The Review of Faith & International Affairs ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rfia20 Taiwan’s Covenantal Pluralism André Laliberté To cite this article: André Laliberté (2021) Taiwan’s Covenantal Pluralism, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 19:1, 42-55, DOI: 10.1080/15570274.2021.1874144 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2021.1874144 Published online: 08 Mar 2021. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rfia20 TAIWAN’S COVENANTAL PLURALISM By André Laliberté T he concept of covenantal pluralism presented in the pages of this journal is simultaneously “top-down” (legal) and “bottom-up” (cultural): Covenantal pluralism offers a holistic vision of citizenship that emphasizes both legal equality and neighborly solidarity. That is, it calls both for a constitutional order characterized by equal rights and responsibilities and a culture of engagement characterized by relationships of mutual respect and protection. (Stewart, Seiple, and Hoover 2020, 2) This philosophy of robust pluralism finds strong resonance in Taiwan. Taiwan’s ability to achieve covenantal pluralism represents a remarkable achievement, considering the shadow of China, where in recent years policies implemented by the Communist Party have been antithetical to what constitutes covenantal pluralism. China negates religious diversity by its bureaucracy of religious affairs, persecutes minorities, promotes atheist education, and dissuades religious literacy. What makes the case of Taiwan even more remarkable is that it has moved past its own history as an authoritarian regime that bore similarities with the current one in China. Even more important, the religious practices of Taiwanese have a lot in common with those of the Chinese. In other words, Taiwan exemplifies the possibility and the robustness of meaningful covenantal pluralism in a society with a Chinese cultural heritage. © 2021 Institute for Global Engagement This essay first presents the two key features of Taiwanese society and history that have made it possible to develop a robust covenantal pluralism. It then presents the key constitutive elements of Taiwan’s covenantal pluralism. It concludes with a discussion of three main challenges that will test its consolidation ahead. The Two Building Blocks of Taiwan’s Covenantal Pluralism Once Taiwanese have become able to shape their own destiny, they have chosen governments that reflect the pluralism of Taiwanese society in terms of religious beliefs and secular values. A facilitating factor in the development of covenantal pluralism that is often overlooked, the polytropic nature of religious practice common to East Asia, has made the social acceptance of Abstract: Despite its diplomatic isolation, Taiwan shines in East Asia as a beacon for pluralism. This is a rare example of a progressive and liberal society where both deep religious diversity and a tolerant secular state co-exist. Taiwan’s liminality between world empires, and its unique position in the global economy partly explain its openness to a diversity of worldviews, but also exposes it to greater challenges to achieve covenantal pluralism. Taiwan’s hard-won democracy has entrenched positive trends, but three issues threaten to undermine it: the political pressure of a domineering China that limits its own religious diversity and that wants to annex Taiwan; the rise in influence of a rather intransigent and divisive religious minority that demonizes its opponents; and the increasing labor immigration addressing the challenges of an aging society. Keywords: Taiwan, religious diversity, Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, democratization, religious freedom, self-determination the review of faith & international affairs | 42 taiwan’s covenantal pluralism different religions and worldviews possible in a more meaningful way than mere tolerance. To this bottom-up origin in the development of covenantal pluralism, one can add a powerful top-down imperative, as political and religious leaders have promoted respect for deep religious diversity and a neutral secular state to cement national identity and to project soft power in a quest for survival in the context of international isolation. From the Bottom Up: The Deep Religious Diversity of Taiwanese Society Taiwan’s deep diversity of religions and worldviews, and the constructive attitudes and policies that have arisen in dealing with this diversity, have made it a relative success story for covenantal pluralism. One key factor has been the polytropic nature of religious practice common to East Asia, which has made the social acceptance of religious diversity a widespread disposition. Polytropy is the embrace of different paths to salvation and the acceptance of social practices associated with different religious leaders and scriptures (Carruthers 2000). This characteristic is shared with other East Asian countries nearby, such as Japan, Vietnam, Korea, and of course China, from which the ancestors of most Taiwanese come. These societies have seen a layering of successive religious and ethical traditions influencing them over their long history: superposed on original religious traditions that included beliefs in gods, ghosts, and ancestors, along with communal gods, the worldviews of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, and later Christianity and new religious movements, have developed. In addition to these fundamental aspects of religiosity, a few additional features distinguish Taiwan from its immediate neighbors in China and Japan. Taiwan’s indigenous people, linguistically related to the Malayo-Polynesian speakers from the Philippines to Madagascar in the West to Micronesia in the East, lived on the island for millennia before the arrival of migrants from South China, and their religious practices have little in common with those of China and Japan. Some of these religions remain important in the social life of some of Taiwan’s indigenous people (Simon 2015). However, many have abandoned their ancestral practices and have converted to Christianity, as the communal religions practiced by the descendants of Chinese settlers are less likely to seek converts. As the example of conversion among the Bunyun demonstrated, indigenous people have transformed Christianity from a foreign religion into something that is familiar and part of their own culture (Yang 2008). For most Taiwanese, whose ancestors came from Southern China, polytropy is the norm: most reckon the value of diffused religions in their lives and many among them also claim affiliation to an institutionalized religion. This dichotomy refers to the definition used by the sociologist Yang Ching-Kun to analyze Chinese religions (Yang 1961, 295). Diffused religions may appear invisible to those who adhere to more conventional and Western-centric views of religion. This includes ancestor worship, devotion to exceptional individuals’ spirits, as well as worship for the saint patron of professional associations, guilds, and a variety of social and economic groups. Diffused religions include the communal religions in which a common ancestor defines the heritage of a community, and popular religions, which bring together people from all over the country in religious festivals and countrywide pilgrimages for the worship of deities such as Matsu, the protector of sailors, and as such contribute to social integration (Yang 2004). The practices of diffused religions permeate other spheres of society such as health care, family ethics and relations, and even law (Katz 2008). Institutionalized religions, for Yang ChinKun (1961), are self-consciously differentiated from other spheres of society. A plurality of Taiwanese self-identify as Buddhist or as Taoist, and smaller minorities identify with one of the more than 20 other registered religions known to the government. The official report produced by the Ministry of Interior used to present in detail the following five important religious traditions of Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Folk Religions (a catch-all category that refers to the diffused religions discussed above), and I-kuantao. It also distinguished four kinds of religions the review of faith & international affairs | 43 andré laliberté alongside them: Religions coming from China after 1949; religions from foreign countries; new religions from existing ones; and new religions created in Taiwan. Within some of these religions, there exist important differences. Hence, while most Buddhists in Taiwan practice according to the Mahayana tradition rituals, many prefer to follow the Tibetan tradition (Jones 1999; Jagou 2018). Likewise, Protestant Christianity counts many denominations with very different theologies and orientations on important aspects of national politics, and disagreements often ran deep among them during the period of martial law (Lin 2020). The numbers of believers in Taiwan have varied little in the last three decades. Christian churches of all denominations have increased in size dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the KMT defeat in 1949, as many Catholic and Protestant missionaries expelled from China sought refuge in Taiwan, increasing the number of denominations (Wong 2016, 292). Fearing persecution, leaders of other religions relocated to Taiwan as well, increasing the number of followers of new religions. After an initial growth, however, Christian churches have seen the size of their flock diminish relative to the whole population, while the number of people who self-identify as Buddhists and Taoists has increased. After 1992, when the government allowed for temporary labor migration, the numbers for religious followers relative to each other changed again. The migration of Filipina increased the proportion of Catholics, the faith of most of that population. As of 2020, many migrant workers in industrial sectors and in the sector of caregiving come from Indonesia, most of whom are Muslims. Although their stay is meant to be temporary—from three to 14 years—their presence changes the religious landscape of Taiwan. The estimated 300,000 Indonesian workers in Taiwan exceed by far the smaller number of Muslims that emigrated after 1949 from China (DoS 2019). From the Top Down: The Changing Response of State and Religious Authorities Religion was an integral component of the life of the Taiwanese indigenous people, as well as for 44 | volume 19, number 1 (spring 2021) the Chinese settlers who gradually moved in. The beliefs of Taiwan’s indigenous people had to contend with the attempts by settlers and rulers from abroad to impose their own belief systems. The first among these outsiders, settlers from China during the Ming dynasty, brought with them their communal cults and ancestor worship maintaining connections with their land of origin (Vermeer 1999, 62–63). Some of them imported as well universal religions such as Buddhism and Taoism, and a variety of other ones that have received over decades various levels of acceptance in China. When Taiwan fell under nominal Qing dynasty rule, revolts broke out among Chinese settlers. However, very few of them had a connection with religion. This connection was tenuous at best, as in the case of rebellion whose leaders belonged to secret societies, such as the Heaven and Earth Society (tien-ti-hui), which has been historically identified as a folk religion sect since the Ming Dynasty (Weller 1999, 346). The other outsiders were merchants from the far-away European trading empires, with French, Spanish, and especially Dutch, leaving their imprint on the island. The colonial authorities of the first two empires, both Catholic, did not seek to impose theirbelief on the locals,and neither didthe Dutch. Their presence in Taiwan was limited in space and time (Wills 1999). Protestant Christianity, and in particular the Presbyterian Church, proved successful much later, after the Canadian Presbyterian missionary George Leslie MacKay arrived in Taiwan and lived there until his death, among indigenous people. Reinforcing that perception is the ease with which Mackay found acceptance in Taiwan, before and during Japanese rule, as he practiced itinerant dentistry among indigenous people during his stay, from 1872 to 1901. Today, when the Taiwanese government refers to the historical experience of religious freedom, it celebrates the legacy of Mackay, as well as cultural diversity and resilience of the indigenous people (Johnston 2012). The following stage of Taiwan’s history proved far less auspicious for religious freedom, as Japan imposed direct colonial rule on the island from 1895 to 1945 and enforced its authority more profoundly. Taiwan went taiwan’s covenantal pluralism through three periods. The first one saw an alternance between uprising and violent repression, culminating with the Tapani rebellion in 1915 (Katz 2005). During that time, colonial rulers did not have the ambition to affect Taiwanese religious life and adopted a laissezfaire approach. This changed during the period of integration (1915–1937), when Japan sought to assimilate Taiwan as just another Japanese province. That policy meant greater oversight and control of native Taiwanese religions, and a preferential treatment for Buddhism, which was also widely practiced in Japan (Jones 2003, 21– 24). The third period of Japanese rule, which saw efforts to make Taiwanese “subjects of the emperor,” meant a policy of “Japanization” that included weaning away Taiwanese from Chinese traditional religions and restructuring the local temples, some of which were destroyed, others turned into Shinto shrines (Jones 2003, 24–25). The ceding of Taiwan by allied powers to the troops of the Chinese nationalist party (hereafter Kuomintang—KMT) changed the equation dramatically. When the KMT clamped down on a nationwide uprising in 1947, none of the protagonists to that tragedy appealed to religion. The issue was national identity and concern over a communist take-over of the island (Kerr 1965). The Chinese rulers sought to turn Taiwanese into Chinese. To that end, Chiang Kai-shek, and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, imposed the learning of Mandarin on all residents of the island and pushed through the teaching of Confucian values in the civic education manuals at all levels of education (Fairbrother 2004). The KMT recognized the legitimacy of some religions because they were Chinese (Buddhism, Taoism, and a handful of small new religious movements), modern (Protestant and Catholic Christianity), or could serve Chinese diplomacy (Islam). This limited recognition had adverse consequences for a few new religions, such as Ikuan-tao (Jordan and Overmyer 1986, 240– 246). Although followers of these religions could be subjected to police surveillance and suffered from the suspicion of other Taiwanese about their religious practices, they did not experience the kind of persecution their co-religionists in China had to endure. Even though some of the KMT leaders had a bias against popular religions when they tried to rule Mainland China, the religious diversity within this party, including the Methodist affiliation of its leader Chiang Kai-shek after his conversion, made respect for religious diversity the default position of its policy on religious affairs. At the time, in a context when the KMT restricted media and political liberties and civil rights, the tolerance of religious diversity appeared as a convenient showcase that the Republic of China was “Free China,” in contrast to the People’s Republic. While the exiled church from China sought to maintain harmonious relations between them and the KMT, leaders of the native Presbyterian Church during the 1960s and 1970s followed their conscience and worked actively to support the movement for selfdetermination and the defense of human rights (Rubinstein 2003). The transition to democracy under the government of President Lee Teng-hui, a Presbyterian Church member, saw a major change in the supervision of religious affairs. His government resisted demands by some religious associations to pass a law on religion, and he diminished the importance of the bureaucracy for religious affairs and government’s oversight. His government also endorsed, by its inaction, the dismantling of the corporatist system that had overseen religious associations during the period of Martial Law. New Buddhist associations or monasteries that registered to obtain permits to build a new site, for example, did not have to fall under the authority of the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC), which used to have exclusive authority over the training of monastics and the accreditation of temples (Jones 1999, 178–179). A key aspect of Lee’s approach to religion is that although there were controversies generated by the actions of new religious movements or selfproclaimed spiritual leaders, he never yielded to pressure from public opinion to forbid such movements but rather let the judicial process runs its course in case of fraud (Laliberté 2009; Chen 2019). Under Lee’s successor Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), the Taiwanese government came the review of faith & international affairs | 45 andré laliberté to officially recognize 29 different religions. In 2006, the Ministry of Education promulgated a law that allowed the accreditation of universitylevel degrees by religious schools and theological institutions. With the return of the KMT to power, under President Ma Ying-jeou (2008– 2016), the bureaucracy for religious affairs had become a small unit within the Ministry of Interior, signaling then that the government had relinquished any role in the management of religious affairs. In the second transition to a DPP government headed by Tsai Ying-wen (2016–), the Taiwanese government has maintained its attitude of religious neutrality, which did not exclude the promotion of interreligious dialogue. Many of the key factors likely to foster covenantal pluralism have flourished during Taiwan’s democratic consolidation. Taiwan’s Resources for Covenantal Pluralism Taiwan can sustain and enrich covenantal pluralism because of the convergence of popular mobilization for greater social pluralism and responsive political and religious leadership for more than three decades. The smoothness of Taiwan’s transition has benefited from the fact that religious diversity predates its democratization. Even during the dark hours of Martial Law, many religious organizations have helped address shared problems, depending on their capacity. With Taiwan’s democratic consolidation religious minorities, hitherto marginalized, integrated into the social fabric. Reinforcing these positive trends, successive governments, regardless of the party in power, have taken seriously the issue of religious literacy and cross-cultural engagement. In that context, the political and legal system did not attempt to restrict religious activities of minorities, no matter how small and marginal, thereby deepening religious diversity. A facilitating factor behind this smooth transition is the absence of inter-religious conflict or religiously inspired violence since the end of Japanese colonial rule. Relations between religions and state have reached an equilibrium of avoiding too close intermingling or too much distance. One consequence of this type of relationship is the 46 | volume 19, number 1 (spring 2021) positive role religions have played in nurturing social cohesion and promoting Taiwan’s integration in the global economy. The best expression of this secularism is the involvement of religious institutions in a wide array of social services. I expand below on these points. The Institutionalization of Religious Diversity Taiwan does not have a state religion, and this was the case even during the period of Martial Law (1949–1987), so some basis for religious pluralism already existed. None of the two important political parties, the DPP and the KMT, represent a religion, even less promotes the interest of one religion at the expense of others. In both cases, successive leaders have held a variety of religious beliefs, albeit the KMT supreme leader has often been a Christian: Chiang Kai-shek was Methodist, Lee Teng-hui was Presbyterian, and Ma Ying-jeou was Catholic. Religious associations are likewise split in their political allegiances: during the presidential campaign of 1996, the main opponent to Lee, Peng Ming-min, was a fellow Presbyterian. Politicians from both parties court the support of all religions at election time: During electoral campaigns at all levels, politicians make sure to pay a visit to local temples, to elicit the support of community leaders. Only rarely did a religious institution promote a politician openly, or even sponsored a political party. Hence, in 1996, the Foguangshan monastic order endorsed the ticket of Chen luhan and Wang Ching-wen for the Presidential elections, who gained close to 10 percent of the vote (Laliberté 2004, 74). In 2015, a Christian group launched a political party, the Faith and Hope League, to pre-empt legislation that would allow for same-sex marriage (Ho 2020, 149). Multi-faith Practical Collaboration to Address Shared Problems For seven decades, religious leaders have looked past their differences and recognized that Taiwanese face the shared problems of existential threats to national survival on top of the risks inherent to the region because of its location in a zone prone to natural disasters. The first of these taiwan’s covenantal pluralism existential threats is the pressure of a rising China, which has political, economic, as well as strategic dimensions, which has become especially strident under Xi Jinping (Thompson 2020). The exclusion of Taiwan from the United Nations since 1971, following the admission of China, has left its population isolated diplomatically, and vulnerable to the economic, political, and military pressure of its giant neighbor. The other kind of threat Taiwanese face is the same that other countries in the region confront: vulnerability to natural disasters such as quakes and typhoons, the latter amplified by climate change. For decades, Taiwanese religious associations have risen to the challenge in helping the government provide disaster relief, depending on their resources (Lee and Han 2015). They proved that in 2020 with the COVID-pandemic. Taiwan has gained an increasing visibility considering its achievements in combatting the global scourge which originated so close from its shores. A good part of this success results from the population’s trust in public authorities and science, and in the government’s ability to gain support from religious leaders in preventing pilgrimages and religious festivals, which risked becoming major super-spreader events though the island and beyond (Shan 2020). Integration of Religious Minorities Taiwan has a good record at the integration of religious minorities. The concept of assimilation does not resonate with the reality of Taiwan because, as mentioned above, there exists no religion embraced by most of the population. Despite the absence of a hegemonic religious community under the sway of a single spiritual authority, however, most identify with a community of shared meaning that practice the rituals of communal religions, such as ancestor worship, and occasionally attend religious services at temples of popular religions or participate at related events such as festivals, processions, and pilgrimages (Gries, Su, and Schak 2012). Two groups, however, do not see themselves as members of this community: the adherents of Abrahamic religions, as well indigenous people. The first group represents a total of 8 percent of the population, the second group over 2.5 percent. The first group comprises two very different populations, of equal number, but with very contrasting demographic dynamics: a declining community of Taiwanese Christians, and Indonesian migrants, who are mostly Muslims, and most of whom reside temporarily for a few years. The practice of inter-religious dialogue initiated since 1994 has contributed to their integration into the nation. Cross-cultural Engagement and Religious Literacy Regardless of the party in power, successive Taiwanese governments have expressed an interest in developing strategies for improving cross-cultural engagement and religious literacy: They have succeeded at giving credibility to the idea that Taiwan is a multicultural society with different dimensions of diversity: ethnic, linguistic, and religious. In the last two decades, the curriculum used in schools teaches about this diversity at the local level and has shifted away from a previously nationalistic emphasis that promoted an idea of Taiwan as a Chinese nation; so that recent curriculum put more emphasis on local identities in all their diversities (Jackson 2014). The discussion on multi-culturalism in Taiwan has included the promotion of interreligious dialogue. This suggests that although Taiwan is a secular state, its approach to that constitutional principle is not the same thing as the assertive or passive forms of separation between religion and state to which the US and France are accustomed. The ministry of education recognizes officially this intermingling between the spheres of the secular and the religious though its sponsorship of Confucian temples, and still shapes the decisions of many households on the issue of filial piety and elderly care (Yang 2019). Freedom of Conscience and Human Rights Taiwan now stands out as an example of a state that respects freedom of religion and freedom of conscience, and that promotes human rights—a fact long noted in the annual the review of faith & international affairs | 47 andré laliberté international religious freedom reports produced by the United States Department of State (AIT 2020). Independent associations for the promotion of human rights such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House produce reports that praise its achievements in respecting political and civic freedoms and, naturally, religious liberties. However, most inter-governmental organizations which have an impact on international law do not record Taiwan’s achievements because of its exclusion from the United Nations’ system that results from the pressure exercised by the Chinese government (Huang 2020). Although Taiwanese religious leaders have proven very savvy until recently in overcoming that obstacle, playing an influential role in the international stage, such as the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC) in the conferences of the World Buddhist Sangha Council, China has diminished their participation in recent years (WBSC 2020). The Rarity of Violent Religious Extremism Except for the uprising mentioned before during Japanese colonial rule, violent religious extremism in Taiwan has been rare (Chang 2010). Taiwan has experienced episodes of violence throughout its history, but they rarely had a religious origin. Likewise, the religious traditions that have inspired violence in China have not found much of a receptive audience in Taiwan. Even during the worst episodes of stateenforced violence following the island-wide uprising of February 28th against KMT abuse and following the different cases of civil society mobilization against the regime during the 1960s and 1970s, the government never had reason to clamp down against religious associations, who have generally stood aside conflicts. For reasons of self-preservation, religions have tended to avoid confrontation with the regime. Moreover, they often shared the views of the KMT in its opposition to the PRC. This was the case with the BAROC, which was a corporate member of the Asian Anti-Communist League (Jones 1999, 149). 48 | volume 19, number 1 (spring 2021) Religion-state Relations— Constitutional, Statutory, and Regulatory As mentioned above, during the period of martial law there was a gap between the claims of respect for religious freedom spelled out in the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory dimensions of relations between the KMT and religions. Since democratic consolidation became entrenched, Taiwan saw a subtle change in the relationship between the government and religions. The latter have felt emboldened by their newfound freedom of expression to reprimand the government on occasion. Sometimes, they have also expressed views on politics that have gone against the wish of the majority on issues such as national identity and relations with China, or articulated views that affected minorities, two issues I address in the third section as possible impediments to covenantal pluralism. These reservations aside, the ability of religious leaders and their followers to make their voice heard in the public sphere represents a positive development, so long as they remain within the bounds of peaceful relations and constructive dialogue with people of other faith and no faith. The combination of a government laisse-faire attitude towards religions and the checks and balances in place preserve these trends (Kuo 2013). Economic Development and Integration It is perhaps in the realm of economic development and integration that religions in Taiwan have made the most significant contribution. Communal religions express local wealth and as such constitute a good example of prosperity religions in affluent Taiwanese society (Hu and Yang 2014). The temples of communal religions represent the anchor of neighborhoods and villages, often under the leadership of an extended family. Popular religions have an even broader reach that extends nationwide: the cult for the goddess Matsu, for example, implies a pilgrimage around the island that brings together communities. The temples of popular religions such as those of Long-chuan and Hsin-tien-kung in Taipei represent major tourist sites and are part of Taiwan’s historical taiwan’s covenantal pluralism and world heritage. In the case of the latter one, its promotion of filial piety stands as a good example of how much these sites contribute to the reproduction of traditional moral values in a context in which ties within the family have been tested by rapid social change. The temples of communal and popular religions have served Taiwanese for generations before 1949 and continue to represent an aspect of heritage that the government celebrates. Religious Pluralization and Economic Globalization Religious pluralization has two connections with economic globalization in the most unexpected ways. At one end, religions of prosperity such as I-kuan-tao owe their newfound respectability to the fact that important businesspeople, such as the founder of the global air transporter Eva Air, Chang Yung-fa, is affiliated to that religion. That religion, although unrecognized in China, has found an ambiguous status in that country, as the authorities of the Communist Party seek to lure in Taiwanese investors. At the other end, the reality of growing pluralization is becoming increasingly visible, as over 150,000 Muslim Indonesians are live-in caregivers who work for months or years in Taiwan, making their religious tradition, with its dietary, clothing, and liturgical requirements, more visible than ever (Sampurna 2019). Religious Involvement in Social Services and Education Religious organizations have gotten involved in various ways in the institutional landscape of Taiwan’s welfare state for a long time thanks to their social services and their role in education (Weller 2006). When Taiwan was a remote outpost of the Qing Empire and was about to become a Japanese colony, it did not have much of an infrastructure for health care, general education, and the situation was especially dire for aboriginal people displaced by Chinese settlers. Christian missionaries saw this situation as an opportunity for service and expansion, and besides the Presbyterian Church, other denominations got involved in the provision of social services. The defeat of the KMT in China, which saw a massive exodus to Taiwan of party members, along with a few soldiers and civil servants among the refugees, saw the arrival of many missionaries from the Catholic Church and many Protestant denominations either expelled by the Communist Party or fearing persecution if they were native Chinese. This influx provided the government with a sizeable number of people willing to volunteer and set up hospitals, schools, and other social institutions, to assist the government while it devoted its limited resources to ensure the security of the country and set the stage for its later policy of development. This approach of outsourcing to religious organizations the provision of social services would prove increasingly unsustainable in the long run, as the Christians represented a small —even if well-connected—minority of the population. Moreover, this small minority started to stagnate and even shrank, as elder Christians’ children would not necessarily get baptized and join churches. This relative decline opened the door for the emergence of philanthropy by other religious institutions, and in particular Buddhists, to which a plurality of Taiwanese claimed an affiliation (Hsiao and Schak 2005). These developments, taken together, make clear that religious believers and non-believers have enough common ground to establish the basis of a robust covenantal pluralism. They may not agree on many things, but they have a shared interest in seeing Taiwan develop as a free society where people care for each other and are willing to help the most vulnerable. Below I underline three trends that could test these bases of covenantal pluralism. Three Challenges to Covenantal Pluralism in Taiwan The Political Pressure of China Although most Taiwanese agree on national identity, there exist differences about how close the Taiwanese government should remain to that of China. These differences find expression in the religious sphere. While most Taiwanese see the review of faith & international affairs | 49 andré laliberté themselves as either Taiwanese, or Taiwanese first and then Chinese, very few see themselves as Chinese first and then Taiwanese, and even less see themselves as exclusively Chinese, a trend ongoing for the last 20 years (Danielsen 2012). The identification of Taiwanese as exclusively Taiwanese has steadily grown over decades, regardless of support to the DDP or the KMT. On relations with China, the differences go deep, however. Supporters of both parties reject rule by the CCP, but they vary in their willingness to maintain relations with China. The original charter of the DPP committed the party to the promotion of self-determination and although the party has stopped short of proclaiming de jure independence out of pragmatic consideration, it still expresses caution vis-à-vis China. The KMT, on the other hand, has long preferred closer relations to China and its leaders have met on occasion with those of the CCP. Only in 2020, with the hardening of the CCP stance towards Taiwan, did KMT voters become more reluctant to move closer to China (Kassam and McGregor 2020). Reflective of these political divisions between the pan-green (those who support the DPP) and the pan-blue (those who support the KMT), Taiwanese religions have adopted very different approaches on this issue of relations with China. As suggested before, the PCT has promoted selfdetermination for Taiwan. Many other Christian churches, whose leaders have been expelled from China, have also cautioned the Taiwanese government against a too tight entanglement with China. The memory of past persecution after 1949, as well as the ongoing reports of harassment against members of the “house churches,” make them reluctant to push for embrace of China. For some Christian churches, and most particularly the Catholic Church, the matter of relations with China poses dilemmas within. As the Holy See seeks to improve relations with China, for the sake of the future of the Catholic Church in that country, Taiwanese Catholics watch with some apprehension at the possibility that the Chinese regional bishop’s conference based in Taipei is ordered to fall into the fold of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association in Beijing in case both parties reach 50 | volume 19, number 1 (spring 2021) an agreement over the management of Catholics’ internal affairs, such as the selection of cardinals (Leung 2018). The leaders of Buddhist associations have also changed their perspective on China over the years. Many of them came from China after 1949 and sided with the KMT in its opposition to the CCP. During the period of martial law, they did not oppose the government, with the rare exception of controversies over the recovery of temples confiscated by the Japanese (Jones 1999, 169–175). Lay Buddhists, under the guidance of their leaders, focused on the modernization of their religious institutions, promoting scholarship, philanthropy, and social work, and studiously worked to dissipate any impression that they support a political party (Madsen 2007). However, as Taiwan’s democratic consolidation deepened, it became increasingly difficult to avoid taking a stand. Buddhist leaders such as Hsing Yun, the founder of the Buddha Light Mountain monastery, hoped to “spread the Dharma” in China (Chandler 2004). Cheng Yen, the founder of Tzu Chi, hoped to see Chinese volunteers join the ranks of her foundation, and to that end she supported the opening of a branch in Suzhou (Huang 2009). Anecdotal evidence points to a possible rift between lay Buddhists, many of whom support Taiwanese self-determination, and their leaders who hope for closer relations with China to achieve their spiritual goals. The Peril of Moral Intransigence If religious leaders and their followers have failed to agree on the issues of national unity and relations with China, most religious leaders have agreed on the issue of same-sex marriage, although it is not clear how much their respective flocks have supported them. The religious milieu appeared to show near-unanimity in their opposition to values embraced by many people who profess secular values, suggesting a gap has opened between people who claim an affiliation to religion and those who do not. For the proponents of marriage equality, the tone of the discourse against the legal change permitting same-sex marriage represented the opposite of the openness promoted in inter-religious taiwan’s covenantal pluralism dialogue. This has revealed the challenges of establishing a covenantal pluralism that is inclusive of all worldviews in that society. A closer look suggests that the division over this issue goes deeper than a division between religious believers and secular-minded people. Same-sex activity has never been illegal in Taiwanese society, which suggests acceptance of sexual diversity, well before the issue became politically salient. Although religious associations had not paid much attention to matters of sexuality in the first two decades of democratization, this changed as public discussion on the issue of same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples became salient. In 2013, a group of religious associations found common cause around their shared opposition to same-sex marriage and diversified family draft bills and created the Taiwan Alliance to Protect Family. In 2015, the fifth Conference on National Affairs of the Forum of Taiwanese Pastors’ held by the Taiwan Christian Union established a political party, the Faith and Hope League, with the sole purpose of opposing the legalization of same-sex marriage and pushing for a referendum that advocated “family protection.” This came close to making the Christian minority an outlier to Taiwanese society: Although religious leaders of other faiths and some secular leaders supported this party and spoke out in its favor, none of the 16 candidates of the party that ran for the general elections in January 2016 gained a seat. Although many religious leaders appeared united in their opposition to same-sex marriage, giving the impression that opponents were religious believers and non-religious believers supportive, there were well-known religious personalities that came out in favor of same-sex marriage, and even performed religious ceremonies for LGBTs before the issue became salient. Hence the Buddhist nun Chao Hui, famous throughout the island for her activism for different causes, officiated at the first wedding ceremony for a lesbian couple in Taiwan in August 2012 (Hsu 2012). In 2006, Lu Wi-ming, a young Taoist priest, established a shrine, the Rabbit Temple, dedicated to a deity believed to take care of gays and lesbian. Although the Rabbit God was the creation of a poet writing during the Qing Dynasty in the province of Fujian, scholarly evidence exists of a cult dedicated to that deity in the 18th century (Szonyi 1998). Although this issue may die down with the decision by the courts to allow for same-sex marriage, other issues appear likely to grow in importance for years to come as Taiwan’s demography changes. The Challenge of the Crisis of Care in an Aging Society Taiwan has been a victim of its success: improvements in living conditions and universal access to healthcare have contributed to a rise in life expectancy. Combined with a decline in birthrate, Taiwan has entered since the 1980s into a rapid demographic transition as an aging society. The society has realized the price of earlier choices in limited social welfare and the resulting shortages in facilities for long-term care. Since 1992, when President Lee launched a program to let in temporary migrant live-in caregivers to look after the elderly, Taiwan has seen a rise in labor migration to meet these needs. This temporary labor migration, originally from the Philippines, comprised mostly Catholics, which led to a growth in their church as an institution. I did witness at mass the expression of solidarity from the Church towards the plight of migrant workers. However, research on the topic has not found much in terms of tangible expression of support from the Church towards these vulnerable workers (Kuo 2018). This may reflect a declining community, as the total number of Filipino migrants diminishes. Over the years, recruiting and placement agencies that bring migrant workers to Taiwan have stopped looking at the Philippines as a source of labor and turned increasingly to Indonesia as a source, arguing that Filipino workers—in all sectors—are too demanding and therefore less docile (Deng, Wahyuni, and Yulianto 2020). Most of these migrant workers toil in the sector of live-in caregiving (euphemistically classified as “social welfare”), manufacturing, and fisheries. Although there is no hard evidence about this, most of them are not Sino-Indonesian, and therefore unlikely to share the same religious beliefs as the people they the review of faith & international affairs | 51 andré laliberté work for. There is anecdotal evidence of some the past association of Christian churches with employers who do not give caregivers a holiday, colonial powers as a handicap. Likewise, they do so for Filipina, they cannot attend mass on most not express anxiety over Islam, as the religion of a occasions. One of the abuses reported for significant proportion of the temporary workers Muslim caregivers from Indonesia has to do with that serve as live-in caregivers or toil in the the manipulation of pork, if not its consumption. construction industry. Although Taiwanese Islamic dietary requirements do not constitute an disagree on many issues, they express these issue in households that are vegetarian, but this differences through peaceful means, and the may be an issue for those that consume pork. So attitude of religious leaders has resonated with far, the growing visibility of a minority whose those trends. Religious leaders have agreed to religious practice does not in principle allow for disagree on many issues among themselves, via polytropy represents a challenge. the pursuit of inter-religious dialogue. Religious This obstacle is not unsurmountable, as the believers and people who do not claim affiliation adaptation of Islam to the culture of a variety of to religion may hold even greater divergences of countries has demonstrated over centuries. The views, but all agree ultimately on the fact that issue is not so much about religions have contributed whether Muslims can adapt to significantly to the common PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT Taiwanese society, in the end, good by looking after the FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE but rather how likely are poor and vulnerable people. Taiwanese to accept these new Moreover, they all see the AND SEE THE MERIT OF aspects of religious diversity if merits of religious freedom COVENANTAL PLURALISM the Indonesian temporary labor and the secular institutions HAVE IN TAIWAN A CLEAR migration turns over time into a that guarantee them. REBUTTAL TO THE THEORY more permanent trend. Taiwan stands out as Although Taiwanese have uniquely well-placed to THAT FREEDOM OF proven accepting of religious promote covenantal CONSCIENCE IS A WESTERN diversity because of the pluralism. There are no CONCEIT INCOMPATIBLE polytropic nature of their reasons to see this situation WITH ASIAN VALUES religious practices, and although changing if Taiwan remains they have been accepting of the a de facto sovereign country. Abrahamic religions because they were the faith of This de facto sovereignty, challenged with fellow persecuted Chinese who were close to them increasing stridency by China, is however linguistically and culturally, the presence of precarious. Countries which enforce policies Muslims who are linguistically and culturally limiting freedom of conscience are more likely to different represents uncharted territory. Only time side with China and see the example of Taiwan as will tell if Taiwan’s covenantal pluralism will a rebuttal to their legitimacy. On the other hand, embrace these new sources of differences. The people who care about freedom of conscience and evidence of incidents against migrant workers see the merit of covenantal pluralism have in from Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam suggests Taiwan a clear rebuttal to the theory that freedom that this should not be taken for granted (Chuang of conscience is a Western conceit incompatible 2018). with Asian values. Most importantly, Taiwanese, as the first ones concerned, are all too aware that the so-called re-education campaign against Conclusion Taiwan represents a rare case of a society Muslim Uyghurs, and the persecution against the where covenantal pluralism thrives. No religious followers of “evil cults” and house churches, and more alarmingly, against Buddhist and Taoist group experiences repression from the state or faces rejection or hostility from the population. sites, go against their deeply held values. China’s Groups like Falungong, persecuted in China, can long-term goal is to fully re-incorporate Taiwan develop without fear. Taiwanese do not look at into its regime, but one of the most baffling 52 | volume 19, number 1 (spring 2021) taiwan’s covenantal pluralism dimensions of the CCP policy on religion, which is the opposite of nurturing covenantal pluralism, is that it is not likely to “win the hearts and minds” of Taiwanese. v Acknowledgements This article is part of this journal’s Covenantal Pluralism Series, a project generously supported via a grant to the Institute for Global Engagement from the Templeton Religion Trust. About the Author André Laliberté is Professor at the School of Political Studies and Co-Director of the Research Chair in Taiwan Studies at the University of Ottawa. His research interests include the role of religions in the shaping of social policies in East Asia and state-religion relations in Chinese societies. He has written The Politics of Buddhist Organizations in Taiwan, 1989–2003 (Routledge 2004), and many articles on religion and democratization in Taiwan. References AIT (American Institute in Taiwan). 2020. 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Taiwan. Taipei: AIT. Carruthers, Michael. 2000. “On Polytropy: Or the Natural Condition of Spiritual Cosmopolitanism in India: The Digambar Jain Case.” Modern Asian Studies 34 (4): 831–861. Chandler, Stuart. 2004. Establishing a Pure Land on Earth: The Foguang Buddhist Perspective on Modernization and Globalization. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Chang, Wen-Chun. 2010. “Buddhism, Taoism, Folk Religions, and Rebellions: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 45 (4): 445–459. Chen, J. 2019. “Regulating Religious Fraud in Taiwan and Hong Kong: A Comparative Study on the Convergences and Deviations in the Understanding of Religious Freedom.” The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 7 (1): 150–189. Chuang, Ya-Tang. 2018. “Migrant Workers as Marginalized People in Taiwan: A Reflexion from Contextualized Theology.” Estudos de Religião 32 (3): 325–343. Danielsen, Michael. 2012. “On the Road to a Common Taiwan Identity.” In National Identity and Economic Interest: Taiwan’s Competing Options and Their Implications for Regional Stability, edited by Peter C. Y. Chow, 135–151. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Deng, Jian-Bang, Hermin Indah Wahyuni, and Vissia Ita Yulianto. 2020. “Labor Migration from Southeast Asia to Taiwan: Issues, Public Responses, and Future Development.” Asian Education and Development Studies. doi:10.1108/aeds-02-2019-0043. DoS (Department of Statistics), Ministry of Interior, Taiwan, ROC. 2019. Annual Statistics Report of Ministry of Interior, 2017. https:// www.moi.gov.tw/stat/node.aspx?cate_sn=&belong_sn=6463&sn=6465. Fairbrother, Gregory P. 2004. “Citizenship Education in a Divided China, 1949–1995.” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 24 (1): 29–42. Gries, Peter, Jenny Su, and David Schak. 2012. “Toward the Scientific Study of Polytheism: Beyond Forced-Choice Measures of Religious Belief.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 51 (4): 623–637. Ho, Ming-She. 2020. “The Religion-Based Conservative Countermovement in Taiwan: Origin, Tactics, and Impacts.” In Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia: Between Entanglement and Contention in Post High Growth, edited by David Chiavacci, Simona Grano, and Julia Obinger, 141–165. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, and David Schak. 2005. “Taiwan’s Socially Engaged Buddhist Groups.” China Perspectives 59: 43–55. Hu, Anning, and Fenggang Yang. 2014. “Trajectories of Folk Religion in Deregulated Taiwan: An Age, Period, Cohort Analysis.” Chinese Sociological Review 46 (3): 80–100. Huang, Kwei-Bo. 2020. “Bringing Ethics of Global Governance Back In: A Case Study of the Republic of China (Taiwan).” Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations 6 (1): 71–103. Huang, Chien-Yu Julia. 2009. Charisma and Compassion: Cheng Yen and the Buddhist Tzu Chi Movement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hsu, Jenny. 2012. “Taiwan’s First Same-Sex Buddhist Marriage: How Much Impact?.” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2012. https:// www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-16308 Jackson, Liz. 2014. “Under Construction: The Development of Multicultural Curriculum in Hong Kong and Taiwan.” The Asia-Pacific Education Researcher 23 (4): 885–893. the review of faith & international affairs | 53 andré laliberté Jagou, Fabienne. 2018. The Hybridity of Buddhism: Contemporary Encounters Between Tibetan and Chinese Traditions in Taiwan and the Mainland. Études thématiques 29. Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient. Johnston, Geoff. 2012. “The Life and Legacy of George Leslie Mackay: An Interdisciplinary Study of Canada’s First Presbyterian Missionary to Northern Taiwan (1872–1901).” International Bulletin of Mission Research 36 (3): 173. Jones, Charles B. 1999. Buddhism in Taiwan: Religion and the State, 1660–1990. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Jones, Charles B. 2003. “Religion in Taiwan at the End of the Japanese Colonial Period.” In Religion in Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society, edited by Philip Clart and Charles B. Jones, 10–35. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Jordan, David K., and Daniel L. Overmyer. 1986. The Flying Phoenix: Aspects of Chinese Sectarianism in Taiwan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kassam, Natasha, and Richard McGregor. 2020. Taiwan’s 2020 Elections. Lowy Institute for International Policy. Accessed December 18, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25092. Katz, Paul R. 2005. When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Ta-pa-ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Katz, Paul R. 2008. Divine Justice: Religion and the Development of Chinese Legal Culture. New York, NY: Routledge. Kerr, George H. 1965. Formosa Betrayed. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Kuo, Cheng-Tian. 2013. “State-Religion Relations in Taiwan: From Statism and Separatism to Checks and Balances.” Issues and Studies 49 (1): 1–38. Kuo, Wen-Ban. 2018. “The Implementation of Catholic Social Teaching in Taiwan.” In The Catholic Church in Taiwan, edited by Francis K. H. So, Beatrice K. F. Leung, and Ellen Mary Mylod, 151–174. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Laliberté, André. 2004. The Politics of Buddhist Organizations in Taiwan, 1989–2003: Safeguarding the Faith, Building a Pure Land, Helping the Poor. London: Routledge. Laliberté, André. 2009. “The Regulation of Religious Affairs in Taiwan: From State Control to Laissez-Faire?” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38 (2): 53–83. Lee, Chengpang, and Ling Han. 2015. “Recycling Bodhisattva: The Tzu-Chi Movement’s Response to Global Climate Change.” Social Compass 62 (3): 311–325. Leung, Beatrice KF. 2018. “The New Triangular Relations Among the Vatican, Taiwan, and China in the Tsai Ing-wen Administration.” In The Catholic Church in Taiwan, edited by Francis K. H. So, Beatrice K. F. Leung, and Ellen Mary Mylod, 233–254. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Lin, Judith C. P. 2020. The Charismatic Movement in Taiwan from 1945 to 1995: Clashes, Concord, and Cacophony. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Madsen, Richard. 2007. Democracy’s Dharma. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rubinstein, Murray A. 2003. “The Presbyterian Church and the Struggle for Minnan/Hakka Selfhood in the Republic of China.” In Religion in Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society, edited by Philip Clart and Charles B. Jones, 204–256. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Sampurna, Rizki Hegia. 2019. “Accommodating Religious Practices in the Workplace: The Case of Indonesian Workers in Taiwan.” Society 7 (2): 159–172. Shan, Shelley. 2020. “Virus Outbreak: Dajia Matsu Pilgrimage is Postponed.” Taipei Times, February 28. Simon, Scott. 2015. “Real People, Real Dogs, and Pigs for the Ancestors: The Moral Universe of ‘Domestication’ in Indigenous Taiwan.” The American Anthropologist 117 (4): 693–709. Stewart, W. Christopher, Chris Seiple, and Dennis R. Hoover. 2020. “Toward a Global Covenant of Peaceable Neighborhood: Introducing the Philosophy of Covenantal Pluralism.” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 18 (4): 1–17. Szonyi, Michael. 1998. “The Cult of Hu Tianbao and the Eighteenth-Century Discourse of Homosexuality.” Late Imperial China 19 (1): 1– 25. Thompson, Drew. 2020. “The Rise of Xi Jinping and China’s New Era: Implications for the United States and Taiwan.” Issues and Studies 56 (1): 1–25. Vermeer, Eduard B. 1999. “Up the Mountain and Out to the Sea: The Expansion of the Fukienese in the Late Ming Period.” In Taiwan: A New History, edited by Murray A. Rubinstein, 45–83. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe. WBSC (World Buddhist Sangha Council). 2020. “Conferences.” Accessed December 16, 2020. https://www.wbsc886.org/en/meeting. 54 | volume 19, number 1 (spring 2021) taiwan’s covenantal pluralism Weller, Robert P. 1999. “Identity and Social Change in Taiwanese Religion.” In Taiwan: A New History, edited by Murray A. Rubinstein, 339–365. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe. Weller, Robert P. 2006. “Religions and Philanthropies in Chinese Societies.” Society 44 (1): 42–49. Wills, Jr., John E. 1999. “The Seventeenth-Century Transformation: Taiwan Under the Dutch and the Cheng Regime.” In Taiwan: A New History, edited by Murray A. Rubinstein, 84–106. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe. Wong, Bibiana. 2016. “Christian Protesters for Democracy in Taiwan: A Study of Two American Missionaries Under Taiwanese Martial Law.” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 16 (4): 288–304. Yang, Ching-Kun. 1961. Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors. Berkeley: University of California Press. Yang, Mayfair Mei-Hui. 2004. “Goddess Across the Taiwan Strait: Matrifocal Ritual Space, Nation-State, and Satellite Television Footprints.” Public Culture 16 (2): 209–238. Yang, Shu-Yuan. 2008. “Christianity, Identity, and the Construction of Moral Community among the Bunun of Taiwan.” Social Analysis 52 (3): 51–74. Yang, Jason Cheng-Cheng. 2019. “The Shaping of Academic Culture in Higher Education in Taiwan: Confucianism, Historic Legacy, and Western Influences.” In Higher Education and Belief Systems in the Asia Pacific Region, edited by Alexander Jun and Christopher S. Collins, 15–25. Singapore: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2021.1874144 the review of faith & international affairs | 55