006, 416. Similarly, James Muyskens argues that “hope helps one in seeking the truth, by keeping certain possibilities open (even remote ones) which one would not, if he merely followed the [evidentialist] maxim to avoid error. By keeping these possibilities open, one is in a good position to look for, and discover, the truth of propositions which would otherwise have remained unknown.” Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, 157 (note 94). To avoid the problem of catching belief, the hybrid account can only allow for a weak hope that is not acted upon. This hope is closer to a wish (or a mere want) than to belief. Cf. Mill, Essays on Ethics, 466. Indeed, it is perhaps better characterized as a wish. Muyskens explains the difference between wishing and hoping as follows: (1) One can wish (counterfactually) that he had not taken a particular job or that he had chosen a different profession. But, logically, one cannot hope counterfactually [...]. Hoping has a possibility condition that wishing does not have. (2) Hoping has a closer relation to action or dispositions to act than does wishing. The person who hopes that p acts as if p were true [...]. An inclination to act as if one believed that p is not entailed by wishing that p (since one may wish counterfactually). (3) If hoping and wishing are both analyzed in terms of desire, wishing covers a much larger range than hoping. One can wish for things that he would not desire on balance. Yet one does not hope for such things. Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, 17. Moellendorf also describes the difference between hoping and wishing: “The hopeful attitude necessarily includes motivation. The taking one’s beliefs and desires as reasons for action is a necessary condition of hoping. A person who fails to do so [...] fails to hope […]. Without [this aspect of hope], a person may wish for an outcome, but she does not hope for it.” Moellendorf, “Hope as a Political Virtue,” 420. Hopes are not only acted upon; they are also motivating, since they provide reasons for action. Martin, How We Hope, 5 indicates that hope against hope has a particularly strong motivating or sustaining power. Miriam McCormick argues that “hope can be a source of motivation and can affect one’s emotional structure. Hoping affects where one’s energy goes, the way one relates to others, and this is especially manifest when what one does can make a difference in whether the hoped-for outcome comes to be.” Miriam McCormick, “Rational Hope,” Philosophical Explorations, vol. 20, 2017, 129f. She therefore suggests that hope requires (not only desire and belief, but also) that one is “disposed [to] feel, act, expend energy, and/or relate to others in ways that views the possibility of the hoped-for outcome coming to be.” McCormick, “Rational Hope,” 130. Similarly, Adrienne Martin writes, “[T]he hopeful person takes a ‘licencing’ stance toward the probability she assigns the hoped-for outcome—she sees that probability as licencing her to treat her desire for the outcome and the outcome’s desirable features as reasons to engage in [...] forms of planning, thought, and feeling.” Martin, How We Hope, 35; cf. Bovens, “The Value of Hope,” 679. Unless supported by evidence or belief, the hybrid account then supports wishes and wants rather than hope. Worse still, it seems to support despair instead of hope against hope, if the hoped-for outcome appears unlikely. As McCormick points out, “[o]ne can desire something, believe it is possible, but feel despair when thinking about the unlikelihood of the desired outcome coming to be.” McCormick, “Rational Hope,” 129. Based on Frank Darabont’s film The Shawshank Redemption (1994), Ariel Meirav argues “that a person who hopes for a prospect and a person who despairs of the same (or qualitatively the same) prospect may be exactly similar with respect to relevant desires and assignments of probability.” Ariel Meirav, “The Nature of Hope,” Ratio, vol. 22, 2009, 222. In the film, Andy hopes against hope that he will escape from prison, whereas Red despairs of this. However, they “have the same desire to [escape], and assign [escaping] the same probability.” Meirav, “The Nature of Hope,” 224. Meirav stipulates that they differ in their attitudes toward a relevant external factor, such as fate or providence. This factor seems important since the object of hope lies “beyond the reach of [the agent’s] causal or epistemic powers.” Ibid., 228. Andy hopes because he regards the external factor as good, whereas Red despairs because he regards it as not good. Ibid., 230. However, Red need not regard this factor as bad. Rather, he could regard it as amoral or indifferent to human desires. He despairs because of the poor prospects, whereas Andy hopes based on those very same prospects. They do not disagree about the evidence (or the probability of escaping), but they take very different attitudes toward the situation. Meirav argues that they have conflicting attitudes toward an external factor beyond their control. Andy goes beyond the evidence by hoping, presumably because he has practical reasons for believing that the external factor is good. Still, this attitude may be a way of seeing rather than a belief. Martin, How We Hope, 20. Red does not share this view, presumably because he refuses to go beyond the evidence as Andy does. I therefore stipulate that we may think of Andy as a pragmatist regarding belief, whereas Red could be an evidentialist regarding belief (at a minimum, his view does not require non-evidentialism, as Andy’s view does). In cases like these, evidentialism seems to favor despair, whereas pragmatism allows hope against hope. In this case, Claudia Blöser and Titus Stahl point out “the rationality of hope depends on the rationality of the belief in the goodness of an external factor.” Blöser and Stahl, “Hope” point to Meirav, “The Nature of Hope,” 233 in this respect. Here, rational hope requires practical belief in a good external factor. But even if Meirav were “wrong about what ‘factor’ the hopeful person’s justification appeals to,” he nevertheless seems “right that the difference between hope and despair is a matter of the justificatory attitude one adopts.” Martin, How We Hope, 20 (emphasis mine). Hopeful and desperate persons have fundamentally different justificatory attitudes toward difficulties beyond their control or power. They hope for, or despair of, something that is difficult to attain (e.g., escaping from prison), since there is no room for hope or despair if the object of hope or despair is easily attainable or within their power. Cf. Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, 15-17; Victoria, McGeer, “The Art of Good Hope,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 592, 2004, 103. We have already seen Martin arguing that the “the hopeful person […] sees th[e] probability [of the hoped-for outcome] as licencing her to treat the desire for the outcome and the outcome’s desirable features as reasons to engage in [...] forms of planning, though and feeling.” Martin, How We Hope, 35. However, in the case of hope against hope, these reasons are not only epistemic, but also practical. Andy may justify his hope on pragmatic grounds, but he can hardly be a rational evidentialist, since he acts on his hopes. Even in other cases, rational hope may involve beliefs in possibility and probability (or even an external factor) that transcend evidence (cf. section VI). For these reasons, evidentialism and hope against hope hardly seem compatible. When evidence is lacking, evidentialism supports despair, wishes, and wants (when the latter two cannot be acted upon) more than hope. Pragmatism, by contrast, allows hope against hope that can be acted upon. At the very least, pragmatism allows a much more radical hope than evidentialism does, since hope is far stronger if it is supported by relevant beliefs. Hope and belief are therefore somewhat connected, both conceptually and empirically, and the connection between hope and belief holds independently of one’s preferences for either evidentialism or pragmatism. One may abandon either hope or evidentialism, if the evidence does not support hope. But there is neither room nor need for hope if the available evidence is conclusive and certain, showing that what one hopes for will be realized. Such evidence would warrant belief or knowledge, not hope. Cf. Moellendorf, “Hope as a Political Virtue;” Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope; Bøhn, “The Logic of Hope,” 112. Hope therefore presupposes uncertainty or inclusive evidence. To put it in probabilistic terms, hope requires a probability that is below one and above zero. Bovens, “The Value of Hope,” 673. IV. Against Strict Evidentialism Regarding Belief There are several reasons why strict evidentialism seems problematic. First, it seems self-referentially inconsistent, since there is insufficient evidence available for evidentialism. Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality, ed. by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1983, 60. At the very least, the available arguments for evidentialism fail to show that practical belief is impermissive. Reisner, “Pragmatic Reasons for Belief;” Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God;” Miriam McCormick, Believing Against the Evidence. Agency and the Ethics of Belief, London: Routledge 2015, 52. Arguments for evidentialism indicate that it is epistemically rational to believe only if belief is based on sufficient evidence. But these arguments do not preclude the possibility that practical belief is rational in some other respect. Ecumenicists concede this by admitting both epistemic and practical reasons for believing, since we are both epistemic and practical agents. Cf. Reisner, “Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.” McCormick (Believing Against the Evidence, 8, 31) argues that truth is important due to its practical value, and that we can only make sense of epistemic value by connecting it to practical value. It is important that beliefs not only track truth but also that they are interconnected and feature in practical reasoning. More specifically, practical belief is not epistemically (theoretically) rational, although it is practically rational (or perhaps even rational all things considered). This ecumenical view is weakly evidentialist and weakly pragmatist at the same time. Strict evidentialists, by contrast, deny that practical belief is rational in any respect, whereas strict pragmatists deny that practical belief is irrational in any respect. However, strict evidentialists base their reasons solely on epistemic agency, separating it from agency more generally in a manner than seems problematic. McCormick, Believing Against the Evidence; cf. Reisner, “Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.” Second, a principled objection to strict evidentialism concerns “restricted propositions” or “restricted truths.” Here, practical belief is necessary (but not sufficient) to acquire new evidence. Belief is first based on practical reasons but is later supported by evidence. A non-evidential belief is therefore only provisional and perhaps but a means toward acquiring new evidence. William Wainwright, for instance, writes the following concerning pragmatic arguments for religious belief: “[M]ature religious belief can, and perhaps should, be based on evidence but [...] the evidence can be accurately assessed only by men and women who possess the proper moral and spiritual qualifications. This view was once a Christian commonplace; reason is capable of knowing God on the basis of evidence—but only when one’s cognitive faculties are rightly disposed.” William Wainwright, Reason and the Heart, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2006, 3. Jordan comments: “If Wainwright is correct, then James’s argument [for pragmatism] is not just a pragmatic argument, but also an epistemic argument, since he is arguing that one of the pragmatic benefits is a more reliable access to reality.” Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.” The difficulty here is that the relevant evidence is only available to pragmatists and is therefore not likely to be acknowledged by strict evidentialists. Something like this is indeed conceivable, but it is bound to be controversial. Third, “dependent propositions” or “dependent truths” represent another principled objection to strict evidentialism. In this case, belief (at least partially) makes something true. Ibid. Practical belief is a truth-maker that somehow (at least in part) produces evidence and facts. William James famously discusses a mountain climber who has no alternative but to leap across a chasm in order to return back home. The climber does not know whether he will be able to jump across the chasm based on the available evidence. But the practical belief that he will succeed in doing so is necessary to actual success. William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, New York: Dover 1956 [1897], 96f.; Jakob Huber, “Pragmatic Belief and Political Agency,” Political Studies, vol. 66, 2018, 658. In this case, even impartial spectators could in principle judge whether practical belief contributes to success and whether it generates evidence. However, James’ main example of dependent propositions is social cooperation. He writes: A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. James, The Will to Believe, 24. Believing in others without sufficient evidence may help them become more trustworthy and reliable. Conversely, not believing in them may make them become less trustworthy and reliable. Someone met with distrust is therefore far less likely to become trustworthy and reliable than someone who is believed without sufficient evidence. It therefore seems that we should think well of others and assume their innocence, even if we lack evidence of this. Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, 50f. However, one may object that in cases of social trust, belief does not make propositions true, although it is still a “necessary precondition for the continued pursuit of the end we have set for ourselves.” Huber, “Pragmatic Belief and Political Agency,” 658. We can only trust someone if we are willing to believe despite a lack of sufficient evidence. We have strong practical reasons to trust others, since we are reliant on them in many ways. For example, it seems that “partners in a monogamous romantic relationship have strong pragmatic reasons to [b]elieve in their respective partner’s faithfulness until evidence to the opposite is conclusive.” Ibid. Even if this is not an example of dependent truths, it implies that practical belief is necessary for social trust. Fourth, the moral duty argument may undermine strict evidentialism. Evans, “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God;” Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.” This argument claims that it is never irrational, all things considered, to do one’s moral duty. This view is relevant to belief management, since practical belief could represent a moral duty. Jordan provides one example of such a case: “Dr. Jones knows that the prognosis for Smith’s recovery is poor, but if she acts on that knowledge by telling Smith of his poor prognosis, she may well strip Smith of hope. Jones believes that maintaining hope is vital for quality of life. Overall, Jones decides it is better not to inform Smith just how poor the prognosis is and she does not disabuse Smith of her evidentially unsupported belief.” Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.” Although there are many similar cases, the duty argument is controversial because it conflicts with evidentialism and presupposes that moral duty cannot be irrational, all things considered. For a critique of the latter view, see Dale Dorsey, The Limits of Moral Authority, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016. Finally, evidentialism seems too demanding, since its standards are too high to work in every circumstance. For this reason, strict evidentialists are hard to find, at least if we look beyond programmatic statements and see how philosophers actually reason. Not even Clifford is a strict evidentialist, since his defense of evidentialism relies on a pragmatic argument for evidentialism. Paradoxically, Clifford appeals to the pragmatic or practical advantages of evidentialism: [I]f I let myself believe anything on insufficient evidence, there may be no great harm done by the mere belief; it may be true after all, or I may never have occasion to exhibit it in outward acts. But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself credulous. The danger to society is not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is great enough; but that it should become credulous, and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for then it must sink back into savagery. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” 294. The operative assumption is that we have practical reasons for being evidentialists, since evidentialism avoids the danger and savagery of non-evidentialism. However, even if Clifford were correct about the dangers of non-evidentialism, as a pragmatic argument for strict evidentialism, this is self-defeating. However, it is not self-defeating to support weak evidentialism with pragmatic arguments, for weak evidentialism does not require sufficient evidence in all contexts. Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.” Much of everyday life and common sense seems incompatible with strict evidentialism. It seems that someone who requires sufficient evidence for every belief may never leave the study or even accept food brought to the door. For instance, there may not be sufficient evidence either for the existence of the external world or for human freedom (to use the classical examples of Hume and Kant, respectively). Still, we cannot always suspend judgment when evidence is lacking, since we are not only epistemic agents, but also practical agents who must sometimes act. Cf. McCormick, Believing Against the Evidence, 55ff. Evidentialism is therefore difficult to practice universally. It is particularly difficult to reconcile with interpersonal trust and social cooperation. Indeed, strict evidentialism seems to be at a disadvantage in some cases, compared to pragmatism or ecumenicism. In order to avoid error, evidentialism risks losing a vital good and also truth (notably restricted and dependent truths). Pragmatism, by contrast, “[r]isk[s] error for a chance at truth and a vital good.” Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.” But even the latter may concede that “in general, the way to get truth is to proportion one’s belief to the evidence and that we have good reason to prefer that we mostly have true beliefs.” (McCormick, “Rational Hope,” 128) As such, evidentialism and pragmatism represent fundamentally different epistemic strategies. V. Requirements for Practical Belief In order to avoid irrationality and wishful thinking, pragmatism and ecumenicism regarding belief require rational constraints. In “The Will to Believe,” James formulates the classic requirements for pragmatism regarding belief, which also seem relevant for hope against hope. He argues that we may only go beyond the evidence if what we believe represents a “genuine option” that is “living,” “momentous,” and “forced.” James, The Will to Believe, 2f. (1) A living option requires a choice between two real candidates for belief (e.g., theism and atheism) that have intuitive appeal and do not clash with the available evidence. Practical belief is only permissible if it does not undermine truth or suppress evidence. McCormick, Believing Against the Evidence, 55. (2) A momentous option requires that something important depend on the choice, or that “the option may never again present itself, or the decision cannot easily be reversed.” Jordan, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God”. (3) A forced option requires that the decision cannot be escaped. Ibid. Practical belief thus requires both epistemic undecidability and some form of practical necessity (e.g., moral necessity). This prevents wishful thinking, as well as belief that is unnecessary or unimportant. Specifically, it rules out belief that is falsified by evidence, since it only allows for beliefs that could be true. VI. Modal Constraints on Rational Hope The requirements for hope differ from the requirements for belief. In the much-discussed standard (composite) account of hope, hope requires both desire and a belief in possibility. Blöser and Stahl, “Hope;” McCormick, “Rational Hope.” In the case of rational hope, Andrew Chignell sketches the following requirement: S rationally hopes that p only if RH1: S rationally desires that p, and RH2: S is justified in believing that p is possible. Andrew Chignell, “Rational Hope, Possibility, and Divine Action,” in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason. A Critical Guide, ed. by Gordon Michalson, Cambridge University Press 2014, 102. Chignell admits the possibility of “hoping that p” without the need for dispositional or occurrent beliefs about its modal status. In order to allow non-doxastic hope, the following modification therefore seems necessary: RH2rev: S would be justified in believing that p is possible if he were to form a belief on the matter. Logical possibility is too weak because it would allow one to hope for something that is impossible to realize on the basis that it is merely internally consistent (e.g., a coherent fantasy). The possibilities must therefore refer to something that can be realized. The most promising candidate for rational hope in all contexts therefore seems to be the following: RH2metaphysical: S would be justified in believing that p is metaphysically possible if he were to form a belief on the matter. Vaidya explains, “The metaphysical possibilities are the logical possibilities that are also allowed by the natures of all of the things that could have existed.” Anand Vaidya, “The Epistemology of Modality,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2017 Edition, ed. by Edward Zalta, in [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/modality-epistemology] (last accessed: 26/4/2019). Metaphysical possibility can then be “defined as truth in some possible world.” Ibid. This requirement is so weak that practical reasons should not override clear evidence against it. Indeed, many forms of hope seem to require stricter modal constraints. Consider the following: RH2practical: S would be justified in believing that p is practically possible (to achieve by acting) if he were to form a belief on the matter. RH2physical: S would be justified in believing that p is physically possible to realize if he were to form a belief on the matter. RH2causal: S would be justified in believing that p is causally possible if he were to form a belief on the matter. Agents who rationally hope for something to be caused presuppose causal possibility, which refers to events or states that could be caused in the world (something that presupposes physical possibility, which represents “the logical and metaphysical possibilities that are also allowed by the physical laws of nature.” Ibid.). Agents who hope for physical states or events presuppose physical possibility, whereas agents who rationally hope to achieve something by acting presuppose a practical possibility which such agents could act on. However, scholars often claim that what we hope for must be seen as probable or likely. At a minimum, the probability must be above zero and below one. Cf. Meirav, “The Nature of Hope,” 219; Bovens, “The Value of Hope,” 673; Martin, How We Hope, 8ff. This may indeed be true in most cases, but probably not in all cases. First, it is not always easy or even possible to estimate or quantify probability based on evidence (or even practical reasons). In such cases, possibility may suffice. Hope may not presuppose probability, Cf. Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, 157 (note 5); Blöser and Stahl, “Hope.” since accounts of hope were developed independently of and prior to accounts of probability. Hobbes, for instance, describes hope in terms of opined attainability, without invoking probability. Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, 12f. Second, the probability relevant to hope is subjective or person-relative probability. Ibid., 8ff. Subjective (epistemic) probability differs from physical probability, and only the former is directly available to the rational agent at the time of hoping. Finally, there is widespread disagreement over the appropriate probability and evidential threshold for hope. More specifically, should the epistemic requirements be raised or lowered when much is at stake? Some hold the former view, while others hold the latter. E.g. McCormick, “Rational Hope;” Marcus Willaschek, “Must We Believe in the Realizability of Our Ends? On a Premise of Kant’s Argument for the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason,” in The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy, ed. by Thomas Höwing, Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter 2016, 223-243. The former view leads to difficulties in extreme cases. Kierkegaard, for instance, argues that an infinite interest in the highest good makes any (historical or empirical) evidence insufficient. His example is a religious person interested in eternal salvation. In this case, any evidence based on historical-critical theology is insufficient, amounting to only an approximation. Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vols. 1-28, Copenhagen: Gad 1997-2013; vol. 7, 31ff. There is always room for doubt and uncertainty, since the evidence is neither infallible nor absolutely certain. Instead of suspending judgment, he suggests that the matter be decided on practical grounds, implying that pragmatic considerations are decisive if much is at stake. Others make similar points. Meirav, “The Nature of Hope,” 224; cf. Willaschek, “Must We Believe in the Realizability of Our Ends?,” 239. Hume, for instance, argues that the magnitude of value compensates for low probability. Hume focuses on evil here but the point seems also to hold for goods, as assumed by Sabine Döring, “What May I Hope? Why It Can be Rational to Rely on One’s Hope,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 6, 2014, 125. Either way, this still implies that the adequate evidential threshold depends on pragmatic considerations, indicating that epistemic agency is connected to practical agency. The available evidence could be insufficient for settling theoretical or academic disputes, at least when it comes to reaching definite conclusions that are not revisable and criticizable. Yet it may be sufficient for most practical purposes (e.g., everyday projects). Justifications may then be context dependent, as contextualists claim. Cf. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Moral Skepticism,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2015 Edition, ed. by Edward Zalta, in [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/skepticism-moral] (last accessed: 29/4/2019). Another consideration that supports interdependency between evidential thresholds and pragmatic considerations is that what is objectively possible or probable may in some circumstances partially depend on our subjective desires and ideals. In the context of politics, Jakob Huber argues that our ideals “feed back into what is practically possible.” Huber, “Pragmatic Belief and Political Agency,” 651. More specifically, he argues for a reciprocal, indeed mutually constitutive relation between our subjective aspirations (the ends for the sake of which we act) and objective possibility (what we can practically attain through our actions). This claim is motivated by an observation about political agency: the observation that, from the perspective of the agent, the most ambitious ideals often underlie the most concrete political efforts, thus feeding back into the ultimate limits of political possibility. Ibid., 654. This is an important point that is relevant not only to politics, but also to many other normative domains, including morality, prudence, law, and religion. In many of these domains, our desires and practical agency may over time partially change or modify what is possible and probable. Many things that we now consider possible were once (considered) impossible or improbable (e.g., banning slavery and torture). On the other hand, our desires may change due to new insight into possibility and probability. Still, there are limits to this reciprocal relation between subjective desires and objective constraints. Immortality, for instance, may not become any more likely just because we desire it or hope for it. VII. Further Constraints on Rational Hope—And the Value of Hope The interdependency between evidence and pragmatic considerations supports the view that rational hope is subject to both theoretical and practical constraints. One clear practical constraint is that we should only hope for goods or values we have reason to value or desire. Moreover, we should not hope for goods or values that are overridden or defeated, but only for those that have normative priority. The object of hope should therefore be the object of overriding desire. Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, 18. Thus the proper object of rational hope represents what is practically good or what is best, all things considered. Traditionally, this object is described as the highest good, a synthesis of virtue and happiness, morality and prudence. According to Kant and much of the Augustinian tradition, it is precisely this good that is the proper object of hope. In any case, it seems that morality and prudence are more normatively significant than other normative domains. Dorsey, The Limits of Moral Authority, 171. Even those who question morality’s authority to override all other concerns tend to concede that moral considerations have a special authority and priority, Ibid. indicating that what we hope for must be morally permitted. Still, those who deny that morality overrides all other concerns will see this only as a pro tanto requirement. Another practical constraint concerns the significance and “benefits to the agent of having the [hopeful] attitude.” McCormick, “Rational Hope,” 132. If there is reason to assume that hope makes a difference for the better as far as the hoper is concerned, this counts in favor of hoping. However, the advantages of hoping are not always dependent on the fulfillment of hope. There are some advantages to hoping which remain even if the hope is disappointed (e.g., due to the placebo effect). Philip Pettit writes: One reason that hope may often be pragmatically rational is that it promises to be able to lift us out of the panics and depressions to which we are naturally prey and to give us firm direction and control. Without hope, there would often be no possibility for us of asserting our agency and of putting our own signature or stamp on our conduct. Pettit, “Hope and Its Place in Mind,” 160. Hope has instrumental value, since it helps us avoid “panics and depressions,” giving us “direction and control.” It makes it possible to overcome hindrances by supporting agency in difficult situations in which the prospects are poor. As Darrell Moellendorf notes, “paradigmatically hope sustains agents in projects in the face of danger or slim odds.” Moellendorf, “Hope as a Political Virtue,” 423. Sabine Döring, however, argues that hope is not only useful, but also indispensable for certain tasks: In hoping we are confident, which gives us stability in the ebb and flow of evidence for or against the likelihood of the occurrence of what we hope for. So what is important to us seems possible, which makes our life appear meaningful and motivates us to do everything within our reach to bring about the things about that we hope for. This is, I suppose, an evolutionary advantage of hoping, and it makes hope indispensable for long-term tasks or projects. By presenting the success of these tasks or projects as both valuable and possible, hope enables us to stay patient and to not become weak, as is exemplified by the hope of Abraham in The Epistle to the Romans (Rom 4–5). Döring, “What May I Hope?,” 128. Hope does not accept reality as it is, nor does it give up the hoper’s ideals or desires. Rather, it accepts the given circumstances and endures them by assuming that one’s desires or ideals can be realized in the future. The present situation is then simultaneously unacceptable in its actuality and acceptable in its potentiality. Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator. Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope, London: Gollancz 1951, 38f. Merely accepting everything as it is would mean succumbing to the evils and injustices of history. Hope, by contrast, makes it possible to overcome evil and injustice by progressing toward our ideals. Without hope to reconcile ideals and facts, our practical identity is double-minded, split between the situation we find ourselves in and the ideals we identify with. Hope is necessary, since our ideals often transcend evidence and make it necessary to act in the face of uncertainty and to put up with difficulties. More specifically, hope enables a coherent practical identity that reconciles ideals and facts. Luc Bovens argues that hope can be “conductive to an increased self-understanding,” since it helps us understand what we want and what we consider attainable. Bovens, “The Value of Hope,” 676. Hope is “intrinsically valuable” not only because it increases self-understanding, but also because it seems “constitutive of intrinsically valuable attitudes such as loving and having a sense of self-worth.” Ibid., 680. Partially based on this, Blöser and Stahl argue that hope has an intrinsic value in representing a constitutive feature of our practical identity. Specifically, hoping represents an aspect of our practical identity that is decisive for how we see and interpret the world. Claudia Blöser and Titus Stahl, “Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity,” Philosophical Papers, vol. 46, 2017, 350, 356. Finally, the attitude of hoping sometimes affects the desired outcome, either negatively or positively. If there is reason to believe that hoping has a positive effect on the outcome, this counts in favor of hoping. McCormick, “Rational Hope,” 132f. But if there is no reason to assume such an effect, there is no reason for hoping, all other things being equal. Similarly, hope that has neither an instrumental nor an intrinsic role for us may be abandoned, particularly when such hopes are unlikely to be realized. Whether or not hope is rational depends not only on how strong the justification for hope is, but also on what the alternative to hope is, all things considered. If it is to be permitted, then hope cannot be worse that the alternative (e.g., despair). This chapter represents a pragmatic approach to hope in two different senses. First, it indicates that pragmatic considerations or practical reasons matter greatly in assessing the rationality of hope. This is a view that is partially compatible with Ryan’s permissive evidentialism. Second, this chapter goes beyond strict evidentialism and supports hope with ecumenicism or pragmatism regarding belief (though without presupposing American pragmatism). Ryan’s permissive evidentialism “allows for all [...] hopes that do not clash with one’s evidence.” Ryan, “Evidentialism, Hope, and Wisdom,” 289. Still, evidentialism requires evidence to support the belief that what one hopes for is possible or—in some cases—probable. In addition, it might require evidence of a good external factor in order to prevent despair. At the very least, it must support the assumption that one can cope with difficulties beyond one’s power. Pragmatism, by contrast, requires neither evidence of a good external factor nor evidence of possibility or probability. As a result, pragmatism supports rational hope against hope, while evidentialism tends to undermine it. When hope is supported neither by belief nor by evidence, evidentialism enables only such a weak hope that it is difficult to distinguish it from despair, wishes, and wants that cannot be acted upon.