Towards a Basque State. Citizenship and Culture

TOWARDS A BASQUE STATE citizenship and culture Ipar Hegoa Foundation / Basque Summer University 2 Author: Ipar Hegoa Foundation With the assistance of the: Basque Summer University ISBN: 978-84-8438-422-9 Legal deposit: BI-1289-2012 Original title: Euskal Estatuari bidea zabaltzen: herritartasuna eta kultura. Cover design: Ipar Hegoa Foundation Translator: Alan R. King Distributed by: Ipar Hegoa Fundazioa Rekalde Zumarkalea, 62 BILBO. Phone: 944706915 E-mail: iparhegoafundazioa@labsindikatua.org Udako Euskal Unibertsitatea (Basque Summer University). University). Erribera 14, 1. D, BILBO. Phone: 946790546 Fax: 944793039 E-mail: argitalpenak@ueu.org / www.ueu.org By the present licence you may copy, distribute and display the content or produce derivative works provided the following conditions are met: – You must cite the author of the original content. – If you modify the content, or create a derivative work and distribute it, you must do so under the same conditions as in the present licence. – You may not use this work for any commercial purpose. 3 Contents FOREWORD Ipar Hegoa Fundazioa ......................................................................................................................................... 4 The Basque State and citizenship INTRODUCTION Txoli Mateos González ....................................................................................................................................... 7 1. ON STATE, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY Julen Zabalo Bilbao and Txoli Mateos González ............................................................................... 10 2. CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION AND THE BASQUE STATE Iker Iraola Arretxe………...................................................................................................................................... 22 3. STATE, EDUCATION EDUCATIO N AND THE BASQUE CITIZEN Txoli Mateos González ...................................................................................................................................... 36 4. CITIZENSHIP WITHIN FEMINIST THEORY AND PRACTICE Mila Amurrio Vélez .............................................................................................................................................. 48 The Basque State and culture c ulture INTRODUCTION Ane Larrinaga Renteria ..................................................................................................................................... 62 1. CULTURE IN STATESTATE-BUILDING: THE STATE AS A SYMBOLIC PROJECT Ane Larrinaga Renteria ..................................................................................................................................... 65 2. STATE, MARKET AND CULTURE: FUTURE CHALLENGES Josu Amezaga Albizu ........................................................................................................................................ 77 3. BASQUE CULTURAL FORMS: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN A HYPOTHETICAL BASQUE STATE Patxi Juaristi Larrinaga ..................................................................................................................................... 89 4. BASQUE EDUCATION RIGHTS, AND A LOOK AT SOME EUROPEAN SCHOOL SYSTEMS Fito Rodriguez Bornaetxea ........................................................................................................................... 102 5. THE SITUATION AND OUTLOOK FOR THE BASQUE LANGUAGE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD Iñaki Martínez de Luna Pérez de Arriba ................................................................................................. 119 4 FOREWORD Ipar Hegoa Fundazioa One of the goals of the IPAR HEGOA Foundation is to carry out studies and analyses of political and social issues of interest for the Basque Country and to encourage discussion of such subjects. Therefore, at the present time when there is much debate about the viability of Euskal Herria, IPAR HEGOA Fundazioa wishes to contribute to the discussion by offering these documents. Some will argue that Euskal Herria is a tiny country, that fragmentation makes no sense in the present era of globalisation, that what is needed now is for all of us to work together and achieve a mutual understanding, that demands for independence lead to discrimination among the members of a community, and so on, and so forth. Many factors and countless arguments are cited as reasons today for not creating new states; some of them are coherent arguments that make a certain amount of sense. And yet, be that as it may, thousands upon thousands of Basque citizens are still insisting that they want a state of their own. What of their arguments? Are these not also coherent, equally important arguments? Whether we like it or not, the fact is that in the world today the state continues to be the chief expression of comprehensive political decision-making power. Therefore, in the contemporary Basque Country, in the current political state of affairs, we believe it is both interesting and necessary to undertake a collective exercise of thinking through the benefits, options, risks and dangers that the construction of a Basque state in Europe would entail, on many levels, including the political, institutional, territorial, socio-economic, linguistic, cultural, and in terms of identity. The IPAR HEGOA Foundation proposes to take a long look at all the circumstances and ask how feasible a Basque state is. Thus we have brought together on these pages the opinions of numerous academics and researchers who are familiar with this range of subjects. We are well aware that there are many other specialists, besides these, who have often made extremely interesting contributions to the field. IPAR HEGOA Fundazioa has not set itself the task of bringing together contributions from every single such expert, or to present in equal measure current opinions in every discipline, or to represent every single region of our country to the same degree. Instead, priority has been given to achieving a coherent picture subscribed to by a respectable number of experts, even at the risk of leaving some geographical areas, universities or perspectives out of the picture. But this does not mean we have striven to produce a single, monolithic viewpoint: that was not our purpose. Each author was free to give their own opinion, provided only that they focus on the overall idea of the necessity and viability of a Basque state; beyond that, it is recognised that there is room for a variety of points of view. After all, the aim of the present study was not to create a constitution for the Basque state, nor to lay down rules for what a Basque state ought to be like. Ours is a less ambitious objective, yet quite a crucial one all the same. The question we wish to answer is this: Is a Basque state viable or not? Would it or would it not be worth the effort to create a Basque state? Would Basques be willing to embark on such a project? In the event that these questions find an answer and if that answer is in the affirmative, then, and only then, would it be time for us to turn to the next set of questions, questions about the direction and purpose of such a Basque state. 5 The IPAR HEGOA Foundation believes that the present study addresses this matter of great interest, and that it is able to play a useful part in bringing Euskal Herria into focus in the present international situation, by gathering together a range of views now current in a variety of disciplines; it may also help to establish the absolute and relative place of Euskal Herria within the domain of present-day states. We believe the interesting theoretical contributions set down on these pages will contribute to endowing the demand for a Basque state with substance, while also proving useful in order to lay a sound material and ideological foundation such as is necessary in order to give form to that endeavour. IPAR HEGOA holds that this is the best option for everybody who lives and works in Euskal Herria and defends the premise that at this time the Basque Country possesses the basic potentialities needed to build a state that can take its place among the states of Europe. Thus the IPAR HEGOA Fundazioa offers, in Towards a Basque State, State a qualified contribution concerning the need for and feasibility of a newly created Basque state. The study consists of three parts covering different subject areas: NationNation -building and Institutions, Citizenship and Culture and Territory and Socioeconomics.This Socioeconomics. book covers the second of these areas. In the section on CITIZENSHIP, CITIZENSHIP Txoli Mateos and Julen Zabalo say it is understandable that in our society we rarely talk about citizenship since the bundle of rights and duties this term denotes is a typically associated with the concept of a state. Discussion of the idea of citizenship, which has given rise to lively debates in some countries, has had a much lower profile among us in the absence of a state, as a result of which decision-making options are severely restricted. In this section citizenship is chiefly linked to the democratic function of a hypothetical Basque state. Thus the authors talk about democracy and democratic citizens, and about the need for a new political culture to help build bridges between Basque citizens. The section on CULTURE, CULTURE as pointed out by editor Ane Larrinaga, Larrinaga not only proposes to demonstrate how Basque culture suffers from the lack of a state, but also considers in what ways Basque society might benefit in cultural terms from the existence of one. Therefore the focus is on the cultural role of the state and new developments in the part the state can play. An attempt is also made to identify some of the strengths and weaknesses appearing in the cultural sphere in the course of the drive for a Basque state, and to note which issues will need to be addressed by a future state. IPAR HEGOA hopes this volume will serve to stimulate fresh discussion and further studies on these facets of building a Basque state; for this is only the beginning! We wish to thank those who have taken part in this project for the interest shown, the time and effort they have devoted to it and for all their contributions; our thanks, therefore, to the volume’s editors, Julen Zabalo, Txoli Mateos and Ane Larrinaga and to all the chapters’ authors. 6 The Basque State State and citizenship Txoli Mateos González Julen Zabalo Bilbao Iker Iraola Arretxe Mila Amurrio Vélez 7 Introduction Txo li M ateo s Gon zále z, Ph.D. (So cio logy ). Professor, EHU-UPV Ernest Gellner, one of the foremost thinkers on nationalism, is known to have said with a touch of irony that a nation always seeks a state, but preferably its own, not somebody else’s. Paradoxically, there is very little discussion in Basque society or in Basque nationalist circles about the concept of citizenship. The reason why I call this a paradox is that when Basques hear the word ‘citizenship’ various notions that are forever being bandied about in our midst spring to mind: nationhood, statehood, country, rights (especially polical rights), and so on. Yet it is quite logical (not paradoxical) that this concept should not be very current since status is linked to statehood. It is the prior existence of a state which brings to the foreground issues and understandings about citizenship, the seeking of consensus and the opportunity for disagreement. In the absence of a state, as in the Basque case, there is very little room for any decision-making on matters of relevance to citizenship, so it is rather futile to start squabbling over such issues. The more democratic a state is, the more profound and complex such problems, debates and eventual solutions are likely to become. Migratory movements triggered by globalization, and shortcomings in the actions of democratic institutions, among other causes, have led to a questioning of the organisation of society and its form of leadership known as the liberal democratic state. Searching questions are being asked concerning citizenship and democracy, issues that are pertinent to a country’s essential identity and the relationships binding its inhabitants. The recent growth of a scientific literature on these subjects in those countries which have made the greatest headway in their thinking on democracy, such as Canada or the United Kingdom, and which do not have a conflict over national identity, such as the United States of America, bear ample witness to this. Here we find theoretical attempts to correct the faults of liberal democracy, and they are pervaded by ideas which no longer refer to representative democracy, but rather deliberative, strong, participatory democracy. At the same time, there have been attempts to expand on the civic and ethical dimensions of citizenship, emphasizing the role of education in seeking to produce responsible citizens. There is discussion not only about the necessary characteristics of citizens for democracy to work, but also the limits of citizenship itself. To begin with, defining who is a citizen citizen and who is an alien is no simple matter, and on this distinction depend many things including eligibility for assistance from the welfare state and the right to vote. All the chapters in this section take as their common theoretical starting point the debates that are underway in all modern countries concerning the nature of the democratic connection among citizens, or to put it another way, the need for democracy to be strengthened. To the need for a new definition of citizenship and democracy another variable must be added in our case, since we are talking not only about the state, but about a Basque state. Euskal Herria, also known as the Basque Country, is a modern, advanced society which would seem to have a need for a state capable of dealing with its many challenging issues, and of providing for a wide variety of needs: that is, for a Basque state. The chapters in this section attempt to address the point. They adopt the assumption that things might be different for Basque society if it were invested with the authority to govern its own affairs. At the same time, however, the authors have endeavoured to present on these pages a scientific analysis, not a mere inventory of desiderata. 8 In a country without a state, there can be no legal stipulation of who constitute its citizens and who are non-citizens. Since Euskal Herria is split between two states (and three administrations), most of its inhabitants are legally French or Spanish citizens, so officially there is no such thing as Basque citizenship. Apart from political-administrative status, several national allegiances compete with each other in Basque society, some people feeling French, some Spanish, others Basque. As one article in the present section puts it, an inhabitant of Portugal does not ask herself whether or not she is Portuguese. She never questions her citizenship and nationality, for they are both the same, both clear, and welldefined. The same is plainly not true of people living in the Basque Country. In their chapter “On state, citizenship and national identity”, Julen Zabalo and Txoli Mateos discuss the problems to which this state of affairs gives rise. The initial premise is that we should differentiate between national identity and administrative status: the former is subjective and depends on personal choice; the latter, objective. There will undoubtedly be some thorny issues to resolve in this regard in the future, but it seems that the specification of citizenship per se should not lead to much contoversy because nowadays residence is, to a large extent, taken as the only criterion determining what Basque citizenship consists of. As the authors point out, political diversity and the peaceful coexistence of different national identities could prove perfectly feasible in a hypothetical Basque state. Nevertheless, like all nation states, the Basque state will always seek to equate nationality and citizenship among its inhabitants. So the people belonging to a nation and its citizens are not automatically the same thing to start with, and matters get more complicated when immigration comes into the equation. In any country, the question of where immigrants fit into the scheme of things is difficult and controversial: an immigrant is neither a member of the nation nor a citizen of the state, but on the other hand an immigrant is not simply a foreigner either. Speaking in general, whether or not a nation has its own state, the relationship between nationalism and immigration is a complex one, and that is no less true of Basque nationalism. The Basque Country has had ample experience of immigration, and having already undergone two distinct waves of immigration producing mixed reactions and effects, it is pointed out that the lessons this offers need to be learnt if we intend to argue for the benefits that would ensue from a Basque state. But in any case it is to be borne in mind that a profound social debate has not taken place in the Basque Country about immigration in connection with citizenship or nationhood, for the simple reason that Basques have so far lacked the political power or legal authority to do anything about it. Therefore, at present, the issue of immigration has mainly been present in discussions in areas other than politics, particularly in debates over social issues. This state of affairs is reviewed in “Citizenship, immigration and the Basque state”, in which Iker Iraola argues that the process of achieving a Basque state should open up a debate about the political dimension of immigration, at which point many questions requiring answers will need to be addressed, such as defining the criteria for becoming a Basque citizen, managing the multiculturalism that ensues from immigration, how to approach the rights of immigrant groups, and finally, the subject of immigrant assimilation or integration. This suggests the need to develop a specific national migration policy, which only a Basque state would be able to implement and manage adequately. In Basque society, the subject of immigration often comes up in debates about the school system and the language of schooling. In any democratic society, the way the school system is oriented is deemed a national issue; schools are a highly effective tool for integrating and socializing a country’s citizens. In short, the school system serves not only to prepare skilled members of the labour force but also creates responsible citizens and members of the nation. Consequently, Txoli Mateos relates education to citizenship and democracy in particular, in the chapter “State, education and the Basque citizen”. He assigns to a future Basque state three tasks which will undeniably benefit Basque citizens. One of these is the creation of a national education and research network which, while 9 recognising the specific characteristics of each Basque region, will end the present administrative fragmentation which is so disadvantageous to Basque society. The status of schools in an education system under a national administration, and the languages of schooling, are some of the things that would have to be decided: this will no mean task by any means! A second point would be to provide for all Basque pupils to receive civic and moral training in order to make for a stronger Basque citizenry. A future Basque state will not only need to nurture in students loyalty to the political structure and love of their nation, but also produce citizens who defend democratic values. Lastly, to achieve the integration of all Basques, the schools must attend to old and new multiculturalism while still according special treatment to Basque culture on account of its vulnerable situation. In addition to Basque culture, there are other weaker players besides immigrants, such as women, as is pointed out by Mila Amurrio who relates the defence of women’s rights to the call for a ‘new citizen’ linked to the Basque state in “Citizenship within feminist theory and practice”. She begins by recognising that defining the limits of citizenship is a great challenge, since it may fail to satisfy all sectors of society. In accordance with feminist thought and practice, it is absolutely necessary to be explicit about the way gender relations may influence the construction of a new kind of citizen. In the interest of redefining those relations, strong guarantees of women’s participation must be established, first and foremost, taking into account the interests of groups of women. But for this to happen, a sine qua non is the promotion of a new political culture which insists on fargoing changes in the power relations between men and women. Within the process of constructing a Basque state, then, defining citizenship must be seen as a multi-faceted task with many dimensions, as is amply acknowledged by all four authors. It has to be admitted that there are great difficulties involved, but at the same time many undeniable benefits are perceived. The challenges posed by modern societies can be confronted here as they are by political authorities elsewhere: through sovereign decisions of the Basques’ own state. 10 1. On state, citizenship and national identity. identity. J u l e n Z ab a l o B i l b ao , P h . D . ( G e o g r a p h y) . P r o f e s s o r, E H U - U P V T x o l i M a t e o s G o n z á l e z , P h . D . ( S o c i o lo g y) . P r o f e s s o r, E H U - U P V Citizenship is conceived of as related to the nation-state and democracy. In modern societies, a citizen is viewed as equivalent to a member of the nation. Furthermore, the more democratic a society, the more profound the debate over the civic characteristics of citizenship. Thus in political, social and economic terms, the notion of citizenship involves duties and rights. Hence as we move in the direction of a Basque state and work towards making the coexistence of different national identities within Euskal Herria feasible, we should think of nationality as part of a subjective (voluntary) domain, and of citizenship as part of an objective domain, while keeping in mind that, like all nation-states, the Basque state will always seek to treat nationality and citizenship as equivalents among members of the population. 11 1. CITIZENSHIP The concept of citizenship has a long history in western societies. In antiquity, the concept was employed, as in cives romani, to represent a relationship between the individual and his or her city. The term reflected a privileged status, with recognition of the right of citizens to take part in public debates. Only “free men” were allowed to be citizens, not foreigners, women or slaves. Likewise in the Basque Country, until fairly recently only landowners were full citizens. With the birth of the absolute state, an inhabitant within the state’s borders was considered a subject of the monarchy, but with the American and French Revolutions citizenship took on a new dimension as it was merged into the idea of nationality. The subject became a citizen, also considered a member of the nation. The nation is the sum of its citizens, of equal components, not something situated over or under anybody: the citizens give the nation its power, and it acts on their behalf. The citizens are everybody, so the criteria which had formerly blocked some people from citizenship, such as sex, land ownership, wealth and so on, gradually disappeared. This process took a long time and was fraught with obstacles; women, blacks and people with few possessions did not achieve full rights until the middle of the twentieth century. But citizenship is primarily a political relationship between the individual and the political community, whereby the individual becomes a member of the community and owes it unending allegiance. Since the emergence of modern society, this political community has taken the form of the constitutional nation-state. Thus the concept of citizen now current took form in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and is strictly related to the idea of the nation-state. Since the mid-twentieth century, with the emergence of the welfare state, the concept of citizenship has been broadened and filled out, with the new concept centring around the freedom of the individual, participation in public debates and the right to benefit from social services. 1.1. Citizenship, the nationnation-state and democracy Citizenship is what links the individual to the state, and it is also the legal status required for participation in the political sphere. Modern states stipulate who are the state’s citizens and what conditions are necessary to achieve this status: conditions such as having lived in the country for a given number of years, for example. It is widely believed that the trend towards globalization will result in the loss of the nation-state’s relevance in determining and managing citizenship issues. So for example citizenship may come to be seen in terms of another kind of structure over and above that of the nation state, such as the European Community. To this we may add other levels of political and administrative organisation, for example the municipal level. But for now, the nation-state still overrides any other sociopolitical structure where the definition of citizenship is concerned, with all the consequences that implies. Specifing who is a citizen and who is not, then, is no trivial matter, for on this distinction depend such crucial points as being able to receive assistance from the welfare state or the right to vote in elections, among other things. Thus, citizenship is associated with a set of rights and obligations in the political, social and economic spheres. The spread of the idea of citizenship and its current prestige are directly related to the development of democracy. The modern history of the developed countries is the history of the evolution of citizenship, and at its core are the freedom and dignity of the individual. But there has not been, and is not today, a single way to understand all this, or democracy for that matter. The modern concept of democracy has gone through several phases during which debates have taken place over what the government of a country ought to be. 12 In recent years a powerful movement has grown up in developed societies to spread and strengthen the set of rights linked to citizenship; that is, to progress beyond the merely formal and legal dimension of citizenship. The crisis of the welfare state, the consequences of political apathy and the proliferation of events requiring broad solidarity are among the developments that have demonstrated that rights and institutions cannot be the sole foundations of democratic societies. On the contrary, if we are to maintain a democratic organisation of society, the attitudes and characteristics of the members of society are of vital significance. Tolerance, participation, responsibility, a sense of community, and an overall loyalty to the political system among citizens is needed. The debate within the broad political and ideological spectrum revolves around not just rights but justice, identity and political participation (see Peña, 2003; Sudupe, 1998). The debat over citizenship brings to the fore a basic question: what constitutes a ‘good citizen’? Despite the fact that it is not always advisable to attempt such classifications, let us say that three ideas of citizenship emerge in discussions of this kind, which we may call, respectively, the liberal idea, the communitarian idea and the republican idea. Let us look briefly at each in turn. Liberalism seeks to equate human rights with social coexistence. It concedes to the individual the right to be critical of the community, so tolerance is one of the values it extols. But to the extent that the individual is put first, it becomes increasingly difficult to secure civic commitment. In the liberal conception, the individual is a person first and a citizen second. As a citizen, a person is represented as having a set of rights. The role of the state is to reach agreement on a number of minimum principles in the public sphere such as justics and equality. Beyond that, however, respect for rights and coexistence must be ensured, and so it is expected to take a neutral stance on matters such as lifestyles, moral values and the like, since society’s basic characteristic is diversity. Communitarians disagree with the liberal view of the citizen. Instead, they hold that politics, hence also citizenship, only makes sense in a framework of shared values, since individuals are the products of the culture and traditions of the community to which they belong. Hence the citizen is not merely the possessor of certain rights but also a member of a community sharing historical memories, an identity and a set of values, so that the proclamation of the state’s supposed neutrality is really nonsense. What is more, political communities have a moral status. The individual inherits from the past of the family, city and nation a range of obligations and expectations, which are the basis of moral life (MacIntyre, 1993). Contemporary society demands certain sacrifices from the citizen, which can only be justified if the citizen feels identified with the community.1 The central concept of republicanism is in fact the citizen. This view agrees with the communitarians concerning the importance of the collective group, but diverges regarding the need for a homogeneous society. Republicans attach importance to rational debate among citizens rather than to tradition. They also consider it essential for power to be kept under control through effective means such as the casting of lots, quotas, or occuyping office on a rotating basis, all of these being methods aimed at making it impossible for power to remain in the hands of a few. Deliberative democracy and participatory democracy both derive from these two characteristics and their goal is clear: to strengthen its democratic character (see Barber, 2004). In the last resort, the objective of republicanism is to carry civic virtue into the public arena, and this can only be achieved by taking part in public life. Nationalism brings together republicans and communitarians, but the contemporary republican wishes to be differentiated from the nationalists, holding that loyalty is owed to the republic, not to a people defined by a set of cultural characteristics. It is now fashionable, in the discussion of citizenship, to speak of an identification deficit. The assumption is that today people lack any affection for their community (Cortina, 1997). 1 13 From this perspective, the nation consists of citizens, as in the French Revolution, and is objectively measured, since only those with a right to citizenship in an administrative sense constitute the nation (see Schnnaper, 2001). These are all ways of understanding the notion of citizenship. Here we have not mentioned another important concept that is frequently mentioned: that of nationality. In modern states, citizenship and nationality are treated as the same thing. Sometimes they are indeed equivalent, and this has given rise to considerable exasperation for those wishing to keep them apart (Connor, 1978). Sometimes, on the contrary, nationhood and citizenship are retained as separate categories, and this is an entirely adequate distinction from the point of view of nationalist movements without a state. In such cases there is no state available for the clarification and protection of administrative rights, and so in the absence of an objective criterion it is useful to introduce a subjective one. So from this alternative point of view it is nationalism, rather than the state, which determines who is entitled to nationality. And the future of the nation will be determined by the strength of that nationalism. Summing up, then, liberals talk of rights, communitarians of identity and republicans of participation, but always within the framework of the nation-state. But what kind of citizenship are we to think about at the present time in an Euskal Herria that has not been constituted as a state? Or to put it another way, what would be the relationship between the citizen and the political administration, and among its citizens, in a hypothetical Basque state? 2. BASQUE CITIZENSHIP A disussion of Basque citizenship2 may either be treated as a work of fiction, a purely theoretical exercise, or as a description of a plain reality. The fact that Euskal Herria lacks a state means that either option is available, and makes it possible to switch back and forth at will between objective and subjective points of view, thus adding to the subject’s complexity. In the interplay between these views, the notions of citizen and nation pop up all the time; these are connected, yet distinct. In the opinion of some there is no Basque nation because they think of a nation as linked to a state, while in the opinion of others the existence of a Basque nation is an undeniable fact for several reasons including its history, language and will to exist. Thus, subjective and objective viewpoints leave the field open. As regards nationhood, from a purely subjective point of view it is enough to note that many thousands of people think that the Basque nation exists and believe in it; in our opinion, that alone is sufficient reason to conclude that there is a Basque nation. By the same token, many inhabitants of the Basque Country who believe in a Spanish or French nation are convinced that there is no Basque nation. On the other hand, from an objective viewpoint, if one agrees to resolve the question regarding the nation’s e existence according to certain pre-established criteria, it would be possible to demonstrate that there is a Basque nation and a shared nationality (because Basques share a common history, or because they have in common the Basque language, for example), or to demonstrate the contrary (if having one’s own state is taken as a condition, for instance). Citizenship, on the other hand, is in principle an entirely objective concept that is applicable on the administrative level. There is less discussion of this, mainly because the When talking about a Basque state, we wish to pay particular attention to the equation Basque (speaker) [‘euskaldun’ in Basque] = Basque citizen which nowadays are assumed by many to be synonymous. In this paper we will link the concept of euskaldun to language: euskaldunak [often translated as ‘Basques’] are people who speak Basque. But Basque citizens, on the other hand, may speak Basque, Spanish or French. the subject of the present article is Basque citizens. 2 14 fact that there is no Basque state means that nobody can be called a citizen of Euskal Herria even though they live in Euskal Herria. Such people are citizens of Spain, France or some other state, not of Euskal Herria. Using this objective, irrefutable argument, many deny there is any such thing as Basque citizenship, or for that matter, a Basque nation. What is more, the fact that the seven provinces that are considered to make up Euskal Herria are not combined into a single administrative entity makes it difficult even to say who would be a Basque citizen if there were such a category. However, the existence of a strong Basque nationalist movement has led to the emergence of a strong feeling of Basque national identity, and consequently, to a wish to deny Spanish or French citizenship, on a subjective level of course. As a result, a person who believes in the Basque nation does what no state would do, by resorting to self-identification: such a person says I am a Basque citizen because that is what I wish to be. Basque citizenship is established subjectively, although objectively it is not allowed. This does not make any difference administratively, but politically it does, because such people think the existence of a Basque nation entails the right to have a Basque state. So, objective and subjective viewpoints tend to cut across each other, and contradictory viewpoints and conclusions are the result. But on the whole, nationhood is easier to explain in subjective terms, citizenship from an objective perspective. Does this mean that there is no point in discussing nationhood because what really counts is citizenship? Not at all; and if this cannot be said when there is a state, it certainly cannot in the case of nations without a state. NATIONHOOD / NATIONALITY CITIZENSHIP Subjective concept Objective concept In states, nationality is closely bound up with citizenship, but the former is a component of the latter: citizenship (objective) is legally prior, while nationality (subjective) is invoked to achieve internal cohesion and to make the state ‘come alive’. Things are entirely different when it comes to nations without a state. In this case, nationhood is the motor with which to attain citizenship. If it is possible to speak of a Basque state at all it will be because a significant number of people who feel like Basque citizens proclaim that state. It now becomes fundamentally important to know who feels they are Basque citizens and only Basque citizens, who belongs to the Basque Nation, because that information will provide the strength to proclaim a state and push for a referendum on self-determination. SITUATION BASIS OF AFFILIATION STATELESS NATION ← NATIONHOOD Goal: To create a state ← NATIONHOOD STATE ← CITIZENSHIP Goal: To strengthen the state ← ↓ ↓ ↓ CITIZENSHIP + NATIONHOOD In the next few section we will examine the subjects of nationhood and citizenship, but this time as they apply to a stateless nation: Euskal Herria. Seeking statehood, and possibly attaining it, would alter perceptions of both. First of all, as we have already observed, the subjective dimension would be developed: in order to call for a Basque state there must be 15 a significant number of people who want one, people who believe in the Basque nation. Then, if a Basque state came into being, the objective aspect would come to the fore because it would be necessary to determine who has a right to be a citizen. Thirdly, for that citizenship to be a uniting force, nationhood would be cultivated once again so that citizens feel they are members of the nation (while respecting the right to have national sentiments beyond the state in question). 2.1. Who is a Basque citizen? Seeking a state. Nationhood It is slightly odd, in a normal situation, to inquire into the national sentiments of a country’s inhabitants because we are used to thinking of this as an objective, straightforward and categorical fact: the nationality of a person is that of the state they live in, to which they are also affectively linked. A state is in a position to foment, encourage and give expression to nationhood, and members of the nation reserve their loyalty and even their pride concerning their nationality. Members of the Portuguese population, for instance, need not ask themselves whether or not they are Portuguese. Such a person is Portuguese, first of all, because he or she fulfils the administrative requirements for being a Portuguese subject; and because besides that, this is constantly being drummed into him or her in so many ways, through the mass media, symbols, in the country’s constitution and laws, and so on. As Billig (1995) has shown, there are countless ways, at different points in one’s lifetime and incorporated unnoticed into daily life through discourse, symbols, sports and so on, to promote such a national sentiment and get members of the nation to identify with the nation and its state. In the nation-state, citizens do not question their affiliation as citizens since that is taken for granted. Citizens have to be outside the box of the nation-state’s ‘normal’ logic in order to raise questions about their nationality. This happens for instance, when someone has emigrated to another country and has been living there for such a long time that a doubt arises about what nationality they are. It can also happen if a nationalist movement appears which challenges the logic upheld by the state. Nationalism can work in favour of the interests of a nation-state or be turned against them. Nation-states seek uniformity within their borders, wishing for all their inhabitants to identify with each other as a single national entity, but this wish is not always fulfilled. Often enough, for one reason or another, people in a certain region will get it into their heads that they wish to break away from the nation-state. This is never easy sailing because one will come up against the power of the nation-state, yet sometimes the emerging movement acquires enough momentum to make the region’s inhabitants think about it. Once that has happened, an issue that seemed quite simple until then poses new questions, as the new nationalist movement strives to appeal to the population’s feelings. That is basically what has happened in Euskal Herria. Events in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in particular, created resentment in the Basque Country, and from the twentieth century onwards some of its inhabitants responded by espousing a new definition of citizenship: henceforth their allegiance as citizens would no longer be conceived of as linked to Spain or France but to a new member-to-be of the world community of states. Once that view emerged, a clash between the nationalism of the two pre-existing states and Basque nationalism was inevitable, and in the conflict that followed people have had to make choices about their national affiliation. Adopting the nationality of the nation-state was inadequate because the Basque nationalist opposition, as it gained strength, was fostering a different national identification. The outcome is that questions such as ‘What do you feel, Basque, Spanish or French?’ and so on, which sound odd in some countries, make perfect sense in the present-day Basque Country, and people are aware of the question’s implications and significance. So what are people saying? 16 There are three distinct, widespread national sentiments in the Basque Country, but they are difficult to quantify for a number of reasons. France and Spain are not overly eager to ask the question, since by not asking it they are able to maintain that the people are, de facto, still French or Spanish. Basque nationalism is interested, but has no way to ask the entire population systematically. Surveys and research programmes are used to register citizens’ opinions, but it is not easy to ask such a question, and survey participants are often asked to talk about a subject that they have not yet given their due consideration. Nevertheless, the data is there, and is made public from time to time. The following statistics, given by Linz, are a classic example. Obtained at the end of the nineteenseventies, they show that the largest group of people (39.7%) in the provinces of Araba, Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia felt they were just Basque; when taken together with those who considered themselves more Basque than Spanish the figure came to 52.3%. The study distinguished between people born in the southern Basque Country and those born elsewhere. Of those born in the Basque Country, 56.2% considered themselves just Basque while only 9.3% of those born elsewhere felt they were just Basque. Among the latter, the most popular response was as Basque as they were Spanish (35.3%), followed by just Spanish (34.7%) (Linz, 1986: 40). However, in northern Euskal Herria the most popular response (with 37%) is just French, adding these to more French than Basque responses, over half of the population is covered (55%) (ibid. 375). In Navarre, lastly, there is a special case, with the most popular response, chosen by 51% being to consider oneself Navarrese. Adding this to the option as Basque as Navarrese, the figure reaches 82% (ibid. 413). For some more recent statistics and to make some comparisons, we will now look at the 2006 data. In a broad survey by Eusko Ikaskuntza on Basque identity and culture (Baxok et al., 2006), we encounter the same overall picture. The largest group of people in Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa (40%) feel they are just Basque, and adding these to those who answered more Basque than Spanish, they come to 55%.3 In the northern Basque Country, the just French option wins out at 36%, and combined with more French than Basque the number rises to more than half, at 52%. However, the number of those who feel they are just Basque has risen to 11% (all data from Baxok et al., 2006: 48). In Navarre things are complicated again, and the data are not completely comparable with Linz’s. The largest group (38%) consists of those who consider themselves mostly Navarrese, but these are followed by 25% who either think of themselves as mostly Basque (10%) or or as Basque as they are Navarrese (15%); finally, 24% consist of those who either consider themselves mostly Spanish (5%) or as Spanish as they are Navarrese (19%) (ibid., p. 49). It is hard to say what the meaning of mostly Navarrese is, but these figures suggest a three-way split between those who see themselves as Navarrese, Navarrese Basques and Navarrese Spaniards.4 As we can see, nationalist movements that do not have a state tend to treat nationality in a subjective manner; whereas nation-states take an objective approach that is linked to certain administrative rights. It would have been possible for the former to adopt an objective approach too, though not in administrative terms (since they are not a nationEuskobarometro makes it possible to compare the 2006-2007 data for these three provinces. They show figures slightly lower than Baxok’s, adding up to 46%, for the groups who consider themselves just Basque (24%) and more Basque than Spanish (22%), and the largest group was I am as Basque as I am Spanish with 33% (source: Llera, 2009: 6-7). 3 4 Here is another interesting fact to show that our two surveys are comparable: when asked whether there had been any change in their national sentiments from ten years previously, roughly three out of four responded that there had not: 79% in Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, 76% in the northern Basque Country and 70% in High Navarre. It is significant that, of those whose feeling has changed, more (12%) feel more Basque now, while fewer (only 3%) feel more Spanish or more French than before. The data for Navarre are even more striking, with 18% feeling more Basque and a mere 1% considering themselves more Spanish (Baxok et al., 2006: 50). 17 state) but in terms of some objective characteristic such as race or language, for instance. However, Basque nationalism has not gone that way, but has chosen instead to focus on the subjective dimension, turning each national into a militant for the Basque nation. Each person’s sentiment determines their nationality, and this fact imbues the nationalist movement with great motivation and drive. It also makes it possible for feelings of Basque nationhood to be nurtured outside Euskal Herria, notably in the diaspora. In this way, Basque nationalism is blazing its own trail. National sentiment reflects what people think, and the statistics presented here show that there exists a will on the part of a great many people to do without the idea of ‘Frenchness’ or ‘Spanishness’. Not all inhabitants of Euskal Herria think alike, and some people attach more importance to the issue of identity than others. Consequently, some major different groups have emerged in relation to their feelings about nationhood, and this has resulted in a national conflict, because to the subjective notion of the nation (I feel Basque) the supporters of Basque nationalism have attempted to add the same notion of objective citizenship employed by the nation-states (I am a Basque citizen). The camps defending Frenchness, Spanishness and Basqueness are all sizable, and it hardly seems likely that a proposal will emerge that makes all of them happy. An issue of people’s identity requires a special solution, and in our opinion a democratic solution here can only be one which respects people’s opinion and takes into account whatever the majority decides. A referendum would decide, on the basis of the right to selfdetermination, whether Euskal Herria should constitute a new state over and above whatever Spain and France may say about it. Talking about the right to self-determination is nothing new in the Basque Country. Again we can look at some statistics: according to Lopez-Aranguren (1993: 253) 5, by 1993 most inhabitants of southern Euskal Herria considered self-determination either important or very important (54% of them in the Basque Autonomous Community, 52.4% in High Navarre). The same view is borne out by more recent statistics, and has become stronger in the case of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. According to 2006 statistics from the University of the Basque Country’s Euskobarometro research group (subsequently they have not focused on the issue of self-determination), 71% of the people surveyed believed that the politicians ought to reach an agreement about the right to self-determination (Euskobarometro, 2006). In a self-determination referendum, people would be asked about their national sentiment or other interests, and it would be decided what option to take administratively, but paradoxically perhaps, not all those who think of themselves as Basque citizens would be able to participate in such a referendum, and even if a state were set up we would have to see whether all the people who feel they are members of the Basque nation are allowed to become citizens of Euskal Herria, because citizensip, let us repeat, is not a subjective concept but a purely objective one. 2.2. Who is a Basque citizen? citizen ? Citizenship in a Basque state In the last section we looked at what the population of Euskal Herria feels, subjectively. However, a country’s administration cannot act according to the subjective opinion of its inhabitants: it cannot consider a person a subject of the administration just because that person wants to be one. If that were the case, immigrants seeking their 5 Aside from the right to self-determination, 48.3% in the BAC and 42.6% in High Navarre were in favour of a referendum on it. However, when an additional intermediate choice was given such as a federal state or autonomous region, the statistic for those favouring self-determination understood as the option to form a state dropped to 20% in southern Euskal Herria (data source: Lopez-Aranguren, 1993, pp. 253–256). 18 own material interests would be attracted, not to mention many members of the diaspora even if they belonged in national sentiment as much to the country where they lived as to the Basque nation. Since there can be no universal citizenship, there cannot be voluntary citizenship either. The world is divided into states and each state stipulates and regulates who its citizens are, and subsequently acts in accordance with its own regulations. Citizenship entails rights and duties, more than those attributed to noncitizens. It is therefore a very important matter to be the citizen of one state rather than another.6 In a nation-state that has to run an administration, objective criteria must be sought and implemented at the expense of subjective considerations. The state may have come into being through a referendum on self-determination, in which national sentiment has played a strong part in determining the voters’ choice. However, and this is where it gets complicated, one’s vote in a referendum, even if under the influence of national sentiment, ought not to have any weight, either for or against, in decisions about a person’s citizenship since this must be based on objective criteria. Feeling Basque will not guarantee Basque citizenship, and not feeling Basque will not be an obstacle to somebody who has a legal right to it obtaining it. But if not sentiment, then what is the basis to be for deciding who can be a citizen of a Basque state? What gives someone the right to be a Basque citizen? Nation-states establish clearcut conditions, usually requiring that the person should have been born on the state’s territory and/or referring to the parents’ citizenship.7 What kind of conditions would a Basque state demand? There are no data on this, since it is not asked about in opinion surveys, but we may use other statistics to obtain some idea, at least in a roundabout way. Coming back to Linz’s study, there is a section of the survey that looks at where Basque national identity is situated, in which survey participants are asked to say whom they consider to be Basques (and so, we may assume, who would have the right to claim Basque citizenship). The data are both clear and significant. Thus for example, those survey participants who feel they are only Basque consider that living and working in the Basque Country is the main criterion (for 79.8%) for having a Basque national identity, over and above speaking Basque (for 28.3%) and having a Basque family (for 41.2%). In general, most of the population (69.2%) think that living and working in Euskal Herria is a sufficient condition for determining Basque citizenship (Linz, 1986:32). Based on the same statistics, Llera follows up on this issue upto as recently as 2005, when the same trend becomes even more pronounced. So in 2005, for instance, responding to the question about conditions for being a Basque citizen, 85% of those surveyed think that living and working in the Basque Country is a necessary condition, followed by wanting to be Basque for 73%, and being born in the Basque Country for 57%.8 Hence those who subjectively consider themselves Basque are of the opinion that objectively people who live and work in the Basque Country should be recognised as citizens. (Legislators will have to decide how long they are required to have been living or working in the country.) It would seem, then, that in a Basque state, the definition of citizenship should not turn out to be too controversial an issue. The Eusko Ikaskuntza group (Baxok et al., 2006) also provides interesting statistics. Asked what they will be feeling in ten years’ time, very few people indeed responded 6 In principle the United Nations have prohibited statelessness. Although all persons are entitled to citizenship, for a variety of reasons there were twelve million stateless people in the world in 2009. Being a stateless person means losing the basic rights to which all all people are entitled; for the statistics and a discussion, see Blitz & Lynch (2011). 7 These criteria are known as iure sanguinis and iure soli. An interesting discussion of these issues is found in Lasagabaster & Lazcano, 1999. Llera uses data for 1979, 1989, 1996, 2002 and 2005 from Linz (1986), taken from CIS and Euskobarometro. There are also questions about three other conditions: speaking Basque (given by 20% in 2005), being of Basque origin (28%) and feeling nationalist — presumably meaning Basque nationalist! (23%) (Llera, 2009: 9). 8 19 more French or Spanish than now, only 1% (3% in northern Euskal Herria). Most (78%) thought they would feel the same as now, but strikingly, 8% say they think they will be feeling more Basque in ten years’ time than at present (and in Navarre, 11%). Moreover, people of immigrant origin in the survey followed the same pattern: 2% think they will feel more Spanish or French, but 6% more Basque (ibid., 51). This suggests there is a definite drift towards greater feelings of Basqueness. 2.3. Who is a Basque citizen? citizen? In search of a sense of community: nationality and citizenship combined Once the Basque state has decided, on a systematic basis, who is a citizen, it would be able to move foward and take its place in the world beside other states. But for other states in the world, such a systematization of their population is not enough. They must have vitality; the citizens need to believe that they are taking part in a common project, otherwise their strength could be dispersed. So what are the options for generating such sentiments? If the state has been created in a democratic manner, the society may possibly be initially divided into two groups. In the best of circumstances, everyone will have accepted the outcome of the referendum, but that does not mean that everybody necessarily shares a common goal. We need to know whether the people who have lost the referendum will agree to accept the new situation, but also whether those who have won will accept that other group. The Basque Country has already known such divisiveness in the past, and even without hard data we may hazard a guess about what would happen. In 2006, according to Euskobarometro data, 64% of the survey participants thought that a referendum on self-determination would not give rise to a divided society (Euskobarometro, 2006). Furthermore, the question of what impact a hypothetical Basque state would have on people who do not believe in such a state has already been a subject of controversy; to be more specific, it has at times been mooted from certain quarters that a Basque state would expel immigrants and people who felt Spanish.9 We lack quantitative data about this, but it is possible to obtain qualitative information from a great many interviews with immigrants who had arrived in Euskal Herria between the fifties and the eighties (see Zabalo, Basterra, Iraola & Mateos, 2010). In fact, we can clearly see on the basis of responses by immigrants who do not have any Basque nationalist inclinations that such people are neither afraid nor distrustful about such an event. In fact, the question often makes provoke laughter, which shows that it hadn’t even occurred to these people to consider any such possibility (ibid., 103). The people in question are well acquainted with the Basque nationalists’ demands, and are not afraid of them (ibid., 109); they themselves may be opposed to such demands, but they have no intention of leaving, and would be ready to continue to cooperate (ibid., 104). In conclusion, then, it seems that a Basque state would not result in a new problem or conflict as suggested by Spain and France’s dire predictions. Rather, it appears that the inhabitants of Euskal Herria desire peaceful coexistence, and fully realise that compromises will be necessary to achieve this. But even after clarifying that, the challenges and risks are many and one will have to live with them, in the beginning at least. On the other hand, benefits may also ensue, as is pointed out in several of the other articles in this collection. Many aspects regarding citizenship remain to be resolved, such as citizenship criteria, European citizenship, multicultural issues and the rights and obligations of citizens (see Lasagabaster & Lazcano, 1999), but it would be premature to discuss these matters here, 9 Needless to say, this is a view cultivated by Spanish nationalism, but to be honest it does reflect one school of thought in Basque nationalism too. However, this way of thinking generally harks back to the old-fashioned race-nationalism of earlier times and in fact has no place at all in the discourses used by present-day Basque nationalist parties. 20 and in any case they probably lie outside the scope of this paper. One such issue, double citizenship, has been talked about on more than one occasion. Some confusion has arisen in this connection, sometimes because of a failure to specify whether we are talking about administrative citizenship or nationality. Our argument that nationality is a subjective matter of sentiment may help to defuse the subject, because citizens (in the administrative sense) would still have a right to choose their nationality, including the option of a double national allegiance. The present-day nation-state, by conflating both concepts, makes it difficult to reject the nationality that is linked to one’s state and even harder to claim a different nationality. In view of the advantages of coupling both citizenship and nationality, the Basque state would also be interested in encouraging this, but would need to maintain a broader perspective on nationality and treat double nationality as an acceptable and interesting option, in view of the coexistence of the three main nationality types within Euskal Herria. Be that as it may, due emphasis ought to be placed on the maturity displayed by the Basque population, whatever its national affiliation, by mainly opting to support mutual, peaceful coexistence among people and by its readiness to respect democratically made decisions. This population appears to have already got started with the development of a broad sense of community, and to be prepared for the long haul. 21 REFERENCES Baxok, E. et al. (2006): Identidad y cultura vascas a comienzos del siglo XXI, Eusko Ikaskuntza, Donostia. Barber, B. (2004): Democracia fuerte, Almuzara, Granada. Billig, M. (1995): Banal nationalism, Sage, London. Blitz, B. K. & Lynch, M. (2011): Statelessness and Citizenship, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. Connor, W. (1978): “A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group,is a...”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1(4), 377-400. Cortina, A. (1997): Ciudadanos del mundo. Hacia una teoría de la ciudadanía, Alianza, Madrid. Euskobarometro (2006): “Estudio Periódico de la Opinión Pública Vasca”, Mayo (UPV/EHU). Lasagabaster, I. & Lazcano, I. (1999): “Derecho, política e historia en la autodeterminación de Euskal Herria”, in M. Gomez Uranga; I. Lasagabaster; F. Letamendia & R. Zallo (ed.), Propuestas para un nuevo escenario: democracia, cultura y cohesión social en Euskal Herria, Fundación Manu Robles-Arangiz Institutua, Bilbo, 175-280. Linz, J. J. (with others) (1986): Conflicto en Euskadi, Espasa-Calpe, Madrid. Llera, F. J. (2009): “Spain: identity Boundaries and Political Reconstruction”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 15: 3&4, 305-335. Lopez-Aranguren, E. (1993): “El problema del derecho de autodeterminación de los pueblos: la actitud de los españoles”, Derechos y Libertades, 1(1), 251–260. MacIntyre, A. (1993): “¿Es el patriotismo una virtud?”, Bitarte, 1, 67-85. Peña, J. (2003): “Ciudadanía”, in Arteta, Garcia Guitián & Maíz (ed.), Teoría política: poder, moral, democracia, Alianza, Madrid, 215-245. Schnnaper, D. (2001): La comunidad de los ciudadanos. Acerca de la idea moderna de nación, Alianza, Madrid. Sudupe, J. (1998): Euskaldunak, liberalak eta komunitatezaleak, Euskaltzaindia/BBK, Bilbo. Zabalo, J., Basterra, I., Iraola, I. & Mateos, Tx. (2010): Etorkinak eta integrazioa. 50-80ko hamarkadetako etorkinen integrazio moduak Hego Euskal Herrian, GITE-IPES, Bilbo. 22 2. Citizenship, immigration and the Basque state. state. I k e r I r a o l a A r r e t x e , S o c io l o g y P h . D . c an d i d a t e , P ro f e s s o r, E H U - U P V Immigration is directly related to citizenship, the nation and the state, revealing as it does the constructed nature of those categories. Here the impact of immigration on Euskal Herria is examined from this perspective, looking first at the processes of migration to it which have produced the make-up of present-day Basque society to a large extent. This is followed by a consideration of the way migratory movements have been viewed by the movement for the development of Euskal Herria into a state, the Basque nationalist movement, since these attitudes have played a fundamental role in defining Basque citizenship. After some observations about multiculturalism, the chapter concludes with a look at how the creation of a Basque state might contribute to this and the issues that will be raised. 23 INTRODUCTION In recent decades immigration has become a basic area of study in the Social Sciences and above all in political analysis. It is such a broad subject that many aspects have been made the subject of study, but since the nineties cultural issues have received special attention. This has resulted in a great many analyses, approaches and debates concerning multiculturalism. There have also been criticisms which accuse such studies of limiting themselves to providing a cultural response to a situation which has many different aspects, and of only associating multiculturalism with immigration. When studying immigration we should be aware of this field’s many limitations; for instance, subjects that are treated as related to immigration are generally applicable to the whole population, not just to immigrants. Nevertheless, in this chapter I propose to examine the issue of immigration from the viewpoint of a host-society that wishes to achieve its own state, by looking at immigration in relation to subjects such as the state, the nation and the nationalist movement. In this sense the focus of my attention will not be on the immigrant per se (otherwise, I would also have to consider the benefits and problems that a new state would entail for the migrant), and when mention is made of the immigrant’s point of view it will be in relation to the perspective outlined above. ‘Immigration’ and ‘immigrant’ are disputed categories that have been discussed from numerous angles. In the opinion of some, the label ‘immigrant’ is better avoided because of its negative connotations. In this view (see Bilbeny, 2009), only people who have arrived recently should be spoken of as immigrants. The point of this is to do away with the category of ‘immigrant’ and just consider such a person as a ‘normal’ full citizen, without this implying any wish to belittle people’s original cultural identities or customs as a result (Zapata-Barrero, 2004). Be that as it may, in this study I will use the term ‘immigrant’ in a vaguely defined way to refer to all inhabitants who have originally come from anywhere outside Euskal Herria, even when the process of their migration began decades ago. To begin with I will consider some key concepts referring to the relationship between immigration and the state or nation on a theoretical level, before turning to look at the Basque Country’s situation in detail. First of all I will focus on the most salient characteristics of the flows of immigrants to Euskal Herria; then the most significant debates that have taken place in the Basque Country on the subject of immigration will briefly be reviewed, focusing on the main lines of thought and developments in the Basque nationalist camp regarding immigration. Following that, I will examine some of the notions that constantly enter into discussions about contemporary immigration such as ‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’, and I will conclude by attempting to relate the ideas discussed to the need for a Basque state. 1. IMMIGRATION, STATE AND NATION Migratory movements have many consequences both for the migrants’ land of origin and for the destination country. Here I will focus on the relationship between immigration and the concepts of nation and state. Immigrating means moving to a different state, which has a number of administrative effects, such as the actual entry process, work permits, regularization of legal status and so on. But the state is not concerned with this administrative aspect only. There is also an undeniable political facet, and here is where the variable of ‘nation’ enters the picture. 24 States typically attribute to their territory a national nature and characterise themselves as a nation-state. The state bases its claim to legitimacy on the existence of a nation. There are many ways to understand ‘nation’, and different elements may be emphasised when defining the nation and specific nations in particular, such as language, ethnicity, history and national aspirations; but in the last resort the nation is a political fact linked to a political goal. Claims to nationhood are not limited to states, and there are many nationalist movements which have not attained to statehood; in many countries there are conflicts between the nationalism of the state and those without a state on this account. So when migrants move to a state, they also enter a nation. It may be the case that there is no contradiction between the two planes of reality, or that the contradiction that exists is only of concern to a small minority group with negligible social impact. But if there exists in the country a significant nationalist movement which disagrees with the nation championed by the state, a national conflict may be in store; and just as local inhabitants will hold a position on the matter, so will immigrants. But whether or not there exists a movement to challenge the official national project, the state may be counted on to promote its own national project, or to try to do so at any rate, making use for the purpose of all the social institutions at its disposal and unconspicuously taking advantage of a multitude of events that are in the public eye at any given time (cf. Billig, 995). The state’s brand of nationalism is usually highly effective because it is not perceived as nationalism but merely as the result of ‘normality’. A nationalist movement without a state, on the other hand, must declare its purpose to the world and its followers must adopt a more dynamic approach to achieve its end. When it comes to the issue of immigration, the difficulty facing the stateless nationalist movement is evident. Such a movement lacks all the mechanisms available to the state, and comes up against numerous obstacles to its national project. It has been noted that in the power relationship between state-sponsored and stateless nationalism, because of many factors, immigrant groups often tend to align themselves with the former to the extent that this affects the immigrant’s life directly and the state is the more powerful player (Kymlicka, 2003; Zapata-Barrero, 2008). However, that is not to say that stateless nationalism is incompatible with immigrants, by any means. Stateless nationalist movements may take many lines on immigration, ranging from those who go on the defensive and adopt a xenophobic attitude to immigrants, all the way to those who hope to win over immigrants to their national project. Likewise, state nationalism may also develop different approaches in this respect. Continuing on the theoretical level, whether or not it obtains a state, the nationalist movement has a complex relationship with immigration. When nationalism specifies the limits of its nation, it defines the members of its nation — its nationals; and when it does so, it determines who are foreigners at the same time. Moreover, to characterize the national us, the presence of a foreign others is needed, even if only symbolically (Connor, 1998: 51; Triandaffyllidou, 1998). In this classification into national citizens and foreigners, the immigrant is in an ambivalent position, neither a member of the nation for an utter foreigner either. Complete foreigners have their own nation, but immigrants, living in a country that is not their own, render problematic the definitions of us and others by occupying a grey area somewhere between outside and inside. To put it another way, immigration ‘adulterates’10 the nationstate and draws attention to its historical and social character (see Gil Araújo, 2006: 59-61). The fact is that the two realities, that of migration and that of the nation or state, follow distinct logics, and as shown by Abdelmalek Sayad (2010), each opens the way to a different order of things: the national order and the migrational order, so to speak. Inevitably, the relations between these two logics are controversial. 10 Or ‘denaturalizes’. Notice that the process of obtaining citizenship of a state is referred to as naturalization! 25 2. A LOOK AT IMMIGRATION TO THE BASQUE COUNTRY The above theoretical discussion has direct implications for the subject that concerns this chapter, the relationship between immigration and a Basque state. For its application to Euskal Herria, we must first of all review the characteristics of immigration to the Basque Country, listing the principal migratory waves that have affected the country and commenting on their nature. We shall speak about two very different immigration processes, one coming from the Spanish state, the other from other countries, which have taken place in different periods, intensifying at times and dropping off at others, but both occurring concurrently even now (even though a single discourse and social representation of immigration is discussed). If we are to consider the relationship between a state of Euskal Herria and immigration, I think it is essential to take into account the Basque Country’s full range of experience regarding immigration, both positive and negative. But first of all, a clarification. The analysis of immigration to the Basque Country is made difficult by the impossibility of obtaining valid statistics. Consequently the data given below must be understood only as a tentative approximation. For example, the immigration data for northern (“French”) Euskal Herria count citizens of southern (“Spanish”) Euskal Herria who reside in Hendaia, just across the official border, as immigrants. This is merely one example of the effects of the lack of recognition of Euskal Herria as a structural entity. 2.1. The precedent of Basque emigration As is well known, in the course of their history Basques have needed to emigrate to other countries, as is witnessed by the Basque diaspora today. Special thought should be given to the place that people of Basque origin born outside Euskal Herria will have in a new Basque state. Among the world’s states there are considerable differences regarding the right to citizenship of foreign-born descendants of their nationals. Let us not forget, too, that all immigrants are likewise part of the diasporas of their respective countries. Turning our attention to immigrants to Euskal Herria, their arrival in significant numbers commenced at the end of the nineteenth century, and the flow of people emigrating from Spain proper began gathering momentum in that period until it turned into a veritable exodus. It was the beginning of a century-long process (see Ruiz Olabuénaga & Blanco, 1994, for a study of the movements of Spanish immigrants to the Basque provinces of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa). Initially, immigration to the Basque Country was focused on certain parts of Bizkaia (Bilbao, the Left Bank and the Meatzalde region) which attracted workers to industries linked to the growth of mining in the area; the number of immigrants gradually grew. In addition to internal migration within the Basque Country (many people moved from farms in rural Bizkaia to the industrial areas in search of work), the flow of immigrants, mainly Castilians, from regions of Spain bordering on Euskal Herria grew steadily. The contrast between the demography of the northern (“French”) and southern (“Spanish”) Basque Country became more pronounced as a result. While the northern provinces of Lapurdi, Low Navarre and Zuberoa continued to lose their population, in the other areas the situation was now changing. Although centring our attention on southern Euskal Herria, it is important to note that the situation was different in different provinces and areas within the country. In High Navarre, for instance, there was no significant influx of immigrants until the middle of thet twentieth century, and even then it was slower than in other provinces (García-Sanz & Mikelarena, 2000). 26 But an immigration process that would make a deeper impact on southern Euskal Herria began later, from 1950 onwards and reaching a high point in the sixties and seventies. Vast numbers of Spanish workers arrived, first in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, later also in Araba and High Navarre, drawn by the availability of work in the Basque Country. This took place during the blackest years of the Franco dictatorship in Spain. The immigrants came in their greatest numbers to Bizkaia, the same region that had already had one wave of immigration, followed by neighbouring Gipuzkoa, where settlements of immigrants were dispersed in different places across the province where industrial development was moving fast; here they gathered in scattered urban centres, giving rise to one notable feature of the Basque urban landscape: hastily built working class precincts, chaotic in design, dotted all over southern Euskal Herria, populated mainly by immigrants. This was also the period, particularly in the seventies, when, on a smaller scale, an influx of immigrants to the provinces of Araba (mainly Gasteiz, the provincial capital) and High Navarre took place. In this cycle, as in the preceding one, and as is usual in such cases generally, people went through hard times and were forced to live in miserable conditions, while at the same time industrialists had a great opportunity to grow very rich. Moreover, these events exerted an influence on the Basque nationalist movement which was taking off again at that time across Euskal Herria and undergoing a profound change of perspective, as we shall see. Another characteristic of this wave of immigration is that it was not limited to male migrants, as is typical of most economically motivated population movements; it involved similar numbers of both women and men (Ruiz Olabuénaga & Blanco, 1994: 154-155). The tidal wave of immigrants transformed the social landscape of southern Euskal Herria. The population of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, and to a lesser degree High Navarre, grew drastically in conjunction with the profound industrialization and urbanization of the country, with people born outside the Basque Country now forming a significant proportion of the population. Thus in 1973 the inhabitants of southern Euskal Herria who were born in the Basque Country and whose parents were also Basques added up to only 53% of the total population (Jáuregui, 1981: 69). The flow of immigrants stopped in the eighties, in the context of an economic crisis, and the migratory trend suffered a turnaround. Fifteen years would have to pass before new immigrants to the southern Basque Country made their appearance in important numbers again, and this time the immigrants had a different place of origin. 2.2. The new wave of immigration Today Euskal Herria has a population of around 3,100,000, fewer than 10% of whom live in Lapurdi, Low Navarre and Zuberoa (the northern provinces), while the highest percentage, 37.1%, live in Bizkaia.11 Table 1. 1 . Makeup of the Basque Country’s population by country of birth (northern provinces: 2008, southern provinces: 2010). Euskal Herria France or Spain Other states, with Spanish/French citizenship Others Others Total Absolute total Araba Bizkaia Gipuzkoa High Navarre North* North* Total 66·6 23·9 0·6 8·9 100 71·2 21·8 1·0 6·0 100 77·1 15·9 1·0 6·0 100 73·6 13·1 2·0 11·2 100 58·7 31·3 5·6 4·3 100 71·5 19·7 1·6 7·2 100 313,819 1,152,658 705,698 630,578 282,003 3,084,756 Source: Aierdi, 2011. The figures presented in this section are taken from Aztiker (2006) and (principally) Aierdi (2011). Most of the Aztiker data are for 2001. Aierdi’s are more recent: the statistics for Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa are for 2010, and in the case of northern Euskal Herria, for 2008. * These figures have been obtained taking into account the whole department of Pyrénés Atlantiques. 11 27 As the table shows, Gipuzkoa is the province with the lowest immigration rate, while the north of the Basque Country has the highest rate. (However, there are big differences among the northern provinces. In 2001 Lapurdi was, of all the Basque provinces, proportionally the one with the highest-percentage immigrant population, whereas Zuberoa was the province with the lowest: see Aztiker, 2006: 116.) The recently discussed influx of immigrants from the surrounding states, and the constant flow from Spain and France following the immigration wave of 1950-1980, has also had a great effect on Basque society, in which it represents about 20% of the current population; and a further 24% of the 2001 population had one or both parents who had immigrated from the Spanish or French state to Euskal Herria (Aztiker, 2006: 117). In short, one way or another, immigration from Spain or France accounts for a part of present-day Basque demographics that is far too large to ignore. Including immigration to the Basque Country from places not in these two states (the phenomenon to which I shall refer in this paper as ‘new immigration’), Araba and High Navarre are the provinces with the highest percentage of immigrants; there are also a significant number (5.6%) of inhabitants of northern Euskal Herria who were born outside France, but who have French citizenship. Another interesting point is that the highest percentage of new immigration is found in High Navarre, precisely the southern Basque province which had the lowest level of immigration from Spain in the twentieth century. It is also notable that the regions that are receiving the highest percentage of immigrants are the southern part of Navarre, around the Tutera (or Tudela) area, and the Errioxa (Rioja) region of Araba, both of which are basically agricultural areas where the Basque language already had an extreme minority status. The new immigration statistics are also high for the northern Basque Country, no doubt mainly around the coastal region of Lapurdi province. Given that officially only immigrants from places outside Spain or France (depending on which part of the Basque Country one is talking about) are recognised as immigrants, the official percentage of immigrants for Euskal Herria, 7.2%, is lower than that for Spain (12.3%) and a bit higher than that for France (5.8%); it is also close to the European Union average, which is 6.5% (Eurostat, 2011). International immigration to western Europe began to increase much earlier, after World War II, when the influx of immigrants from Northern Africa and Turkey, among other places, began to intensify in France, the UK and Germany. So if we count all the people born outside France, whether or not they have citizenship, their percentage of the French population actually rises to 11.1%, while that of Spain remains at 14%, probably because many immigrants have not yet had time to achieve citizenship (ibid.). A word needs to be said here about the duration of what I call ‘new immigration’. How long has this been going on for? In southern Euskal Herria, as in Spain, the new immigration began later than in northern Europe and has risen sharply over the past decade. In Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and High Navarre, the new immigration started reaching significant levels in the first decade of the new century. The subject of the social image of ‘new immigrants’ (commonly equated with illegal immigration despite the fact that a most new immigrants to the southern Basque Country have legal status) would merit a separate study (Ikuspegi, 2011a). The main distinguishing characteristic of the new immigration is its place of origin, a fact which tends to lend it visibility, more in fact than the actual numbers. These immigrants are generally from more faraway places than those of the earlier wave, with Latin America providing a major component. The top countries of origin for the southern Basque Country are Morocco (13.5%), Romania (12.3%) and Colombia (9,5%); however, the American continent (mainly Latin America) accounts for a full 42.1% of all new immigrants entering southern Euskal Herria (Aierdi, 2011). This is furthermore immigration with a strong female element, once again with a large presence of Latin American women. Internationally 28 immigration ceased to be dominated by young men in the industrial sector back at the beginning of the nineteen-seventies, and in some parts of the Basque Country a growing proportion of immigrants is made up of women with occupations in parts of the service sector. Immigration is generally analysed from the vantage point of the state and it is difficult to obtain data at levels below that. This is particularly noticeable in the case of northern Euskal Herria, because it is not recognised as an entity by official institutions. It can be seen on the table above that immigration from France has made a deep mark on Lapurdi, Low Navarre and Zuberoa, with such immigrants representing over 30% of the total population; adding this to immigration from outside France, autochthonous people now only make up around 60% of the population of the northern Basque Country. Probably most of the immigrants are located on the Lapurdi coast, while in the inland areas the opposite is the case: these districts are being emptied of people. It is an often-forgotten fact, which I believe also merits a separate study, that migration is a very important fact of life in all three northern provinces. 3. IMMIGRANTS IMMIGRANTS TO EUSKAL HERRIA AND BASQUE NATIONALISM Immigration to the Basque Country has been a long process with profound consequences of all kinds for the country’s demography, economy, culture, social makeup, politics and so on, which no attempt to understand present-day Basque society can afford to ignore. Since the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between a Basque state and immigration, we must pause to consider the Basque nationalist movement12 given that, to some extent, immigration has been one of its driving forces. National conflict is a basic element in Euskal Herria, with different nationalisms vying for dominance in every realm of life, immigration included. Here the disagreement between Basque and Spanish nationalisms has been more evident in the south (see Zabalo et al., 2010: 37-62) than in Lapurdi, Low Navarre and Zuberoa where, apart from the fact that the situation has its own distinct characteristics, the power relationship was different and the conflict has been channelled into different areas. We will now have a look at how Basque nationalism’s attitude to immigration has evolved, although we should note that many factors that have played a fundamental part in it, such as (to name but one) the position of Spanish nationalism, will have to be omitted from consideration here. As already noted, Basque nationalism has attached great importance to the subject of immigration; this is hardly surprising given the great impact it has had on Euskal Herria. A variety of positions on immigration emerged, but one way or another immigration has been a significant issue for Basque nationalism. For our purposes, what needs to be focused on is the changes in Basque nationalism’s views on immigration which have, in the course of a long, drawn-out process, evolved from a closed-minded, antagonistic attitude to immigrants towards a point of view which seeks to integrate them (cf. Conversi, 1997: 187-221). It is no secret that Basque nationalism was born, under the influence of its leader Sabin Arana, out of a reaction against the arrival of Spanish immigrants. As we have seen, there was an important influx of immigrants to recently industrialized parts of Bizkaia at the end of the nineteenth century. At that point Arana founded the Jeltzale nationalist movement, which originally was of a conservative and religious nature. Hence the discourse over immigration had pride of place in the new-born nationalist movement, as indeed in all sectors of Bizkaian society at the time — not only in nationalist circles — where it had become the topic of the day. 12 Although nazionalismoa and abertzaletasuna are sometimes considered different concepts, in this work euskal nazionalismoa and abertzaletasuna are treated as synonyms [both will therefore translated as ‘Basque nationalism’ - translator]. 29 Arana developed a hard line against Spanish immigrants, a point often emphasised even today, to the point that is has become a cliché used against Basque nationalism.13 ‘Race’ was Arana’s criterion for Basqueness, yet he understood ‘race’ in a special way based on the possession of forebears with Basque surnames without incurring in an explicitly biological racism (Azurmendi, 1979: 128; Conversi, 1997: 68). However, there could be no place in Arana’s Basque nation for immigrants, about whom he spoke in very harsh terms. In a period when the Basque nationalists were no more than a small group, Arana adopted the idea of a ‘Basque race’ then current in European scientific circles and put it to his own use, proclaiming the Basque nation. Nationalist movements use different elements to delimit their nations, and Arana chose ‘race’, probably because he found other elements (such as language, for example) inadequate for the purpose (regarding Arana’s concept of ‘race’, see Douglass, 2004). For several decades the Basque nationalist movement was closed to immigrants, despite the fact that immigrants and their descendants were becoming increasingly numerous in the Basque Country, although in practice exceptions were made, and the ‘racial requirements’ for taking part in the nationalist movement were relaxed. Evidently, this position seriously limited the movement’s capacity to expand its ranks and exert more influence. Other attitudes did start to come in gradually, very slowly at first, then with more success. Examples of these changes are to be found among Sabin Arana’s followers, as we see in the delarations of some of the leaders of the Jagi-Jagi movement (Gallastegi, 1993: 110 ff.) and in a new secular nationalist tendency, outside the Arana tradition, espoused by Eusko Abertzale Ekintzak, ‘Basque Nationalist Action’ (see Díez Medrano, 1999: 104). But Basque nationalism did not fare well when confronted by the ideologies emerging from the workers’ movement, not to mention the negative stigma acquired internationally in the following years by the notion of race. Those effects were to make themselves felt fully a few decades later when, in ETA, a left-wing nationalist movement was born. At the time of the wave of immigration in the nineteen-sixties and seventies, a new brand of Basque nationalism came to the fore which adopted a different definition of Basque citizenship. The issue of race was relegated altogether, to be replaced at first by the notion of ethnicity, later still by language (Jáuregui, 1981: 133-135). The issue of immigration figured large in ETA’s internal debates in the sixties: at first different points of view were discussed, but once the movement had aligned itself as Marxist, the thesis that immigrants could be integrated into the nationalist movement triumphed outright. This view was subsequently implemented in practice by the Basque Nationalist Left (ezker abertzalea) movement (Garmendia, 1983: 78). This new definition of Basque citizenship opened the doors of the Basque nation wide open to anyone who wanted to belong to it, on condition that they learnt to speak Basque. This turnaround set going a tremendous leap forward in the tenets of Basque nationalism, and resulted in a radical change in relations between immigrants and nationalists (Shafir, 1995: 112). In practice it also meant a further relaxation of the ‘conditions’ for Basque citizenship, which now boiled down to speaking Basque, political will, and participation (Zabalo, 2006). The main requirement for anyone to be a Basque citizen was to want to be one. Nationalist sentiments were encouraged, and ‘citizens’ were asked to adopt an activist stance. The change in the concept of ‘nation’, then, had fargoing consequences for the movement’s dealings with immigrants. And there was a lot of immigration going on at the time, but now, far from stubbornly refusing to let immigrants in, Basque nationalism had 13 It is frequently assumed that the contemporary Basque nationalist movement holds a position based on discrimination against immigrants, a claim favoured by placing undue emphasis on the premises of the movement’s earliest years while glossing over its evolution over the subsequent sixty-year period. The same ulterior motive is reflected in claims that Basque nationalism is an ethnic nationalism understood in a negative sense. 30 made a different choice: it actually became an important goal of the new movement to attract immigrants to their cause and, in general, towards a sense of Basque national identification. The integration of immigrants was now a major goal of Basque nationalism (Shafir, 1995: 126; Conversi, 1997: 199). Fundamental to this new development was the leftwing character of the new Basque nationalist movement.14 And a large number of immigrants did join the Basque nationalist movement (see Garmendia et al., 1982; Shafir, 1995: 114-115; Conversi, 1997: 205). Moreover, this approach, which began in the nationalist Left, would eventually be adopted by the entirety of the broad Basque nationalist movement. The process briefly outlined here had far-reaching consequences. At a time when survival of the Basques’ national traits, in particular their language, were already under threat, the massive influx of Spanish immigrants undeniably exacerbated the situation. Within a large part of the Basque public, the sensation of gradual loss of their national traits was intense (Jáuregui, 1981: 70), and this makes the daring new direction taken by Basque nationalism at that point all the more striking. So far I have discussed immigration from Spain because this has unquestionably had the greatest effect on the southern Basque Country to date, as well as the most profound consequences for Basque nationalism. As mentioned earlier, in northern Euskal Herria the debate developed in other domains and probably calls for a separate analysis. As for the ‘new immigration’, this was most notable in Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and High Navarre in the first decade of the new century, and has had less sweeping effects than the preceding immigration cycle. Given that the latter is still very recent, it can probably be assumed that the perspectives already developed by Basque nationalism on the issue remain valid. 4. SOME NOTES ON IMMIGRANT ‘INTEGRATION ‘INTEGRATION’ INTEGRATION’ Immigrant integration (Favell, 2003) is a broad concept encompassing the entire, long process that follows an immigrant’s arrival in the new country. It is the source of widespread debate and touches on many dimensions of society, including the world of work, social relations, party politics, and learning the language. But let us note that structural integration (especially in connection with social structure and work) is inevitable, unlike political and cultural integration. Integration is understood as a two-way process involving both the immigrant and locals. Thus it is a process that takes place between two groups, but since there is an unequal power relationship between the two, it should be borne in mind that it is an asymmetrical process. Although often used as a synonym of assimilation, integration really implies more than that. The state plays a fundamental role in integration, both on account of its power to define reality and via its immigration policy. The state’s citizenship policy can also serve as a basic mechanism for either integrating or excluding immigrants. Moreover, although attention is often paid in this process to certain characteristics of the immigrant (such as religion, or insistence on maintaining their own customs), the inclusion or exclusion mechanisms (as the case may be) tend to depend on the characteristics of the host society (Gil Araújo, 2006: 64). However this may be done, and leaving aside for now discourses aiming to expel or marginalize the ‘foreigners’, all states wish to assimilate newly arrived individuals arriving in their country. In the process, the two-way aspect of integration tends to be forgotten and it takes on an assimilationist character, where demands are only made on the immigrant. The bottom line is that it is ultimately the immigrant who is told to ‘integrate’ into the host society, not vice-versa. The Marxist influence is present in the very definition of citizenship, with frequent reference to the ‘Basque working people’ (pueblo trabajador vasco in Spanish): Basque is he/she who lives and works in the Basque Country. 14 31 Immigration, then, foregrounds social, cultural, political, demographic, legal and other questions. But in the last few decades, the cultural facet has been accorded a central position in academic studies and social debates about immigration. A phenomenon that is fundamentally social in nature has thus become ‘ethnified’ (Cachón, 2009: 262), as a result of which issues that have other causes as well (such as class, gender, age and so on) are provided with ‘cultural’ explanations. Of late, the various ways in which both states and social and political actors address multiculturalism ensuing from immigration have become an endless source of research topics in countries where immigrants have reached significant numbers. Cultural diversity, influenced by immigration, has increased in the host societies, or to be more precise, diversity has become more noticeable. Many models have been developed to address multiculturalism resulting from immigration, according to the context (since, though not the only ‘multiculturalism’, this is the one that attracts attention). Until the nineteen-seventies, the major paradigm, especially in the English-speaking world, was that of the melting pot whose goal was to integrate the immigrant into the host society’s culture (as if there were such a thing as a single culture) in different ways. According to this point of view, the process of integrating into the host society, which was assumed to happen ‘naturally’, was the business of each immigrant. From the seventies onwards, however, the faults and limitations of that paradigm have come to light, and a positive appreciation of multiculturalism, or cultural diversity, arose. Recognising that the putative cultural homogeneity of the host society is a false premise to start with, this view puts the diversity of cultures contributed by immigrants in a positive light. It is now the standard assumption in most immigration studies (see López Sala, 2005: 77-92). The main paradigm of cultural diversity, that which has been most studied and provoked the most controversy, is that of multiculturalism,15 which setting out to achieve social equality and cohesion, places the emphasis on protecting the right of national and ethnic minorities to be different (hence it is not exclusively concerned with immigration), and on the whole springs from a liberal viewpoint.16 Its message may be summed up as: “We are all equal in sharing the same right to be culturally different.” Multiculturalism is criticised from many angles, ranging from those who think that it undermines social cohesion by promoting differentiated cultural communites (see e.g. Sartori, 2003) all the way to the critical feminist standpoint17, for instance. There are indeed many different ways to understand multiculturalism.18 In any case it is obvious that the issue of cultural diversity does come into the integration process that immigrants need to undergo in the host society. Hence the state also needs to define a position on cultural diversity. The proponents of multiculturalism transcend acknowledgment or acceptance of cultural diversity, elevating it to a right. Once we get beyond the liberal premise of the state’s neutrality on ethnic issues, the diversity resulting from immigration and the diversity associated with stateless nations must be linked, in cases where there is a strong nationalist movement that does not identify with 15 Within the field of cultural diversity, there is a paradigm which is sometimes claimed to go beyond multiculturalism called interculturalism. It is by no means clear, however, where the line is to be drawn between it and multiculturalism. Interculturalism claiims to give priority to the mutual relationship and synthesis of cultures, while accusing multiculturalism of emphasizing the differences and contrasts between cultures. Interculturalism has mainly been developed on the ‘micro’ level, particularly in the field of education. À propos, Nimni’s (1999) criticism is also worth considering. In his opinion, the Left is mainly responsible for the hegemony of the liberal perspective in the contemporary debate over multiculturalism, because instead of adhering to the theoretical position historically defended in the Left (as e.g. in Austromarxism) of accepting difference, it has abandoned this perspective to the liberals. 16 Feminists argue that the ‘defence of one’s own culture’ implied by multiculturalism may lead to an essentialist understanding of culture and its reification, resulting in a tendency to forget about power relationships (e.g. between the genders) and internal dissidence within cultural minorities (Yuval-Davis, 2010). From another perspective, Žižek criticises as false liberal multiculturalism’s ‘acceptance’ and ‘tolerance’. Žižek furthermore situates those demands within the logic of the global market; in his opinion liberal multiculturalism orients the struggles of minority groups towards acceptance rather than opposition to the system (Žižek, 1998). 17 18 See Galfarsoro (2012) for a critical review of multiculturalism. 32 the state’s nationality. In such contexts, the classification proposed by Will Kymlicka is taken as a reference point, a distinction being made between two categories, multinational and polyethnic, to refer to the main kinds of cultural diversity. According to this, a multicultural state will be a multinational state if its citizens are members of different nations, and a polyethnic state if they have immigrated from different countries, insofar as this difference has personal or political significance (Kymlicka, 1996: 35 ff.). Normally states will be either multinational or polyethnic (or both), but given that each source of diversity gives rise to different kinds of requirements, the distinction is useful. With this as his starting point, Kymlicka takes the position that the challenge of multiculturalism is to reconcile national or ethnic differences sustainably while achieving that reconciliation in an ethical manner. Thus Kymlicka extends the subject to the realm of rights. The point defended by multiculturalism is that the collective rights of immigrants and other minorities should be recognised. Expressed schematically, he distinguishes between rights to self-government, polyethnic rights and special rights to representation. The first of these types of rights corresponds to nations without a state; the second is consequent upon polyethnic diversity and is therefore associated with immigration. The latter, in contrast to rights to self-government, have as their goal the integration of ethnic minorities into the society. Lastly, the point of special group representation rights, which are temporary rights linked to the notion of affirmative action or postive discrimination, is to achieve institutional representation for different groups, not only national or ethnic groups (Kymlicka, 1996: 47 ff.). Applying the multiculturalism approach to Euskal Herria, the contributions this paradigm can make to the Basque situation have been debated, not so much from the perspective of the nationalism that already has its own state but from that of a movement fighting to achieve one. Here emphasis is placed on the need to avoid any kind of assimilationist thinking (even when this may be disguised under the term ‘integration’) and to insist on the importance of taking immigrants’ rights and points of view into account. Based on this approach, the proposal has been made to incorporate a proclamation of immigrants’ rights into the overall movement to defend the rights of Basque citizens generally, aiming thereby to consruct a movement encompassing the demands of inhabitants of Euskal Herria of diverse origins (Albite, 2008). 5. IMMIGRATION AND THE BASQUE STATE: BY WAY OF A CONCLUSION Immigration is a political issue. The very notion of immigration in modern times, normally referring to migrations from one country to another, is linked to that of the state: immigration consists of movement between states. Citizenship, understood as membership of the state nationality, contrasts with ‘otherness’: hence with foreigners and, more controversially, immigrants too. But rather than excluding or segregating immigrants, the discussion over immigrants revolves around ‘integration’, notwithstanding the controversy surrounding this notion; and in this process, the issue of culture has dominated the stage in recent times. However, there is an asymmetrical relationship between the host society and the immigrant, and despite insistence that integration is a two-way process, it is still a relationship between domains whose social position is based on difference. The political nature of immigration is nowhere seen more clearly than in the case of a national conflict. When numbers of migrants reach significant levels (remembering that this category is a cover term for countless different places of origin, cultures, classes, genders etc.) in countries where a national conflict is being played out, immigration becomes an important item on the political agenda. Immigration services are normally in the hands of the state, with which migrants typically have their first dealings on an institutional level. That being the case, unless the nationalists without a state develop their own relations with immigrant, this may well result in the state inducting immigrants into its own national project, especially if there are more opportunities for social mobility within the nation 33 associated with the state and its culture. Therefore the public debate over independence in some countries (Quebec being the best-known case) is sometimes linked to the immigration issue, or to be more precise, to this country’s need for competence to develop its own immigration policy. In the Basque Country there is a different situation. Given the lack of competence to deal with immigration (as a matter connected to citizenship and its ‘national’ dimension), there has been no real public debate on the issue, and politically too, the issue has not been focused on. Discussion of Basque citizenship, on the other hand, gained momentum in the seventies and eighties, at least in the case of the political avantgarde. But today immigration is largely a topic of conversation in other domains, particularly in connection with social issues and, secondarily, in education and language circles. However, the political dimensions of immigration will have to be discussed in the process of turning Euskal Herria into a state, and when that happens many issues that need to be resolved will be raised including, in particular, the issue of citizenship19 (conditions for becoming a Basque citizen); the question of cultural diversity associated with immigration (the place for those ‘cultures’ in different domains of Basque society, such as education for instance); the role of the Basque language in connection with immigrants, and the place for the other languages of the Basque Country (Spanish and French) and of those spoken in it as a consequence of immigration; the treatment and rights of immigrant groups (a discussion on the rights of groups); and immigrant integration (including clarification of the goals that lie hidden behind the word ‘integration’ and the mechanisms used). So, a Basque state will have to address different goals regarding immigration, since it will need to serve the interests of all the citizens living in its territory, whatever their place of origin may be. It will aim to strengthen the pillars of the Basque nation, as well as to promote immigrants’ well-being and their equality with other citizens. And here it will be as well to bear in mind that immigrant is a blanket term and that immigrants are not only individuals who have moved to the country; they each belong to other categories too, such as class, gender and so on. Therefore it is worth pointing out, even if it seems obvious, that all the benefits that accrue to Basque citizens thanks to the existence of a Basque state should also apply to its immigrants. Every nation that provides itself with a political structure develops its own national immigration policy. And all ‘developed’ states develop a specific procedure for individuals arriving in the country. Such a national immigration policy will include, among other things, rules and procedures for entry into the state’s territory, the acquisition of citizenship and the broad process of immigrant integration, inter alia. Some of these matters are of course the responsibility of the European Union in the present case. Also, the Basqe state, like any other, will need to develop its particular policy on migration, which will give Euskal Herria powers and options that it lacks under the current administrative arrangement in which it has no such competence; the impossibility of obtaining certain data for the Basque Country specifically is just one example of this fact. An important part of that policy will concern the immigrant integration process, which it will be possible to design from within Euskal Herria from scratch with clearly defined objectives. Then, for example, unlike now, the Basque language will have a place in that process.20 Another subject that I have not focused on in this chapter is that of the injustices resulting from present-day policies, but in my opinion a future Basque state should, at the very least, address the challenge of trying to eradicate these, remembering as always that integration is a two-way affair and that it is the job of locals as well as immigrants to adjust. 19 This subject is discussed in another chapter of this volume. One consequence of having a state may be that the Basque language will be treated as a normal part of life rather than as a special feature of a part of the Spanish territory (or French territory, if it were even given that official treatment). 20 34 If we want to think about what relationship a Basque state will have with immigrants, it is important to bear in mind the Basque Country’s experience with immigration. In this article I have taken note of two aspects of that long, far-reaching process: the major waves of immigration to Euskal Herria starting at the end of the nineteenth century, on the one hand, and Basque nationalism’s response to them, on the other. From the first of these points we conclude that the population of Euskal Herria has diverse origins. Although this is sometimes viewed as a problem, in any case homogeneous societies are actually a myth. Moreover, the makeup of the population of Euskal Herria is not radically different from that of its neighbours. With regard to what I have called the ‘new’ immigration from overseas, while it is true that the situation is different in each country, the number of immigrants is fairly low in comparison to many European countries, including our immediate neighbours. In the second place, I have talked about evolution within Basque nationalism on the issue of immigration. I consider this an important topic, because given that the Basque nationalist movement is the force that is driving for a Basque state, the view of immigration developed by that movement acquires considerable significance. We have seen that over the course of time the nationalist movement came to defend, by the second half of the twentieth century, the incorporation of immigrants within the Basque nation. Within Basque nationalism and in Basque society generally, that position provides us with a basis for addressing new immigrations. Thus considerable experience exists on the subject of immigration in Euskal Herria, and the movement in favour of a Basque state has already addressed the topic, although the great debates took place several decades ago. These may be regarded as strong points for the future state. Contemporary immigration raises some new issues (witness the variety of viewpoints on immigrant integration, for example) which were not resolved in the period of the earlier waves of immigration; these should certainly be pursued, and I believe that the creation of a Basque state can only have a positive effect in that respect. 35 REFERENCES Aierdi, X. (2011): “Immigrazioa Euskal Herrian”, Gaindegia txostena 2010, Gaindegia, Andoain, 41-48, <http://www.gaindegia.org/files/GT2010_EU_1.pdf>. Albite, P. (2008): “Migrazioak, kultura-aniztasuna eta estaturik gabeko nazioak”, Jakin, 165, 31-73. Aztiker (2006): Euskal Herria datuen talaiatik, Txalaparta, Tafalla. Azurmendi, J. (1979): Arana Goiri-ren pentsamentu politikoa, Hordago, Donostia. Bilbeny, N. (2009): “La integración social en sociedades pluriculturales con inmigración. Concepto y límites”, in M, Boladeras (ed.), Ciudadanía y derechos humanos. Gobernanza y pluralismo, Horsori, Barcelona, 49-68. Billig, M. (1995): Banal Nationalism, Sage Publications, London. Cachón, L. (2009): La ‘España inmigrante’: marco discriminatorio, mercado de trabajo y políticas de integración, Anthropos, Rubí (Barcelona). Connor, W. (1998): Etnonacionalismo, Trama, Madrid. Conversi, D. (1997): The Basques, the Catalans and Spain. Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation, Hurst & Co., London. Díez Medrano, J. (1999): Naciones divididas. Clase, política y nacionalismo en País Vasco y Cataluña, CIS, Madrid. Douglass, W. A. (2004): “Sabino’s sin. Racism and the founding of Basque nationalism”, in D. Conversi (ed.), Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World, Routledge, London, 95-112. Eurostat (2011): “6.5% of the EU population are foreigners and 9.4% are born abroad”, Statistics in focus, 34, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KSSF-11-034/EN/KS-SF-11-034-EN.PDF>. Favell, A. (2003): “Integration Nations: The Nation State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe”, Comparative Social Research, 22, 13-42. Galfarsoro, I. (2012): “Kulturaniztasuna eta naziotasuna: identitatearen politikak vs. politikaren identitatea”, Hausnart, 1, 26-54. Gallastegi ‘Gudari’, E. (1993): Por la libertad vasca, Txalaparta, Tafalla. García-Sanz, A. & Mikelarena, F. (2000): “Evolución de la población y cambios demográficos en Navarra durante el siglo XX”, Gerónimo de Uztariz, 16, 125-138. Garmendia, Parra & Pérez-Agote (1982): Abertzales y vascos. Identificación vasquista y nacionalista en el País Vasco, Akal, Madrid. Garmendia, J. M. (1983): Historia de ETA, Haranburu-Altuna, Donostia (vol. I). Gil Araújo, S. (2006): Las argucias de la integración. Construcción nacional y gobierno de lo social a través de las políticas de integración de inmigrantes. Los casos de Cataluña y Madrid, UCM, Madrid. Ikuspegi – immigrazioa (2011a): “Migrazio-fluxuen urrezko hamarkada”, Immigrazioaren begirada, 38, <http://www.ikuspegi-inmigracion.net/documentos/panoramicas/eus/pan38eusweb.pdf>. Ikuspegi – immigrazioa (2011b): “Atzerritar biztanleria EAEn 2011”, Immigrazioaren begirada, 40, <http://www.ikuspegi-inmigracion.net/documentos/panoramicas/eus/pan40eus.pdf>. Jáuregui, G. (1981): Ideología y estrategia política de ETA, Siglo XXI, Madrid. ––––––––––, (1996): Ciudadanía multicultural. Una teoría liberal de los derechos de las minorías, Paidós, Barcelona. Kymlicka, W. (2003): La política vernácula. Nacionalismo, multiculturalismo y ciudadanía, Paidós, Barcelona. López Sala, A. M. (2005): Inmigrantes y Estados: la respuesta política a la cuestión migratoria, Anthropos, Rubí (Barcelona). Nimni, E. (1999): “Nationalist multiculturalism in late imperial Austria as a critique of contemporary liberalism: the case of Bauer and Renner”, Journal of Political Ideologies, 4 (3), 289-314. Ruiz Olabuénaga, J. I. & Blanco, Mª C. (1994): La inmigración vasca. Análisis trigeneracional de 150 años de inmigración, Deustuko Unibertsitatea, Bilbo. Sartori, G. (2003): La sociedad multiétnica. Pluralismo, multiculturalismo, extranjeros e islámicos, Taurus, Madrid. Sayad, A. (2010): La doble ausencia. De las ilusiones del emigrado a los padecimientos del inmigrado, Anthropos, Rubí (Barcelona). Shafir, G. (1995): Immigrants and Nationalists. Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia, State University of New York Press, Albany. Triandafyllidou, A. (1998): “National identity and the ‘other’”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21: 4, 593-612. Yuval-Davis, M. (2010): “Etnicidad, relaciones de género y multiculturalismo”, in P. Bastida & C. Rodríguez (ed.), Nación, diversidad y género. Perspectivas críticas, Anthropos, Barcelona, 64-88. Zabalo, J. (2006): “Nacionalismo vasco: el discurso teórico sobre la nación y su readecuación en la práctica”, Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas, 5: 1, 83-94. Zabalo, Basterra, Iraola & Mateos (2010): Etorkinak eta integrazioa. 50-80ko hamarkadetako etorkinen integrazio moduak Hego Euskal Herrian, GITE-IPES, Bilbo. Zapata-Barrero, R. (2004): Multiculturalidad e inmigración, Síntesis, Madrid. ––––––––––, (2008): La inmigración en naciones minoritarias. Flandes, Quebec y Cataluña en perspectiva, Icaria, Barcelona. Žižek, S. (1998): “Multiculturalismo, o la lógica cultural del capitalismo multinacional”, in F. Jameson & S. Žižek, Estudios Culturales. Reflexiones sobre el multiculturalismo, Paidós, Buenos Aires, 137-188. 36 3. State, education and the Basque citizen. citizen. Txo li M ateo s Gon zále z, Ph.D. (So cio logy ). Professor, EHU-UPV The direction taken by the school system is recognised as a “national issue” in all modern democratic societies, since it is the job of the schools to produce not only a skilled workforce but also responsible citizens and members of the nation. A future Basque National Education System will have three new tasks. One will be the creation of a nationwide education and research network to remedy the difficulties faced by present-day Basque society on account of current administrative divisions. Another will be to provide all the students of Euskal Herria with civic and moral training in order to strengthen their sense of Basque citizenship. The future Basque school system will not only need to instil into students a sense of loyalty to political institutions and a love of their nation, but also to produce citizens who will defend democratic values. Thirdly, in order to achieve the integration of Basque citizens, schools will need to acknowledge both old and new cultural diversity, while giving pride of place to Basque culture given its vulnerable situation. 37 1. NATION, STATE AND EDUCATION Education as a discussion topic is as old as the concept of childhood as understood in the modern era, which began to take shape in the sixteenth century in association with the development of the modern family. Interest in education, linked to the emergence of school systems from the eighteenth century onwards, has continued until the present day and shows no sign of being about to wane; quite the contrary, in fact. Universal literacy and the right to an education are modern values which are seldom questioned these days. There is a striking degree of agreement and consensus among different societies and school systems over the recognition of this right. Moreover, for a long time in western societies and more recently in new states that have sprung up around the world, the right to a basic education has also become an obligation, in contrast to other rights associated with citizenship, such as the right to vote, where there is less agreement and more opposition. Because not every part of every community possesses the resources to implement this, it is the state that takes responsibility for ensuring that this right is fulfilled, and most importantly, education is made an essential aspect of the state itself, with the social, economic and political functions of the school system basically serving to uphold the very survival of society. In other words, the state is the protector of citizens’ living conditions and their social and political integration, and it performs this task through the medium of a national school system (Gellner, 1988: 52). The route that finally led to the embodiment of what is today called the nation-state was a long and arduous one. The concept started taking shape in the sixteen and seventeenth centuries and resulted in the declaration of national interests. For the first time, society began to be seen as a unified entity. It gradually became increasingly necessary to legitimize the state in terms of the nation, as states felt the need to gain citizens’ loyalty in order to get them to satisfy its requirements, such as the payment of taxes and service in the state’s army. In the type of nation-state to which the modern state lays claim, nation and inhabitants of the state are equated with each other, and to bring about that equivalence the state undertakes a deliberate integration policy. Symbols of national identity are created, and a school system is set up to foster a sense of national identity in children, teach them its history (directly and indirectly) and nurture patriotism. It is therefore not by mere chance that the nineteenth century is known both as the century of the child and the era of nationalism since these two things have been inextricably linked since that time. For the first time, education was considered an issue of universal interest, and the child began to be seen as a public resource to be taken care of. The authority of the nation-state progressively displaced that of other social entities (notably the family and the church). The development of a public school system can only be understood in the context of the process of building the modern state. That process is not only about setting in motion the government’s administrative and political apparatuses. Collective ideologies and beliefs were also developed, and with them concepts of nationality and nationhood: this has been called ‘stong planning for political socialization’ (Smith, 1991). All modern nation-states consider education a national concern of special importance, although system of different kinds are found depending on the type of state and of authority exercised in different states. In the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, social partnership was developed on account of the weakness of state authority; while in Fance and Spain, on the contrary, state partnership became predominant, because of the greater degree of state authority and centralism (see Ramirez & Boli, 1999). The degree of literacy and technical skill required of people is so high that only a national school system can satisfy the educational needs (Gellner, 1988: 52). Thus in modern 38 societies all phases of education have come under state control, and the implementation of the right of all citizens to education devolves on the public administration which operates through regulation and distribution of public funds. The placement of all forms of education under state control does not mean that the distinction between public and private schools is erased, but somehow or other there is a blurring of the sharp line dividing the two which at least in former times, and in some countries, seemed to be absolute. To some extent that distinction is a reflection of the evolution of the state’s own characteristics, which also vary as the modern nation-state’s character is constantly being modified. Since the middle of the twentieth century this became the welfare state in the most advanced western countries, while more recently there is talk of the market state. The state administration, then, is not only involved in the regulation of the economy but also in determining its own future direction. Meanwhile, the character that justifies calling education public, namely its openness to all citizens regardless of their social origin, is increasingly being brought into question as the quest for excellency proceeds, under market pressures, as more and more public teaching institutions are transformed into arenas of competition. Yet at the same time, the borderline between these systems is becoming increasingly less well-defined as a result of the gigantic system of grants to the private school network which is not under direct control from the public administration.21 2. THE FUNCTIONS OF A NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM Unlike earlier societies, today it is understood that an education system should be a single institution which, step by step. encompasses the entire educational process all the way from elementary school to university, managing this process in a way which incorporates all the appropriate administrative and rational characteristics. Education is seen as a strategic issue of public concern in all modern societies today, and decisions on its future directions are placed at the centre of political and theoretical debates. Let us consider some trends that may lead to a re-examination of the philosophical foundations of late-twentieth-century democratic organisation. We can start with the fall of the Berlin Wall. With the collapse of communism, the needs of the newly democratic European countries began to make themselves felt, and this resulted in special attention being paid all over Europe to the development of civic education programs to train citizens in democracy. Meanwhile, in the United States and Canada the individualist outlook of liberalism entered a crisis provoked by a philosophical and political debate, and many thinkers asserted the need to review and strengthen the basis of democracy. And lastly, globalized economic relations and unending waves of migration have also stimulated new thinking about the model of the citizen that it is the task of the education system to educate (see Naval, 2003). While it is the primary job of the schools to prepare the child to be a member of society, in advanced countries where liberal democracy has prevailed there is an eternal debate over the need to raise citizens loyal to a democratic society and workers capable of contributing to an economy based on new, globalized relations. The schools, and hence the public authorities, are called on, then, to perform a triple task: 21 a. To enter into and participate in the information society, providing the training needed for the so-called Third Industrial Revolution. b. To produce civicly responsible citizens capable of participating in political life. c. To implant national pride, the nation’s culture and a sense of belonging to the national community, while at the same time fostering respect for cultural diversity. Cf. Oberti (2005), which presents a comparative analysis of school systems in several countries. 39 2.1. The task relating to the socioeconomic structure of society: scientific and technological training In South Korea, teachers are known as nation builders. Here in America, it’s time we treated the people who educate our children with the same level of respect… We want to prepare 100,000 new teachers in the fields of science, technology, engineering and math. In fact, to every young person listening tonight who’s contemplating their career choice: If you want to make a difference in the life of our nation; if you want to make a difference in the life of a child, become a teacher. Your country needs you. (Barack Obama, US Congress, 25/1/2011) It is no secret that the birth of the education system was closely linked not only to the nation-state but to capitalist economic structure. The birth of the industrial enterprise, among other things, brought about the promotion by schools of the economic socialization of childhood, that is to say, their endeavour to provide the adequate minimum skills and attitudes needed for the new economic system; the schools became the doorway to the factory. For two centuries, many different kinds of relationship between the education system and the economic system, or job market, have developed of which, speaking in general, many social scientists have been extremely critical. The schools, they argue, do not really prepare pupils for jobs but only teach them to be slaves of the capitalist economic system. The actual training needed by workers, then, is acquired outside school. However, schools have a direct role in the reproduction of the economic system by inducing in children an acceptance of social inequalities. Many pages would be required to tell this story in full. A few ideas in particular have been extremely influential in the analysis of education. All in all the trend has been to downplay education’s economic functionality and instead to emphasise the schools’ ideological role, assuming that schools had little ability to actually produce a qualified workforce. But present-day readjustments in the organisation of the capitalist system have led to significant changes in the demands made of the education system. Considering the role of information, knowledge and employment qualifications, schools have a clear economic purpose: now more than ever, one might say. The basis of the Third Industrial Revolution is science and technology, and it follows that in the information society the importance of a skilled workforce has increased dramatically. Among the things made possible by the intensive use of information and knowledge is the coordination, to a large extent, of work outside of the factory setting. Professions are strengthened and push out unskilled labourers, who are in constant competition with machines trying to replace them. But the needed qualifications are basically in function of the educational options and the working of the schools. Schools, hence the state, are under pressure from both the economic system and individuals to give traning in the skills that tomorrow’s workforce will require (Fernández Enguita, 2001). Education addresses a great many needs of modern nations, such as scientific development, specialized technical training, cultural and artistic development, language transmission and maintenance, and so on. Hence, notwitstanding the countless faults and criticisms that can be levied against the performance of the education system, it is an undeniable fact that the schools contribute to the progress of society and citizens’ wellbeing. In a democratic society, however, it is not thought that schools should perform this task in just any manner, since they have other responsibilities. 2.2. The task relating to the democratic organisation of society: civic and moral education There is no such thing as an education that doesn’t transmit any values, so it is pointless to debate whether or not the schools should transmit values. What is more, the only real difference between schools is that some state, frankly and explicitly, what set of values they adhere to, and others don’t. In some cases this may be because they 40 themselves don’t know what those values are, but other times it is because, ignoring the community’s values, the teachers’ teach their own (Etzioni, 1999: 219). These days the school’s moral function is being talked and argued about more and more openly, and people are thinking hard about the meaning of values-based teaching. A broad public interest among Basques in the issue of civic education for citizenship has come about in recent times for a number of reasons: the diminshed role of religion in the schools is one; the need gradually to adapt to the rules of democratic practices, another; and a third, the constantly growing importance of cultural diversity. What kind of citizen will today’s child be tomorrow? And what should the government do about it? Such questions, to which there are no easy answers, are of grave concern to the public. But it is not easy to reach agreement about what civic education, or training for citizenship, schoolchildren should receive. According to some minimalist views, the basic means for participation in political life are sufficient; at the other extreme, maximalists hold that the goal should be to produce citizens armed with civic virtues. There are also people occupying a middle ground who say that it is enough to seek a rational understanding of justice. From the liberal viewpoint, furthermore, the highest value is the autonomy of the individual, so the main objective is to give priority to producing citizens who have opinions of their own and who are capable of impartial decisions. But those who criticise liberalism, whether from a republican or a communitarian perspective, and also generally those who would make certain changes to the liberal programme, say that the key is not respect but virtue, because only virtuous citizens are committed to the community’s well-being. Inasmuch as the state, i.e. the state administration, is responsible for the education of society, it is commonly said that these views are perfectionist. There are also some who take the position, in this debate over how to improve democracy, that too much faith is placed in the ability of education to nurture a civic spirit. A citizen, they say, becomes a citizen through practice, not through formal education. What a strong democracy needs, they argue, is not citizens who only know their rights and obligations, but experienced citizens who are ready to take responsibility (Barber, 2004). 2.3. The task relating to the society’s national identity: civic and national education It is one of the main beliefs prevailing in modern societies today that all individuals are equal. In theory at least, this is a well-established idea which takes away legitimacy from attempts at discrimination. One of the catchphrases that the government administration claims to espouse in its actions is ‘we are all citizens’, and it is on this account that it is possible for it to attend to the social needs that give rise to the Welfare State.22 Yet at the same time, the state is a staunch defender of the language and customs of a single cultural nation: that is, it protects one particular cultural tradition to the detriment of others. Even in the ‘purest’ civic societies the nation’s history and culture are extolled and the nation’s language and symbols are taught (Llobera, 2001). Inevitably, the state makes certain cultural decisions, one of the most important of which concerns which language should be used at school, as is pointed out by Will Kymlicka: When the government decides on the language of public education, it gives what is likely to be the most important form of support needed by the cultural structures, by guaranteeing the transmission of the language and its traditions and associated conventions to the next generation (Kymlicka, 2003a, vol. 1). 22 Some of our readers may remember a famous advertising slogan used by the Spanish government saying: Hacienda somos todos (“Internal Revenue is all of us”). 41 It is well known how nation-states operate in this respect. The development of the nation-state may be understood as a dual process: on the one hand, cultural homogeneity is promoted among the citizenry; on the other, the sense of citizenship is reinforced; and all this has been achieved through the imposition of a universal curriculum and a single language. The end-result is the cultural homogeneity of all the state’s citizens, and as a matter of fact that is the usual perception, because we have been taught to take it for granted that one country implies one culture shared by all the people in that country. But the consequence of new migratory movements triggered by globalization is that not all people in a country see themselves reflected in the dominant, official culture, and as a result there are unavoidable tensions (see Taylor, 2003). Far-reaching debates are underway today on what direction to take in education in a framework of cultural diversity; the huge task has fallen to the education system of not only undertaking the acculturation of a new generation but raising the responsible citizens that democracy needs. Thus extreme liberalism receives considerable criticism on the grounds that defending freedom of choice is not enough, because identification is very important. Democratic policies are built upon such identification, which can facilitate the involvement of citizens in the quest for justice. Just as we love our own children (whether biological or adopted) more than those of our friends because they are part of our family, so we value differently the cultural orientations of our country because they are ours. There is no need to argue for any moral superiority in order to say this. All that is needed is to say that some forms of life are better than others for us and our children because these orientations give meaning and enrich the internal life of the family and society (Gutmann, 2001). Diverse approaches have been tried out towards managing cultural diversity and diversity of opinions. At the risk of oversimplifying highly complex stuations and debates, they can be presented in three groups: – Interculturalism emphasises the building of a synthesis based on the coexistence of different cultures through a sort of cosmopolitanism. The goal of cosmopolitan education, then, is to promote universal citizenship, overlooking local differences and reinforcing the points shared by all people. Pupils are made to think about compromise among the world’s peoples to be achieved through cosmopolitanism, that is, transcendence of the borders of nation-states. But cosmopolitanism is given specific characteristics, sometimes attempting to fulfil a moral function and avoid abstract universalism. Consequently this cosmopolitanism is referred to as humanistic, civic, and various other adjectives. (Cortina, 2009; Nussbaum, 2005; Rosales, 2000). – Multiculturalism is a liberal approach that encourages coexistence between all groups to support minority cultural and national rights, in defiance of cosmopolitanism. It revises liberalism by taking the stand that sharing culture or identity is more than just sharing certain principles of justice and tolerance that should prevail in public life. As Kymlicka points out, sharing principles is insufficient to address demands for selfgovernment: The fact that national groups share the same principles of justice does not necessarily provide them with a solid reason for remaining united rather than dividing into two different countries, since each national group may apply those principles to its own independent state (Kymlicka, 2003b: 342). – A communitarian, nationalist or republican approach warns of certain dangers in radical multiculturalism, on the grounds that the latter excludes intergenerational culture and thus promotes diversity within the school. It is argued that a common 42 national identity needs to be reproduced in schools as well as educating for democratic citizenship. From this it follows that schools should be public in their character, should be places in which members of different ethnic groups are together and are taught together. This does not mean telling schools how they must be organised and financed, but that they should be culturally inclusive and not sectarian in nature. Consequently, there should be something in a national curriculum, a central body of materials that all children should assimilate (Miller, 1997). So a common cultural identity, i.e. a shared language and history, are essential in order to ensure the sense of responsibility and participation that are necessary for a democratic society to work. The sacrifices and moral commitment that people are sometimes called upon to make are much more feasible when people feel that they belong to a single national community: when they love their country, in other words. This is directly relevant to the curriculum that schools are required to teach: The underlying principle that should orient schools and universities is that it is essential that those who graduate from them should have certain shared heroes, respect shared symbols and all reflect the nucleus of shared values (Etzioni, 1999). Hence, it is argued, some sort of accord is needed so that public schools may integrate the country’s history, literature and language into their curriculum, while not glossing over the dark periods of the past. 3. THE NATIONAL BASQUE EDUCATION SYSTEM: ADVANTAGES AND ISSUES PENDING All countries that have their own political system, then, prioritize the implementation of their own education system. Hence placing Euskal Herria alongside the modern nations implies the building of a National Education System which would operate according to the instructions of a Basque state. 3.1. transcending ing current 3.1. Creating a national education and research network transcend administrative divisions For a number of reasons, education has been a controversial topic in Basque society for some decades, and is still hotly discussed today (see, for example, Various authors, 1998). All kinds of issues have been involved: public or private schools? what language(s)? what kind of territorial network? a multilingual syllabus? how to educate for peace? how should we attend to recent immigrants? Each of these subjects is complex and demands careful thought. But we may assume that all these matters would be approached differently and find different solutions if the management of education were under the Basques’ own political authority, under a democratic regime at the service of Basque citizens. An education system functioning under a Basque state in a democratic Basque Country would eliminate some basic obstacles, thereby certainly benefitting Basque society by doing away with the fragmentation of the country imposed by the present administrative separation into three unconnected areas, with all the disadvantages of such an arrangement. In working towards a Basque state, full priority should be given to promoting initiatives on the national level, but in so doing the differences between areas of the Basque territory should also be taken into account. Thus when talking about a national education system, it is essential to make sure there is a minimal degree of homogeneity, but that does not mean eliminating or overlooking the special characteristics of each province or region, for to treat the Basque Autonomous Community, Navarre and the north as if they were in the same position with respect to education would be to turn our backs on reality. For one 43 thing, there are differences regarding the degree of local authority over education at present: compared to the northern Basque Country, the two autonomous administrations in the south have attained a significant degree of control, even though the Spanish government reserves for itself the power to make decisions about the school curriculum. It can be said that all three regions are alike in not having the last word on such matters. Here I have been referring mainly to non-university education, but the situation is essentially similar in all areas and at all levels. The main tenets of university and scientific policy in the area of the Basque Country are not decided upon by Basque society. Secondly, at a time today when on the European level enormous facilities are being provided to promote student mobility, it is still close to impossible for students from the northern Basque Country to attend a university in the south on normal terms, on account of insurmountable administrative obstacles. Obviously a Basque state would make sure that there existed a nationwide education and research network to meet the needs of progress in a modern Basque society at the service of all Basque citizens. But logically, discussions about education do not only consider the differences between the central government, the autonomous administration and educators themselves, but also focus on issues concerning diversity in Basque society, that is, among its citizens, and so a Basque national administration will inevitably need to accommodate different views to resolve some of the problems. Without underestimating the hurdles to be surmounted, clearly the possession of a political authority that united the three currently dismembered Basque school regions would lead to tangible improvements for the situation of the Basque language, provided Basque is made the language of the schools. There is no lack of studies (see, for one example, Odriozola, 2000) that emphasise the absolute necessity of such a structure to provide the thrust and the safeguards needed to ensure the language’s survival. There is a broad consensus of opinion among many of society’s leaders that the present language policy of the education system is in need of a thoroughgoing overhaul, but that the political resources required to carry them out are unavailable. For reasons that need not be entered into here, Basque, as a school medium, must receive priority treatment, this is unquestionable; but at the same time it chould not be forgotten that Spanish and French are also languages spoken by Basque citizens, and not all Basque citizens are Basque speakers. The Basque school system would certainly reflect that fact. So the system will need to address everyone’s practical and emotional interests and their language loyalties. Given this, it may be advisable to establish the principle that, while giving Basque pride of place as the one language spoken throughout the Euskal Herria, all pupils should leave school perfectly fluent in either Spanish or French as well. Apart from the schools’ language policy, operating under a political system of one’s own would provide another significant advantage, namely the possibility of conducting a thorough discussion of the reorganising of the education system without interference from the governments in Madrid or Paris. Such a discussion would of course be nothing new for the Basques, but there might be a chance to review one of the biggest controversies to date: the status of important parts of the Basque school system as either public or private, and a split that has occurred within the school system as a result.23 Adopting the goal of constructing a national educational system under the aegis of a Basque state, there would no doubt be an opportunity to reactivate this debate. The relationship between the parallel school networks might be reviewed, including the status of the teachers, and the role of parents and students in governing the schools, while the 23 In a nutshell, the controversy in the Basque Autonomous Community over the Basque School Law was about this. Some people thought that what makes education ‘public‘ is its being run directly by the government administration, while in the opinion of others parents, and civil society generally, should have a say regarding the running of the schools and that, argued they, makes a school ‘public’. At stake throughout this debate was the fate of the ikastola school network (see Various authors, 1998; Mateos, 2000). 44 future national administration would have ultimate responsibility for the system. Education is not just a private matter as some liberals hold, nor is it just an administrative concern that can be run without consulting the wishes of citizens. But this is the subject of a lively debate today, not just in Euskal Herria but in many democratic countries: who has the right to decide what direction education should take? We all know that it is a difficult questions. The Basque state’s administration should open the way for parents, teachers, students and administrators to achieve mutual trust, for the sake of the good education of Euskal Herria’s chidren and young adults. 3.2. Strengthening Basque citizenship: the need for civic education Whatever its faults, education brings many benefits, one of the most important being its responsibility for producing future citizens by transmitting, through logical reasoning and the development of ‘spirit’, an adequate sense of citizenship. We shall need to proceed step by step towards discovery of the most effective route to that goal and the transitional situations that the process may entail, but as of now it may be said that the production of Basque citizens would be one of the main purposes of Euskal Herria’s education system. This means that loyalty to our country’s political structures and love of the Basque nation must be nurtured in our children and adolescents. And this should be said without any reticence or qualms, in the first place because that is precisely one of the principal objectives of all national education systems anywhere in the world, for there is no such thing as schools that teach universal citizenship, as we have already seen. Secondly, the education system will need to flesh out with content the concept of Basque citizenship. In short, the aim is to build responsible citizens who will defend democratic values and practices, with the skills and preparation necessary to participate in a democratic society. There are many citizens and groups who have tried to embody the model participant in democracy within Basque society. Thirdly, the Basque education system must also produce Basque citizens who are proud of their country, identify with its national symbols and heroes, without distorting the truth about the past or compromising their critical capacity and personal autonomy. To put it another way, Basque citizenship should fuse republican, liberal and communitarian values, incorporating certain elements from each in its model of the ideal citizen.24 Civic education has two components: one political (or national), the other moral. The task of a Basque education system with regard to the latter is to favour the development or citizens with a sense of membership in the larger human community, that is, willing to take a stand against inequality and resist discrimination, for it is the job of the schools to explain and convey methods and values for stopping the many kinds of inequality that exist in society. Many ways have been developed in modern society to reduce the effects of inequality and avoid discrimination of all types. Take for example the variety of approaches aimed at correcting for the penalties suffered by some because they happen to be disabled, female or homosexual, to name but a few cases, whether through affirmative action quotas, or awareness campaigns, or other means. The school should be the perfect example of these things, teaching respect for differences and taking appropriate measures, as needed, to bring about rational reflection about these issues and putting such ideals into practice in the school’s day-to-day operation. That is, we think of the school as a perfectionist model of administration that demands that citizens be not only responsible but virtuous. Of course we realise that these things require a lot of discussion and are highly complex. For one thing, it is necessary to differentiate between civic and individual virtue, but the general idea is that more attention should be paid to the moral aspects of education and the quest for the common good, and that this should be accompanied by an ongoing debate, with the understanding that debating is not merely a question of talking but of helping pupils, as citizens, to prepare themselves for civic and political action (Peterson, 2011). 24 Cf. Julen Zabalo and Txoli Mateos’ chapter “On state, citizenship and national identity” in this section. 45 This is one of the important issues that will need to be addressed by a future Basque State: it will be necessary to master a reasoned moral discourse, something notably lacking in Basques’ civic and moral education. In some instances this has come about on account of the approach taken by the Left under the influence of a militant agnosticism which has opted to reduce the moral component of school objectives as a way of overcoming the domination of a certain moral discourse reflecting overly conservative views. Although there are growing endeavours in society and education circles to look more deeply into the issues surrounding cultural diversity and search for alternative approaches, there is a deficit of awareness about the extent to which cultural diversity raises not only linguistic issues but also religious and moral ones.25 3.3. The Basque education system: system: a new definition of national culture in a framework of cultural diversity In a future Basque state, not only must citizens’ political loyalty and moral education be ensured, but a particular culture has to be nurtured, knowledge and use of a particular language (or several particular languages) established, a certain range of artistic expressions encouraged, and so on. As we have seen, an education system is forever making cultural choices, and cannot help giving priority to certain kinds of cultural expression over and above others. At the very least, some sort of tension will need to be managed in this respect. For years now there has been an ongoing debate in Basque society over culture, together with the debate about language. Basically, doubt has often been expressed about the effectiveness of the policies needed to develop Basque culture (understood as culture developed through the Basque language). There has been broad agreement among a significant part of society on the basic tenet that Basque culture must receive preferential treatment in the schools if it is to survive at all. Indeed, many who support this idea are of the opinion that the only way to ensure its survival is through a Basque nation-state, i.e. that Basque culture should have the same kind of support that the cultures developed in the Spanish and French languages have been receiving for centuries.26 But let us suppose for a moment that this has come about and that those needing political protection now will have obtained it. We would then run into another matter requiring a solution: how should a hypothetical Basque state treat culture developed in Spanish and French? The fact is that all three cultural traditions are present in Euskal Herria, and it has already been suggested above that Basque pupils should leave school with a knowledge of both Basque and Spanish or French. In establishing something amounting to a national culture, inevitably the Basque state will need to acknowledge cultural productions in languages other than Basque as well, and so, one way or another, will be forced to search for a new definition of Euskal Herria’s national culture. Let me be clear on this point: I do not believe there is such a thing as cultural ‘neutrality’ or universalism; but at the same time I do think that the schools should make a concerted effort to recognise and support the cultural characteristics of all Basque citizens. Many of the literary, artistic, musical and intellectual products of those other (non-Basque-language) cultural traditions form part and parcel of Basques’ cultural heritage, and schools are obliged to teach and cultivate them in an appropriate manner, or else risk failing to achieve the integration that is the education system’s aim. There is no other option for the Basque state and a democratic society. However, because it has been in a disadvantaged position for such a long time, Basquemedium culture deserves special support both in the officially stated curriculum and in In the case of Basque nationalism, for example, there is a conspicuous lack of attention to moral (and religious) matters in the schools (cf. Mateos & Zabalo, 2005). The nationalist Left’s agnostic approach has led to the massive negligence of this area in school policies. In my opinion, this is illustrated by the practical lack of substantial content, in many schools, in the classes that are given as a substitute for the traditional (Roman Catholic) religion subject, even filling the time slot wity crafts classes and so on (see Mateos, 2008). 25 26 Needless to say, I share this opinion. Indeed this is the ‘spirit’ that brings the authors of this series together: the belief that it is necessary for Basque society to have its own state to address its needs. 46 extracurricular activities. A broad consensus on this might be sought across Basque society, and even if none were achieved the issue would still need to be addressed. But that is not the only cultural issue that would need to be resolved (although it is the most important one) in present-day Basque society, because on top of this old cultural diversity a new diversity has been superimposed by waves of immigration from overseas in recent years. This has given responsible educators new things to worry about and given rise to a great number of opinions, concerns and proposals. Different orientations are present in these, yet on the whole they all agree on one point: that it is absolutely essential for political resources to be brought to bear in order for the school system to be capable of dealing adequately with the many issues arising from cultural diversity, of which the most often debated concern the language model to be applied to immigrant pupils and the policy of dispersing such pupils among the school centres and networks. The first of these is not so complicated in my opinion: immigrant pupils should receive the education prescribed by the government administration, and at the present time that means Basque-medium instruction. The second one is thornier. Briefly put, there is concern to avoid turning certain schools (public schools, principally) into immigrant ghettoes, which has led to attempts to manage their numbers through a rationally planned distribution; while on the other hand, there is a desire to respect such pupils’ wishes (the same as those of the parents of non-immigrant pupils) and avoid removing pupils from their own neighbourhood on account of immigrant student quotas. Eventually, this cultural diversity (including religious differences) will no doubt bring to the surface other questions and a large-scale debate will need to ensue in Basque society over the place of foreign cultures in the schools; to put it another way, what kind of responsibility do the political authorities have in the preservation of cultures? There are already proposals circulating which, valuing cultural diversity positively and favouring the coexistence of diverse cultures, advocate a policy of mutual recognition. It has been suggested, for instance, that immigrant pupils should have to go to Basque-medium schools, but that in these schools a place should be made for their native language. In other words, immigrant groups must recognise that when they come to Euskal Herria they are coming into a society which has a particular culture and history, and Basque society must also acknowledge that the immigrant groups have a history, a past and a culture of their own. Mutual acquaintance and respect, then, should be maintained along multiculturalist lines (Albite, 2008). Obviously finding a solution is not easy. Even assuming everyone starts out from a position of proper, sincere respect for the cultural expressions of all individuals and groups, Basque schools will be hard pressed to give equal treatment to absolutely every culture, and unavoidably there will be some compulsory cultural choices to be made. The path towards integration of new immigrants will need to be traced out gradually, without undervaluing immigrants’ cultural roots. However this comes about, it will clearly be necessary to promote a profound discussion in society about this issue, because a democratic Basque state has to achieve the compatibility of human rights, educational goals and a cultural policy. The role played by the education system in this respect will be a fundamental one, because the schools have the job, to a great extent, of putting this into practice. 47 REFERENCES Albite, P. (2008): “Migrazioak, kultura-aniztasuna eta estaturik gabeko nazioak. Euskal Herriaren erronkak”, Jakin, 165, 31-73. Barber, B. ( 2004): La democracia fuerte, Almuzara, Granada. Barcena Orbe, F. (1995): “La educación moral de la ciudadanía. Una filosofía de la educación cívica”, Revista de Educación, 302, 275-308. Cortina, A. (2009): “Educación para el patriotismo o para el cosmopolitismo?”, in A. Cortina (ed.), La educación y los valores, Biblioteca Nueva, 2nd ed., Barcelona, 71-79. Etzioni, A. (1999 ): La nueva regla de oro. Comunidad y moralidad en una sociedad democrática, Paidós, Barcelona. Fernández Enguita, M. (2001): Educar en tiempos inciertos, Morata, Madrid. Gellner, (1988): Naciones y nacionalismo, Alianza, Madrid. Guttman, A. (2001): La educación democrática. Una teoría política de la educación, Paidós, Barcelona. Kymlicka, W. (2003a): “Las fuentes del nacionalismo: un comentario sobre Taylor”, in R. McKim & J. McMahanf (ed.), La moral del nacionalismo I, Gedisa, Barcelona. ––––––––––, (2003b): La política vernácula, Paidós, Barcelona. Llobera, J. (2001): “Hizkuntzaren indarra identitate nazionalean. Mendebaldeko Europaren esperientzia”, Bat. Soziolinguistikako Aldizkaria, 39, 63-81. Mateos, Tx. (2000): Ikastola edo eskola publikoa. Euskal nazionalismoaren hautua, Euskal Soziologiazko Koadernoak 5, Eusko Jaurlaritza, Bilbo. ––––––––––, (2008): Alternativa a la “alternativa”. La falta de dimensión moral en el dicurso educativo del nacionalismo vasco, I Jornadas de Ciencia Política Crítica. Mateos, Tx. & Zabalo, J. (2005): “Hezkuntzaren helburu zibikoak eta nazionalak Euskal Herriko erakunde abertzaleen esanean”, Uztaro, 5 2, 91-109. Miller, D. (1997): Sobre la nacionalidad. Autodeterminación y pluralismo cultural, Paidós, Barcelona. Naval, C. (2003): “Orígenes recientes y temas claves de la educación para la ciudadanía democrática actual”, Revista de Educación, Número Extraordinario Ciudadanía y Educación, 169-189. Nussbaum, M. (2005): El cultivo de la humanidad. Una defensa clásica en la reforma de la educación liberal, Paidós, Barcelona. Oberti, M. (2005): “Dynamiques institutionnelles et pratiques scolaires: les frontieres poreuses du public et du privé”, Sociétés contemporaines, 5959 -60, 5-11. DOI : 10.3917/soco.059.0005. Odriozola, J. M. (2000): Nazio identitatea eta eskola, BBK/Euskaltzaindia, Bilbo. Peña, J. (2009): “El retorno de la virtud cívica”, in j. Rubio Carracedo; J. M. Rosales eta M. Toscano Mendez (ed.), Democracia, ciudadanía y educación, Akal, Madrid, 99-128. Peterson, A. (2011): Civic Republicanism and Civic Education. The Education of Citizens, Palgrave Macmillan, London. Ramirez/Boli (1999): “La construcción política de la escolarización de masas. Sus orígenes europeos e institucionalización mundial”, in M. Fernández Enguita & J. M. Sánchez (eds.), Sociología de la educación, Ariel, Barcelona, 297-314. Rosales, J. M. (2000): “La educación de la identidad cívica. Sobre las relaciones entre nacionalismo y patriotismo”, in J. Rubio Carracedo, J. M. Rosales & M. Toscano Méndez (ed.), Ciudadanía, nacionalismo y derechos humanos, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 117-132. Smith, A. D. (1991): National Identity, Penguin Books, London. Taylor, C. (2003): “Nacionalismo y modernidad”, in R. McKim & J. McMahan (eds.), La moral del nacionalismo I, Gedisa, Barcelona. Various authors (1998): Euskal Eskolaren azken 20 urteak, Ipar Hegoa / Hik Hasi, Lasarte-Oria. 48 4. Citizenship within within feminist theory and practice. practice. M i l a A m u r r i o V é l e z , P h . D . ( So c i o l o gy ) . P r o f e s so r , E H U - U P V This chapter examines some basic feminist critiques of the concept of citizenship, understanding feminism as a body of theory and practice in flux. It defends as a point of departure collective goals which should be taken on by a Basque state if it takes some of these critiques on board, both in public and private/domestic domains of life. It is proposed that a hypothetical Basque state should be oriented not only to commercial interests but to life in its entirety, developing a new way of understanding citizenship which takes account of both these domains, the public and the private, so that the production of individual rights would be associated with public and private activities: employment, politics, social life, culture, and domestic work and maintenance. 49 1. THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP Citizenship has been put at the centre of a theoretical debate that is taking place in different disciplines such as philosophy, economics, politics and sociology. The debate involves a variety of issues including personal identity, the moral subject, political participation, the essence of the Welfare State, the implementation of human rights and the goals of social policies. Political theory provides a multitude of arguments that are useful for explaining this diversity in the use of the concept, including the crisis in Marxism and the appearance of liberal democracy as the only legitimate system of government (Garcia Guitian, 1999). Thus the basic core of political scientists’ work is the analysis of democracy, and in this context the position of the Left is identified with a call for increased political participation, although this idea may take the form of different proposals. Hence discussions about the practical attributes of citizenship (who is a citizen and what are the citizen’s rights) always presuppose a broad conceptualization of democracy. The difference between views about democracy would bring out the existing difference between those who maintain a pragmatic perspective when defining a democratic regime (based on models embodying a liberal morality) and those who prefer to endow it with a moral content (designing alternative models). Ways of understanding citizenship within the Western political tradition may also be reflected in this manifest difference: one which emphasises the participatory dimension, another which understands it as a legal status, to both of which some add moral principles: civic virtues, being a good citizen. The success and institutionalisation of this legal conceptualisation and that of some participating dimensions have made it possible in modern liberal democracies to base its analysis and discussion upon a real context. The most widely accepted definition is T. H. Marshall’s, proposed in 1949, according to which citizenship is a legal status which entitles people to civil, political and social rights. This has limited to a considerable extent the theoretical framework of the debate, making other theoretical issues evident such as those deriving from the crisis of the Welfare State and demands for political recognition: the kind of rights intrinsic to citizenship and their content. Thus the new right emphasises obligations, the individual responsibility to earn one’s own living and the need to limit social rights. From more radical perspectives, the insufficiency of present-day rights is denounced: feminists call for reproductive rights to be recognised amid further development of social rights in order to achieve equal citizenship; while pluralists support the inclusion of specific and special cultural rights for certain groups. Meanwhile, immigration, the creation of structures above the level of the state, the European Union, the radicalization of nationalist demands and perceptions of the globalisation process have led to a re-examination of the traditional limits of the political community of the nation-state. The equation of nationhood and citizenship is in crisis. A debate has opened over who are, and who should be, the members of the political community who make up the demos — citizens — and also what should be citizens’ legal, political and social status in plural societies. Once again, the proposals vary according to the ideological perspective: liberals defend constitutional nationalism, while cultural pluralists call for differentiated citizenship and nationalists support citizenship with an integrating shared identity. Whichever one’s choice, the concept of citizenship always implies placing limits on the acquisition of membership in the political community comprising the demos and exclusion from that membership, and also some decisions about the rights, obligations and options associated with the status of the citizen. 50 2. THE FEMINIST VIEW OF CITIZENSHIP The concept of citizenship, in setting limits and yielding rights, obligations and choices that have been fought for, cannot satisfy everyone. The polemical nature of citizenship is always dynamic, and is best unerstood as an ongoing debate over rights, obligations and choices. Understood in this way, feminist and gender research has contributions to make to the ongoing debate. 2.1. Feminism as theory and practice in flux When talking about feminism in this article I will not take as my point of departure the ideas of different brands of feminism, but rather a procedural definition of feminist practice (Lombardo & Verloo, 2009). Feminist practice is understood in a specific way characterised both by different debates about the concepts of gender, sex, domination and subordination relations and the ongoing struggle over the multitude of critical views of gender equality. Ongoing struggle is the overriding concept of any feminist practice because it is change; thus feminist practice must of necessity be fed by the presence of struggles and irreconcilable positions. Feminist practice would be depolarized if one feminist position were to be imposed over others under the pretext of seeking unity. This analysis defines feminist practices on the basis of many types of feminism. Basing the definition of feminism on this approach has two advantages: – It avoids having to define the feminist political struggle a priori as a women’s common/shared identity. This makes it unnecessary to link the partiality of feminist perspectives to an assumption of a universal subject, which is in the last resort just an expression of one partial position among others. – Understanding feminism as under constant debate makes it easer to adapt to the constant transformation of the gender struggle and its strategies and agendas. So, it seems logical to understand feminism as a theory and practice in flux. The format of ongoing struggle results in feminist discourses questioning the assimilation processes of female or male rules of domination. Feminism not only criticises the assimilation of indisputabe male rules but identifies oppositions within itself: it reveals the essentialism and homogenization processes of specific women’s groups, and the exclusion of many other feminist approaches in the debate. The theoretical format of feminist practices unites constructivist and deconstructivist views. The characteristics of the first view are the socially constructed nature of reality as contextualized and localized knowledge, and the interpretation of social construction as an invitation to action for change. Those of the second are an emphasis on the fragmentation and diversity of reality, and an insistence on the provisional character of truth; rejection of the dualistic hierarchy of Western philosophy and the search for objectivity and a single theory. The feminist unification of both views makes possible the constant generation of partial knowledge in feminist debates, sometimes conflicting viewpoints, and these keep the movement and its practices going until new challenges and options appear. However, the standard ideal which considers the feminist subject to be plural and contradictory is very rarely put into practice, as we shall see below. 2.2. Feminist debates Numerous feminist political debates take place concerning concepts, perspectives and strategies in the framework of an ongoing gender conflict. 51 The plurality of feminist traditions and approaches to the achievement of a society free from gender domination and oppression has resulted in the synthesis of three main views on gender equality, each of which raises different issues for politics to contend with, pointing towards different strategies. First of all, gender equality may be conceptualised as a quest for equality in the sense of similarity; this goes together with an equal-opportunity strategy. In the second place, equality can be conceptualised as the affirmation of a difference from men’s rules; this view comes with an affirmative-action strategy, although it is not limited to that. Lastly, gender equality may be seen as a transformation in all the established rules and routines that are (or ought to be) feminine and masculine; the strategy of preference for achieving such a transformation is gender mainstreaming. From the equality viewpoint, the issue is that women have been excluded from the political domain, and the proposed solution is for women to enter that domain without questioning the underlying masculine rules. The guiding idea of this strategy is to propose that every person should have access to the rights and opportunities of males regardless of their sex, and be treated according to identical principles, rules and standards. But this feminist tradition has received a great deal of criticism because it fails to question the prevalent patriarchal values directly. The differentiation approach makes a social issue of a male norm which may not be disputed and women are required to follow (Mackinnon, 1987). It seeks to remake politics through recognition of women (as the non-hegemonic gender identity). This point of view goes together with radical and cultural feminism. The transformation view which is supported by postmodern feminism puts the gendered world itself into question, not just the exclusion of women or the existence of a male standard. The proposed solution is to transcend the false equality versus differentiation dilemma through the deconstruction of the political discourses that create domination. All three theoretical views regarding gender-equality have been insititutionalized, and a variety of different political debates are taking place in the resulting framework. Rather than review all these debates, I will refer to those that may be considered fundamental for an understanding of feminist citizenship. 2.3. Gender and other differences The notion of citizenship emerged on the basis of an idea of a socially constructed, universal human being. Women are made subjects of citizenship as if they were equal (Quesada, 2004), without taking into consideration other characteristics: race, class, ethnic group, age, sexual orientation, abilities and other complex differences. This homogenizing tendency has given rise to much discussion within feminism. Feminist theories mostly see gender as an organising principle of social reality and an analytical category; as a complex system at the centre of the social construction of relationships of power and domination where sexual roles are created and differentiated. Since the meaning given by a society to sexual inequality is constantly evolving, the concept of gender is open-endedl but its essence is maintained in the socially constructed nature of sex relations and its close connection to power. 52 In practice, feminist theories focus on a primary structural difference, the primary character of which is disputed more and more. For the past two decades the main topic of debate has been how to incorporate gender into the context of the many differences between women. Black feminism has made a fundamental contribution to the debate on citizenship by alerting feminist academics to the risks of essentialism and homogenization within the feminist movement. New theories have been developed about the differences between women taking into account race, class, ethnic group, age, sexual orientation, abilities and other complex differences (Yuval Davis, 1991; Yuval Davis, 1997), showing that gender difference, in all its complexity, can only be understood in conjunction with these other differences. In the view of political intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989), differences and their intersections are basic to political strategy. This concept suggests it is problematic to construct political differences in terms of a single dimension of difference because that single dimension is not neutral vis-à-vis the other dimensions. Thus the following questions arise: where and how is feminism discriminating against ethnic minorities or disabled women? where and how are measures against racism discriminating against women? where and how are gender-equality policies discriminating against lesbians? Although the concept of political intersectionality is widely used in academic circles, it has only barely started penetrating the formulation of actually policies (Lombardo eta Verloo, 2009). In the same vein, if one wishes to redefine the concept of citizenship to take a gender perspective into account, how should this be done: as equal citizenship (the moral subject) or as differentiated citizenship? Feminist theory cannot provide a single answer or a complete framework, but can only offer different proposals, which ultimately reflect different concepts of democracy; but underlying the approach to the form of participation, representation or specific social and cultural rights there is a single general perspective. Some examples of this are Benhabib’s deliberative democracy, Okin’s Rawlsian liberalism, Mouffe’s radical pluralist democracy, Young’s communicative democracy or the position of radical postmodernism, which is: make no proposals (Benhabib, 1996; Okin, 1994; Mouffe, 1996; Young, 1997). All these authors have taken changes inspired by a gender perspective as their starting point, because multiple projects do not weaken the feminist struggle, on the contrary they enrich it. Neither need such pluralism obstruct political campaigns. Besides constructing alternative models which may some day come about or at least be of use to transform the status quo, there is another area of study: the present-day situation and how to advance from it. Just as theorists make different proposals for models of democracy, there is something that links these feminists: criticism of the structures and processes of present democratic regimes for excluding women or subordinating them to men. Critical theory has made it possible to prove that citizenship discriminates against women, and has made proposals for change without necessarily agreeing with a fully defined alternative project. As regards citizenship, proposals for transformation through gender analysis chiefly focus on issues raised by a rethinking of the traditional classification of public and private domains. 2.4. Defining politics: the dichotomy between public and private domains The gender system affects all social relationships, and naturally political ones too. The public-private dichotomy invented by liberal patriarchal ideology has characterized and delimited the modern political domain. This dichotomy sees society as divided into two hierarchical domains, the public domain assigned to men and the private domain associated with women; the first of these has higher status, a power quota and more material resources. Modern politics is part of the public domain, and participating in it is considered a man’s job. Most definitions of social and political participation refer to the public, political domain, and since until recently women were excluded from the public domain, their social and political role is invisible in our society. Today this dichotomy has come under debate in both political theory and political sociology, with critical contributions developed within feminist theory playing an important part in the discussion. These contributions transcend the observation of the public-private dichotomy to posit a 53 new definition of social and political participation in which participation is open to the whole community rather than only to one part of it. In the whole social system, the understanding about the reality behind the participation proposal is not just split into two separate domains but take a more complex form. We would add a third domain, the domestic, which is quite distinct from the private domain. ‘Private’ refers to one’s own personal space and time, within which decisions one can make desicions; this is a positive value, in order to isolate oneself from the outer world to attain well-being in privacy: that is men’s privacy. But there is a second form of privacy which is concerned less with oneself than with others, with the family at home, and involved with the needs created by the family. This amounts not so much to being with oneself as to being with others; it is a state of service. This is women’s privacy, and it is accorded no value. Domesticity signifies giving up one’s own personal space and time for the sake of other people (Murillo, 1996). When the liberal public-private dichotomy talks about civil society it does not take domestic life into account, so social theories ignore women’s experience and everything relating to daily life. This despite the fact that work (not employment), personal relations, care of the young, sick and elderly, and everyday life are all essential for the public and private domains to function. The domestic domain is related not only to the public-private but also to the public-domestic; first of all, because a great many personal circumstances such as laws of the family, employment, abortion etc. are regulated and governed in the public domain. And secondly, because the family performs the social functions of life’s social reproduction, which are necessary for survival: socialization processes and caring, including everything relating to the body as the natural basis of life. Another component of the public-private dichotomy is time. In advanced societies, time which can be turned into money has value: this is public time. However, feminism has shown that there is another time, subject to economics, hegemony and power, not included in public time: reproduction time. This encompasses many uses of time that are essential for life to proceed: caring, giving affection, maintenance, managing and administering the home, relationships, leisure activities. This time is not counted or remunerated, it is living-time, given and created, immeasurable, ruled by human subjectivity; all these things are related to human desires concerning the organisation and relationships of life, and the desires which give life meaning (Carrasco, 2006; Zabala & Luxan, 2009). Overlooking the qualitative aspects of time leads to ignoring and downplaying women’s experience relating to the life cycle. In such daily experience, where time that is not public is invisible, arise the biggest managerial issues, for women at any rate. This management goes beyond the structuring of time to cover caring, affection, emotions, networks, employment and work, leisure time, participation and much more; it is a responsibility that is not easily classified into separate compartments. The above ideas show up the excluding nature of the male model of participation which requires time and freedom of action to participate in the market and in public life, but does not include time for looking after people. But that participation makes it necessary for there to be another person — a woman — to satisfy the needs of those living in the home, including those of the males who are taking part in the market and public life. Thus the political domain and citizenship recreate and maintain gender differences just as other structures, work and intimacy, do; in all cases, the public-private dichotomy stands in the centre. The separation of work and intimacy recreates the public-private dichotomy, because the distinction between work and caring, or between paid work and unpaid work, is based on a male-female hierarchy which rests on the subordination of women to men. The traditional male and female roles or the acceptance of heterosexual complementarity 54 pervade the organisation of private life and relations with children. Citizenship does not recognise the private and domestic domains, hence it is restrictive. For citizenship to be universal (with equal rights for all), it must refer to undifferentiated individuals, independently of their ideology, class, race, ethnic group, gender, family, age, life cycle and so on. Good citizens are asked to forget their private loyalties, bonds and interests, yet these are the very loyalties upon which they have built their personal individuality. This contradiction expresses the opposition between the public and the private: the public is political, it is the domain of universal rights and characteristics, whereas the private is mainly the domain of the family, diversity and the particular. Conceiving of citizenship as exclusively public has resulted in the linking of the production of individual rights to public activities: employment, politics, social and cultural life. The debate over the division between the public and private domains certainly continues to hold centre-stage in feminist practice. There is a huge vacuum in the formulations of political practices and policies: some things are considered private, while others have been regulated by the state for centuries, including gender identities, sexual identities, love and sex. The state has itself played a part in the perpetuation of gender differences. But at the same time it has to be admitted that the Welfare State, in practice if not in principle, has modified the division between the public and the private. The existence of social rights has moved private life into the domain of politics, hence of public life, even if this practical change has not led to a redefinition of politics, which maintains an odd sort of duality in this respect: it recognises social rights but does not attribute to them the same status as political rights. The beneficiaries of these rights, such as women, are treated as if they had an inferior status. These rights are viewed not as forming part of citizenship directly but as “fringe” issues. The gender system has been responsible for the extreme difference between the public and private. Silence still surrounds the private domain even when the public voices have changed and although the change calls for a reconceptualization. The content and characteristics of the public and the private, their institutions and activities have evolved over time, but politics has never defined itself as the place for establishing the collective goals coming from both domains. Public politics and its expression have always been the public voice. Public voice, private silence. This nature of politics has had important consequences for collective social goals or the agents for achieving them: it excludes women, and social projects deriving from private activity too. However, although women have experienced first exclusion and later limited admission to citizenship, there have always been ways for them to make demands and contribute to political projects. Feminism has been one expression of those demands, but women have often participated in political organisations and institutions (Astelarra, 2005). 2.5. Feminism transforming the state: equality policies, representation and political presence The nineteenth-centry nation-state legitimised the separation of public and private life. Legislation and official policies reinforced it, and the courts perpetuated the established order. Many women rebelled against this situation and started the women’s suffrage movement; but they had to wait until after the First World War to achieve the right to vote. Following the World War II, the women’s suffrage spread to most western countries. Although the international suffrage movement managed to eliminate those legal restrictions, discrimination against women continued by indirect means. Not only did the state continue to assign to women the functions of looking after the family and the home, but it refused to recognise their authority in the family: that position belonged to the father, or the oldest male. Again, the Welfare State has in practice modified the division between public and private domains, with most of its services taking place between the state and the family, the ultimate recipient of most of them being the family. Nevertheless, those 55 practical changes did not lead to a status change for women because the state carried on considering women’s role to be in the family, which makes them a different kind of citizen; social rights were not linked to individual rights, as were political rights, because the latter were associated with people who had employment in the labour market: hence, with men; other family members who did not earn a salary were under their charge. This situation put women at a disadvantage. The right to vote did make women citizens, but it didn’t lead to equality between women and men. To eliminate this inequality, it was necessary for women to participate in public life, not only because the inequality was derived from a system created by men but because public policies were recreating and maintaining the difference. The social atmosphere created by the feminist movement, which started in the nineteen-sixties27 and grew over the following decades, helped to modify the discriminatory behaviour of the state. Various strategies have been (and still are being) tried out to correct and eliminate the unequal treatment of and discrimination against women: these are equal opportunities, affirmative action and mainstreaming.28 An equal-opportunity policy is one that aims to incororate women into public life. Once women had been recognised to have the same rights as men, these rights of women needed to be backed by measures to ensure that women could avail themselves of their rights by removing legal, economical, social, cultural and power-related barriers. One of the most important tools making it possible for women to enjoy the same opportunites is education, both formal and cultural. The objective is for women to realise that they have individual rights which they can assert in the job market, politics and social life. Together with such cultural training, women also needed to acquire training in job skills through higher education. Thus education policies are one of the main means for implementing an equal-opportunity strategy. But the creation of awareness among women is not sufficient: another part of the strategy is to bring about structural changes. Legislation has been a major structural component, because it is important for the law to establish legal equality. The first step is to review current legislation, because even though women now have the vote many inequalities remain embedded in current legislation. Once discriminatory laws are eliminated, new laws have to be created to promote equality: laws dealing with violence, employment, laws that make the pursuit of family life and a professional career compatible, and laws about participation in political institutions. But new laws do not change the part women play in society. An examination of these policies shows that women and men do not stand in the same condition when it comes to taking an active role in public life. Although equal opportunity strategies have produced many good results, it has remained difficult for women to enter the public domain, one of the main problems being the organisation of society which continues to discriminate against women, particularly women’s role in the family. That is not the only problem because women also suffer discrimination within the public domain itself. The movement’s response to othese difficulties and limitations is to point out that if women do not have equality at the starting point and on that account find it harder to take part in public life, then the starting point has to be put right. At the same time, it must be made possible for women to attain the same positions as men in the public arena, the job market, politics and society. Affirmative action and the women’s empowerment are the best strategies for overcoming the obstacles brought to light by equal opportunity approaches. 27 Namely the second wave of the Feminist Movement. 28 These were presented and analysed in the section titled “Feminist debates”. 56 Affirmative action encourages participatory policies to compensate for the obstacles to women’s presence in public life by giving priority to women over men as the subjects of inequality in equal conditions. There are many ways to apply the principle of affirmative action, such as the quota system, which aims to balance the numerical proportion between men and women in certain activitiet, for example to support the presence of women in politics. Women’s empowerment works the same way, by securing a larger quota of power for women. Some empowerment strategies are akin to affirmative action because giving women equal opportunities does not suffice to abolish discrimination. Power is of course one of the main components in relationships between women and men, to confront which it is necessary both for women to gain more self-esteem and confidence in their own abilities, and to wield power in their personal and public lives. Although affirmative action has been an essential part of equal opportunity in order to overcome some of the latter’s limitations, its implementation has not done away with discrimination either, because it has not resolved the underlying problem, which is that the presence of women in public life has not resulted in a change in the housewife’s role. In women’s life, doing double work has become the norm. To develop public strategies to end discrimination against women, it is necessary to change the conceptual framework behind those strategies. New categories are needed to analyse the basis of women’s inequality, and for that it is necessary to recognise the gender system, and not only in public life. The basic point of this new conceptual framework is the proposal to modify all the imposed feminine and masculine rules and routines in order to make gender equality available, preferably through strategies of mainstreaming and parity. Initially, gender mainstreaming called for a broadening of the domain of participation of equal opportunity policies, so that they covered the whole of the state, through greater political compromise to end discrimination and more involvement of resources and institutions. Its core strategy has been to include the gender dimension in different public activities, each of which is analysed to see whether there is a difference in its impact on female and male groups. Although mainstreaming is broader than the other strategies, it does not replace them, but rather each complements the other. Parity is also seen as affirmative action to ensure that both genders are equally represented in all activities, but particularly in political positions and posts. Parity consists of the application of quota policies so that neither gender has more than 60% representation, so there is a maximum 60-40 proportion. The objective is recognition of legal subjects of both sexes thanks to social action, surmounting the limits of formal equality between men and women, and ensuring true equality in all domains. The inclusion of sexual identity in the definition of a legal person would entail the same status for women as for men. This is parity. As regards citizenship, representation has been considered in both directions in all three strategies. As was hinted in the above descriptions, there have been demands for the presence of women in traditional domains of institutional representation, meetings, administrative and executive bodies, on the assumption that their presence in the political elites would lead to the appearance of new subjects on the political agenda and have an influence on policies. It was also expected to achieve representation of a broader kind, not just increasing the number of participants but broadening the places and manners in which that participation occurred. Besides calling for the non-formal modes of participation which appear to be more accessible to women (Amurrio et al., 2007b: 39-41), support for broader participation would be connected to a proposal, relevant to modification of job distributions along sex lines, for social and political participation to be open to the whole community. 57 All the political strategies and measures mentioned have been widely implemented in the Basque Country, although the country’s administrative fragmentation has exerted its influence here too. Thus in southern Euskal Herria, the model used in the Spanish state has been maintained, so that in the nineteen-eighties, in each autonomous community official organisms were created which were affiliated to the Woman’s Institute (a Spanish organism necessary to channel policies of gender equality): these were the Basque Woman’s Institute (or Emakunde) in the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), and the Navarre Equality Institute in Navarre.29 The capacity for action of these institutes has been proportional to the degree of legitimacy attained in the respective autonomous community administrations; thus while the Basque Woman’s Institute is currently implementing its Fifth Equality Plan, The Navarre Equality Institute only completed its first Equal Opportunity Plan (for 2006-2010) barely a year ago.30 (It is also worth noting that the Basque Autonomous Community adopted the Law of Equality Between Women and Men three years earlier than the Spanish state.) Thus the Basque Woman’s Institute seems to have achieved broader legitimacy than the Navarrese institute. The time lag between the two administrations is also evident in the following statistics. Accessibility of the public domain: affirmative action Percentages of female town councillors Until: 1995 2002 2011 Navarre 17·2 21·1 27·74 26·6 35·05 BAC 21·4 Sources: Astelarra, 2005: 378, <www.mujeresenred.net>. Percentages of female members of autonomous communities’ parliaments Until: Navarre BAC (1998) Sources: Astelarra, 2005: 374, <www.mujeresenred.net>. 1998/1999 2011 26 34 30·7 45* And from the equality officers of the local government network Berdinsare, which was created in the Basque Autonomous Community to facilitate coordination and cooperation among these officers, has come a broad organisation of local training courses. It is not the purpose of this article to recount over twenty years of activity, so I will limit myself to a few facts in order to show what progress towards equality has been made so far in some Basque towns, with good results in certain cases and more dubious ones in others.31 The way has been led by insitutional feminism in consultation with women’s and feminist groups in the cases where this was possible. As I have shown, feminist analysis of citizenship leads to an analysis of policy and the activity of the state; some initiatives deriving from such ideas have been carried out in these domains, and I have tried to go some way towards showing that although feminist practices have achieved some good things in the course of the quest for equality between men and women, one major obstacle comes up time and time again: the division of work that underpins the way society is organised, so that the place where least has changed is the area in which women’s presence is the greatest, namely the domestic domain. Despite Called in Spanish the Instituto Navarro para la Igualdad y la Familia, formerly Instituto Navarro de la Mujer: see <www.navarra.es> viewed on the 1st of April, 2012. 29 <http://www.navarra.es> viewed on the 1st of April, 2012; http://www.emakunde.euskadi.net viewed on the 1st of April, 2012. Parekotasunaren helburua lortua. 30 31 Note that some important elements of the Law of Equality Between Women and Men have yet to be developed and implemented. * 58 the fact that the tasks performed in this domain are basic to life, they are still ‘valueless’ tasks in our society, as is the time spent on them, because women’s time is unquantifiable. These activities are not reflected in public citizenship, while in these pages I have put forward the idea that a different kind of citizenship, one which does not exclude women, is possible, provided a policy can be created which brings together public and private voices through a process backed by the state. Today when a broad wave of Basque national sentiment is clamouring for a Basque state in Euskal Herria, an interesting process of reflection is getting under way regarding the nature of such a political structure, and feminists are eager to participate in this process using all the tools that feminism has developed, in the conviction that this will be beneficial for all of Basque society. 2.6. The opportunity to join public voices and private voices in Euskal Herria At a time when a broad social and political sector of Basque society has embarked on a process of reflection about the significance of a hypothetical Basque state, the feminist perspective is able not only to point out how gender relations can affect the process but to make proposals about existing gender inequalities. Let us therefore participate in these reflections. The extent of Basque national sentiment underlines the need for a Basque state. There is talk of a widespread sentiment, and this is of prime importance for the growing national project, so the idea is for this project to have a heavy component of participation and integration so that the national sentiment will spread even more in Basque society. In the debate over what the national project will consist of, it may be suspected that the participation in it of women and men will be unequal, and that what women say about it will be taken less into account than what men have to say on the matter (Walby, 1992). Thus gender relations can be expected to have a big impact on what will be decided about the national project. Women’s interests may be either absent or poorly expressed in the national project, and this could diminish support for the project on the part of women. If so, an opportunity to achieve a sentiment giving even wider support to the national project woud have been lost. Two issues need to be resolved so that this is not allowed to happen: one is the issue of unequal participation of women and men; the other, that of women’s opinions not being heeded. The solution to the first of these is easy: women’s and men’s participation in the debate should be balanced; for that to happen, the obstacles preventing women from taking part need to be removed so that their double work load does not turn into a triple one. The second issue can be addressed by turning things around and listening to women’s concerns and proposals. To a large extent, both solutions require a change in political culture and power relationships; if achieved, we would have a national project based on relationships of equality, and by presenting a national project with the added value of equality in Basque society there would be a better chance to win wider support for the project. A more widespread sentiment of Basque nationhood created by a national project based on relations of equality should incorporate into the future state, from both public and private (including domestic) domains, collective goals arising from both, thus orienting a hypothetical Basque state not just towards the market but to life as a whole. Such a state would give rise to a new concept of citizenship which took into account the two domains, the public and the private, and so would be linked to the production of individual rights in public and private activities: employment, politics, social life, culture, housework and caring. The benefits of individual rights would thus extend to the entire population. 59 All these changes would redefine the domain of politics as a domain for establishing collective objectives from public and private life. But it is one thing to establish objectives and quite another to achieve them. For the latter purpose, the Basque state will need to work together with Basque society, since many of those collective objectives require changes in social structure, including relationships within the family, intimate relationships, work relationships and so on. Legislation and gender policies are useful tools, but they are not enough, so the Basque state would be unable to achieve these objectives without the support of Basque society; therefore, to keep the channels open and working between the Basque state and Basque society, the state will have to take the local councils and social movements into account as well. Basque society is modern, advanced, pluralistic and culturally diverse, and as whatever the components of a definition of citizenship, somebody will always be unhappy. This polemical aspect of citizenship is always dynamic, and is best understood in terms of an ongoing debate concerning rights, obligations and choices. Feminism is also characterised and permeated by these debates, within which it creates new concepts still at a normative level, now being circulated in academia, but which may some day be able to make interesting contributions to the debate, provided the idea of political intersectionality is put into practice. It must not be forgotten that the political category of women is blind to other possible inequalities among women such as race, class, ethnic group, age, sexual orientation and so on. Thinking about Basque citizenship should also take note of these inequalities, and indeed may find the theoretical tools developed by feminism useful for the purpose. 60 REFERENCES Amurrio, M., Larrinaga, A. & Mateos, T. (2007a): Participación sociopolítica de las mujeres en los órganos de decisión y consultivos del ámbito institucional municipal de Bilbao. Informe cuantitativo, University of the Basque Country / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Research funded by Área de Igualdad, Cooperación y Ciudadanía, Bilbao City Council (unpublished). ––––––––––, (2007b): Participación sociopolítica de las mujeres en el ámbito institucional municipal de Bilbao. Informe cualitativo, University of the Basque Country / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Research funded by Área de Igualdad, Cooperación y Ciudadanía, Bilbao City Council (unpublished). Astelarra, J. (2005): Veinte años de políticas de Igualdad, Cátedra, Madrid. Benhabib, S. (1996): “Toward a deliberative Model of Democracy”, in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference, New Jersey, Princeton University. Carrasco, C. (2006): Estadístiques sota sospita. Proposta de nous indicadors des de l´experiència femenina, Institut Catalá de les Dones, Barcelona. Crenshaw, K. W. (1989): “Demarginalising the intersection of race and sex: a black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics”, University of Chicago Legal Forum 139, 139-167. García Guitián, E. (1999): “Ciudadanía y Género: posibilidades de análisis desde la teoría política”, in M. Ortega et al., Género y Ciudadanía. Revisiones desde el ámbito privado, Instituto Universitario de Estudios de la Mujer, Madrid, 53-63. Lombardo, E. & Verloo M. (2009): “Contentious citizenship: feminist debates and practices and European challenges”, Feminist review, 92,108-128. 92, Murillo, S. (1996): El mito de la vida privada, Siglo XXI, Madrid. Mouffe, Ch. (1996): “Democracy, Power and the Political”, in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference, New Jersey, Princeton University. Okin, S. M. (1994): “Political liberalism, justice and gender”, Ethics, 105. Quesada Saravia, L. (2004): “Hacia una propuesta holística política para abordad la relación ‘género y democracia’”, in A. Garcia (ed.), Género y ciudadanía: un debate, Icaria, Barcelona. Walby, S. (1992) : “Woman and Nation”, International Journal of Comparative Sociology XXXIII, 1 2, 81-100. Young, I. M. (1997): Intersecting Voices, New Jersey, Princeton University. Yuval-Davis, N.(1991): “The Citizenship Debate: Women, Ethnic processes and the State”, Feminist Review, 39, 58-68. Yuval-Davis, N. (1997): “Women, Citizenship and Difference”, Feminist Review, 57, 4-27. Zabala, I. & Luxan, M. (2009): Propuesta de elección y construcción de un sistema de Indicadores de Igualdad y no Androcéntricos para el municipio de Bilbao, University of the Basque Country / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Research funded by Área de Igualdad, Cooperación y Ciudadanía, Bilbao City Council (unpublished). 61 The Basque State State and culture Ane Larrinaga Renteria Josu Amezaga Albizu Patxi Juaristi Larrinaga Fito Rodríguez Bornaetxea Iñaki Martínez de Luna Pérez de Arriba 62 Introduction A n e L a r r i n ag a R e n t e r i a, Ph . D . ( S o c i o lo g y ) . P r o f e s s o r, E H U - U P V The issue of culture is important in state-building, just as it is in nation-building. Culture may in general be said to provide resources for achieving social cohesion and hence for creating a shared collective identity. Ultimately culture provides any social group which considers itself as such with ways to re-create and perpetuate itself. From this perspective, any analysis of culture reveals connections between culture and power. If a social group wishes to be reborn culturally or socially in the present era, it needs to achieve some degree of cultural sovereignty; that is to say, it needs to have the ability (power) to manage, regulate, create and defend its own symbolic resources. Notwithstanding the present-day questioning of its role, the state is still the institution that makes possible such independence in political terms. Therefore, inasmuch as it is a necessary tool for social or cultural rebirth, stateless national groups seek such an institution for themselves. Despite claims about the demise of the state, it is an observable fact that new states are being created all the time around the world, at least on those occasions when such a political opportunity arises. Let us not forget that five of the twenty-seven members of the European Union are states created during the 1990s. The world’s states numbered fifty at the start of the twentieth century; at the beginning of the twenty-first century there are two hundred. But what most interests us here is the fact that a review of the theoretical frameworks developed to study the birth of states reveals that the determining factors accounting for the disintegration of some states (and the subsequent emergence of new ones) include, along with economic, institutional and political factors, cultural elements linked to identity: language and culture (López, 2010).32 Thus, among stateless groups there still appears to be great faith in the cultural efficacy of the state as an institution. Along with a description of the disadvantages to which Basque culture has been subjected in the absence of its own state, the following pages contain reflections on the benefits in cultural terms that would derive from a hypothetical state for Basque society. They focus on the cultural functions of the state, as well as changes to these functions in recent times. There is also an attempt to identify some of the weaknesses and strengths in the cultural sphere affecting endeavours to obtain a Basque state, taking note of issues which the state would be called on to resolve. These reflections occupy several chapters. Each of the articles that form part of this section adopts its own specific perspective with regard to subject matter and the position taken. But over and above the multiplicity of viewpoints represented, a common thread runs through them all: curiosity and questioning about the state, from the point of view of culture. Taking as their point of departure an analysis of the cultural reality of Euskal Herria and a consideration of current theoretical views and debates, these chapters by professors Ane Larrinaga, Josu Amezaga, Patxi Juaristi, Fito Rodríguez and Iñaki Martínez de Luna explore a range of topics, including the nature of the state’s symbolic power, globalization, developments in the culture market and the consequences of transnational culture on a state’s cultural sovereignty, an analysis of Basque cultural expression, reflections on the Basque education system and an assessment of the state of the Basque language. Since all these topics have a universal aspect, the analyses are theoretically grounded. But they are also all anchored in a particular historical context, the Basque context. Each chapter represents an attempt to relate universal and particular facets to each other, to correlate 32 Jaume López, ed. (2010): “Noves Estatalitats i Processos de Sobirania”. IDEES. Revista de Temes Contemporanis 33 (OctubreDesembre 2010), 1-230. 63 theoretical and empirical views, in some instances allowing the theoretical to occupy centre stage, and in others the practical. Despite the effects of globalization which raise questions about the independence of the state, Ane Larrinaga observes that states are not disappearing, but merely adapting to different roles in contemporary times, particularly in the economic domain. As far as their cultural function is concerned, the author suggests that states have aimed to accumulate a monopoly of cultural resources ever since they started, since they were born with the ambition of being nation-states. Present-day conditions have broken that monopoly, but not entirely. In “Culture in state-building: the state as a symbolic project” Larrinaga argues that, beyond the historical ability of states to impose a uniform cultural system on their territory, no other institution has achieved a degree of efficacy as a producer of social reality comparable to that of states. States are institutions with a capacity to adjust the mental structures of the citizens on their territory, in such a way that they are able to impose certain shared world-views, perceptions and senses of belonging among members of society in the state. Hence it is still an important instrument for social regeneration. Larrinaga’s article insists on the importance of the centripetal influence of the state on the culture system; in the next chapter, Josu Amezaga looks at the opposite effect of present-day forces. “State, market and culture: future challenges” examines changes in the current relationships between state and culture: first, the progressive supremacy of the market in culture; secondly, a number of phenomena resulting from globalization which have affected the flow of capital, information and populations; lastly, the violation of the nation’s cultural space. Amezaga points out some of the issues that a hypothetical Basque state would have to grapple with: one is the need to build a nation-state out of the cultural community, another the need to address cultural diversity appropriately. One of Basque society’s challenges will be balancing the tension between these two principles while attending to shared minorities (for instance, adopting the language as a common element), while others will include establishing regulations to resist market pressures and promoting cultural policies acknowledging grass-roots participation in cultural production. The third article in this section, “Basque cultural forms: strengths and weaknesses in a hypothetical Basque state”, describes several expressions of Basque culture. Patxi Juaristi begins by reviewing the polemical issue of how to define Basque culture. He opts for the position that if culture is in Basque then it is Basque culture. He goes on to examines five cultural forms based on verbal communication: bertsolaritza, song, theatre, books and cinema. Juaristi argues that the future of the Basque language, hence also that of Basqe culture and the Basque-speaking community, depends on cultural forms linked to verbal communication. Therefore, he maintains, an analysis of these cultural forms will provide a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Basque culture in the process of state-building. The strengths include the organisation and institutionalisation of Basque culture by its producers in Basque society outside of public initiatives. Among the weaknesses we may mention the minority situation of the language, the small market for Basque cultural products and the vulnerability of the Basque culture industry. The point of departure taken in the next chapter is again an analysis of the situation in Euskal Herria, but this time concerning the education system. In “Basque education rights, and a look at some European school systems”, Fito Rodríguez begins with a review of Spanish and French legislation. He concludes that in the case of Spain, the power to organise the education system as a whole is reserved for the state, even though the Spanish constitution attributes control over education to the governments of the autonomous communities. France does not contemplate any sharing of the state’s power to control education. One obstacle standing in the way of a Basque education system is the fact that the Basque language does not have the same legal status everywhere. Looking to the future, the author considers it necessary for the right of all pupils to study 64 through the medium of Basque to be upheld, and for teachers to be trained in Basque. The chapter ends by considering the education systems of certain countries — Finland, the Netherlands and Estonia — which could serve as models for Basque education. These examples may be particularly useful because they are of systems involving languages which are not only located in Europe but also in situations of language-contact and/or have maintained a high level of quality over a long period in recent years. In the last chapter in the section, “The situation and outlook for the Basque language at the beginning of the 21st century: the challenges that lie ahead”, Iñaki Martínez Martínez de Luna offers a diagnosis of the present situation of the language through specific examples. Two key points for an understanding of the language situation are the way the administrative fragmentation of the Basque Country has limited the language’s development, and how the language’s varied legal status has resulted in dubious language policies. In addition to discussing these key factors, Martínez de Luna also paints a fine-grained portrait of the linguistic situation using other kinds of indicators. The analysis of the agents of language transmission, measurements of the language competence and use of the population and descriptions of attitudes and opinions reveal the great obstacles for the regeneration of a minority language such as Basque. The language situations and tendencies in different areas clearly correlate with the the type of legal framework and the kind of language policy developed in the respective places, as well as with the strength of the grassroots language initiatives developed. The article examines the difficulties for the survival of a language without the backing of a state, whether because of objective or subjective factors. 65 1. Culture in statestate-building: the state as a symbolic project. project. A n e L a r r i n ag a R e n t e r i a, Ph . D . ( S o c i o lo g y ) . P r o f e s s o r, E H U - U P V Is there any point, today, in relating the demands for sovereignty of national groups without a state to state-building? Or is the institution of the state, as some would claim, doomed as a consequence of the globalization process? This chapter shows how a state, in acquiring and implementing legitimate cultural resources, possesses the effective means to generate social reality symbolically, which gives it the ability to construct and adapt society to its needs. Thus in its socializing authority to impose shared world views, forms of partnership among the citizenry, and so on, its capacity for social regeneration remains unequalled when it comes to ensuring the cultural survival and social integration of a particular group. 66 Is there any point, today, in relating the demands for sovereignty of national groups without a state to state-building? Such questions are often asked, in political and intellectual circles, of the supporters of the right to create their own state who believe that this is necessary as a means of ensuring social regeneration. Why a state, if the state is doomed as a consequence of the globalization process? Isn’t it an obsolete institution, since there are more and more opportunities to go over, or under, the state to regenerate and develop a culture, and culture markets have already transcended state borders in today’s globalized world? The following reflections have been written to address these questions. 1. IS THE STATE DOOMED? SURVIVAL OF THE STATE IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION In recent years much has been said in theoretical and academic circles about the possibility that the state is approaching its eventual demise. The emergence of the state in the western world was clearly linked to the goal of setting up, defending and regulating an internal market limited to a specific territory. This function, the importance of which had intensified since World War II in particular, has lost some of its significance with the emergence of global capitalism, and this has raised questions about the new role and state of health of the state. There has been a lot of discussion of the state’s loss of sovereignty. We often read in the literature of recent decades about the supposed demise of the state as a consequence of changes that have resulted from the globalization of markets. In many fields globalization has turned the way society works upside-down: previously unknown problems have arisen today, generated by the traffic of communication and information, economic production and its financing, the transfer of technology, and demographic, ecological and geostrategic risks. It apears that no adequate solutions to these serious probems can be found within the domain of the nation-state. This is seen by some analysts as a gradual weakening of the intrinsic sovereignty of the classical nation-state. But the diagnoses do not always coincide. J.R. Monedero expresses doubt about forecasts of the state’s inability to withstand the onslaught of internationalization, and asks: “Have nationstates really retreated? Has the function of this political structure truly changed? Has the state receded, or is the Leviathan merely temporarily fatigued from the demands of the postwar social compact?” (Monedero, 2003: 10). In these questions we can discern different possible facets lurking behind the state’s transfiguration. Despite partial disagreement among analysts about the new forms adopted by the state, all coincide in attributing the main cause of the crisis of the state to the transformation of the socioeconomic system. Recent studies likewise tend to focus on changes in the state as a consequence of economic aspects. These studies suggest that with the creation of global markets and their own institutions and decision centres, a profound asymmetry has emerged between the forms of authority existing in the society, on the one hand, and the economy, on the other (Strange, 2001). In the economic domain the traditional authority of the nation-state has been weakened by integration of state economies into the global economy, which has in turn led to financial and technological change. Therefore, analysts conclude, the hitherto traditional economic responsibilities and powers of the state are weakening little by little: for instance, the influence of the state on economic growth, the effect of employment policies and active intervention to correct economic imbalances have all diminished more and more strikingly in recent years. The resources developed by the state over centuries, such as its principles of sovereignty and territory, are showing cracks as a result. For one thing, state sovereignty is considered to have been seriously breached. The newly created capitalist market requires other political powers which need to share power with the traditional states, some of which are at a higher level than the state (such as the European Union and its institutions), while others pertain to a smaller scale, e.g. regions, so-called global cities and so on. For another, state borders and state-level regulations pose an obstacle to the global markets which need to move 67 their products and finances around within a single, uniform space. But are these changes powerful enough to lead to the progressive contraction and even disappearance of the state as an institution? Taking only economic reasons into consideration, present-day trends do not support any such assumption. Certainly, today’s economy is global; but the fabric of this economy is composed of multiple networks of interaction at state, supra- and infra-state levels (Mann, 2003). Over eighty percent of world production is aimed at national markets. As of today, goods, assets and research and development are in their states of origin; indeed, they receive necessary state aid to provide for their needs in human capital, communications and other kinds of infrastructure, and economic assistance when required. In a word, the states provide one of the foundations upon which global capitalism stands. Perhaps the main foundation. Over and above the transnational relations based on capitalism’s technological and social connections, global networks are to a large extent segmented according to the particularities of nation-states, especially in the case of the most powerful states of the North. Since authority over the world’s territories is still vested exclusively in the states, the makeup of all kinds of global systems is based essentially on their participation. Moreover, far from disappearing in the era of global capitalism, the states seem to be starting to perform other functions too. We are witnessing a readjustment of the role of the state, and in the process states are positioning themselves in a much wider and more complex domain of power (Sassen, 2007). They have not by any means merely limited themselves to reducing their authority over the economic domain or relinquishing their former power to regulate the domestic economy. They have, on the contrary, acquired new functions in order to incorporte and adapt, within the state and its body of legislation, emergent international players in the economy — companies, markets, supranational institutions — and in society and culture, so that players originally created within the state which, paradoxically, may sometimes be thought of as losing ground for the state itself, can also operate beyond the state’s boundaries (Sassen, 2007). Naturally, like other transformations in history, the adjustment of institutional and legal elements by states with a view to the requirements of the global market is not everywhere the result of a smooth, seamless process. Let us not forget that the world is made up of a system of states exerting mutual influences, and that not all states are endowed with the same degree of power and sovereignty. Neither have they all had the same historical origin and development. Such adjustments and adaptation should not obscure the historical evolution of the institution. Without losing sight of this systemic, historical perspective, Michael Mann reminds us that the nation-state, territorially based and independent, is a fairly young institution (Mann, 1993). The number of states in the world has increased progressively and is still continuing to grow (López, 2010). Over the past three centuries both their number and domain of intervention have expanded. Although some of the state’s powers have diminished in the past three decades, particularly its power to regulate the economy, other attributions have on the contrary become greater of late, most notably those related to regulation of the private domain: family life, the individual’s life cycle, private interpersonal relations and so on (Giddens, 1994; Gurrutxaga, 2004). 2. CULTURE IN STATESTATE-BUILDING: THE STATE AS A SYMBOLIC PROJECT If we view the state as a tool for a given society to confront the challenge over independence on the local and international stage, this function of the state has undergone changes over recent decades. It is undeniable that such changes have occurred in the institution’s economic domain of activity. But can they also be broadened to include 68 other domains? Specifically, can the state be an effective formula for societies consisting of a minority group trying to protect its culture? What has the state to offer a society from the point of view of culture and identity? 2.1. A look at the conditions of state creation at the beginning of the Modern Era: the monopolistic accumulation of social resources The cultural mission is not usually considered a salient feature in classical definitions of the state. Or at least, this is usually left implicit. The best known among classical sociological definitions of the state is Weber’s, now a century old. In his words, something is a state “if and insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.” In this view, the accumulation of resources of physical force appears as the chief defining characteristic of this institution. Similarly, most frameworks used to study the origin of the state give preference to such a view: not only Weber, but also Norbert Elias and Charles Tilly, for instance (Weber, 1975, 1979; Elias, 1993; 1994; Tilly, 1992). As has been shown in these frameworks, the formation of the state is accompanied by the concentration of coercive forces in a single place. Thus, in an ideal model state, this institution which is licensed to keep order gradually distances itself from the common social milieu. Thenceforth, legitimate physical force cannot be used by anyone in the society unless it is created for that express purpose, and clearly identified in the society, by this centralized and disciplined public entity. This monopoly is the basis from which the state’s power derives. The western state only achieved this monopoly on the use of violence little by little, in the historical process of its birth, insofar as it dispossessed its internal competitors of the right to use force. Specifically, the state, in its beginnings at the start of the modern era, had to assert itself in the use of physical force not once but twice. First of all the state had to assert itself within its borders against the rival powers (the prince, aristocracy etc.), and the populations under their control. But it also had to fight outside its borders, to defend itself against other existing or would-be states, in order to survive. Thus, as historical studies have demonstrated, the states in Europe were not formed in isolation but as part of a system of states. And the creation of states was invariably associated with warfare, which constituted the “natural selection” mechanism for states (Tilly, 1992; Ramos Torre, 1995). But according to the classical analysis, although the accumulation of the resources of physical force is necessary, on its own this does not explain the full extent of the state’s power. Historically the monopoly of physical force was linked to the imposition of a system of taxes (how else could civil and external wars be paid for?) and the unification of an economic zone (Weber, 1979; Tilly, 1992; Elias, 1993; 1994; Ramos Torre, 1995). Thus began the idea of a “national” market within the territorial borders determined by the state. Hence the monopoly on force and the monopoly on taxation (“coercion” and “capital”, in Tilly’s words) have to be understood as closely associated processes. Marx himself had noted, in his time, that the modern state and capitalism were created and developed simultaneously. But does the accumulation of physical force and economic resources, emphasised by the classical authors, fully account for the nature of the state? I don’t think so. The concentration of the armed forces and financial resources is not feasible unless the state also consolidates a symbolic capital of approval and legitimacy. The state always starts out as a project to create an integrated society. The state needed to be a nation-state in order to survive. Thus the legitimacy of official tax-collecting is usually linked with the statepromoted creation of bonds of identification and loyalty. Collecting taxes and economic relations ultimately favoured the reinforcement of representations of the state as a united territory. In this manner the state first took root in a given space; this was not, of course, the 69 national space that would eventually be occupied by the state, but that sovereignty appeared increasingly as its competence. Thus the concentration of economic capital and the imposition of uniform taxes may be said to have undergone a similar process as the consolidation of cultural resources and the unification of the cultural market. It makes sense to assume that these resources should be linked. At the beginning of the modern era, the communal and traditional European social order prior to the emergence of the state was in crisis, so the new institution embarked on the creation of an order of a different kind. Clearly the only way to bring about this change was to act in all domains, government, economy and culture; or to put it as some analysts do: cultivating the areas that involved violence, capital and symbolic production. Thus, as the state gradually accumulated resources in all these domains, it undertook the enormous symbolic reconstruction task of integrating and legitimizing the modern social order (Bauman, 1997). And the medium of the modern order was, and is, the nation-state. Thus the state has acquired all kinds of cultural resources in its historical development, including tools for re-creating culture and transmitting it; and just as has happened in the domains of power and economics, its monopoly of the cultural domain has entailed the dispossession of “others”. Within that meta-process, the state has obviously had to ‘manage’ the cultural diversity of the original communities contained within its borders. Initially, this plurality of cultures was expressed not just through linguistic diversity but also customs, traditional rights and numerous other characteristics. To deal with diversity, the state, through the elites or dominant groups that have been in charge of it, has had to make choices: which culture to transmit in the society, which language to use in schools, which culture to make official in the bureaucracy and public administration, and so on. Obviously the part it has played in these choices and decisions has not been a neutral one; like any other historical order, it has acted as an institution defending its own interests. Social integration is the objective, and culural resources have certainly been used as instruments of integration. Consequently, culture has had to fulfil a unifying role for the state, and usually that is what happens, sacrificing diversity and the ethnic or national groups represented by that diversity. Hence one of the tasks faced by every state is to bring about the unification of the state’s culture market, reducing all the codes that exist within its territory to one, including forms of speech, laws, weights and measures, and making all forms of communication uniform, especially in writing and bureaucracy, all for the sake of making the social integration and the very society of the state legitimate. In so doing, the state has not imposed any one culture. On the contrary, it has had to raise particlar cultures and languages to a status of universality. But in this process it has denied to other cultures and languages access to the domains of universality; these are refused a chance to regenerate and survive. 2.2. A condition for statehood: the monopoly of culture The different culture systems developed with normality in modern Western Europe have for the most part taken shape under unifying, monopolistic conditions created by states. The development of these cultures, and indeed other, not strictly cultural targets of the state including its nation-building project, economic development and the development of human resources, could not have been achieved without first ensuring the relative cultural and linguistic unity of the state’s society. The unity of the culture, and even that of the whole society, depended, among other things, on the imposition of the dominant language and culture. The state is obliged by necessity to bring to bear the mechanisms of social generation and regeneration in order to ensure the survival of the state’s order. The means of regeneration are basically formal or informal cultural resources and resources of 70 socialization: schooling methods, linguistic codes, bureaucratic procedures and so on. Over time, the constant application of these means of regeneration result in the creation of a special domain in the state’s society: a culture system. By ‘creation of a culture system’ is meant an autonomous domain developed in a ‘normalized’ manner in the state’s society with institutional support. Once the conditions for unification created in these societies have been ensured, the stage is set for progressive strengthening of the culture. Paradoxically, it is the state that paves the way for the autonomy of the culture system by pursuing cultural policies and regulating the cultural domain. In the course of this slow, complex historical autonomization process, the legitimate flag-bearing organisations and entities of the language and culture, such as schools, universities, academies, scientific institutions, publishers and cultural concerns, together with artists, intellectuals and the like, assert their authority as time goes by through the gradual accumulation of cultural resources (Bourdieu, 1995). The articulation of a culture system by every modern state is necessary for the survival of the state’s society, because its development provides the state with effective tools for building a common collective identity: the national identity. Cultural institutions in and of themselves are not enough to build a nation-state, but they are necessary nonetheless. Theorists of nationalism say that in the modern era the meanings of a nation are achieved, among other things, through symbolic creation within the cultural domain, such as novels, theatre, poetry, operas, newspapers, films etc. In all of these the nation’s characteristics are given expression, origin myths are developed, the group’s historical roots are articulated and the general symbols of reference of social life (culturally, geographically, representationally) are established. In fact, the state’s nation-building endeavour is in large part an exercise in culture-building: it is its daily task to offer its cultural representation everywhere, at all times, in all cultural and linguistic settings, in official declarations and in everyday life. Through its direct and indirect presence in all facets of social life, the state suffuses the entire fabric of social life with this gigantic symbolic construction and so helps to create a community defined by shared cultural tenets and practices. Obviously a key role in this undertaking is played by specially created formal institutions dedicated to socialization such as the public school system and official bodies for the promotion of the culture system. It is their task to teach the official school curriculum (for example, spreading a standardized version of official history), construct a model literature, and fit musical and artistic creation into the state’s historical and social coordinates. But let us also not neglect to mention the influence of the informal socialization performed through other social practices. For example, universal obligatory military service, economic development (the sociocultural assimilation of the rural population, for instance, has historically played an important part in state-building), bureaucracy (whereby citizens’ lives are regulated by procedures reflected in official designations and documents) and countless other practices have the effect of training and conditioning the population. One notable function performed by the cultural component of nation-state building is the work of ‘political archaeology’ carried out by cultural institutions and producers (Smith, 2000), whereby states use cultural resources and institutions of socialization to articulate and adjust what the population remembers and forgets, helping to reconstruct the past in order to legitimise the present-day community. The work of many historians, philologists, philosophers, anthropologists, archaeologists, writers and other contributors to the culture within the framework of the state’s culture system consists, indeed, of constructing elements of the state culture. In most cases this is not done consciously. As a matter of fact, the state is the unconscious, subliminal political backdrop of every official, dominant culture system, taken for granted and considered indisputable in normal cognitive structures. Intellectuals and professionals in cultural fields have provided keys for understanding the contemporary social state, helping to situate it in history and the world, magnifying the culture of the society and cultivating its language. Many have gone further still and 71 attempted to filter certain parts of the heritage and cultural traditions, cultivating these by selecting and registering events, interpreting these selectively, and also establishing, rounding out and polishing a canon, which is moulded and adapted to current scientific evidence and contemporary perspectives. Groups located outside the state-supported culture system or lacking institutional backing from the state, on the other hand, generally find it very hard to induce social regeneration and survive culturally. In a word: unless you have strong state sponsorship, you must work very hard indeed to define yourself as a differentiated group and present a social and cultural identity to others, and you will obtain help from far fewer resources in the domain of symbolic struggles. In most cases, therefore, symbolic influence is much more limited. Unlike state cultures, those without state protection tend to be under-institutionalised and socially atrophied, and it is difficult for them to become culture systems, that is, to create an institutional fabric, and for producers of such a culture to acquire authority (Larrinaga, 2007). Thus typically one of the objectives of stateless national movements is, in the absence of initiatives from political institutions, to stimulate and support their own culture through grassroots initiatives. For the same reason, programmes for the recovery of minority languages and cultures, that is, endeavours to construct their own culture system, are most often linked to demands for political sovereignty and institutions of some sort or other. 2.3. The symbolic power of the state What have been the consequences of the accumulation of cultural resources in the hands of the state and the articulation of the culture system that the state has made possible? How effective does this accumulation of resources make the state as an institution? Why, from the point of view of culture, would a stateless group wish to assert a need to have their own state? Beyond the visible expressions of a particular culture system that are conventionally labelled as culture, every society adopts, internally, a symbolic dimension which is less evident to the naked eye. Or to put it another way: a basic component of any society, besides its social or institutional structure, is its symbolic order. This symbolic order provides the members of the society with an overall framework comprising the meanings, cognitive structures, beliefs and symbols which favour social integration. It supplies symbols and narratives which encourage a sense of identity, and constitutes a complex structure that gives meaning to social acts. As Geertz observes, culture (as a symbolic world) and social structure are two inseparable levels of social life: on one level we have beliefs, meaningful symbols, and values, which individuals use to define the world, express feelings and ideas, and formulate opinions; on the other, the human relations which constitute society’s structure (Geertz, 1987). By obtaining and accumulating cultural resources, the state has acquired effective tools for the symbolic creation of a social reality, thereby gaining opportunities to build and mould society according to its requirements. So much is this so, that in the modern era ‘society’ is identified more and more with the society which the state has articulated; so for example, when the concept of ‘society’ was used in sociology it was long equated with the society of the state (Lamo de Espinosa, 2001). Today we often hear that the market trends, technological changes and transnational migrations of cultures and populations resulting from globalisation have diminished the cultural monopoly once held by the state. It is quite true that, as a result of worldwide culture industries and the migratory movements of populations with different cultures, states have faced difficulties in enforcing their projects for imposing cultural uniformity and limits have been placed on their monopolistic plans. Nonetheless, I suspect that the newly emerging institutions cannot yet match the efficacy of the state as an entity capable of producing social reality in a symbolic form in people’s everyday life. 72 In fact, not only has the state managed to create a dominant cultural model through its laws, bureaucracy, education system, social rituals and use of the mass media and language in the framework of the state, but it also has other profound symbolic influences, for it has the power to modify its subjects’ very mental structures to a far greater extent than any other social institution. By use of this power it imposes a shared world-view, perception and particular type of belonging on the members of its society. Insofar as it regulates social behaviours (together with the cognitive and cultural principles behind them), the state has the power to bring about in its subjects permanent loyalty and a common way of thinking, so that they will perceive reality in a particular way and are conditioned to feel and interpret things according to certain patterns. Such shared patterns of judgment, perception and memory help to achieve agreement about evidence based on the society’s established ‘commonsense knowledge’ in the societies of all states. In this way, symbolic domination using cultural and cognitive resources has gradually replaced violent subjugation in the activity of states. Indeed this form of domination is much more efficient than physical force because it is based on the implicit assent of the dominated. In such cases, the state is still, today, one of the most effective and powerful apparatuses for the creation of systemic compliance and moral conformism, in spite of the fact that its social power is never absolute, since it is capable of creating cognitive structures which support unthinking, reflex acceptance of a certain meaning of the world, and because these make the common experience of the world accessible to individuals within the state. Comprehensibly, then, today many stateless social groups have aspired to a state of their own in order to ratify their social character. Bourdieu points out that the state effectively helps create and re-create the tools needed to build a social reality (Bourdieu, 1997). Although a new social reality and new actors have emerged on a different scale in the era of globalisation, such as the transnational markets and cultural enterprises, the state is still playing its part, articulating and constituting mental structures of thought, memory and comprehension very effectively. Hence the social order established by the state does not raise too many issues or controversy because its institutional structures correspond adequately to the citizens’ cognitive patterns. The state remains, today, the chief repository of democratic rights and the arena for democratic participation by citizens (Giddens, 1994; 2000). The other side of the coin is the symbolic capital which the state must accumulate in order to achieve this. If it is anything, the state is the main locus of accumulation and use of symbolic capital in modern societies. Its various legal resources are among the most objectified and codified expressions of this symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1997). The state has gathered symbolic capital in such a way that this institution is the main referent for social ‘denomination’ in the present era. This means that through certificates, designations, titles and all kinds of public recognition and official registers, the state has the authority to determine people’s legitimate social identity in their own country. In other words, the state is attributed sufficient legitimacy to have the authority to say what and who things and people are and can be, what they say, and can say, do, and can do. Thus it is the state which names and approves the legitimate associations in the society: for instance, it decides what does and does not constitute a family, an organisation or a political party. It decides on the legitimacy of social identities: who is a citizen, a tax-payer, an owner, a relative or a person capable of practising a given occupation. What is more, the state must be informed of changes in such designations, and the state must be asked for recognition of new rights. There do not appear to be any other powers today, whether markets or political institutions on any other scale, for instance, that have achieved a comparable degree of legitimacy to determine the nature and social identity of people and groups in this manner. 73 2.4. 2.4. The state and building the individual’s everyday world: national identity in daily life For now, then, the nation-state is the dominant political structure. Globalisation has not yet freed the countries of the world from the political ascendancy of the state. Indeed, the world is undeniably divided into sharply delimited, discrete nation-states. This world of states could not sustain itself if it did not have strong backing in people’s consciousness. In other words, today’s nation-states have essential components of culture and identity, and display a capacity to re-create these continuously. And what is more, they are capable of embedding them into the everyday thoughts and everyday knowledge of their citizens. But what is meant by ‘everyday knowledge’ or ‘commonsense knowledge’? Knowledge is a basic category in the process called the social construction of reality by P.L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 1979). Social reality consists of individuals’ acts of mutual agreement, acts which are repeated over and over again over time. Knowledge is thus not only the systematised and formalised knowledge which characterises intellectual spheres of activity, or the cultivated knowledge created by recognised professionals in academic fields. Knowledge also consists of the ordinary cognitive practice generated by social activity and embedded in that activity. Therefore, in addition to formal knowledge there is also informal knowledge; besides professional knowledge there is folk knowledge; as well as cultivated knowledge, ordinary or commonsense knowledge. This second kind of knowledge dominates everyday life, as the body of knowledge that is developed and shared by all the members of society. Such knowledge gives them a basic reference about social life, making it possible for them to deal with everyday social functions. This pretheoretical ‘received knowledge’ generated in socialization processes provides members of society with basic knowledge or understanding about social life so that they acquire pragmatic skills for everyday life. When people internalise that knowledge as real, they assume that the view of reality it supports is also true. So the social reality of everyday life is considered an established reality in the ordinary perspective shared by members of a society, and so it appears in the guise of indisputable fact. As such, it needs no checking or verification. The ordinary knowledge on which this reality is based is founded upon ‘common sense’, it is self-reflexive and non-scientific, but that doesn’t make it any less effective socially because it has the strength of evidence. Among the elements of people’s knowledge of everyday life, their common worldview, is the very idea of the nation that has been created by the state. States constantly transmit, spread and anchor in individuals’ national consciousness the category of the nation as a moral order by means of immersive socialisation. As Michael Billig rightly says, nationalism is not just a kind of activity developed by nationalist movements without a state who are seeking change, i.e. a ‘visibe’ activity through political activism and unconventional protests or mobilisations; this is only one facet of nationalism. Nationalism consists for the most part of the ‘cold’ activity carried out by nation-states in the midst of everyday ordinariness. The point is that this ordinariness usually makes it impossible to see the state’s activity; indeed, state nationalism goes unmentioned in many analyses. Hence nationalism has frequently been studied as a particular political variable as if it were the specific domain of groups seeking to create a nation-state. It is not treated as a feature of all the political, cultural and everyday acts of already established states (Billig, 1998). It is therefore not usual for studies to take into account the cultural, ideological and political conditions required for the regeneration of already existing nation-states. It is forgotten that every state needs to keep regenerating to survive, and this regeneration must take place within objective or subjective structures, that is, in institutional structures and individuals’ consciousnesses. To achieve this, the state and its institutions must perform a constant ideological and symbolic-cultural function to fill people’s world with beliefs, images and social practices concerning social reality. In this way the nation-state has become an indisputable reality embedded in people’s everyday world, unnoticed and ubiquitous in the societies of contemporary states. This order created by the nation-state is 74 not put to a referendum every day. Rather than conscious, voluntary loyalty, the force of systemic complicity is imposed, day in, day out. Through conventional acts, citizens are created and re-created as members of the nation-state without any sense of compulsion, both from a cultural perspective and the perspective of identity. This being the case, the national identity that is forged by the state cannot be understood, as it is in many of today’s textbooks, as a mere reflection of the individual’s inner self or ego. Whatever the psychological dimension may be, identities are based on particular collective ways of life situated within society and history. To put it another way, national identities, like other group identities, incorporate collective categories and representations, and social customs and practices too. A national identity is a way of existing in the world and understanding and perceiving the world, which also serves, at the same time, to regenerate that world and present it as something ‘natural’. By being a way of life and being rooted in everyday social experiences, the experience becomes so wellknown and ordinary that it is thought of as obvious. Thus thought and perception categories about social reality (including the nation) are regenerated within individuals through their practical experiences because the cognitive and symbolic structures promoted by the state are embedded in daily social practices, such as school traditions, all sorts of bureaucratic practices which must be repeated over and over again, media consumption, sports and cultural activities, language, and so on. When speaking, going to school, dealing with the administration, watching television, participating in sports events, getting married, licensing a vehicle, getting health assistance, or just looking at one’s surroundings (with its official buildings, flags, street names, signs in a particular language, etc.), members of the society perform ordinary acts in their daily lives which involve cognitive structures inscribed with specific identity markers or world-views, and unconsciously internalize those structures. The nation-state’s symbolic order is regenerated in this way. Of course, in addition to this ordinary kind of regeneration, occasionally extraordinary events occur in the life of a state which also serve to revitalise sentiments of identity and belonging. Sometimes these are the result of unexpected turns of events, such as international crises, state funerals, or conflicts with other states; other times, the state itself orchestrates such occasions, as with celebrations of the ‘national day’, ‘independence day’, ‘armed forces day’ or whatever. On all these occasions the monotony of the ordinary is set aside and resources are put into play to ignite citizens’ sentiments of loyalty (Billig, 1998). Today, such meaning is attached to important sports competitions and other cultural events and so on. But once such exceptional happenings, which shake up our feelings for a time, are over, the usual ordinary regeneration sets in again. In this fashion, the nation-state remains present in the foundation of people’s day-to-day life, regenerating over and over again and embedded in their daily consciousness. This unknowing habitus of daily life constitutes the unconscious reverse side of custom, by means of which daily life is nationalised, because the nation-state has become the ubiquitous context and stage for people’s lives. This habitus encompasses structures of remembering and forgetting, the state’s ongoing socialising operation, which implicitly includes a reading and interpretation of history and of the present, and situates citizens’ ordinary perceptions and viewpoints within certain social and historical coordinates in accordance with that reading, making it unquestionable, seemingly natural. The state’s biggest challenge and greatest achievement is the naturalization of a certain social order and symbolic order. It is that power which stateless national groups aspire to obtain by building a state of their own. Let us return to the initial question with which the chapter began, then. Is the state becoming obsolete? Can a state offer a social group demanding one any assurance of social survival and regeneration? A state is a complex thing, a changing, many-faced institution which is constantly reshaping itself to adapt to the changing conditions of 75 society. Its structure and functions have been affected by globalisation and recent requirements of the capitalist markets. As a result the traditional sovereignty of the state appears to have been diminished, particularly in the economic domain. In the cultural domain too, global movements of markets and populations have created resistance and raised barriers against the state’s former integrating and homogenising projects. But again: the state is a many-faced, multidimensional institution, an adaptable entity which enables powers and functions of many different kinds. One of these dimensions is its symboliccultural power, which has been discussed in this article. In my opinion, the socialising effect of accumulated symbolic resources on members of society within the state remains strong. Thanks to that effect, the state-imposed symbolic order is the invisible hidden face of all social practices. When the ubiquity of the state is almost absolute in the social practices of a given country, this institution is capable of remaking the social order to its requirements over and over again. Of course, this regeneration is never perfect, it is neither complete nor flawless. This is witnessed by the resistances and tensions to the state’s cultural autonomy, from without or within, which states today increasingly need to manage. Nevertheless, although in recent years some marked trends have begun to threaten the state’s monopoly, the state is still more effective than other emerging types of institution at producing symbolically citizens’ social reality throughout their everyday life. Thus even today the state’s resources for social regeneration make it a necessary tool for social survival. 76 REFERENCES Bauman, Z.(1997): “Is There a Postmodern Sociology?”, in S. Seidman (ed.), The Postmodern Turn. New Perspectives on Social Theory, Cambridge University Press, New York, 187204. Berger, P.; Luckmann, T. (1979): La construcción social de la realidad, Amorrortu, Buenos Aires. Billig, M. (1998): “El nacionalismo banal y la reproducción de la identidad nacional”, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 60. vol., 1, 37-57. Bourdieu, P. (1995): Las Reglas del Arte: Génesis y Estructura del Campo Literario, Anagrama, Barcelona. ––––––––––, (1997): “Espíritus de estado. Génesis y estructura del campo burocrático”, in P. Bourdieu (ed.), Razones prácticas. Sobre la teoría de la acción, Anagrama, Barcelona, 91-125. Elias, N. (1993): La sociedad cortesana, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Madrid. ––––––––––, (1994): El Proceso de Civilización. Investigaciones Psicogenéticas y Sociogenéticas, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Madrid. Geertz, C. (1987): La interpretación de las culturas, Gedisa, Barcelona. Giddens, A. (1994): Modernidad e Identidad del Yo: el Yo y la Sociedad en la Época Contemporánea, Península, Barcelona ––––––––––, (2000): Un mundo desbocado, Taurus, Madrid. Gurrutxaga, A. (2004): “El Estado-Nación en tiempos de incertidumbre”, in A. Gurrutxaga (ed.), El presente del Estado-Nación, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Argitalpen Zerbitzua, Bilbo, 17-47. Lamo de Espinosa, E. (2001): “La Sociología del siglo XXI”, REIS, 96, 21-49. Larrinaga, A. (2007): Kulturgileak eta kulturaren esparrua II. Euskal kulturgileak Euskalgintza mugimenduaren eraikuntzan, Utriusque Vasconiae, Donostia. Lopez, J. (ed.) (2010): “Noves Estatalitats i Processos de Sobirania”, IDEES, Revista de Temes Contemporanis, 33 (Oct-Dec 2010), 1-230. Mann, M. (1993): “Los Estados-Nación en Europa y en otros continentes”, Debats, 46, 102-112. ––––––––––, (2003): “¿Ha terminado la globalización con el imparable ascenso del estadonacional?”, in J. C. Monedero (ed.), Cansancio del Leviatán. Problemas políticos en la mundialización,Trotta, Madrid, 231-260. Monedero, J. C. (2003): “Reglobalización o barbarie”, in J. C. Monedero (ed.), Cansancio del Leviatán. Problemas políticos en la mundialización, Trotta, Madrid, 9-38. Ramos Torres, R. (1995): “La Formación Histórica del Estado Nacional”, in J. Benedicto & Mª L. Morán (eds.), Sociedad y Política. Temas de Sociología Política, Alianza, Madrid, 435471. Sassen, S. (2007): Una Sociología de la globalización, Katz Editores. Smith, A. D. (2000): “¿Gastronomía o Geología? El rol del nacionalismo en la reconstrucción de las naciones”, in A. Fernández (ed.), La invención de la nación. Lecturas de la identidad de Herder a Homi Bhabha, Editorial Manantial, Buenos Aires, 185-209. Strange, S. (2001): La retirada del Estado. La difusión del poder en la economía mundial, Icaria, Barcelona. Tilly, C. (1992): Coerción, Capital y los Estados Europeos, 990-1990, Alianza, Madrid. Weber, M. (1975): El político y el científico, Alianza, Madrid. ––––––––––, (1979): Economía y Sociedad, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico. 77 2. State, market and culture: future challenges in a hypothetical Basque state. state. J o s u A m e z a g a A l b i z u , P h . D . ( S o c i o lo g y) . P r o f e s so r , E H U - U P V Culture has played an important part in the building of nation states, among other reasons, because it has contributed to the nation’s homogeneity. But today the ability of states to impose a common national culture has run up against a limitation: as a result of globalization national markets have been weakened, including nationallybased culture markets; and intercultural contact has intensified owing to the increased movement of people and information flow. Add to that the advances in information technology, and we have a formula for growing internal multiculturality in present-day society. What does a state require in order to create a national culture in such conditions? Is it even possible? What is the purpose? Through what kind of cultural policies? This chapter addresses those questions. 78 1. STATE AND CULTURE Where history, economics and political power have permitted the formation of a state solidly established within society, states have endeavoured to make the nation appear to be uniform. Where the most succesful states have arisen, this has been the most common approach to the cultural issue in an attempt to build a political community and attach legitimacy to its power. That is because since their beginnings modern states have needed to create a nation around themselves, understanding ‘nation’ as a political community which shares a common sense of belonging and, in consequence, accepts a power structure that represents it and takes responsibility for it. Given that throughout all of history a common culture has always been one of the chief components underlying ethnic groups which unites their members and supplies them with a group identity, the task of nation-building required a national culture, that is, a uniform culture which would unite the nation. Anything that might jeopardise that unity was seen as a threat. The Committee of Public Safety, set up following the French Revolution, said as much in 1794: Le fédéralisme et la superstition parlent bas-breton; l’émigration et la haine de la République parlent allemand; la contre-révolution parle l’italien, et le fanatisme parle le basque. Cassons ces instruments de dommage et d’erreur… Pour nous, nous devons à nos concitoyens, nous devons à l’affermissement de la République, de faire parler sur tout son territoire la langue dans laquelle est écrite la Déclaration des droits de l’homme.33 (cf. Cantera Ortiz de Urbina, 1992) In the nation-state, cultural exclusion is the foundation of the political community: exclusion not only of ethnic minorities in the territory that is subject to the state, but also foreigners to be kept out of the community of the nation (Robins, 2006). In the first years of the nation states, schools were the most effective means of unifying the culture. In addition, they began to design and implement cultural policies. Probably the first steps of what we think of today as cultural policy were taken in the Italian Renaissance, where the ruling classes, to legitimise their power, established the patronage system whereby art and creativity were supported and given monetary aid. Then there are nonstate policies with cultural implications, such as the Church’s regulations (for example the requirement to establish a surname, thereby eliminating the Basque tradition of taking the name of one’s house) or repressive measures (the Inquisition). But another way of influencing culture spread with the patronage system. After that the modern state implemented a nationalising cultural policy focused on acknowledgment of the nation and school education, as is seen in national museums, national academies and so on. It should also be kept in mind that the modern state grew up in the period of the Illustration, and traces of that movement are visible in the cultural policies of the new states: this is seen in the state’s power to extend its reach to broader sectors of the population through the medium of elites of knowledge and education. Another process leading to a particular kind of state cultural policy was industrialisation, which required a literate population. Thus from the Renaissance to the present day a cultural policy has evolved which some (Zallo, 1995) have defined as cultural democracy, but these policies were always subservient to the aim of constituting a nation and achieving uniformity. Of course, the press and media have also been excellent tools of this homogeneityseeking policy: From the printed media of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries right down to the audiovisual ones of the twentieth, the media helped to create compact spaces where ideologies supporting the government or symbols of national identity were promoted while also creating a common culture. Inasmuch as that space coincided with 33 “Federalism and superstition speak Breton; emigration and hatred of the republic speak German; the counter-revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque. Let us break these harmful instruments of error... As for us, we owe it to our citizens, we owe it to the consolidation of the Republic, to cause the language in which the Declaration of the Rights of Man was written to be spoken throughout its territory.” The document went on to command that schoolteachers be sent out to all the territories where French was not the common language and which were in need of ‘Frenchifying’. 79 not just the nation’s political space but its market as well, the culture industry that has developed over the past century and a half has also been a source of national homogeneity. In our socio-historical context, this type of uniform national culture of a nation-state is the norm. Not only for the states that oppress us, for it has also been in the nationalist discourses developed to demand liberation from them. As Letamendia says (Letamendia, 1997), ethnic groups tend to mirror the oppressor whom they confront, not only demanding their own state but also seeking to build a national community of their own. And to do that they also need their own national culture, distinct from the oppressor’s culture, so they undertake their own exclusion campaign, distinguishing between ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, giving preference to what distinguishes us within the former category, and marginalising whatever makes us like the second. In this way uniformity is again sought: one that sets us apart from the oppressor’s uniformity. Here the point is not, in my opinion, to criticise and reject this mirror-behaviour just because it leads to the exclusion of certain cultures. The issue raised by the French revolutionaries of how to build a new state in the midst of linguistic and cultural diversity is not resolved by a pro-diversity discourse alone. We may argue about whether or not we want a state, but if we do then we shall have to grasp this bull by the horns. And it is not an easy one! And if it was hard before, now it is harder. After all, some things have changed since the Parisians took the Bastille, and those changes affect the power of the state over culture. First, the state has lost some ground to the market, in culture as in other areas. Secondly, there is the set of phenomena referred to as globalisation which, with its movements of capital, people and information, simultaneously promotes uniformity and cultral diversity in contradictory ways. In the third place, cultures have also changed a lot, there is more interchange between them now, and drawing exact lines to separate one culture from another, and hence speaking of cultural systems, is getting very complicated. And lastly, newer technology, and especially the digital age, may bring about changes in culture at least as great as those ushered in by the advances of preceding periods such as writing, printing or television. 1.1. Competition between the state and the market Until it became a big business, the market didn’t have enough power to influence the state’s cultural policy. Culture had been used to make money before, for example with cordel literature or the sale of Basque ‘verse papers’. But the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the growth of a reading audience and a new literature aimed at it. Subsequently the audience grew still more, and so did cultural production, eventually adapted to the new media of the periodical press, radio, cinema, television, etc., and so the culture industry was born. This industry has progressively become more powerful both economically and ideologically, until it was in a position to vie with the state for the control of culture. Today if we take the culture industry in its broadest sense to include the information industry within it, it may be considered the world’s biggest business.34 This culture industry, having entered the logic of capitalism, has been putting more and more pressure on states over recent years until they ran up against certain limits put in place by the latter. What happened with radio and television in Europe in the nineteenseventies and eighties was paradigmatic: having been in public ownership until that time, in name a public service, in intention a means of legitimising the state, they then started to 34 To gain an idea of the amount of surplus value this industry produces, consider the movie Avatar, the biggest selling film ever in its day: having cost $460 million (half in production, the other half in marketing), it brought in nearly $3000 million in 2009, the first year, alone. 80 be deregulated with the entry of private capital. Today, market logic has completely taken over in all the audiovisual media, not only in privately-owned media but even in the public ones, putting an end to whatever still remained of the state’s avowedly enlightened purposes (such as the promotion of educational television). This tendency towards deregulation has not been limited to the audiovisual media, however; it has spread right across the whole culture industry. At the same time, states’ culture policies have changed direction in the last few decades as a consequence of a number of factors (Zallo, op. cit.): for one thing, the emergence of new social movements brought into question the existing cultural framework according to which it was mainly the job of the state to carry high culture to the masses; indeed, those movements threw doubt on the very concept of ‘high culture’ (consider pop art, for example). For another thing, the state now attempts to compete with the industry, turning the country into an audience. And thirdly, with the beginnings of disintegration of the welfare state the very concept of public service is crumbling: in periods of crisis, the budget for culture is one of those that can be cut, and in any case some functions have been transferred to the private sector. As a result of these changes, the logic of economics is penetrating further and further into the cultural sphere, not just in the industry but in cultural policy too. The latest trend is to use culture for the purposes of marketing and boosting the economy, the Guggenheim Museum in the Basque Country (both the one in Bilbao and the project for Urdaibai) being our best example of this. 1.2. Globalisation As economics has gained influence over culture, worries about cultural sovereignty have increased worldwide. When the modern states were created, insofar as they were capable of regulating their national markets, the market was an accomplice in the pursuit of their unification project. Thus the issue of cultural sovereignty was only an issue for communities that lacked a state of their own, such as ethnic minorities and colonised countries, who denounced the cultural oppression to which they were subjected by states refusing to recognise their nationhood or denying them independence. But the decolonisations that took place in the second half of the twentieth century brought a new matter to the world’s attention: political sovereignty is not the same as economic sovereignty; and neither of these is the same as cultural sovereignty. The last point came into full evidence in the debate over the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in the nineteen-seventies. It was argued by the protagonists of that debate (MacBride, 1985) that cultural frameworks and communication media from the richest countries (and the US in particular) which were spreading all over the world were a threat to the cultural and communication needs of poorer countries, which were at risk of being made subordinate to the world powers in cultural as well as economic terms. Critics claimed that such cultural uniformity would threaten the survival of most of the world’s peoples and cultures. The term that best described this threat in the 1970s was cultural imperialism. What this was taken to mean was that culturally dominated societies were being immersed in and drawn over to the world’s dominant ideas and values, and their own cultural roots invalidated (Schiller, 1976). Needless to say, this concept, which was most widespread in Third World countries, was also widely adopted in the Basque Country. Thus to the cultural oppression to which Basques were already being subjected by the Spanish and French nation-states must now be added another, coming mainly from the English-speaking world. But eventually the cultural patterns of a handful of places turned into a threat not only for the poorest countries, as increasingly concern spread to those who had a strong economy and, to the extent that their internal cultural unification had advanced, a wellestablished national character too. That concern was expressed clearly in the 1995 negotiations over one of the chief promoters of globalisation, the World Trade 81 Organisation. A decade after the NWICO debate, in a context where the state, as primary cultural sponsor, had ceded much of its former effectiveness to private business, some states took a stand in favour of cultural exception, the right to exempt culture and communications from measures applied to other commercial products in the worldwide agreement. That right was ratified by UNESCO ten years later (UNESCO, 2005), and several powerful states, most notably France, applied it, wary that the liberalisation of the culture and communications market could jeopardise their national project for cultural unification. This debate concerning the dominance of the media and culture industries of a handful of countries over other countries was, so to speak, ordered, both on the level of a dispute between nationalities and dominant states (cultural oppression), and between ex-colonies and metropolises (cultural imperialism) or between English-speaking countries and others (cultural exception). I say ‘ordered’ because it was clearly the case that cultural power was concentrated in a few places who exerted this power over everywhere else. But as globalisation has proceeded, the debate has become much more complex. John Tomlinson (Tomlinson, 1991) points out that globalisation comes after imperialism, and one of the main features of imperialism is its complexity. Thus, rather than a process in which a few centres of power impose their models on all the others, it is a process involving many variables and contradictory tendencies where even hitherto dominant countries will ultimately be affected: “The effects of globalization are to weaken the cultural coherence of all individual nation-states, including the economically powerful ones - the 'imperialist powers' of a previous era” (p. 175). Today many facts support Tomlinson’s analysis. If the French revolutionaries in the eighteenth century considered the existence of places where French was not spoken an obstacle to national unity, what are we to make of the fact that in the United States today the percentage of the population who do not speak English at home has risen from 11% to 20% during the past twenty years? Or that the tendency to maintain the language of their home has risen among American immigrants (Siegel, Martin & Bruno, 2000)? In Australia too, the proportion of the immigrant population whose home language is not English has risen from 17% to 22% in the past two decades. I do not dispose of comparable statistics for Europe, but partial studies of the vitality of immigrants’ languages (Baker & Eversley, 2000; Extra & Yagmur, 2004) suggest similar trends. In countries that seemingly had achieved national unty based on cultural unification, reactions to the effects of globalisation also reveal a threat to those nations’ cultural coherence: for example, the creation of a Ministery of Immigration and National Identity in France; the requirement in more and more European Union countries (currently all of them except Sweden, Ireland, Cyprus and Spain35) of knowledge of the national language as a prerequisite for obtaining residence, citizenship and other rights; or questioning of whether certain cultural (chiefly Muslim) groups should be allowed to become members of the community (Sartori, 2001), all suggest that such ideas are gaining a foothold. 1.3. Mass media, contact between cultures and digitalisation To analyse what is happening with culture in our times (and no doubt in the near future), it is essential to look at the changes taking place in the field of communications. Granted that the media are not the only repositories and conveyors of culture, and they work in conjunction with other institutions, such as the family, the neighbourhood, the schools and so on. If that were not the case, Basque would surely have disappeared by 35 Let us recall that the Spanish Constitution establishes the requirement for all Spanish citizens to know Castilian. Therefore a legal foundation exists for a hypothetical language knowledge requirement for citizenship, and so for the granting of basic civil and political rights. 82 now because it did not have any access to the media at all until well into the twentieth century. However, the influence of all these components has not been the same in every period, and at the present time the influence of the media in cultural regeneration is at an all-time high, with the others losing out in the bargain. This is so for several reasons, but in brief, mediated comunication has stolen much territory away from face-to-face interactions. In industrial societies people’s lifestyles have become atomized, social networks weakened, and social interaction restricted. Families, which are one of the chief channels for the transmission of culture, have become smaller, urban life is largely anonymous, mobility of populations has increased, living and working conditions have become more and more changeable (at the expense of established structures or customs and traditions), and so on. We live in a society where people spend on average over three hours a day in front of the television or the Internet, and the manner in which we spend this time is becoming more and more solitary. Even in school Internet contents have a growing presence, whether directly or mediated by the school’s educators. All this, together with changes in technology, make the media so much more important for the way culture is evolving. On the one hand, the media and the culture industry generally are becoming transnational. This is an encoachment on the national cultural space, as I have already observed. But in recent decades we are witnessing another phenomenon: migrants who are moving from one country to another as a result of accelerating flows of migration have more and more easy access to the media of their countries of origin, hence to their culture. We can take satellite TV as an example. Over 90% of people in the US who speak a language other than English at home have the opportunity to watch programmes in their own language. The situation in Australia is similar: we lack precise statistics for Europe, but the presence of programmes broadcast to the continent in ‘non-European languages’ suggests the same trend36. Plenty of studies have shown that immigrants and diaspora groups make more than anecdotic use of their original languages in the media, and these are closely linked with the regeneration of their language, culture, religion and identity (see Amezaga, 2007 for references). So as Tomlinson predicted, transnationalisation is no longer limited to the imposition of the cultural patterns of rich countries on the rest; to a large extent, migrants, when they move from poor countries to rich ones, carry their cultural patterns with them; and when they have access to the media, the baggage of culture and identity that they brought with them is re-affirmed. Several concepts have recently been proposed to account for these phenomena: to explain the implications of flows not only of capital and merchandise but of populations beneath globalisation (Appadurai, 1996); transnationalism to define the regeneration of national identity beyond its borders (University of Oxford, 2011); or transculturalism to explain the experience of those who are immersed simultaneously in different cultures and communities: the home country, the host society and international migrant networks (Robins, op. cit.). Such growing fluxes have put the world’s different cultures into contact with each other to a hitherto unprecedented degree. The exchange which formerly took place within the borders of a culture’s territory has now spread to all places and levels. And it is no longer limited to an exchange between two or three cultures, but takes place simultaneously between many cultures. In culture systems’ age-old dialectic between centrifugal forces (dispersal of elements and incorporation of elements from other cultures) and centripetal tendencies (amalgamating elements and agglutinating them around a single main hub or core), the balance is tipping in the first direction. Consequently, it is getting harder to conceive of cultures as closed, discrete systems. If We have already gone as far as to question the concept of 'non-European language'. For example, does this include Arabic, of which there are millions of speakers in Europe (and which historically has been present on the continent for many centuries)? 36 83 it was hard before to answer questions like ‘What is Basque culture?’, the answers are becoming ever more complicated now. Technology, especially digitalisation, is intensifying the effect. For instance, the statistics given in the above example of satellite television are even higher when we look at media on the Web, including internet TV, radio, press, forums and all the rest. Culture is going digital, and for a hint of how enormous the resulting changes will be, suffice it to consider how other great changes throughout the history in the media for transmitting information have affected culture: just look at the consequences of the introduction of writing; then of printing; and finally of television. It is still uncertain what digitalisation will lead to, but it is definitely going to be a massive change. 2. FUTURE CHALLENGES 2.1. Can we influence culture? culture? Let us briefly recapitulate the panorama painted above. First, faced with the upsurge of the private culture industry and the global markets, states’ ability to control the culture of their national spaces is waning. Next, contact between cultures is intensifying, stimulated by the worldwide flow of people and information. Thirdly, the world’s societies are becoming more and more like each other in culture, while simultaneously they each become internally more heterogeneous. And lastly, as a consequence of all the above, it is getting harder for any state to apply an effective cultural policy. This overall picture raises some basic questions: is culture important for the construction of a Basque state? If so, what should be the purpose of acting to influence culture? And how can it be done? To answer the first question, in the Basque Country the theses bandied about outside the cultural community that supports Basque nation-building are well-known: they have been specially developed to refute Basque nationalism and bolster up the Spanish nation, in defence of a project to impede the development by Basques of a culture of their own and instead create a homogeneous Spain just consisting of ‘regions’. These biased interpretations of Habermas’ ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas, 1989) have little or nothing to do with reality at all: what the original proponents of that concept were denying is not the option of a cultural community but the idea of basing a nation on an ethnic nucleus alone (which is perfectly logical, coming as it did from a society still recovering from the excesses of Nazism). History shows that purely political ideologies deriving from a constitution are not enough to consolidate a nation. As Castells points out (Castells, 1997), the most powerful state there has ever been, the USSR, failed to build a Soviet nation around the sole idea of a political ideology and the transformation of society, hence as soon as the state weakened the Soviet Uniion split up into numerous nations based on cultural communities. The same happened in the former state of Yugoslavia, and we are even watching it happen now in Belgium, a state with a far longer historical tradition. So we conclude that some sort of cultural community is necessary for the building of a state. The debate opened in 1789 about how to build a state without cultural unity is still ongoing. In some countries, multiculturalism has been the response to this debate, where by multiculturalism we mean a policy of building a national community while still respecting cultural diversity. The United States and Canada immediately come to mind. In the case of the US, we should bear in mind that a culture was developed in the twentieth century to lend cohesion to a society with multiple origins, the so-called culture of the masses which, by combining elements derived from the many cultures of immigrants, ranging from the hamburger to rock music, gave the people a cultural identity which became an important component of the nation (together with other components, including a historical narrative — the drive to colonise the lands of Native Americans, the War of Independence, the 84 American Dream, and so on and so forth). In the case of Canada, the very concept of the Canadian nation is questioned by the Québécois independence movement. The vicissitudes of Canadian cultural policy also prove that multiculturalism is not incompatible with the imposition of a cultural lowest common denominator: in the end the most important factor is language (Kymlicka, 2003). Culture helps to create a space for the building of a community. However, cuture is not the only way to give identity, although it is admittedly fundamental for communication. Take language: language is a component of culture, and we communicate through language. Unless we share that cultural element, we shall hardly be able to communicate. But the same is true of other components of culture: the more elements we have in common, the better our ability to communicate. This is applicable both to cultural content (language, values, customs etc.) and to cultural institutions (media, the culture industry etc.). And of course communication is essential for a democratic state, i.e. for the creation of a public domain where citizens are able to participate, build a civil society, and so on. On another level, culture is a system that we develop to confront reality with. If we want to develop as a country we need our culture. It is important to realise that the phenomena discussed above — cultural oppression, cultural imperialism and globalisation — do not cancel each other out: each is superimposed on the other. So for example the era of external cultural imperialism did not, in Euskal Herria, lead to the disappearance of the preexisting cultural oppression by Spain and France, which was maintained as always, but now Basque culture had to address a new challenge: the Anglo-Saxon invasion, so to speak. And now the same is happening again with globalisation. The new trends introduced by globalisation, such as the implantation of immigrant cultures in rich countries or the appearance of new agents of communication, have not wiped out the power of the previous dominant cultural agents.37 So like different layers placed one on top of another, a projected Basque state has to confront the culture issue on multiple levels. If it doesn’t, the whole society that needs to support the project, and the individuals who make up that society, will end up in the grips of other cultural powers. 2.2. The purpose of intervention From what we have seen so far, it is difficult to imagine a nation that is culturally uniform. Not only is it difficult, but I would go so far as to say that it is not even desirable because it necessarily entails cultural oppression. In the course of history, peoples have largely been differentiated by their cultures, and the nation-states intensified those differences with the intention of thereby achieving homogeneous communities. But nowadays the dividing lines have become more blurred. However, as I have said, a hypothetical Basque state would be in need of some lowest common denominators if it wished to surround itself with a political community. The language could be one, given its characteristics: it links us with our past, is accessible, is the most important communication system, and so on. That is precisely the approach of European states: knowledge of the language is a requirement for access to certain basic rights. It would be ironical indeed if anyone were to accuse a Basque state of excessive ethnicism or essentialism on account of its imposition of its own language! But there are undoubtedly many things to be discussed here: apart from the language, what other cultural minima must a Basque political community have to secure its survival? A collective memory? Values? Customs? Because a cultural policy will have to establish such objectives. 37 Today half a dozen companies control the entire planet’s communications market and these companies are all concentrated in a very small number of places: the US (Time-Warner, Disney, Viacom, News Corporation), Japan (Sony) and Germany (Bertelsmann) (Thussu, 2006). 85 Another issue that will be much debated in the near future is multiculturalism, in the sense of a policy to address cultural diversity resulting from immigration. Other policies that have been tried out by rich, developed countries, ranging from segregation to cultural assimilation, seem to have failed: regarding the first of these, Angela Merkel’s admission to The Guardian (The Guardian, 2010), recognising the failure of a decades-long policy of exclusion of Turks and Kurds from German nation-building, are telling: ‘We kidded ourselves for a while that they wouldn't stay, that one day they'd go home. That isn't what happened.’ France, on the other hand, the country that has tried hardest to assimilate immigrants culturally, has seen its policy thrown into disarray by events such as the position taken by the National Front, or the unrest involving third-generation Maghrebi immigrants in the autumn of 2005. Thus the only viable policy for addressing this issue today would seem to be multiculturalism. It is also probably the most difficult objective to define and implement. Another objective of any cultural policy is to achieve recognition of the value of its culture. A culture is not just of value to draw a national community together, but is also an essential means of personal development and a group’s basic way of dealing with the world. Just because this chapter has hardly referred to this matter it is not implied that it is not in need of a thorough analysis. On the contrary, it should be considered indirectly implied in the comments found in every section. In order to address issues of gender discrimination, the environment, social justice and so on, the culture must come into the equation at every turn. Therefore, a cultural policy must define very clearly in its objectives what kind of society we wish to have, and its policy developed accordingly. On some subjects, such as patriarchy for example, that will entail intervention on the deepest roots of the culture. 2.3. 2.3. Tools for a culture policy Once the objective of influencing culture is decided upon, the appropriate tools must be chosen. As I have tried to show thoughout this chapter, states today have less ability than in the past to implement an effective cultural policy, just as it is harder for them to influence the economy. Formerly they employed two strategies for this: direct participation (through the organisms under their control) and regulation (in order to control the activity of private enterprises and other kinds of initiatives). Now, however, the first of these has fallen under the laws of the market, and the second has been greatly restricted by globalisation (transnational cultural output is hard for a state to control), technology (it is technically impossible to limit the movement of information to the national arena) or neoliberal ideology. So a cultural policy is difficult to implement these days. But a state cannot afford to ignore culture altogether if it hopes to ensure its survival, particularly if it wants to be a means of achieving a freer society. Culture is too important to be left entirely up to market forces or in the hands of other states. So despite the difficulties, new ways to influece culture must be sought. Throughout history three main actors have made an impact on the evolution of culture: people and society; power and the state (including the Church); and the market. In each period of history one of these three has played a leading role, yet that has not eliminated the effects of the other two, and at the present time there are important forces at work in cultural production at all three levels. Hence a cultural policy must take into account all three to achieve its objectives. First, then, people and society: Euskal Herria has a long tradition and tight social networks in the cultural area, and it should be one of the state’s chief goals to strengthen and develop these. Recovering what is recoverable from the public debate of a few decades ago about popular culture while adapting it to the way things work nowadays, a top objective should be to promote initiatives and trends of grassroots origin, whether they are linked mainly to old 86 traditions or new ways, including uses of new technology. Let us remember that a factor that made the twentieth-century culture industry so powerful was the concentration of media and their unidirectional character (with one sender and many receivers); this is what was known as ‘mass communication’. These days, some specialists (Castells, 2009) speak of mass selfcommunication, to emphasise that receivers are acquiring an increasingly important role while new communication agents are springing up who are modest in size but many in number (the Web 2.0 phenomenon). Even if we avoid the temptation to be dazzled by this new setting and bear in mind that it is still early days to be drawing any solid conclusions, a cultural policy would definitely want to keep a close eye on this trend because it could turn out to provide a useful way to mobilise the population. Culture, then, is going digital, as cultural content is finding itself more and more in a digitalised medium (with all the advantages this implies for its transport and distribution). Therefore, this is a space that should be watched closely, and where popular trends may play a particularly important role. As regards what the state can do directly, one of its greatest powers is the ability to regulate: for despite what neoliberals may think, it is necessary to set up a framework where all actors must play a part. Rules about the language, content, monopolies and the like cannot be left outside of the state’s competence. As we have seen, there are several cases in Europe worthy of study in order to make more progress in this area. But the state’s role cannot be limited to regulating, among other reasons because there are also limits to what can be regulated in the world we now live in. As I have shown, the state’s competence in this respect is rather limited. So other forms of intervention must be developed, one of which will be promotion of Basque cultural activity, whether coming from the grassroots or from business concerns. Digitalisation brings with it the cheapening of distribution channels for many cultural products, making products highly accessible (in the case of audiovisuals, music and literature, for example); so the focus should be on production in order to supply the market with products compatible with the general objectives of a cultural policy. One of the state’s main concerns, where it is able to act directly, is to establish stable places for Basque culture which can serve as sources of information, knowledge and references. In other words, places to gather, cultivate and give access to the tradition of Basque cultural products, i.e. museums, libraries, archives and the like, and give to the Basque people’s historical cultural assets the place of honour they deserve. Usually too little value is attached to Basque culture as the repository of a language that has survived for thousands of years. This viewpoint ought to provide a legitimate counterweight to imported cultural models, particularly those originating from the transnational culture industry or the French and Spanish states. Lastly, arguments were given above in defence of regulating market activity to whatever degree is possible, and that includes the cultural domain. Besides, the culture industry today is one of the biggest areas of the world’s economy and there is no reason for not jumping on the bandwagon: so the economical value of culture is also a point to consider, and this can be seen as economic development. Therefore, investment in culture can be seen in an economic light also. But in this we should not lose our way: the main function of culture is not to make money, but to help build a freer society and a freer country. A Basque state will need to get the balance right here. In order to build a free country made up of free people, we need our own culture, a culture that will stand side-by-side with the rest of the world’s cultures, and one which will make us a people. For that, a cultural policy must be developed which will make a stand against the current trends towards uniformity or negation. But a cultural policy needs to have 87 its own state structure behind it so as not to remain subject to other states or markets. From that perspective, the attempt to build a freer people will need the support of a state. At the same time, that state which Euskal Herria needs in order to advance on other fronts as well will need its own culture, in order to draw the nation to it and articulate a political community. Basque culture needs a state; and the Basque state needs a culture. 88 REFERENCES Amezaga, J. (2007): “Geolinguistic Regions and Diasporas in the Age of Satellite Television, International Communication Gazette”, 69(3), 239-261. Appadurai, A. (1996): Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (1998), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Baker, P. & Eversley, J. (2000): Multilingual capital: The languages of London’s schoolchildren and their relevance to economic, social and educational policies, Battlebridge Publications, London. Cantera Ortiz de Urbina, J. (1992): “‘Lengua e imperio’ en la política de la Revolución Francesa y sus antecedentes en la Península Ibérica en el siglo XVI (en el quinto centenario de la ‘Gramática castellana’ de Nebrija: 1492-1992)”, [downloaded 01-04-2009: <http://revistas.ucm.es/fll/11399368/articulos/THEL9292120029A.PDF>]. Castells, M. (1997). La era de la información. Economía, sociedad y cultura, vol. 2: El poder de la identidad, Alianza, Madrid. ––––––––––, (2009): Communication Power. Oxford University Press, USA. Extra, G. & Yagmur, K. (2004): Urban Multilingualism in Europe. Immigrant minority languages at home and school, Multilingual Matters Limited, Clevedon. Habermas, J. (1989): Identidades nacionales y postnacionales (1988 vol.), Tecnos, Madrid. Kymlicka, W. (2003): La Politica Vernacula: Nacionalismo, Multiculturalismo y Ciudadania, Ediciones Paidos Iberica. Letamendia, F. (1997): Juego de espejos. Conflictos nacionales centro-periferia, Trotta, Madrid. MacBride, S. (1985): Many Voices, One World: Communication and Society, Today and Tomorrow (abridged version), UNESCO. Robins, K. (2006): The Challenge of Transcultural Diversities Cultural Policy And Cultural Diversity (1st ed.), Council of Europe, Strasbourg. Sartori, G. (2001). La sociedad multiétnica : pluralismo, multiculturalismo y extranjeros, Taurus, Madrid. Schiller, H. I. (1976). Communication and Cultural Domination, M.E. Sharpe. Siegel, P., Martin, E. & Bruno, R. (2000): Language Use and Linguistic Isolation: Historical Data and Methodological Issues. Presented at the FCSM Statistical Policy Seminar, US Census Bureau, Bethesda [downloaded from <http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/language/data/census/li-final.pdf>]. The Guardian (2010): “Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has ‘utterly failed’” (2010-10-17), London [downloaded from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angelamerkelgerman-multiculturalism-failed>]. Thussu, D. (2006): International Communication: Continuity and Change (2nd ed.), Bloomsbury, USA. Tomlinson, J. (1991): Cultural imperialism. A critical introduction, The Johns Hopskins University Press, Baltimore. UNESCO (2005). Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Paris [downloaded from <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=31038&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>]. USA Census (2010): 2010 Census [downloaded 03-03-2011: <http://2010.census.gov/2010census/>]. University of Oxford (2011): Transnational Communities Programme [downloaded 14-01-2011: <http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/>]. Zallo, R. (1995): Industrias y políticas culturales en España y País Vasco, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Bilbo. 89 3. Basque cultural forms: strengths and weaknesses in a hypothetical Basque state. state. P a t x i J u a r i s t i L a r r in a g a , P h . D . ( S o c i o lo g y) . P r o f e s s o r, E H U - U P V Basque culture, like all cultures, adopts forms which can be classified into two broad types: those based on verbal communication, such as bertsolaritza, songwriting, drama, literature, television, radio, internet, cinema, the press, books, periodicals or storytelling; and those which use non-verbal media, such as dance, fine arts, architecture, town planning, fashion, design, music etc. This chapter examines five cultural forms based on verbal communication — bertsolaritza, songwriting, drama, books and cinema — in an attempt to identify the strong and weak points of Basque culture, asking what strategies need to be pursued in order to make them more effective. 90 INTRODUCTION Different identities and cultures live in Euskal Herria. By the side of people who live traditionally in Basque are found the Spanish culture and the French, not to mention the identities and customs of recent immigrants (see Baxok et al., 2006). Given the coexistence in such a small area of so many views of the world in close contact or intermingling, there are disagreements about the definition of Basque culture. In some people’s opinion Basque culture is that which is entirely in the Basque language (the linguistic criterion); while others think Basque culture is whatever is produced by people who were born or live in the Basque Country, regardless of the language they may speak (the administrativeresidential criterion). This is no sterile debate. The choice of either of these definitions will have clear consequences when it comes to outlining and implementing cultural policies. To the extent that one leans towards the linguistic criterion, efforts will need to be focused mainly on Basque-language cultural expressions to achieve a strong Basque culture. According to a report suggesting guidelines for the development of strategies in Basque culture-building by Sorguneak Ikertegia (2011:14), “Basque is this country’s native language which has been turned into a minority language, and it is the job of the Basque language community and the public authorities to support the language’s development. That means that this variable must be taken as a basic variable in an understanding of cultural policy too.” According to those who think Euskal Herria’s cultural construction should be based on the administrative and residential status of those who live in the Basque Country, on the other hand, people who live in Euskal Herria make Basque culture, independently of whether they use Basque, Spanish, French or any other language in their cultural production. It follows that all cultural expresions arising on Basque territory, whatever the language used, deserve the same amount of support. For example, the cultural plan “Kulturen Aldeko Herritartasun Kontratua” [The Citizenship for Cultures Contract] published by the Basque Government in 2010 (Kulturen Aldeko Herritartasun Kontratua, 2010) talks about giving equal treatment to Basquelanguage and Spanish-language culture: “This contract for cultures takes full account of the multilingual nature of Basque society, and is equally applicable to activities in either Basque or Spanish.” The choice to define and design strategies for Basque culture in different ways may lead not only to different readings, analyses and forecasts for Basque culture but even result in opposing conclusions in some instances. The position one takes about Basque culture will vary depending on the definition adopted. On account of the minority situation of the Basque language, conclusions founded on the linguistic criterion will generally be more pessimistic than those based on the administrative-residential standpoint. Whatever the arguments for or against, I consider Basque culture to be culture in Basque, and this article is written from a viewpoint that corresponds to that criterion. 1. BASQUE BASQUE CULTURAL FORMS Basque culture, like all cultures, finds expression in forms of two different kinds. One kind is based on verbal communication: here we may include bertsolaritza (improvised verse composition), songs, theatre, literature, television, radio, the Internet, filmmaking, the press, books, periodicals, story-telling and so on. Then there are the cultural forms which employ non-verbal communication, such as dance, the fine arts, architecture, town planning, fashion, design, music etc. 91 In this chapter I will look at five forms of culture based on verbal communication, namely bertsolaritza, song, theatre, books and filmmaking, omitting from consideration the non-verbal forms although these are an important part of Basque culture too. My reason is that it is chiefly the forms based on verbal communication that are critical to the future of the Basque language, hence also to that of Basque culture and the Basque speaker community. I suspect that by examining bertsolaritza, song, theatre, books and filmmaking we can obtain a fair idea of the strong and weak points in Basque culture of relevance to a hypothetical Basque state and the strategies that will be required to make the culture stronger. 1.1. Bertsolaritza Bertsolaritza, a Basque tradition of improvised rhyming verse composition, is an ancient cultural form (Amuriza, 1996; Urkizu, 1996: 13). However, in the last thirty years it has shown a capacity for innovation and modernisation, becoming one of the most successful Basque cultural manifestations (Siadeco, 1995; Aierdi et al., 2007). It has undergone the influence of many factors, of which I would like to single out four for comment: bertso schools, the Bertsozale Association, championship contests and bertso sessions. The first bertso school of the modern period was founded in Almen Ikastola (in Aretxabaleta) in 1974. It was followed by the creation of many other such schools during the eighties. These schools have performed excellent work for over thirty years. They have endowed the so-called ‘National Sport of the Word’ with a fresh image and reared a new brand of bertsolari. Proof of this is the fact that of the 47 competitors in the 1997 national bertsolari competition, no fewer than 26 were people with university educations. These schools have done more than produce bertsolariak; they have generated greater admiration for these artists among the population, and made people more knowledgeable about the principles of their craft. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that never before have there been so many bertso enthusiasts who can actually tell the difference between a good verse and a mediocre one! Bertsozale Elkartea (the verse enthusiasts’ association, http://www.bertsozale.com) has also played a big part in the revival of interest in bertsolaritza. Founded in 1987 as the Bertsolari Association, it has been called the Bertsozale Elkartea since 1995. The Association has stimulated the popularity of bertsolaritza with great success, and has a current membership of 2,400 verse singers, masters of ceremonies and enthusiasts. The Association’s efforts have resulted in better organised competitions and sessions, and support for events and resources, including television programmes (the first of which was broadcast in 1988), teaching materials (also since 1988), the Bertsozale bulletin (founded in 1989), the Xenpelar Documentation Centre (founded 1991) and the Lanku company (as of 1999). In my opinion a third factor that has boosted bertsolaritza is that of the bertsolari competitions. In the view of some, the competitive character of these competitions goes against the traditional spirit of bertsolaritza, and are intimidating for many good bertsolariak who turn their back on the art as a result. While this is perhaps true, in my opinion competitions do strengthen bertsolaritza. They have attracted interest from the media, made it popular and generated many enthusiasts. The finals of the 2009 grand championship drew a crowd of 14,500 spectators; two weeks before the event, tickets to it were already sold out, while the television and radio broadcasts of the contest were followed by many more thousands. 92 Verse festivals are a fourth way in which stronger interest is encouraged. The bertso schools, Bertsozale Elkartea’s activities and the competitions all contributed to creating the right kind of atmosphere for the development of bertsolaritza in the nineteen-eighties, and from the end of the decade on, verse sessions became more and more widespread. By the early nineties bertsolaritza was going through a veritable boom. In 1992 alone 715 verse sessions were held across Euskal Herria, which were enjoyed by between 250,000 and 300,000 spectators, according to data from Siadeco (1995: 23). Since then, the big numbers of the nineties for verse sessions and audiences have fallen off somewhat. However, verse festivals continue to draw large numbers. As a matter of fact, these are good times for bertsolaritza. According to Aierdi, Aldaz Alkorta, Retortillo & Zubiri (2007: 11), of every ten Basque speakers four are bertso fans. About a third of these are highly enthusiastic, representing between ten and fifteen percent of all Basque speakers.38 In 1995, the research company Siadeco described bertsolaritza as a high velocity train whose destination was uncertain (Siadeco, 1995: 27). Today the train may have slowed down a little, but its destination, and how and by what means it will get there, may be said to be somewhat better known. It has proved to be more than a balloon that blows up fast and then fizzles away. Perseverant work has paid off, it is a form of cultural expression with strong roots, and if things don’t go very wrong it it likely to be around for a long time to come. In the nineties some feared that the apparent boom in bertsolaritza might have negative effects for the future of Basque culture because it was taking over spaces and functions that did not belong to it, thereby robbing space from other parts of culture, such as music and theatre (Atxaga, 1992). The popularity of using bertsolaritza in teaching, the media and other cultural events, it was claimed, was having the effect of stifling the development of other cultural forms (Siadeco, 1995: 31). Today it is apparent that its success is the result of work well done, and what is happening in Basque culture is due not so much to the excessive presence of bertsolaritza as to the weaknesses of other cultural domains. 1.2. Basque song Basques have been singing for a long time! At church or in the tavern, on special events and festivals (such as Saint Agatha’s Eve, Christmas Eve or the Carnivals), or just after a meal, Basques love to have a sing; and Basque towns, associations, parishes and neighbourhoods have all had their choirs and singing groups from time immemorial. Euskal Herria has produced many fine voices including Jose Maria Iparragirre and Luis Mariano. Yet in the nineteen-fifties the world of Basque song was an arid wasteland (see Agote, www.badok.info). The Franco dictatorship had stamped out Basque culture and the Basque language, the remnant lacked the strength to create anything, and in any case all attempts at cultural activity were obstructed by the authorities. Singing was not an exception. Nevertheless, throughout the sixties there began to be a gradual crescendo of political and social demands, which included calls in defence of the Basque language and Basque culture. The time had come for a great rebirth of Basque culture; indeed, during that decade many of the foundations of contemporary Basque culture were laid down. In 1957 Txillardegi published his landmark novel Leturiaren egunkari ezkutua (‘Leturia’s secret diary’); in 1958, Euskaltzaindia (aka the Academy of the Basque Language) organised the 38 The Basque Government’s Basque Culture Observatory, in its 2007-2008 survey Kultura Ohiturak, Praktikak, Kontsumoa, gives different statistics, according to which 17.3% of the bilingual population of Euskal Herria have gone to listen to bertsolariak in recent years. According to this study the number of passionate enthusiasts is lower: 8·1% of Basque bilinguals listen to bertsolariak habitually, i.e. have attended bertsolari events in the last three months. According to the survey, 24·4% of those who go to bertsolari events have gone three or four times in the past three months. Even according to the data one in four bertso fans are very enthusiastic about it. 93 Bizkaia Bertsolari Contest; 1960 saw the founding of the Jarrai drama group which ushered in modern Basque theatre; in 1964, Gabriel Aresti published his seminal book of poetry, Harri eta Herri (‘Stone and Country’); in 1965 the Gerediaga Association organised the first annual Basque Book and Record Fair; and in 1968 Nestor Nestor Basterretxea and Fernando Larrukert made their landmark documentary film, Ama Lur ‘Mother Land’. It was also in this period of political, social and cultural unrest, yet enormous creativity, in 1961, that the Basque New Song movement took off. The movement encompassed numerous artists and groups, but one of the most significant turns of events was the creation of a vanguard movement of committed Basque singers, writers and other figures in culture which called itself Ez Dok Amairu (literally ‘There’s No Thirteen’). The members of this group took traditional song as their initial point of departure to explore new avenues. Although the group itself was disbanded in 1972, far from being the end this was only the beginning of the story! Singers and songwriters who had formed part of Ez Dok Amairu, such as Mikel Laboa, Lourdes Iriondo, Xabier Lete and Benito Lertxundi, went on to have spectacular careers as solo artists and laid down much of the groundwork upon which modern Basque music rests today. Ez Dok Amairu and the whole Basque New Song movement succeeded in breathing new life into Basque music and Basque culture in general. As well as embarking on new directions of social, political and cultural protest, the singers and their songs created innovative ways of singing, a new aesthetic style. But this wave came to an end in the early eighties, when newer rock or folk groups such as Errobi, Itoiz, Izukaitz, Haizea and Oskorri came to the fore, eclipsing somewhat the singer-songwriters, and shortly afterwards the appearance of Basque Radical Rock resulted in a complete break (Agote, www.badok.info). The so-called Basque Radical Rock movement made an explosive entry into the Basque music scene in the early eighties and lasted roughly until 1990. Although most of the groups in the movement sang in Spanish, there were some Basque-speaking groups too and the result was a renovation of Basque song. Moreover, although the movement petered out in the early nineties, the new rhythms, music, aesthetics and words of the period exerted a strong influence on many subsequent Basque groups. In the late eighties, as Basque Radical Rock was slacking off, a number of Basque trikitistyle accordeonists using the midi format started trikiti-rock groups which achieved much success right through until 2000, recording many disks and playing live in town squares (Markez, www.badok.info). The trikiti-rock groups brought a breath of fresh air to Basque songwriting, and although these groups started to disappear around 2000, their influence continues to this day. Many successful contemporary Basque groups, such as Gose or Esne Beltza, have drunk from the waters that sprang from the movements of that period. And thanks to the trikiti-rock groups the Basque accordeon has known unprecedented popularity since the nineties. Trikiti schools sprang up all over Euskal Herria, and the Basque Trikitixa Association came into its own.39 Basque music has come a long way in a short time. Between the wilderness of the sixties and the present day is a road marked by thousands of albums, songs, lyrics, sounds and groups. Basque musicians and singers have experimented and innovated over and again, and produced good results. The Basque Song Association (www.kantuzale.net), founded in 1990, has supported numerous song contests and festivals to motivate new singers. Founded in 1990, this association was initially run by volunteers but acquired its first professional administrators in 2001. Today there are over three hundred members (http://www.trikitixa.net). 39 94 However, Basque song now seems to have reached a crisis. No new movement has appeared to reflect the current period, and as a result there is an over-representation of Basque New Song, Radical Basque Rock and trikiti-rock groups in the contemporary Basque music scene. There is a shortage of groups and musicians producing new styles, rhythms, music and lyrics: the most successful groups of late are Berri Txarrak and Ken Zazpi, but a decade has passed since they started playing. Consequently, non-Basque groups have filled the space that was occupied by Basque singers in the eighties and nineties. Because of the dearth of new groups and musicians, we are turning back to the past: given the lack of new groups, the songs and artists from the period between the late sixties and the early eighties are undergoing a revival.40 Why has this happened? What is the reason for the crisis in contemporary Basque music? No doubt there are many reasons, but I would pick out four in particular: The first reason is the meagre support and aid for Basque musicians from official institutions (Mendibil, 2008). A second reason may be that Basques, and Basque youth in particular, are drawn more to foreign groups, backed by powerful publicity campaigns, than to local artists. We seem to be stuck in a vicious circle here: because new Basque music is not being created, young people listen mostly to foreign groups; and that in turn makes it harder to produce new Basque musicians and groups. In the third place, in giant concerts held in the cities of Euskal Herria and small-town festivals and cultural programmes, Basque singers are mostly absent (Mendibil, 2008). Lastly, consumer habits and ways of listening to music have changed over the past decade owing to the Internet and new technological resources. Like musicians all over the world, Basque singers sell less now than they did a few years ago. This and the other reasons mentioned have directly affected the production and sales of Basque music albums. Elkar (a brand of Oihuka and Elkarren) is the record company for modern Basque music that produces the most records per year. In 2000 it carried 43 labels, last year only 21 (Erostarbe, 10-3-2011). The crisis in Basque music necessitates measures to protect it, but what measures? Gontzal Mendibil (Mendibil, 2008) proposes a quota for Basque music in radio, television and cultural programming, as is currently done in some other countries. No doubt this would be of some help, but in my opinion it is more important, in order to stimulate creativity and the emergence of new musicians and groups, to promote education, grants, concerts and awareness of singers. 1.3. Theatre Euskal Herria has a long theatrical tradition too. The masquerades, pastorals and astolasterrak go back a long, long way (Urkizu, 1996: 75). In recent times, the dynamic Basque theatre that emerged in southern Euskal Herria in the period of the Second Republic, from 1931 until the Spanish Civil War, became a valuabe tool for propaganda and winning people over to the Basque nationalist cause (Urkizu, 1996: 75). After the war, the Franco regime outlawed Basque language and culture, and Basque theatre practically disappeared. Nonetheless, the special social and political climate of the 40 Some symptoms of this wave of nostalgia are the CD and concerts of Gu Gira, a recent documentary about Ez Dok Amairu, or the comeback of the rock group Zarama. 95 sixties and early seventies led to a profusion of groups that introduced the trends of modern drama: Jarrai (started in 1960), Goaz (1974), Geroa, etc. Since then, many other Basque-language theatre groups have arisen. Amateur and professional drama groups seem to have become even more numerous in the last fifteen years. Here the influence is seen of drama schools which opened their doors during the past thirty years. There is more Basque-language theatre now than a few years ago. With the support of public subsidies, the recent trend has been to offer the same play in both languages, and this policy has increased the opportunities to watch theatre in Basque. The creation and maintenance since the beginning of the nineties of a theatre network in the Basque Autonomous Community41 has also had a positive impact on the vitality of the Basque drama scene. Compared to the nineteen-sixties the situation of Basque theatre is greatly improved today. Furthermore, there are reasons for thinking it will be in an even better situation in the future, thanks to three projects to strengthen Basque theatre that have arisen in recent years: Eszenika, EHAZE and Mintzola. The Mintzola Foundation (http://www.mintzola.com) was created in 2008 to support research into oral traditions. Its work promises to be a spur to creativity in bertsolaritza, theatre, song and story-telling. Another move that will probably offer a lot of support to Basque theatre was the founding in 2010 of the Basque Theatregoers’ Association (EHAZE, http://www.antzerkizale.com). The association’s purpose is to bring together the dispersed supporters of Basque theatre, both professional and amateur, and to bring the Basque language into it so that a genuine Basque threatre is built. And last but not least, a new higher school of dramatic arts, dance and theatre techniques will open its doors in 2012-2013 in Bilbao, called Eszenika, offering five degrees in drama and dance; this will certainly give Basque drama a further boost. Many members of the staff and administration of the various music schools, who have been working in the field for years now, are somewhat uneasy about Eszenika. They fear that their schools will be plunged into a crisis, not only because they will have fewer students but because the Basque government will reduce the subsidies they receive. This looks like it is going to be a chanllenge for Basque theatre: to strike the right balance between the established schools and Eszenika. The schools need to be protected so that they can perform their work of preparing pupils well for admission to Eszenika. Thus the schools will need to bridge that gap, while still performing their present function for the amateur theatre community. Language is another issue affecting Basque theatre, and Eszenika in particular. Eszenika should not forget the fact that the number of students learning drama in Basque has risen in recent years, and bear in mind that the place allotted to Basque may have an important effect on the future of Basque theatre. Another important matter is the position taken by Basque theatre towards its bilingual audiences. Some people think the policy of supporting through subsidies the offereing of works in both languages has been good for Basque theatre, while others claim it has hurt it. According to the Sorguneak research centre (Sorguneak Ikertegia, 2011), in those fields of Euskadiko Antzoki Sarea is made up of 51 threatre groups from every part of the BAC; its objective is to provide the dramatic arts with the necessary infrastructure. 41 96 culture where both languages are used Spanish has gained dominance both in the area of creativity and in that of distribution. 1.4. Books The book industry is another area of Basque culture which has made enormous strides since the sixties. Between 1965 when the Gerediaga Association inaugurated the annual Durango Book and Record Fair and today, the numbers of Basque books, publishers and writers have mushroomed, and the book business has taken shape and been consolidated.42 In the nineties, between 1,100 and 1,200 new book titles were published each year (Torrealdai, 1997: 90), while in the next decade the yearly average rose to around 1,900 (Torrealdai, 2011: 23). The number of reprinted titles was a bit lower in 2009 than 2008, but if we look at the last ten years as a whole there is a general upwards trend here too, which probably means that the rate of reprints has stabilised: in 2009 reprints made up 29% of book production. One reason why Basque book production has risen is that until recently the Basque Government subsidised Basque-language books by buying a certain number of copies of each new edition. A second reason may be that there are more people able to read and write Basque today than ever before.43 A third reason is that there are more Basque writers today than there have ever been in the past.44 Some of the best, such as Bernardo Atxaga, Ramon Saizarbitoria, Andu Lertxundi and Joseba Sarrionaindia, have even been translated into other languages. Fourthly, since 2004 the Bergara Writers’ School (http://ieskola.asmoz.org/) has been training new writers, with a favourable impact on Basque literature, books and culture. Lastly, Basque writers, publishers and associations to popularise reading have organised themselves over the past few years, and it is fair to say that this has had a hugely favourable effect on the Basque book industry.45 However, the Basque book sector also faces a number of problems. The first of these is that it doesn’t have many readers. Although the number of readers of Basque is admittedly growing46, that number is still too low, in my opinion, for us to be able to claim that we are building up a broad Basque reading public. Thus if we want to sustain the Basque book trade, we are going to have to do something to spur more interest in reading Basque, especially among children.47 42 Nineteen publishing houses took part in the first edition of the Durango Fair, which only included a handful of new items. In the 2010 edition, the 45th, 138 organisations exhibited their wares, occupying 284 sales points, and 505 new items were launched (www.berri.info). According to official Basque government statistics, 27% of the population of the BAC can read Basque well, and another 13% fairly well (Eusko Jaurlaritza, Prospekzio Soziologikoen Kabinetea, 2011: 21). 43 44 The Basque Writers’ Association has over 350 members (www.idazleak.org). EIE (the Basque Writers’ Association, www.idazleak.org) was started in 1982, followed two years later by the creation of the EEE (the Basque Publishers’ Association, http://www.editoreak.com/). Then in 1990 the Galtzagorri Association was founded (http://www.galtzagorri.org) to promote an interest in reading among young people and support and publicise children’s and young adult literature. 45 46 According to a 2003 report titled Hábitos de lectura y compra de libros en Euskadi, 20·4% of the population of the BAC usually read in Spanish but someetimes read Basque; only 0·6% read in Basque only. When the study was repeated in 2005, it was found that 27·3% usually read in Spanish and sometimes in Basque, and 3·1% mostly in Basque (www.euskadi.net). 47 Therefore I think we should value highly initiatives such as the Berria newspaper’s Saturday supplement Mantangorri and the Bularretik mintzora project. 97 Another problem is the small scale of Basque publishers, which impacts unfavourably on production (see Torrealdai, 2011: 25). Yet another issue involves book sales. Books are indeed published but are often very poorly publicised and therefore sell poorly. Most Basque authors are not subjected to good marketing, or else they must take charge of promoting their own works. There is a need for a general plan for Basque book promotions and sales. 1.5. Basque filmmaking Filmmaking is nothing new to the Basques (Gutierrez, 1994: 279-295). But the scholars and experts all agree that its turning point was Nestor Basterretxea and Fernando Larrukert’s Ama Lur (1968), a Basque-language documentary which introduced a new idiom of cinematic narration, and marked a new style. Since that time a good many films have been made in Euskal Herria, but nearly all in Spanish or French. Legislation about Basque filmmaking exists, but the Basque-language film industry is weak in production and even in dubbing capacity. Although audiovisual production and translation companies popped up in connection with Basque television, the latter failed to promote the film industry as it might well have done. The Basque Government’s ministry of culture created a “Cinema in Basque” programme, yet in the towns and cities of Euskal Herria opportunities to watch films in Basque are frankly few and far between; the “Cinema in Basque” programme sees to it that at least one film plays in Basque in each of the chief cities every month.48 Some believe the Basque film industry to be weak because it has no market. Basque speakers are too few in number to create much demand and make the business profitable. What little is produced or dubbed must be done using public subsidies, which is not fruitful in the long run. There are also some who say there is a lack of talent in Basque cinema, which is therefore not competitively viable (Erostarbe, www.berria.info). Admittedly it would not be easy to create a “Basquewood”, yet I do think there are some arguments in favour of starting some kind or other of a film industry here: a modest tradition does exist; there are skilled directors, actors and technicians. Almost all the universities in both the northern and southern Basque Country offer degrees related to the audivisual field. ZIBIES, the Film and Video School in Andoain, has been providing the audiovisual sector with trained professionals since 1986; and in recent years there have been a number of courses and seminars on scriptwriting too. In my opinion, there is a future for Basque filmmaking provided new ways and paradigms are evolved. There is little chance for Basques to compete on the commercial market, but independent films might offer their professionals better opportunities. Basque filmmaking faces many challenges; of that there can be no doubt. Nonetheless, I believe that if things are done in the right way, a market can be found. When the Basque film Kutsidazu bidea, Ixabel was included in the 2006 edition of the San Sebastian International Film Festival, it was seen by about 29,000 people in the first few weeks it ran; and the documentary Nömadak TX was another great success. 48 In a 2007 study of language use in cinemas, the Counsel of Basque Social Organisations (Kontseilua) found that of 29 cinemas in different parts of Euskal Herria the place for Basque was minimal. Most of the items shown in Basque were children’s films, and of the ten most popular films there no Basque was heard in any of them. 98 2. THE STRENGHS AND WEAKNESSES OF BASQUE CULTURE FOR A HYPOTHETICAL BASQUE STATE For the state, culture is an important issue. It gives society an identity, and keeps it together; it also gives it a justification for its own existence expressed through reasons, principles or symbols. In communities that have lost their own culture and assimilated somebody else’s, there are typically problems, and members of such a society develop all sorts of imbalances. But how can a society as diverse and complex as the Basque Country acquire cultural cohesion? In my opinion, for a hypothetical Basque state it is imperative to make sure that an opportunity exists to develop all the senses of identity, cultural expressions and national identifications that coexist in Euskal Herria, but by the same token, its Basqueness must be maintained. That means in particular that Basque cultural forms need to be supported to put an end to the assumption that Basque culture always belongs to a ‘minority’ or subordinate category. The linguistic and cultural communities that speak Spanish, French or some other language will have to acknowledge that their languages and cultures receive support and gain their strength somewhere in the world, whereas the only chance the Basque language has for regeneration is in Euskal Herria. Basque is the language of this country and a hypothetical Basque state must support its development. 2.1. Strengths and weaknesses Basque culture has been successfully modernised, regenerated or adapted to contemporary life starting out from tradition. In the period between the dark age of the postwar years and the present day, many thousands of records, books, verses, associations, theatre groups, institutions, songs, bands, films etc. have been produced. The makers of Basque culture have come up with many excellent proposals, initiatives and undertakings, thereby revitalising Basque culture and paving the way into the twenty-first century. While recognising the significant remaining problems, particularly in the domain of the cinema, creation of cultural forms of expression has continued unabated. This fifty-year process has demonstrated that the Basques may be few in number but they have a great capacity for cultural innovation and creativity. It is also a strong point of Basque culture that important organising efforts by the creators and facilitators of the different verbal culture forms took place in the eighties and nineties, through institutions and associations for the defence of their interests and the interests of Basque culture: the list must include the Bertsozale Elkartea (verse enthusiasts’ association), Euskal Kantazaleen Elkartea (association of enthusiasts of Basque song), Euskal Herriko Trikitixa Elkartea (Basque accordeon association), Euskal Idazleen Elkartea (Basque writers’ association), Euskal Editoreen Elkartea (Basque publishers’ association), Euskal Herriko Antzerkizale Elkartea (drama enthusiasts’ association of the Basque Country), Mintzola (oral traditions association), etc. In spite of their numerous weaknesses and frequent funding crises, these associations have withstood the test of time, influenced public opinion and official institutions, and as a consequence more support, recognition and money for Basqe culture has been rallied than ever before, even though still not as much as it needs. By virtue of the hard work and vigorous efforts of these and other such organisations, Basque culture has made itself seen and heard and improved its prestige, the proportion of the population who support Basque culture has risen, and more people have taken an interest in the products of and happenings in Basque culture. Practically all the cultural organisations that have emerged did so in spite of the political and administrative obstacles put in their way, and looking towards the future that is a positive point because it has given the Basque cultural movement so much more cohesion and strength. Let us note that all the associations we 99 have talked about here have a professional management, they all have their own websites and such, and make use of new technology. Whatever their weaknesses, I think the Basque cultural organisations are well placed to confront the challenges of tomorrow. As a result of this institutionalisation of the cultural forms based on verbal communication and the funds of official subsidies, infrastructures have improved and concerts, verse sessions, drama festivals or cultural programmes can be organised with as much facility as any other kind of cultural event or initiative. Similarly, a minimal educational infrastructure has been created. Over the past thirty years, verse schools, drama schools, writers’ schools and faculties or schools offering audiovisual courses have sprung up around Euskal Herria, together with the production of textbooks and teaching aids. But although these things warrant some amount of optimism, it seems to me that Basque language and culture present a lot of weak points which will need to be addressed by a newly created Basque state. The first weak point is the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of Euskal Herria do not speak Basque. Furthermore, from the perspective of use, the situation of Basque does not look good. According to studies, Basque speakers who use Basque in their everyday activities are in the minority (Juaristi, 2007). Consequently, Basque is not present in most cultural events in the Euskal Herria. Although Basque culture has made much progress, the cultural panorama in the Basque Country is dominated by languages other than Basque. What is more, most Basque speakers do not attend the events, read the books, or go to see the plays or films that are the products of Basque culture. According to Maialen Lujanbio, there are only nine thousand people who are habitual consumers of Basque culture (www.berria.info). In conclusion, the market for the products of Basque culture is too small, and is not profitable for private enterprise. Inevitably books, CDs, plays or films that are created or produced in Basque need public subsidies to be viable. Indeed, many people say that Basque culture is built on a social falsehood. Many more books, CDs, films and plays are produced than are actually sold or consumed, and people buy more than they read, watch or listen to. Another weakness of Basque culture is the fact that the business concerns involved in it are too small and feeble to lead the way in Basque culture policy and ensure it will have a future. Yes, the infrastructures and associations have been created; but many of them are too short of resources to truly serve Basque culture. Nearly all are over-dependent on public subsidies. And normally the subsidies given out by public bodies are either unstable or inadequate. 2.2. Strategies for the future Clearly Basque culture will need to be reinforced in the process of building a hypothetical Basque state. That will require a general plan of culture covering all seven Basque province. Here are some of the things such a project would need to take into consideration. Our experience has been that those cultural forms which have managed to start out from tradition and create something new have met with success. For Basque culture to flourish, Basques need to create something new, but something theirs (cf. Barandiaran, 1999: 239). 100 Basque cultural figures need to receive more support. Basque singers, bertsolariak, dramatists, filmmakers and writers need to see that the public institutions value their work and show it by providing grants, promoting their products, taking their view and needs into account, and backing cultural events. The schools set up by the recently created cultural associations, public institutions and figures in Basque culture need to grow stronger, and new schools opened. A general plan should take into account the need for education to strengthen Basque culture and promote creativity. At all levels and in all areas of culture, further associations need to be started, and the existing ones made stronger. Cultures benefitting from compact social networks have a better education system, infrastructure and organisational capacity. They also make it easier to make themselves heard by the authorities and obtain funding, support and assistance for culture. It is essential to attract people who speak Basque into Basque culture. This can be achieved by creating high-quality products and by drawing people to those products through effective publicity campaigns. This will result in a broadening of the market for cultural products and a strengthening of the vulnerable Basque culture industry. Basque culture needs a network made up of theatres all over Euskal Herria. It needs an infrastructure that will support a permanent programme of Basque-language products in the seven provinces. Indeed, what is the point of having drama schools, bertso schools, writers’ schools and all the rest, if there is nowhere for the artists to present their works? And finally, it needs to be clearly understood that in order to strengthen Basque culture in all domains, the Basque language needs to have much more access to these than it does at present. 101 REFERENCES Agote, G.: “Kantagintza berriaren sorrera”, Euskal Kantagintzaren Webgunea: <http://www. badok.info>. Aierdi, Aldaz, Alkorta, Retortillo & Zubiri (2007): Bertsolaritza. Tradizio modernoa, EHUko Argitalpen Zerbitzua, Zarautz. Amuriza, X. (1996): Bertsolaritzaren historia, Egin, Donostia. Atxaga, M. (1992): “Euskal Kultura 1992”, Jakin, 73. Barandiaran, J. M. (1999): “Breve estudio sobre la Etnia y sus raíces”, Etnografía del Pueblo Vasco, Etor-Ostoa, Lasarte-Oria. Baxok, Etxegoin, Lekunberri, Martinez de Luna, Mendizabal, Ahedo, Itzaina & Jimeno: Euskal nortasuna eta kultura XXI. mendearen hasieran, Eusko Ikaskuntza, Astigarraga. Erostarbe, G. (2011): “Diskogintza (I). Sektorearen Egoera”, Berria newspaper article (10-03-2011). ––––––––––, : “Arkaitz Basterra eta Koldo Almandoz”, Berria newspaper article. Eusko Jaurlaritza, Prospekzio Soziologikoen Kabinetea (2011): Euskal iritzi publikoaren urtekaria 2010, Eusko Jaurlaritza, Vitoria-Gasteiz. Eusko Jaurlaritza, Kultura Saila (2010): Kulturaren euskal planetik kulturen aldeko herritartasun kontratura (www.euskadi.net). ––––––––––, (2010): Kulturen Aldeko Herritartasun Kontratua (www.euskadi.net). ––––––––––, (2003): Hábitos de lectura y compra de libros en Euskadi 2003 (www.euskadi.net). ––––––––––, (2005): Hábitos de lectura y compra de libros en Euskadi 2005 (www. euskadi.net). Eusko Jaurlaritza, Kulturaren Euskal Behatokia (2007-2008): Kultura Ohiturak, Praktikak, Kontsumoa inkesta (www.euskadi.net). Gutierrez, J. M. (1994): “Euskal Zinea. Cine Vasco”, Riev, 2, Eusko Ikaskuntza, Donostia, 277-295. Juaristi, P. (2007): “Euskararen kale erabilera Bizkaian”, Bat Soziolinguistika Aldizkaria, 64, Andoain. Markez, M.: “Trikitixa, baserritik kalera”, Euskal Kantagintzaren Webgunea: <http://www.badok.info>. Mendibil, G. (2008): “Euskal kantagintza”, Berria newspaper article (28-12-2008). Otamendi, K.: “RRVren eztanda”, Euskal Kantagintzaren Webgunea: <http://www.badok.info>. Siadeco (1995): “Bertsozaletasunari buruzko azterketa”, Jakin, 87. Sorguneak Ikertegia (2011): “Euskal kulturgintza: nondik gatoz, non gaude, nora jo beharko genuke. Eztabaidarako proposamen bat”, Jakin, March-June, 183183 -184. Torrealdai, J.M. (1994): “Euskal Liburugintza 1993”, Jakin, 85. ––––––––––, (1997): “Euskal Liburugintza 1996”, Jakin, 103. ––––––––––, (2011): “Euskal Liburugintza 2009”, Jakin, 182. Urkizu, P. (1996): Historia del teatro vasco, Egin, Donostia. WEB SITES MENTIONED: MENTIONED: Bergarako Idazle Eskola (Bergara writers’ school): http://ieskola.asmoz.org/ Berria newspaper: http://www.berria.info/ Bertsozale Elkartea (verse enthusiasts’ association): http://www.bertsozale.com Euskal Editoreen Elkartea (Basque publishers’ association): http://www.editoreak.com/ Euskal Idazleen Elkartea (Basque writers’ association): www.idazleak.org Euskal Kantagintzaren Webgunea (Basque songwriters’ website): http://www.badok.info Euskal Kantuzaleen Elkartea (Basque song enthusiasts’ association): http://www.kantuzale.net/ Eusko Jaurlaritza (government of the Basque Autonomous Community): http://www.euskadi.net Euskal Herriko Antzerkizale Elkartea (EHAZE, Basque theatre enthusiasts’ association): http://www.antzerkizale.com/ Euskal Herriko Trikitixa Elkartea (Basque accordeon association): http://www.trikitixa.net/ Mintzola Fundazioa (Mintzola foundation): http://www.mintzola.com/ Galtzagorri Elkartea (Galtzagorri association): http://www.galtzagorri.org/ 102 4. Basque education rights, rights, and a look at some European school systems. systems. Fito Rodríguez Bornaetxea, Ph.D. (Science of Education). Professor, EHU-UPV It is impossible to achieve the normalization of Basque schools when they are subjected to five sets of regulations on the use of the Basque language in different parts of Euskal Herria. Instead of an education system that differentiates between various language models, what is needed is a school system that recognises the right of all Basque children to be educated in Basque and provides the necessary means to achieve this. As in Finland, Quebec or Belgium, so in Euskal Herria too it should be a given that all future university graduates must know the national language. The road to independence is incomplete without education in Basque. This chapter explores ways to improve this situation by looking at how things are done in Finland, in particular, and in the Netherlands and Estonia. 103 INTRODUCTION Each of the two states responsible at present for Euskal Herria’s education system has endeavoured to implant its own culture at the expense of a hypothetical Basque school curriculum; this has had, and still has, consequences for education policy and legislation which make themselves felt in the biased language-support structure and also when attempting to ensure balanced development of a teaching community. To begin with, the French national school system has never consented to give assistance to school systems outside its own system. And in the kingdom of Spain the only recognised language of education is Castilian. The whole educational structure has been organised in accordance with the two states, ignoring the educational needs of Euskal Herria historically and imposing the states’ education policy. State-building in France and Spain led to the choice of a single language and culture among those found in each state’s territory, and its development. The languages and cultures that were not chosen were thus displaced or even forbidden. Consequently Breton, Alsatian and Occitan were not able to have a state-supported school system, and neither could Catalan, Galician and Basque. These languages were excluded from the official public education system. This is by no means the only example of the use of a school system to force an alien culture on people. In the United Kingdom, for exlample, Gaelic, Scots Gaelic and other Celtic languages were excluded from the public school system; in Belgium, Flemish (Dutch) did not receive proper treatment in public education until Belgium became a federal kingdom (in 1932, in Flanders, there were 108 public schools and 101 private schools, all of which only taught French) (Rodriguez, 2011). The French national education system has never consented to give any assistance to the schools outside its own system. The words of Barère, spoken in 1794, still echo today: “Le fédéralisme et la superstition parlent bas breton, l’émigration et la haine de la République parlent allemand, la contre-revolution parle italien, et le fanatisme parle basque. Cassons ces instruments de dommage et d’erreur.” [Federalism and superstition speak Breton; emigration and hatred of the republic speak German; the counter-revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque. Let us break these harmful instruments of error.] In the whole history of educational legislation (e.g. Mirabeau 1740-1791, Talleyrand 1758-1838, Condorcet 1743-1793) and especially Napoleon Bonaparte’s educational reform (1799-1815), there is never a good word spoken for anything outside of French culture, just negation and exclusion. A decree of the 17th of November, 1794, established that primary schooling anywhere in France must be in French. In a recommendation emitted by the Bayonne city council in April, 1796, and in another from the prefect of Maule in 1802, it is laid down that only French is to be used in schools. The same thing was repeated by the prefect of Donibane Garazi in 1819, and thus Basque was persecuted throughout the northern Basque Country: “J’ai exigé des instituteurs l’abolition entière de l’usage de la langue basque en classe” (Maule school inspector, 1833); “Le Réglement interdit de parler basque” (Donapaleu committee, 1846). In such ways as this Basque was systematically pushed out by French: “Nos écoles au Pays Basque ont particulièrement pour objet de substituer la langue française au basque» (prefect of Bas-Pyrénées, 1846). Not only has France’s national education system never accepted any culture or language but its own in the public school system, it even refused all assistance to initiatives outside the public system up until the publication of the legal agreement of the 11th of December, 1959, when the national system began to hand out subsidies to so-called ‘private schools’ on a one-by-one basis (Rodriguez, 1996). In the kingdom of Spain, too, Castilian was the only acceptable language of instruction: “Mando que la enseñanza de las primeras letras se haga en lengua castellana generalmente y dondequiera que no se practique, cuidando de su cumplimiento las audiencias y justicias respectivas para su exacta observancia y diligencia en extender el idioma general de la nación” (Article VIII of an order given by King Carlos III on the 23rd of 104 June, 1768). [I command that primary education shall be carried out in the Castilian language generally and wherever it is not practised, compliance with which being supervised by the respective courts in order that this be exactly observed, taking care to spread the general language of the nation.] When the Moyano Law was passed, it became absolutely clear that Castilian was to be the only language admitted in education: “The grammar and spelling of the Academia Española shall be the obligatory and exclusive text for these subjects in public education” (Article 85 of the Ley Moyano or Law of Public Instruction, 7th of September, 1857). Some school textbooks in Basque were subsequently published, e.g. in the south, Diálogos basco-castellanos para las escuelas de primeras letras, Iturriaga 1842; Diccionario manual vascongado y castellano, Astigarraga 1825; Método práctico para enseñar el castellano en las escuelas vascongadas, Eguren 1867; and in the north, Uskara eta franzes gramatika uskalerrietako haurrentzat egiña, Archu 1852. But all these books were bilingual; their purpose was to wean pupils away from Basqe, and they were used to teach Spanish or French to monolingual Basque-speaking children (who were the majority) (Rodriguez, 1999). What is more, the entire organisation of education was as determined by the two states: in Spain’s case, this was in accordance with a decree of 1874. The local authorities lost their competence to hire schoolteachers. A statewide teaching profession was established, training and qualifications for which were under state control and have remained so to this day; since 1902 in Spain. Article 26 of the 1988 Declaration of Human Rights states that all people have a right to receive an education without any kind of discrimination. Throughout history, Basques have been denied the possibility of taking responsibility for the fulfilment of this right. 1. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION Article 20 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, the purpose of which is purportedly to ensure educational freedom, nonetheless places strict limits on the possibility of developing Basque education. Article 27, on the other hand, addresses educational rights. According to the latter, the state of Spain reserves the option to guarantee that all Spaniards’s educational rights are respected and speak on powers covering local languages and education. Accordingly, although there are two different politically autonomous regions in southern Euskal Herria which both have powers in education, competence to organise the education system as a whole belongs to the state. In consequence, Euskal Herria is denied the ability to organise its own education. The French Republic, as we have seen, does not share its powers over education with anyone. The only national education and language are French education and the French language. In Spain, on the other hand, control of education is determined in Articles 20, 27 and 149 of the Spanish Constitution together with a set of more specific laws. All this is limited by Article 148 of the Constitution. So let us see what limits this places on education in the southern Basque Country. Although Article 20 of the 1978 constitution claims to ensure freedom of education, it establishes narrow limits. The most basic point is that it forbids any criticism of the Spanish Constitution in non-university education (Antonio Embid Irujo, 1984); that rules out making any claims on behalf of Euskal Herria. 105 Article 27, on the other hand, addresses educational rights. According to this article, the Spanish state reserves the right to guarantee that all Spaniards’s educational rights are respected and to speak on powers concerning local languages and education: “Velar por el cumplimiento de las condiciones básicas que garanticen la igualdad de todos los españoles en el ejercicio de sus derechos y deberes en materia de educación, así como de sus derechos lingüísticos, y en particular el derecho de recibir enseñanza en la lengua oficial del estado” (Royal Decree 480 1981 of the 6th of March on the High Inspectorate of State for non-university education in the Basque Country and Catalonia). [Ensure compliance with the basic conditions guaranteeing the equality of all Spaniards in the exercise of their rights and duties in education, as well as their language rights, particularly the right to receive education in the official state language.] Briefly put, Spain retains as its own the following powers in education: 1. Organisation of the education system: the power to create structures (levels, cycles and the relationships between them), conditions and criteria for teachers, schooling periods, school organisation, average for pupils in formal education… 2. Minimum teaching contents: curriculum objectives and content, criteria for evaluation, general requirements for textbooks... 3. Design of qualifications or equivalences: syllabuses, minimum credits, core subjects, fields of study... 4. Teaching structure: staff positions, resources, etc. 5. Superior inspectorate: ways to check whether the above conditions are being met, investigate whether there is discrimination against Spanish pupils, check whether requirements for obtaining qualifications are being complied with. Apart from this, there are clauses relevant to education in the Gernika Statute (Organic Law 3-1979) and the Law of Improvement of the Regime of Navarre (Organic Law 13-1982); these lay out the basic powers of the governments of the Basque Autonomous Community and the Community of Navarre respectively. In the Gernika Statute there are three such articles: Article 6 (on the official status of the language), Article 10 (on culture in general) and Article 16, which is directly concerned with education. The pertinent parts of the Navarrese law are articles 9, 44 and 47. The determinations on transfers of powers in education contemplated in Article 148 of the Spanish Constitution are fleshed out in these legislative documents. However, those transferred powers are subject to conditions laid down in the constitution’s Article 149, which lists the powers which the state retains for itself, which include control of the civil service (teachers in the Spanish public school system have the status of civil servants), the ability to issue qualifications and responsibility for school inspectors. Civil servants in the public school system, however, have been covered by special state powers since the Bravo Murillo Law of 1852, although the general law in effect in the southern Basque Country governing this dates from 1918 and was amended in 1964 and confirmed again in the 1978 constitution. In northern Euskal Herria, the 1946 Law of Public Service amended after the Second World War remains in force to this day. Accordingly, although there are two different autonomous communities in southern Euskal Herria which both have powers over education, the power to organise the education system in its entirety remains in the hands of the state. Hence the following are not controlled by the Basque Country: 1. Organisation of the education system, including the power to: 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 1.5. Create structures (levels, cycles and the relationships between them). Determine conditions and criteria for teachers. Decide schooling periods. Organise schools. Average for pupils in formal education. 106 2. Minimum teaching contents: 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 3. Design of qualifications and their equivalences. 3.1. 3.2. 4. Determine syllabuses autonomously. Decide core subjects and fields of study. Freedom to organise the teaching structure. 4.1. 4.2. 5. Choose Basque as the only language of education. Set curriculum objectives and content. Determine the criteria for evaluation. To legislate general requirements for textbooks. Employ school staff. Provide for teaching resources. A superior inspectorate to check whether the above conditions are being met, investigate whether there is discrimination against Basque-speaking pupils, check whether requirements for obtaining qualifications are being complied with. This list contains competences attributed to itself by any state in order to ensure that educational rights are provided for, yet despite the transfer of powers over education in the southern Basque Country, these powers are denied to the Basque Country; these rights remain to be conquered. 2. LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE: A PROPOSAL The normalisation of Basque education is impossible as long as Basque is subject to five different sets of administrative regulations in the territory of Euskal Herria. With regard to language use in instruction, we demand a school system which will ensure respect for the right of all children in the country to be educated in Basque. To achieve this, there is a need for a Basque system, that is, the right to give out qualifications and the ability to organise teachers. This leads to the need for a reform of schools and faculties for the training of teachers. The University should ensure, as in Finland, Quebec or Belgium, that all newly qualified teachers know the country’s national language. A Basque education is necessary for the road to independence. To outline that road we shall note in particular the case of the education system adopted by Finland, while also lookinig at what has been done in the Netherlands and Estonia. These countries, starting from an initially bilingual sociolinguistic situation, have successfully extended the proper fulfilment of the right to education, and all have now attained top marks in education quality, with good reasons to foresee excellent perspectives for the future. 2.1. Education in Finland We may conclude from a comparison of PISA statistics between countries that at age fifteen Finns have the highest scores anywhere in reading, mathematics and science. From that point of view, the Finnish school system may be considered a model for imitation. Of course many other aspects should also be evaluated to determine the bill of health of education, not just these skills. In any case, there is much to be learnt from the Finnish example, which has often been noticed by Basques. Many teachers, principals and educators from the Federation of Teaching Cooperatives of Euskadi and HETEL have been there on visits. They have seen the Finnish schools in action, studied them, evaluated them and analysed what can be learnt from them in the Basque Country (Hik Hasi, monograph, 23, 2008). 107 Key features In many countries in the world, giving children a school education or making them literate is an objective that has not been achieved in its totality. In other countries, all children can read and write and go to school; this basic right has been fulfilled. For these countries the big challenge is to improve the education system: its resources and infrastructure, pedagogical issues, the situation of the staff and the pupils, participation and so on. Many measurements are made to quantify the state of health of education systems. One of these is PISA, the Programme for International Student Assessment. This study is performed once every three years. The first took place in 2000, and forty-three countries were took part. The second was carried out in 2003 in forty-one countries and the third in 2006 in fifty-eight countries. PISA evaluates reading, mathematics and science skills. The results to date show that the Finnish school system has achieved the highest ranking. Fifteen-year-old Fininish pupils achieved better scores in 2003 than in 2000 in the mathematics and science sections. In reading Finland remains in first place. Finish pupils have achieved the best results in “the key competences related to knowledge and skills for life”. What is more, when compared to other countries, the system in Finland shows the greatest degree of equity between students. There are fewer differences between girls and boys, or between schools among the regions, in Finland than in other countries. So what is the Finnish system’s secret for achieving such good results? How is it organised, and how do they train their teachers? Here are some of the facts to explain this success: Finland is a country of 5,200,000 inhabitants. There is a high level of social cohesion and homogeneity among the population. It has the highest literacy rate, at 100%. It may be said that there was no literacy at the start of the twentieth century. Education has been fundamental to this country which lived under Swedish and Russian domination for centuries. Education has been the road to the maintenance of a national identity and the achievement of indepedence. Educators’ university training Teachers are able to update their training through in-service courses as regulated by local councils. Courses are provided with assistance from the central government. But less importance is attached to this than to teachers’ initial training. Anyone who wants to be a teacher must go to university. This is considered important. Places at university fall short of demand, and only 10-15% of the applicants get in. Three basic qualifications are offered by the university: – Infant Education diploma: courses last between two and three years. – Primary Teachers: studies last between four and five year. – Teachers of specific subjects or areas: teachers are responsible for one or two subjects at compulsory secondary school level. The university recognises two possible routes: 1. 2. Subject-based: mathematics, chemistry, geography etc. Teaching-focused: special training focusing on preparation for the teaching profession, provided by the Faculty of Education. There are also many Masters degrees for specialisation, including special education, arts, music and domestic economics. All specialisations share 35 credits in core education-related subjects, and it is here that the general principles of educators’ training are defined: – Training based on research projects: there is ongoing cooperation between those who perform research and those who put it into practice from the beginning of the programme. 108 Practicum: a practical component is done at all levels and in all stages. For every module that they complete, trainees perform some kind of activity, such as an observation or an internship, to see the things that they have learnt in theory put into practice. The content and objectives of the practice component are related to the programme syllabus. Trainees begin as observers and by the end they perform a real, professional assistanceship, acting as teachers and taking part in all school activities, including teachers’ meetings. They can keep track of a class of pupils year by year and follow the group’s evolution. Theory and practice are closely linked. Based on their theoretical knowledge, they learn to seek solutions to the challenges that arise each day at work. They do not limit themselves to a single methodology, but develop several methods so that they can choose the most suitable one later when they are working. – – Council involvement Town councils have an important function. The council plans, builds and maintains schools. The council hires school staff (always supervising the principal’s work). It also hires the principal. The council is in the last resort responsible for the good working of the school and is its owner. It establishes the principles governing the school’s autonomy. The school and its staff (especially the principal’s office), for their part, are answerable to the council for the functioning of the school. Teachers have a great deal of autonomy in the school’s functioning and to implement and adapt the national curriculum. Although under the supervision of the principal and the council, they are not limited by them. The different sectors of the school take part in the school’s committees and also in their town’s education commission. Decentralisation One of the features of the Finnish education system is decentralisation. They have carried out a twenty-year decentralisation system for the purpose of improving their system of education. Currently the functions carried out by the authorities are as follows: Ministry of education: – – – – – – Educational legislation and strategy. Development of education plans. Budgets for education. General objectives. Achievement targets. European and international agreements. National Education Commission (a commission made up of education experts which assists the ministry of education): – – – – Design of curricula for each level. Evaluation of skills and study programmes. Education management systems. Services for the ministry, schools, educators etc. Local administration, education commissions and inter-city federations: – – – – – – Local and regional strategy. Local school system. Local curriculum. Hiring of teachers, principals and other services. Organisation of enrolment. What schools delegate to other entities varies from place to place. 109 Entrance exams However, it was the impression of the Basque visitors that choices become much more limited beyond the level of compulsory education. Thirty to thirty-five percent of applicants who wish to study for the equivalent of A-levels are turned down. According to the experts, “each secondary school has its own entrance exams; some take into consideration the applicant’s marks for the last three years, others set different exams depending on the area of specialisation, still others require a minimum mark.” “[In the Basque Country] there are more opportunities for higher studies. Whatever one thinks about whether or not it is a good idea to have so many people with degrees, the fact is that the opportunities are greater here” (see Hik Hasi, monopgraph, 23, 2008). A-level schools are specialised. Vaskivuori School in Vantaa, for example, specialises in music and dance. The core curriculum which is obligatory for all pupils covers 63-68% of the timetable, and the rest is optative. There is a very flexible schedule and individual pupils program their own modules. The A-level programme usually lasts three years but some do it in two years, some in four. Occupational colleges Individuals who have no official qualification but demonstrate that they have mastered a trade can be recognised by the occupational schools and in some cases receive a qualification. This scheme, which started ten years ago in Finland, was recently adopted in the Basque Country. 54% of the population are in in-job training, and this increases the importance of the occupational schools. Prestige and training of teachers Given the tough selection process for admission to teacher training, and on account of their university education, teachers are held in high esteem. Only 15% of student applicants to the Faculty of Education are admitted. “We asked at the university about the reason for the high prestige attaching to the teacher’s profession, and were told that the reason is historical,” wrote HUHEZI instructor Marian Bilbatua (ibid.). “Finland used to belong to Sweden and Russia, and one of the few areas where they could maintain their own culture was in education. This explains the stress placed by Finns on education.” The study programme is centred around thinking. “The ultimate goal of training is to provide teachers with tools for thinking about and improving the situation and what one does about it,” explains Marian. “When students start their degree they think they know everything, because they have been in school for years. Their main work is to review and analyse that experience, evaluating positively the things that were useful. They must each reflect on their own experience in order to bring about improvements.” So the keys to good training are thinking and linking theory to practice. 2.2. Education in Estonia We must go a long way back to find the beginnings of the Estonian education system. The history of formal education in Estonia starts when the first schools were founded in the thirteenth century. At the time, Estonia was controlled by German and Danish feudal lords, and the education system is linked to the vicissitudes of history as Estonia changed hands between Finland, Sweden, Germany and Russia. Getting an education has always been very important to Estonians. The first Estonian university, the University of Tartu, was established in 1632, and by the end of the eighteenth century two out of three Estonians 110 could read, while according to the 1881 census 90% of Estonians were then literate. Now, after independence, the education system has two main goals: one is for all children to go to school; the other is to win over to Estonian all children with another native language. The education system in Estonia was already closely linked to the language before independence: during the period of Soviet occupation (1940-1990) the schools fought hard to be able to teach in Estonian, because Russia had established that Russian was to be the language of education. Today the Russian community are an important minority in Estonia: 26% of the population are Russians, and in the capital, Tallinn, they make up half the population. Since it became independent Estonian is the only official language of this Baltic republic, and it is also the language of school. In compulsory education, from ages seven to fifteen, at least 60% of classes must be taught in Estonian so that pupils will be able to do their A-levels and university degree in Estonian. Russian is the second language at school. Interested in the language recovery work being done by the schools, Hik Hasi visited Tallinn to take a closer look at the Estonians’ education system. Organisation of the education system Compulsory education in Estonia is from seven to fifteen years old, but the Estonian education system encompasses infants’, primary, secondary, occupational, higher and adult education. Most of the schools were started by the state or local governments, although a few in the capital have been founded with private capital. The ministry of education establishes the general guidelines, which are to create suitable conditions to favour the development of identity, family and the Estonian nation; to favour the development of Estonia’s culture, politics, economy and ethnic minorities; to teach good citizenship; and lastly, to provide the conditions for the creation of a national, lifelong tradition of learning. Each town council has an education commission and authority to develop its own education policy. From the age of eighteen months on, children may start school, so infants’ schools are for children aged from a year and a half to seven years old. Today children go to nursery school until they are three years old. But until recently, children stayed at home with their mother, who retained her job and was paid a full salary. As a result of the financial crisis the terms of maternity pay and leave have worsened, and although a mother’s job is kept for her for three years, the state ministry has cut their pay back almost by half. The effects of the crisis are revealed in the figures: in 2003 there were 15,698 children attending school in Tallinn; last year there were 21,512. Thus there has been a rise of almost 40% in seven years. In the case of infants’ schools, the city council pays the school a quantity for each child enrolled, regardless of whether the school is public or private. At present, for example, infants’ schools in Tallinn receive 1,279 euros from the council for each pupil. Parents pay 22 euros a month for each pupil. They are charged €1.60 for each day the pupil eats at school, covering three hot meals. Staff and maintenance costs are paid out of the money provided by the council and parents’ monthly fees. From eighteen months to three years old, classes of fourteen children are looked after by two educators, although two to four more children may be brought into a class according to needs. Average attendence is 50%, so about half of the fourteen are in class on a normal day. From age three to seven, there are 24 children and two educators per classroom. Although each infants’ school may differ, Estonian infants’ schools generally, and particularly the ones visited by Hik Hasi, share some common characteristics. From the youngest age, the education system is based on respect for each child’s personality, with learning based on play and democratic coexistence among the children. In addition to teachers the schools also provide psychomotor, music and speech pathology specialists, and it is understood that the children’s education is the responsibility of all of these educators, together with their families of course. Consequently, infants’ schools nurture a close relationship between the school and the family. To facilitate this, the schools remain open from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m., although formal school hours are from 9 a.m. until 5 p.m. There are some schools (in Tallinn there are three) offering a night-care service for parents who because of their work or other necessities cannot have their children at home overnight. 111 There are school for children with special needs all over the state, but if parents prefer they can put their children into regular schools. In Tallinn for example, there are two specialneeds schools, but there are thirteen other schools in the city which allow such children to be enrolled provided a ratio is maintained of one special-needs child for every three with normal needs. Each school is free to choose its own pedagogical approach, but certain currents are popular in Estonian schools: these include the Maria Montessori and Loris Malaguzzi (Regio Emilia) methods and the approach of an Estonian called Johannes Käis (1900). This is based on two basic principles: developing a close connection with nature, and using play as a basis for learning. Play has a special place in infants’ school, being considered a fundamental resource for the education of small children. Children play outside for an hour and half every day, and in spring and autumn when daylight hours are longer there are two such hour-and-a-half outside play sessions per day. Schools are not just the place where content is transmitted: children get three meals a day at school, at 9 o’clock, noon and 3:30, and after lunch all children up to age seven have a nap for an hour and a half or two hours. The school is closely involved with health care, and in addition to playing, sleeping and eating, is also concerned with their physical exercise: during the extremely cold Estonian winter saunas are used with all pupils to make them sweat: children from 18 months to three years old spend ten minutes in a 60ºC sauna, while children between three and seven spend twenty minutes at 65ºC. There is a first-aid kit in every classroom and a nurse for each school. In addition to playtime, the current lesson plan is based on four components: play, creativity, nature and culture. The schools are important tools for transmitting Estonian culture, both by revitalising and teaching the language and transmitting the culture itself, especially oral culture. To be a teacher for children from eighteen months to fifteen years, teachers in training must follow a degreelevel course of studies which takes four years at a university. Over the four years they will have to spend eleven weeks altogether as student teachers. Candidates for the job of school principal must have a Masters degree as well as a four-year first degree. Then the principal of the school undergoes an evaluation every two years and in the event of failing twice in a row must step down and be replaced by someone else. All teachers must take part in in-job training courses every five years. Furthermore, all teachers undergo an annual internal evaluation following criteria established in 2006 by the ministry of education, and an external evaluation every three years. In addition to evaluation of the director and teachers or staff, there is joint cooperation, with yearly evaluations of the administration’s work (especially the budgets) and pedagogical projects. Apart from evaluations, teachers and schools participate in numerous competitions, particularly contests organised by the local council to motivate, make known and stimulate school employees. When The hiring process for jobs begins with the choice of principal. Teachers who have, in addition to their degree in Pedagogy, completed a Masters degree that enables them to be a principal receive an announcement of the availability of a principal’s position. The principal, once chosen, is given a permanent contract, then the principal chooses the necessary teachers and other members of staff with the assistance of a representative of the council, an education specialist, a teachers’ representative and a parents’ representative. These representatives all belong to the council’s education commission. Once the teachers are selected they are also given permanent contracts. The same system is followed in public and private schools. In the case of new schools, the local council may make the initial appointments. The basic salary for teachers is 750 euros. This is a hundred euros lower than the average Estonian salary. However, after working for five years they receive a pay rise. The minimum monthly wage in Estonia is 300 euros. Parents who decide not to send their children to an infants’ school at age 18 months are advised to get a carer with a childcaring qualification. These childcarers have done a 160-hour course including subjects on education, psychology, social work, health and safety. Compulsory education Since 2006 there are 601 schools in Estonia, including 85 infants’ schools, 264 primary schools, 236 secondary schools and sixteen adults’ secondary schools. This is not counting 112 special education schools and occupational colleges. Although most children start school at 18 months, compulsory education starts at age seven in Estonia, and remains compulsory until fifteen. Basic education consists of nine grades and is paid for by the state and the town council. After the nine grades of basic education, pupils go on to compulsory secondary education; a further three years are required for A-level classes. 72% of pupils who finish their compulsory education opt to continue on to do A-levels, and of these 70% get into university, while 28% opt to go to occupational colleges. The remaining 28% of those who have completed their compulsory education do vocational training, for which there are 48 schools around the country. Occupational education in particular has become stronger in the last eight years, with the creation of networks incorporating both public and private schools which coordinate their course offerings. There are another eighty trade schools in Tallinn targeting pupils who had difficulty completing compulsory education. Although the ministry of education establishes guidelines and minimum requirements for compulsory education as it does for infants, each school decides what subjects outside the obligatory curriculum it wishes to teach, as well as which parts of the obligatory curriculum it wishes to reinforce. Pupils must pass three state exams in order to obtain a diploma of compulsory secondary education (Hik Hasi journal, 160, 2011.) 2.3. Education in the Netherlands Country introduction The area of the Netherlands is 41,500 km2, twice that of Euskal Herria. But its population of sixteen million is five times the size. That makes it a country with a high population density. The state’s capital is Amsterdam, but the government and ministries are located in The Hague. There are over three million immigrants in the Netherlands, making up almost 20% of the population. Half of them are first-generation immigrants, the rest were born in the country and are second-generation immigrants. Most immigrants are Turkish (22%), Surinamese (21%), Moroccan (20%), Dutch Antilleans (8%), and many others come from the country’s former colonies. In speaking of pupils’ place of birth the Dutch make a distinction between autochtonen (of Dutch origin) and allochtonen (of non-Dutch origin). Characteristics of the education system The ministry of education establishes the general lines of the system, providing legislation, funding and monitoring. In other words, the government decides what must be achieved and is responsible for the resources needed to achieve it. 1. Legislation: – – – Establishes the conditions which must be met to set up schools. Sets requirements for becoming a teacher. Specifies a basic curriculum, with 58 general objectives, that pupils must complete by the age of twelve. 2. Funding: In principle, compulsory education (ages four to eighteen) is free for everyone. – – – Sets the amount of money to be assigned per pupil. At the present time, rounding off, the amounts are €4000 for each pupil in infants’ or primary school, €6000 for those in secondary school, and triple these amounts for each pupil with special needs. All teachers receive equal treatment. The same basic pay applies to all, with bonuses for seniority and for teachers aged over 45. Each school spends roughly between 80% and 85% of the money received per pupil from the administration on teachers’ salaries, and the rest on its other expenses. 113 3. Monitoring: – – – – – – All pupils take a state exam at age twelve called CITO. An external, independent examining body carries this out. Results are made public and placed on the Internet where everyone has access to them. For the evaluation of each pupil, in addition to CITO, the school’s own evaluation of each of its pupils is taken into account and the average of the two taken. These results make a big difference to pupils’ future study options: there are three channels in secondary education. Schools with poor results are placed under direct supervision from inspectors, and they are provided with special resources. But if there is no improvement more drastic measures are taken, which may go as far as the school’s closure. The main task of the inspectorate is to monitor schools and promote improvement. PISA and other international evaluations are also used. CITO and PISA results have been found to correlate quite closely. The schools The most striking features of the system are its autonomy and flexibility. Each school hires whatever staff it needs, determines its own education project, specifies its curriculum, develops its own methodology and procures its resources. Legislation establishes the ‘what’, while the school is in charge of the ‘how’ and its implementation. Each school tries its best to respond as adequately as possible to its needs and priorities and those of the neighbourhood, town and circumstances. Citizens’ rights Parents decide which school to send their children to. At the present time, 33% of schools are public, most of which are run by town councils. Often the council is a shareholder but delegates the school’s management to a foundation. 66% are ‘special’ schools or social enterprises; the initiative to open these schools may originate from groups of citizens, congregations or foundations of various kinds. Under 1% are private or special cases. Three routes for secondary education At the end of eight years of primary education, pupils take the CITO exam. The school counsels each pupil on which option to choose for their secondary education. The final decision is taken by the parents: 1. Vocational training (4 years). 2. General secondary (5 years). 3. Pre-university (6 years). 3. SUMMING UP Although this article is based on my own research, especially “Schools and linguistic normalization: some comparative examples” (Digit-hum/UOC.2002), I would not have been able to do this without taking into account both the work done over the years by the journal Hik Hasi and the evaluation data from PISA, obviously. What is PISA? It is an international research programme. Analysing what? Pupils’ ability to apply what they have learnt in real life. What is the purpose? What is tested? Reading, the natural sciences and mathematics (2009 language). 114 Who performs the research? It is organised by OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Here is where it is done: OECD COUNTRIES NONNON -OECD COUNTRIES AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES OTHERS Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK USA Albania Argentina Azerbaijan Brazil Bulgaria China (Taipei) Colombia Croatia Dubai Estonia Hong Kong - China Indonesia Israel Jordan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Macau – China Montenegro Panama Peru Qatar Romania Russian Federation Serbia Shanghai - China Singapore Thailand Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Uruguay Andalucia Aragon Asturias Balearic Islands Canary Islands Cantabria Castile and Leon Catalonia Ceuta and Melilla Euskadi Galicia Rioja Madrid Murcia Navarre Campania Emilia-Romagna Flanders Liguria Lombardy Piedmont Sardinia Scotland Sicily Trento Veneto etc. The following results for language knowledge and reading were achieved in the countries covered by PISA: PISA 2009. AVERAGE AVERAGE READING SCORES BY COUNTRY Country Finland Canada Japan Netherlands Belgium Norway Estonia Switzerland Poland USA Sweden Germany Ireland France Denmark Euskadi UK Hungary OECD Portugal Italy Latvia Spain Czech Republic Slovak Republic Luxembourg Lithuania Turkey Chile Bulgaria Average score 536 524 520 508 506 503 501 501 500 500 497 497 496 496 495 494 494 494 493 489 486 484 481 478 477 472 468 464 449 429 So in this article we have looked at Finland, which has stayed at the top of the list year after year; Netherlands, which resembles Euskal Herria and is likewise near the top of the 115 PISA ranking; and another country which is comparable to the Basque Country and has recently achieved independence, Estonia; all of these are European states and education systems which historically have been through period of language contact, and which from a compensatory point of view are model examples of achieving an equilibrium in culturally asymmetrical societies. An educational structure is needed in the process of forming a Basque state. To help move in that direction, let us look at the Finnish system again and note the following points in particular: people who want to become a teacher must go to university; there are also masters degrees in many specialisations, e.g. special education, art, music and domestic economy; the local councils play a large role. The council plans, builds and maintains schools (a power which was lost in the Spanish state at the beginning of the twentieth century) and hires their staff. One of the characteristics of the Finnish education system is its de-centralisation, and another is the prestige attached to the teaching profession. The cornerstone of their training is thinking and a close link between theory and practice. In the Netherlands, in addition to passing laws, the state funds and monitors schools. Thus the main task of the inspectors is to monitor the schools and encourage improvement. In Estonia, after independence, the education system has two main objectives: one is to give all children a school education, the other, to bring children whose mother tongue is not Estonian into the Estonian linguistic fold. Finally, it should be borne in mind that in these education systems adult education, institutions of higher education, health and education or the role of the teacher and literacy programmes have been incorporated as core elements of the national system. Thus, with a bilingual situation as the point of departure in all these countries, they have succeeded in extending the right to an education to the entire population adequately, and today obtain some of the highest scores using quality indicators even though not part of the PISA evaluation scheme. 3.1. Strengths Strengths and weaknesses Basque education has a tradition of attaching special importance to the education community. The ikastolak, for example, have not only been concerned for the language but have practiced and preached local council participation and civil disobedience in the face of the obligatory imposition of the Spanish and French states’ education systems. As we have seen, the Finnish system is based on close links with the town councils and decentralisation (Rodriguez, 1996). But teacher prestige has been another cornerstone: social attitudes towards Basque teachers in Euskal Herria have been positive, but subordination to the legally determined Spanish curriculum limits their training, turning it into a weakness (Rodriguez, 2011). It is also necessary to build bridges between non-university and university teaching. This is what has been done in the examples cited, and is what was foreseen in the Lizarra Statute of Autonomy of 1931, although present legislation blocks this option, creating another weakness (Rodriguez, 1999). Reading is one component of the curriculum that is a basic criterion used by PISA to evaluate educational success; but insufficient research has been done in the Basque Country to identify the potential Basque reading audience, nor have proposals been developed to design a reading plan. This is another weakness. 116 Special education, arts, music and domestic education have been cultivated in Euskal Herria, unlike the surrounding states, and that gives us a point in our favour. Basque teachers have a long tradition of ccultivating the link between pedagogical ideas and practice and teachers’ in-job training (cf. the journals Isilik and Hik hasi, the teachers’ association, ADARRA, the Basque Summer University and so on), and this theoretical practice performed non-institutionally, which has made of re-training a permanent habitus, is another of the sector’s strong points. But opportunities in the Basque Country to pass laws on education have been extremely limited. That is a weakness. The ability to provide schools with money and monitoring, which is the main function of the inspectorate, is ruled out in Euskal Herria because the states reserve this function to themselves. That is another weakness. So there is very little activity to monitor schools and bring about improvements. Another weakness. 3.2. The contributions of a hypothetical state In Estonia after independence, the Estonian education system has had two main objectives: to give all children a school education, and to win children whose mother tongue is not Estonian over to Estonian. In the Basque Country the first of these objectives has been attained but the second has not, and can only be achieved through a new educational legislative arrangement which an independent state would make possible. To make this clearer and summarise the things that have been explained throughout this article: To be able to organise the entire organisation of the education system according to the political decisions of the new state, that is: the power to structure the education system by grades, cycles and so on, and the links between them; to decide on terms and criteria for teachers; to set periods of schooling; to manage the organisation of schools with freedom according to needs; to average for pupils in formal education. Also: to decide minimum teaching contents; to choose Basque as the only language of education; to set curriculum objectives and content; to determine the criteria for evaluation; to legislate general requirements for textbooks. Consequently, to design necessary qualifications and their equivalences; to determine complete syllabuses autonomously; to decide core subjects and fields of study. And all that, of course, in order to have freedom to organise the teaching structure; to hire school staff and ensure the provision of educational resources. To achieve this, it would be possible to create a full inspectorate to check whether the above conditions are being met, investigate whether there is discrimination against Basque-speaking pupils, and check whether requirements for obtaining qualifications are being complied with. What is described here are the powers of any state to ensure that educational rights are guaranteed, and of course a hypothetical independent state would need to structrue the field of education according to its needsd and requirements, which is obviously impossible at present. 117 In any event, there is one area, besides the power of an independent state to pass laws and regulations in any area, that can be given special attention in the field of language and education, and that is the link between local council policy and education. We have seen that both with regard to the protection that must be given to the national language and the guaranteeing of local school organisation, the top-ranking countries according to PISA, such as Finland, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia or Switzerland, have opted for a non-centralised school system. To achieve that, at least where the language is concerned, territorial language rights are generally preferred over personal ones (Txillardegi, 1999) and language use in education has been configured according to regional population surveys. In the Basque Country, an educational structure organised according to linguistic registry data has been proposed by Udalbiltza and UEMA, who have now shown how to reorganise councils as described above (Rodriguez, 1993). This offers possibilities for supporting Basque education and culture and developing them as a mainstream national culture, not just as a minority language (Rodriguez, 1993). Thus, rather than the present unending uphill struggle, although there remains much to be done in order to achieve a new organisation of education in the Basque Country, some things have already been done and a hypothetical Basque state has quite a few places to learn from, both inside and outside Euskal Herria. 118 REFERENCES BAT soziolinguistika aldizkaria, 30, 1999. Hik hasi, monography, 23, 2008. PISA txostenaren ebaluazio diagnostikoa 2011. Emaitzen txostena eta aldagaien azterketa (ISEIIVEI), February 2011. Rodriguez, F. (1993): “Hizkuntzen erabilera Europar Batasunari begira”, Agalia journal, 38, Associaçom Galega da Língua, Coruña, 136-148. Rodriguez, F. (1993): “Euskararen herritik erdal mundura”, Tanttak journal, 9, UPV/EHU, Bilbo, 61-73. ––––––––––, (1996): Ikastolak eta Euskal Eskolak, Orain, Donostia. ––––––––––, (1999): Construir o destruir naciones, Besatari, Bilbo. ––––––––––, (2002): “Schools and linguistic normalization: some comparative examples”, Digithum/UOC. ––––––––––, (2011): Nacionalismo y educación, Delta, Madrid. ––––––––––, (2009): “Mita kuuluu?”, Hegats, 42, Euskal Idazleen Elkartea, 11-25. Txillardegi (1990) :”Soziolinguistika egunak”, Hizkuntza/Hezkuntza, UPV/EHU, Bilbo, 55-62. 119 5. The situation and outlook for the Basque language at the beginning of the twentytwenty-first century: the challenges that lie ahead. ahead . Iñaki Martínez de Luna Pérez de Arriba, Ph.D. (Sociology). Professor, EHU-UPV What is the situation of the Basque language? How has the language fared in recent years, and where do things stand today? What challenges will Basque face in the future? Attempting to answer these questions, this chapter touches on issues such as the language’s legal status and language policy in each part of Euskal Herria; language transmission and language work; linguistic competence, language use, attitudes, opinions and representations. The chapter ends with some thoughts about the main challenges Basque will now have to face in order to stake out a satisfactory future for the language, including issues like the symbolic violence to which Basque speakers are still subjected today, the sociolinguistic ignorance that runs rife in this society, and the battle to win over public opinion. 120 1. WHERE BASQUE STANDS TODAY 1.1. Legal situation and administrative treatment Euskal Herria, the etymological meaning of which is ‘the people of the Basque language’, is divided in terms of the law and current political structures into four areas within which Basque is subject to six different legal statuses: five in southern Euskal Herria (the so-called ‘Spanish Basque Country’) and one in the north (within the French state). In the south, one status applies in the Basque Autonomous Community (henceforth, BAC); another three within the Autonomous Community of Navarre (Nafarroa in Basque), which recognises ‘Basque-speaking’, ‘mixed’ and ‘non-Basque-speaking’ zones; besides which there is Trebiñu County, an enclave located in the heart of the province of Araba (part of the BAC) administered by the Autonomous Community of Castile and Leon, and another enclave located in the province of Bizkaia but belonging to the Autonomous Community of Cantabria, called Valle de Villaverde (aka Villaverde Turtzioz).49 In northern Euskal Herria the legal position of Basque is determined by the laws of the French Republic, so there the status of the language is different again. The Spanish constitution of 1978 dictates the legal and political conditions of Basque in the various areas of Euskal Herria under Spanish jurisdiction. Article 3.1 of the constitution states that Castilian is the official language of the state, while Article 3.2 adds that other languages may also have official status in their respective autonomous communities in accordance with each community’s statute of autonomy. The constitution says nothing about any obligation to know these other languages, whereas it does impose on Spanish citizens the obligation to know Castilian. From this it follows that although the other languages appear to have the same status as Castilian, in reality there is an essential asymmetry between Castilian and all the other languages (Bilbao & Casares, 2010: 29-30). Within the bounds of the Spanish constitution, the statutes of autonomy of the BAC (adopted in 1979) and Navarre (1981) recognise some degree of official status for Basque in the respective territories. In contrast, the statute of Castile and Leon and that of Cantabria do not recognise the Basque language in their respective municipalities of Trebiñu Country and Valle de Villaverde. No legal status at all is acknowledged for the Basque language in the northern Basque Country, which is situated within the French Republic, and no special linguistic area is recognised for it either. However, some changes occurred in the late twentieth century, as a certain amount of language loyalty is being displayed: society is recognising in Basque a sign of its own identity, and as such starting to be concerned for its survival. Thus the social movement in support of Basque found in the BAC and Navarre is gradually spreading to the northern part of the country (Barandiaran, 2009: 250). 1.2. Legal status and language policy policy A fundamental document to take into consideration here is the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1992, which is a cornerstone of European legislation on the subject. The charter proposes that measures should be taken to promote the use of regional or minority languages in a variety of domains of public life including education, the court system, the administrative authorities and public services, the media, cultural events and services, economic and social domains, and cross-border exchanges. The signatory states periodically submit a report to the general secretary of the Council of Europe reviewing the extent to which they have complied with the measures required by the charter, and other legal institutions or 49 Villaverde Turtzioz is the Basque name and corresponds to Villaverde de Trucíos in Castilian, which was the official name of this municipal entity until the council decided to change its name to Valle de Villaverde on the 28th of January, 2008 in order to avoid confusion with the Bizkaian munipality of Turtzioz (in Spanish, Trucíos). 121 organisations are allowed to present their own reports. Having evaluated these, observations and recommendations are sent from the Council of Europe to the participating states. Spain signed this charter in 1992 and ratified it in 2001, since which time it is legally in force in Spanish territory (BOE 15-9-2001). However, progress is slow, as witnessed by the fact that the recommendations received by Spain in the third report concerning the application of the charter’s principles largely coincide with those thathad already made in the first and second reports (Hizkuntz Eskubideen Behatokia, 2011: 150). Although France signed the charter in 1999 it has not ratified it, so it is not implemented on French territory, which includes the northern Basque Country (Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetza, 2011a). In the BAC, the Organic Law of the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, dated the 18th of December, 1979, names both Basque and Castilian as official languages throughout the autonomous community’s territory and recognises the right of all inhabitants to know both languages and use them in speech and writing. This principle stated in the Statute of Autonomy for the BAC was fleshed out by the new Basque Parliament in Basic Law 10/1982, passed on the 24th of November, 1982, which regulates the use of the Basque language. This law establishes that measures will be taken to favour the development and normalisation of Basque in a number of areas including public administration, education, Basque language and literacy courses for adults, and the media. The law specifies that local sociolinguistic conditions are to be taken into account in its application in each place (Barandiaran, 2009: 251) This basic law was followed by others that developed it further: Law 6/1989 of the 6th of July regarding the Basque civil service, and Law 6/2003 of the 22nd of December, which covers consumers’ and users’ rights. Besides these, there are also other decrees and orders establishing certain measures and criteria concerning the knowledge and use of Basque in education, the media, health services, public transport and road safety, the Basque police force, welfare services etc. However, ensuring that the rights recognised in these laws and regulations are actually honoured is another matter, and herein lies the difficulty, according to Bilbao & Casares (2010: 50-51). The Department of Language Policy, within the Basque Government’s ministry of culture, is responsible for the BAC’s oficial language policy. It is also responsible for making sure that BAC public bodies, such as provincial governments, town councils, the University of the Basque Country, etc. fulfil their linguistic obligations. In 1998, a General Basque Language Revitalisation Plan was adopted with three strategic goals: a) Basque language transmission; b) use of Basque in society; c) Basque language quality control (Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetza, 1999); and the same principles were ratified in 2005. A few years later, in 2011, the plan’s General Framework aims to support Basque through motivation, language knowledge and language use in the following domains: 1) the family; 2) citizenship; 3) education; 4) the administration; 5) the workplace; 6) leisure activities; 7) sports; 8) culture; 9) the media; 10) new technology (Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetza, 2011b). Coming now to Navarre, there are two chief legal documents underpinning the treatment of the Basque language. The first of these is Organic Law 13/1982 of the 10th of August for the re-establishment and improvement of the Navarrese regulatory regime, and the second is Navarrese Law 18/1986 of the 15th of December regarding the Basque language. These laws specify that henceforth both Basque and Castilian shall be official languages in the Basque-speaking zones of Navarre, while elsewhere only Castilian has official status. 122 The stated purpose of these laws is to defend the language rights of the citizens of Navarre and establish measures to promote Basque language revitalisation and increase the use of Basque. But since Navarre has now been divided into separate language zones, these rights are denied to some Navarrese because they live in the ‘wrong’ zone: territorial criteria override personal rights (Barandiaran, 2009: 257), and are as follows: a) there are 56 boroughs or municipalities in the Basque-speaking zone where the Basque language has official status (similarly to the BAC); b) there are 48 municipalities in the mixed zone where a more restricted set of language rights of Basque-speaking residents is recognised; and c) there are 168 municipalities in the non-Basque-speaking zone where Basque speakers have virtually no language rights whatsoever. This zoning system has been a source of discrimination and rights violations among Navarrese citizens (Bilbao & Casares, 2010: 43-45). Thus the right of some Navarrese citizens to use Basque is recognised in education, the media, health services, transportation and road safety, the Navarrese police, social services and so on. Unlike the BAC, the language rights of consumers and users and rights in the legal administration and the courts are not covered under present legislation (Bilbao & Casares 2010: 43-45, 51). Between 1995 and 2000 the laws were changed twice: in 1995, the Navarrese government recovered a 1994 law (135/1994) and used it to regulate the use of Basque in public administration. But in 2000 a new government passed a new law (372/2000) which narrowed the application of the previous law. This oscillation reveals the divisions and contradictory positions within Navarrese politics concerning Basque and language policy (Barandiaran 2009: 257). Some analysts stress the restrictive effects of this legislative impasse (Bilbao & Casares, 2010: 46). Since 2000, the tug-of-war in language policy has continued in the same vein. For example, Navarrese Law 29/2003 of the 10th of February regulates the use of Basque in the Navarrese public administration, but Navarre’s supreme court ruled (585/2004 of the 20th of May) in favour of an appeal against the law, not only declaring some of its clauses null and void but stipulating which obligatory Basque language requirements can or cannot legally be applied, and the tests to be used to fill posts, including different specifications for the Basque-speaking and mixed zones (Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetza, 2011a). Since 2008 Navarre’s language policy has become the responsibility of an institution called Euskarabidea - Instituto Navarro del Vascuence, the new name for the former Euskararen Nafar Institutua (Navarrese Institute of the Basque Language). Euskarabidea Works in four main domains: a) to provide language assessment to public institutions requesting it; b) to perform and promote linguistic and sociolinguistic research on European minority languages and Basque in Navarre; c) to promote certain programmes, one of which concerns citizens’ right to know Basque and use it in their dealings with public institutions, and another aims to recover and develop the use of Basque in different social domains, or promote attitudes favourable to Basque; and d) to respond to demand for Basque language courses for adults, and in particular for staff in the public administration (Euskarabidea Institutua, 2010) Basque receives no recognition or acknowledgment at all in Trebiñu County and Valle de Villaverde. The Spanish constitution leaves the deteremination of languages’ legal statuses in each place up to the statutes of the corresponding autonomous communities. The statutes of Castile and Leon and of Cantabria say nothing about the situation of Basque in Trebiñu County and Valle de Villaverde, respectively. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages likewise fails to mention these territories, which are located in the interior of the BAC. 123 All the same, grassroots initiatives in Trebiñu County have given rise to a multitude of local activities in support of the Basque language, most notably the creation there of an ikastola (Basque-medium school) despite the refusal of the Castile and Leon authorities to back these moves (Hizkuntz Eskubideen Behatokia, 2007: 12). In such cases, doing nothing also amounts to a language policy of sorts.50 In the northern Basque Country the status of the Basque language is subject to the French legislation in Law 75-1349 of the 31st of December, 1975, concerning the use of the French language, where no recognition is implied of any special sociolinguistic situation affecting this Basque-speaking area. And in 1992 France changed the second article of its constitution to make it perfectly clear that the language of the Republic is French. Two other laws insist on the official status and use of the French language: Law 75-1349 of the 31st of December and Law 94-665 of the 4th of August, 1994. The latter, principally intended to counteract the influence of English, sets out to guarantee the use of French. Any languages other than French will have no legal support and are merely tolerated (Bilbao & Casares 2010: 25-26). Although it has not ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, since 2000 France has started recognising some regional language rights albeit asserting, in every case, the preeminence of French throughout France (Barandiaran, 2009: 270). A proposal in the French National Assembly in 2002 to amend the constitution, which would have given proper consideration and protection to the languages of the regions, was defeated. A 2008 constitutional amendment calls these languages part of the ‘French heritage’, but that recognition in itself does not ensure any rights or freedoms, according to France’s Constitutional Council (Portalingua, 2011). An experimental move in the direction of a language policy for the northern Basque Country was made in 2004 with the creation of the Euskararen Erakunde Publikoa or Office Publique de la Langue Basque, in which all public organisations with competence in northern Euskal Herria are represented. In 2006 the Office Publique prepared a language policy programme to support Basque in the following domains: 1) transmission within the family, nurseries and schools; 2) use of Basque in the media, leisure activities, publications, place names and current affairs; 3) adult language learning, corpus quality, sociolinguistic research and motiation (Dalmas, Simoni, Dupuit & Pradeaux, 2010: 33-34). The government of France approved the results obtained from 2006 to 2010 and agreed to give it a further lease on life. In 2010 a new plan called the Cadre Opérationnel 2011-2016 pour la politique linguistique [the 2011-2016 Operational Framework for Language Policy] was drawn up and put into effect, with the subtitle ‘Main objective: fully competent speakers. Target group: the new generations.’ It seeks to pursue further the three main avenues of the 2006 document (EEP-OPLB, 2010: 5). 1.3. Language transmission Two variables are usually singled out in assessments of the outcome of Basque language recovery attempts since the middle of the twentieth century: the expansion of language competence and the development of language use. But the transmission of a language consists of more than that. A child’s first experience of socialisation and learning its first language (L1) go hand in hand, or to put it another way, first language acquisition is just one component in the course of a broader socialisation (Martínez de Luna, 2009: 13, 18). 50 No data are available on the status of Basque in the Cantabrian municipality of Valle de Villaverde. 124 Three processes in socialisation are to be distinguished. First there is language acquisition, a cognitive process. In the second process, which has been studied in sociology and anthropology, the speaker unconsciously and inevitably identifies that linguistic content as ‘my/our language’. Thirdly, there is a positive or negative affective process: the child comes to feel that, for example, Basque is nice and Spanish/French is foreign, or else learns, say, to think of Basque as a useless language. The most influential agents of this language socialisation process are the family, the school, the media, and friends; here I will consider the first three. The first steps toward becoming steeped in one’s language start in the family, making this the most important agent of transmission when we are talking about one’s mother tongue (L1). But let us not forget that children and young people whose L1 is Basque are now only a minority of those who can speak Basque, for whom Basque is not their most internalised language (Martínez de Luna, 2009: 18-19). Transmission through the family: As Figure 1 shows, in the fifteen-year period from 1991 to 2006, transmission of Basque within the family rose from 19% to 21% in the 16-24 age group (Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetza, 2008c); in other words, the proportion of children and youth whose L1 is Basque is gradually growing, which represents a turnaround from the previous downward trend. Figure 1: First language in Euskal Herria by ageage-groups (1991(1991-2006) 90,0 78 80,0 79 81 79 70 70,0 72 60,0 50,0 40,0 28 30,0 20,0 19 17 16 13 23 10,0 0,0 5 3 3 Total 16-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 >=65 Basque only 8 3 4 Total 16-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 >=65 Basque and Spanish/French 1991 Total 16-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 >=65 Spanish / French only 2006 The reason why the transmission rate has grown is not that Basque only is being transmitted to more and more children; this kind of transmission has actually fallen by three percentage points, from 16% to 13%, in the 16-24 year age group. The rise in the family transmission rate for Basque is due, rather, to the fact that to an increasing extent children are being taught both Basque and Spanish or French, in which case both of these languages can be counted as L1. Thus a double trend difference is seen in language transmission between young people under 25 and over 25 with regard to language transmission habits. The northern Basque Country is an exception; there, transmission in French only was still increasing (by 12 points) between 1991 and 2006 among the overfifteen age group (Martínez de Luna, 2011). However, transmitting Basque as an L1 is not the Basque-speaking family’s only job. Whether families are Basque-speaking or not, they can also be active agents in the Basque language movement (or not be, if they prefer), for instance by supporting the ikastola (Basque-medium school) movement (Martínez de Luna, 2011). 125 There are also people who have acquired Basque from other sources than the family, particularly from school, and to a lesser extent through study as adults. It is mostly thanks to these L2 Basque speakers (called euskaldunberriak in Basque, literally ‘new Basque speakers’) that the absolute numbers and percentages of Basque speakers have risen in southern Euskal Herria (Euskarabidea Institutua, 2009: 47; Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetza, 2005: 68). Transmission through the schools: schools Although there were some earlier historical precedents, the present trend of incorporating the Basque language into the education system really only got seriously underway in the second half of the twentieth century, in both the north and the south, on account of the ikastola movement (Garmendia eta Etxezarreta, 2009). Later when Navarre and the BAC obtained the power to administer the school system, Basque was brought into the public schools as well through the introduction of a scheme of three types of school, called ‘language models’: in Model A, Basque is only taught as a subject; Model B is a bilingual formula which seeks a balance between the two languages; while pupils in Model D are fully immersed in Basque; in Model G, widespread in Navarre, no Basque is taught, the same as the BAC’s exceptional Model X. In the BAC there is a choice between three models, A, B and D, in both public and private schools; Model X is reserved for exceptional cases. In Navarre, the full range of choices may be available, or only some of the options, depending on the language zones: in the Basquespeaking zone either there is a choice between B and D, or else D is compulsory; in the mixed zone there is a full choice; and in the non-Basque-speaking zone either there is an option for Model A, or else Model G is obligatory (Euskarabidea Institutua, 2010: 60). At different speeds and with unequal intensity, the Basque-language models, D and B, are becoming progressively more widespread in all three administrative parts of Euskal Herria.51 The trend is strongest in the BAC, where between the 1997-8 school year and 201011 enrolment in Model D rose from 36% to 60%, and Model B from 18·8% to 22%, in primary and secondary schools (Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetza, 2011c: 18). The proportion of Basque is also rising progressively in Navarrese primary education, where there were 19·9% Model D pupils in 1996-97 as compared to 28·8% in 2006-07. There is virtually no Model B. Model A, which is the only option with any Basque offered in the nonBasque-speaking zone, is growing, having risen from 15·2% in 1996-97 to 31·6% in 2006-07 (Vilches & Vilches, 2006; Nafarroako Gobernua, 2011). In the north, the percentage of pupils enrolled in Basque-language primary education (bilingual schools plus immersion) has gone up from 24·5% in 2004-05 to 32·3% in 2009-10 (Euskararen Erakunde Publikoa, 2011). Media: Zubiri, Retortillo & Aierdi (2008: 86, 89-93) offer relevant data and concusions about the consumption of Basque language media. Even by an optimistic estimate, media in Basque only reach half (57·7%) of Basque speakers. It is claimed that the Basque language media do not satisfy Basque speakers’ needs; the authors distinguish between two kinds of cause for the limited reach of Basque media: demand issues and supply issues. 51 A precise, direct comparison between these areas was not possible owing to the unavailability of strictly comparable statistics. 126 2. BASQUE LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT AND THE SITUATION TODAY 2.1. Language competence Euskal Herria had a population of 3,015,558 in 2006, of whom 71% were in the BAC, 20% in Navarre and 9% in the north (Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetza, 2008a: 199). To these must be added 1,640 in Trebiñu County and 369 in Valle de Villaverde (INE, 2011). There has been remarkable progress in the development of Basque language competence from 1991 to 2006 among inhabitants aged sixteen and over: see Table 1. Ge1. TAULAhiagoko biztanleriarentzat (portzentje bertikalak). 1991 2006Table 1. Language competence in Euskal Herria in inhabitants aged sixteen or more (vertical percentages) 1991 Bilingual Basque speakers: better at Basque than Spanish or French BILINGUAL 2006 7·7 22·3 7·9 25· 25·7 Balanced bilingual: speak both languages equally well 6·2 7·8 Spanish/French bilingual: speak the other language better than Basque 8·4 10 Passive bilingual: know some Basque but don’t understand as much as a full speaker Non-Basque-speaking monolinguals: only speak Spanish or French 7·7 15·4 70·0 58·9 Source of data: Euskal Herriko Hizkuntza-Adierazle Sistema (EAS). Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetza (2008c). The author is responsible for the tabulated presentation. The number of non-Basque-speaking monolinguals has fallen by 11·1 points, mostly in favour of the group of passive bilinguals which has grown by 7·7 points, although the other bilinguals have also grown in number by 3·4 points. The main explanation for this rise in passive bilinguals is as follows: a lot of children who were supposed to learn Basque as an L2 have really only learnt it in part; this is the case of many children from homes where the L1 is not Basque. The efforts to teach Basque through the schools only, without any transmission in the home, are in many cases (Gabiña, Gorostidi, Iruretagoiena, Olaziregi & Sierra, 1986: 23; Sierra & Olaziregi, 1990: 40-44; Arregi & Tambo, 2010: 30) only meeting with limited success as a way of ensuring adequate Basque language competence. However, the group of passive bilinguals also includes a good number of adults who have tried to learn Basque without fully competing the process. These are general figures for the whole of the Basque Country but they vary greatly between areas. The BAC is the part with the highest proportion of active and passive bilinguals, followed by the north, while Navarre has the fewest of both (see Figure 2). Figure 2: Language competence in Euskal Herria by regions (2006) 100% 90% 80% 51,5 58,9 70% 68,9 81,3 60% 50% 40% 18,3 15,4 8,6 30% 20% 25,7 30,1 7,6 22,5 10% 11,1 0% Basque Country Active bilinguals BAC Passive bilinguals Navarre North Monolingual Spanish/French speakers 127 The number of Basque speakers in the BAC and Navarre grew between 1991 and 2006 by 6·2 and 1·6 percentage points respectively. However, in the north the percentage of Basque speakers fell by 10·6 points, although even there the downward trend is reaching a turning point in the youngest age group. In the BAC the increase in the number of bilinguals extends up to the under-fifties, in Navarre to people under thirty-five, and in the north is true of under-twenty-fives. Thus, in all three parts of the country, the younger the group the higher the number of bilingual people. 2.2. Language use Data ranging over the period from 1989 to 2006 show that “street use” of Basque (i.e. spontaneous conversation in Basque observed in the streets among ordinary people”) has increased gradually; averaging out the data for the whole of Euskal Herria, its percentage has risen from 11% to 14% in this period (Soziolinguistika Klusterra, 2007): see Figure 3. Here too there are notable differences between different parts of the country, with the province of Gipuzkoa coming first in both the amount of use of Basque and how much it has increased. Next comes Bizkaia, and in third place is Navarre. The lowest numbers for language use are for Araba and the north, which are tied in the 2006 statistics, but while the figures for use of Basque are rising in Araba, in the north they are falling. Figure 3: Street use of Basque from 1989 to 2006 in Euskal Herria and by regions (vertical percentages) 33 29 23 11 8 7 14 10 7 7 4 1989 EH 13 10 Ar. Biz. 4 7 5 5 1997 2006 Gip. Nav. Pays Basque The increase in this language use starts with the adult population and falls off at an incrasing rate as the subjects’ ages rise; children have the highest perentage, 21%. But for the elderly, use of Basqe was lower in 2006 than it was in 1989, and indeed that is the generation with the lowest proportion of Basque speakers that has ever lived in the Basque Country (see Figure 4). 128 Figure 4: Language competence in Euskal Herria by regions (2006) 25 20 21 15 15 14 14 1989 2006 12 11 10 9 9 5 0 Children Adolescents Adults Elderly The Basque government developed a typology in 2006 to measure the amount of Basque used in the family, among friends and in formal domains of language use. According to its data, 15·3% of the inhabitants of the Basque Country either use as much Basque as Spanish or French (for 5·4% of them) or more (9·9%) in their daily life; another 9·8% also use some Basque but not as much as Spanish or French; while 74·9% only use Spanish or French (Hizkuntza Politikarako Sailburuordetzak, 2008a: 215). The same research also analyses the interlocutors with whom speakers use the most Basque (Figure 5): the highest rate of Basque use is that of parents addressing their children in the BAC and Navarre, but not so in the north, where the highest rate of Basque language use is when speaking to one’s parents.Use of Basque between members of a couple is lower than that between brothers and sisters in all three parts of the country. Lastly, Basque is used least of all with parents in the BAC and Navarre, but in the north, on the contrary, this is the relationship where it is used most. Figure 5: Use of Basque according to interlocutor, by by regions (2006) 100% 15 90% 80% 25 36 49 70% 55 43 54 9 47 9 74 55 38 47 14 65 46 11 9 7 30% 21 11 14 14 5 40% 20% 35 10 60% 50% 41 45 51 19 68 48 37 39 28 10% 0% BAC Nav. North With parents Always in Basque or > Sp./Fr. BAC Nav. North BAC Nav North With siblings As much Bq. As Sp./Fr. With partner BAC Nav. North With offspring Always in Sp./Fr. Or > Bq. 129 These statistics are significant: the conviction of a need to transmit the Basque language to one’s children is very widespread in society in the BAC and Navarre, hence the particularly strong tendency to speak to one’s children in Basque. Not so in the north, where L1 Basque speakers speak to the older generation, their parents, in Basque but transmission to the following generation has been interrupted. Enthusiasm for the Basque language, which has reignited in recent years, does not yet have enough social weight to have made an impact on the statistics. 2.3. Social attitudes, opinions and representations representations As with all social behaviour, languages have both objective and subjective facets. Bourhis, Giles & Rosenthal designed a Subjective Vitality Questionnaire in order to profile the subjective dimension (Bourhis et al., 1981). An exploration of this subjective dimension is one possible way of accessing society’s attitudes to language, hence the following section. 2. taula. Euskara ikasteari buruzko jarrerak euskaraz ez dakitenen edo pixka bat dakitenen artean (16 urte edo gehiagoko biztanleria). Table 2. 2 . Interest in learning Basque among people who know no or little Basque (population 16 and over) Area Age group Origin EH BAC Nav. Nav. North 1616-29 3030-45 4646-64 65 Immig. Immig. Sec. Sec. gen. gen. immig. immig. Basque Yes 5 6 2 4 11 6 2 1 2 8 5 No, but I once tried 23 29 15 8 32 30 20 8 11 34 25 23 25 22 20 26 30 21 17 23 24 24 46 40 56 61 26 33 53 71 63 31 42 No, but I would if the conditions were right No, and I don’t plan to No comment 3 2 6 8 5 3 3 3 2 3 5 (Vertical percentage) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 As Table 2 shows, 46% (nearly half) of the inhabitants of Euskal Herria who do not speak any Basque or only a little have never tried to learn Basque and have no intention of trying. This attitude is even more widespread in Navarre and the north, people over 45, and immigrants. But 23% of monolingual Spanish or French speakers say they would like to learn Basque if there were suitable circumstances; and this attitude is fairly evenly spread among all the groups. It is also a significant fact that another 23% of the people who don’t speak Basque have studied it at some point. We might say that these all ‘dropped out’ for some reason or other, leaving them in the category of people who know no or very little Basque (Baxok et al., 2006: 62-70). The combined 46% of the population who either are or have been learning Basque or would be prepared to were asked for their reasons for being interested in Basque. The answer most often given (by 70%) was linked to a sense of identity: 41% said ‘Because it is the language of this country’, 19% ‘Because I feel Basque’, and 10% ‘To discover my roots’. Other reasons mentioned include the following: communication: ‘To be able to communicate with Basque speakers’ (34%); work: ‘Because I need it for my work or to get a job’ (17%); family: ‘Because my children are learning it’ (17%); and social integration: ‘To become integrated in this country and not feel excluded’ (10%)52 (Baxok et al., 2006: 63-64). Of all these pragmatic reasons, the only one which might be classified as social pressure is the need to know Basque to find employment, and notice that this was not one of the commonest responses; the others all imply a free choice. 52 These do not add up to 100% because respondents were allowed to choose up to there reasons. 130 3. AT THE CROSSROADS: A LOOK TOWARDS TOWARDS THE FUTURE Up to this point I have sketched the situation and development of Basque. Based mostly on these observations, let me now sum up the present state of affairs and try to pinpoint the crossroads at which the language now stands. 1. Official status. status. In southern Euskal Herria, the real status of Basque is inferior to that of Spanish on account of the fact that the obligation to know Castilian, stipulated in the Spanish constitution, is not matched by a clause imposing any similar obligation regarding Basque. Given this context, Basque has attained a sort of second-class official status in the whole of the BAC and one part of Navarre. In the rest of Navarre there is no legal recognition of Basque, so many requirements of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages do not need to be applied. Similarly in northern Euskal Herria and in the districts of Trebiñu County and Valle de Villaverde, administered by the Spanish autonomous communities of Castile and Leon and of Cantabria respectively, Basque is accorded no official status and there is no recognition of any rights of Basque speakers in those places. 2. Language policies. policies. In accordance with the different legal statuses of Basque in different parts of Euskal Herria, language regulations vary. The language policy in different regions is not only conditioned by the legal and statutory situations but also affected or restricted by differing political interests. A good many favourable measures are being implemented in the BAC and the Basque-speaking zone of Navarre, which receive assessments that range from one extreme to the other depending on political leaning and viewpoint; in consequence, it is difficult in some cases to bring about the observance of legally acknowledged rights. In the north and the mixed and non-Basque-speaking parts of Navarre, pro-Basque local authorities and members of the language movement are trying to apply measures or programmes and to organise events by making the most of loopholes left by those who are opposed to giving Basque any legal recognition. For its part, the international group of experts charged with monitoring the Euro-Charter submit recommendations to the authorities in the Spanish state, Navarre and the BAC, suggesting further steps and improvements that each should take in the area of the Basque language. 3. Competence and use. use. The number and proportion of inhabitants who know Basque is rising in Euskal Herria, particularly among young people and children; thus the decline of years past has been reversed and the changed trend has started to make itself felt of late in the north, as it did a few decades earlier in the south. This revitalisation is taking place largely through transmission of the language in the schools (where Basque is L2), and to a lesser extent through increased transmission at home (where Basque = L1, mostly as a result of a growth in the number of linguistically mixed marriages. For Basque revitalisation it is indeed essential that the number of Basque-speaking people should grow, and such growth does expand the language’s horizons, but we must not forget that among today’s Basque-speaking children and youths, the majority are people for whom Basque is an L2. These new Basque speakers, unlike the Basque L1’s, are generally less competent in Basque than in Spanish, and on account of this a proportion of them have a tendency to abandon Basque and live out their lives in Spanish. The fastest growing group is that of passive bilinguals who don’t know enough Basque to be called Basque speakers, and this fact calls for some reflection. One way of looking at this fact is as an increase in the number of people who ‘want to but can’t’: they have tried to learn Basque but failed. On the other side of the coin, however, clearly the study of Basque as a second language favours the growth of the number of Basque speakers, and even a limited, passive bilingualism among non-speakers facilitates some forms of Basque language use: for example, certain kinds of social event can be carried out in Basque only, because everyone can understand, even if some only just. 131 4. The subjective dimension. dimension. One perceives a definite effort to transmit Basque language competence at home in both the BAC and Navarre; however, the fact that Basque is used proportionally less when speaking to grown members of the family, i.e. siblings, partners or parents, unfortunately conveys to the children in such families the subliminal message that Basque is a language for children while Spanish is the language for grownups and the language that really ‘works’ in society. Nearly half of the people who cannot speak Basque have no interest in learning it; this indicates that Basque is not regarded in society as something necessary or important. However, one in four non-Basque-speakers would like to learn Basque; this reveals a certain sense of loyalty to the Basque language in society. Today, Basque identity is the strongest factor generating favourable attitudes and behaviours in support of the Basque language, especially when under the influence of a Basque nationalist ideology. Conversely, given that the society has failed to generate a need for Basque to supply other wants, people who disagree with the nationalists’ postulates for the most part feel no strong motivation to support the language. 5. Society and linguistic situation. situation. In the light of what has been said, the variations from one part of Euskal Herria to another regarding their situations and trends in Basque language competence and use are not arbitrary. The variations correspond in large part to the configuration in each region in terms of the legal framework with regard to the Basque language, the aggressiveness of the official language policy and the strength and effectiveness of the Basque language movement. Many of the current efforts towards Basque language revitalisation are working well, but some no doubt need to be refined to improve their efficacy. 6. Public opinion. It may be that today’s greatest risk for the future of Basque is a certain response to the existing power relations, namely what Pierre Bourdieu has called symbolic violence, to which, applying his idea to language, the Basque-language community seems to be subjected. In this case the besieged language community submits itself to the dominant language’s postulates, leading a minority language speaker to adopt and use the invading language to such an extent that it becomes a reflex response. Even if speakers want to, it is difficult to reverse this behavioural trend (Suay & Sanginés, 2011: 11). Such languagesubmissiveness is seen, in the case of Basque, when, for example, even where the law states that Basque speakers can choose freely which language to use in many public relations, they opt for Spanish (or French), whether out of embarrassment or some fear or other. Two states of affairs need to be battled in the whole of society, among both Basque speakers and non-Basque-speakers: a) ignorance about the full complexity of a language recovery effort; b) the absence of new reasons and motivations for taking a strong stand for Basque, which involves reflecting carefully about why we need Basque and what we need it for in terms which go beyond the identity perspective, perceiving a value in the language for the whole of society. Basque public opinion, including both those who are Basque speakers and those who are not, needs a new cognitive ‘framing’ (Martínez de Luna, 2010: 53-67) to guide and direct the perception and representation of the reality of the Basque language. Considering the enormous impact of the media in the creation of public opinion, it is both shocking and disheartening to observe the limitations and inadequacies of the Basque language media in both offer and demand; it will be impossible to rectify those problems within public opinion without proper communication. 132 7. Future in the sky? sky? It is always possible to doubt whether all these efforts will suffice to achieve the normalisation of a language such as Basque. The answer to that question will not fall out of the sky, but depends on what the speakers and the speaker community are going to do about it: Even the weakest of languages can have their place. All it takes is for the language community to have a strong will to keep its language alive, but to bring that about a good language policy must be enforced. (Coyos, 2010: 179). 133 REFERENCES Arregi, A. & Tambo, I. (2011): Ebaluazio Diagnostikoa 2010. Emaitzen txostena eta emaitzen analisia. 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