CONVICTION AND HUMILITY

Bias, Belief, and Conviction in an Age of Fake Facts, 2022

Personal convictions and commitments sometimes conflict—in content, priority, or application—with broader moral and social values. Furthermore, honoring personal convictions can involve forgoing other worthy projects and causes. Those who prioritize matters of personal conviction over other moral or social values are vulnerable to criticisms of self-indulgence, misplaced priorities, or ineffective action. However, such criticisms are often to be rejected as unacceptably moralistic. Action that “does not make a difference” can nevertheless be a mark of virtue or internal moral development, as has been argued by Iris Murdoch. Excessive concern to produce desirable external results fails to respect the value of inner activities such as contemplation and can also generate problematic moral compromises or be self-defeating. Given the multitude of worthy projects and problems in the world, there is nothing inherently self-indulgent in choosing to focus on projects and ways of living that prioritize one’s most fundamental, life-enriching values. Such “ground projects,” as Bernard Williams calls them, constitute the basis of a meaningful and motivated life. These issues are illustrated in J.M. Coetzee’s novel Disgrace by the character David Lurie, who honors his conviction about the respect owed to animals in a manner that may seem not to “make a difference” but which nevertheless reflects ethical sensitivity and integrity. From Bias, Belief, and Conviction in an Age of Fake Facts edited by Anke Finger and Manuela Wagner (Routledge, 2022) Open Access: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003187936-6/conviction-contemplation-making-difference-matthew-pianalto

Speech and Debate as Civic Education, 2017

Speech and Debate as Civic Education, 2017

2012

Research by Abelson (1986) suggests that people’s strong beliefs and convictions are like dear possessions, subsequently not easily abandoned and something the holder tends to fight for. This qualitative study aims at gaining increased understanding concerning conceptualization and psychological mechanisms related to strong beliefs and how the strong belief is manifested and expressed in the holder’s self-image and identity. Five holders of strong beliefs were interviewed, ensuing analyze following the principle of thematic framework. Six super ordinate themes were found to stand out as significantly important in the origin, conceptualization and preservation of a person’s strong belief: Belief; a legacy, Self-image and Identity, The Value-expressive function, In-group- and out-group-bias, Cognitive and emotional dissonance when acting against belief, Perceiving it as impossible to abandon a belief. The “Deliberative discussion” was presented as an important tool possibly empowering...

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Can one enter into an argument with one's intellectual equals in good faith if one regards the matter in hand as already settled? Adopting such an attitude looks very much like taking a dogmatic stance, in that one is closing one's mind to counterarguments in advance. Dogmatism is, of course, an intellectual vice. Moreover, such dogmatism seems morally problematic, in that one is failing to treat one's adversary with due respect. While there is clearly something correct about this line of thinking-dogmatism, like all intellectual vice, is obviously to be avoided-it is also maintained that, properly understood, there need be nothing intellectually viceful about engaging in an argument where one regards the subject matter as settled. Related to this point, it is contended that someone who possesses the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility may well engage in arguments in just this fashion. The upshot is that one can consistently and properly argue with both conviction and intellectual humility.

Episteme, 2021

Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern 'hinge' commitments that are unresponsive to rational considerations. This explanation, if correct, seems to have troubling implications for how we should respond to deep disagreement. If my position on a topic is not responsive to rational considerations, then what choice have I but to dogmatically hold to that position, and simply dismiss the views of those with whom I disagree? I address this problem by identifying an attitude of intellectual humility that is appropriate to have towards one's hinge commitments, and suggest that this attitude provides the basis for a non-rational, constructive way to resolve deep disagreement.

Current Opinion in Psychology, 2015

Godden, D. (2010). The importance of belief in argumentation: Belief, commitment and the effective resolution of a difference of opinion. Synthese, 172, 397-414., 2010

This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution of a difference of opinion. I argue that differences of opinion are only effectively resolved if commitments undertaken in argumentation survive beyond its conclusion and go on to govern an arguer’s actions in everyday life, e.g., by serving as premises in her practical reasoning. Yet this occurs, I maintain, only when an arguer’s beliefs are changed, not merely her commitments.

Political Psychology, 2014

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2015): 1-24