This article was downloaded by: [Nathan, Laurie] On: 6 April 2009 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 910206143] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Contemporary Security Policy Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634773 AFRICOM: A Threat to Africa's Security Laurie Nathan Online Publication Date: 01 April 2009 To cite this Article Nathan, Laurie(2009)'AFRICOM: A Threat to Africa's Security',Contemporary Security Policy,30:1,58 — 61 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13523260902760090 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260902760090 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. AFRICOM: A Threat to Africa’s Security Downloaded By: [Nathan, Laurie] At: 08:21 6 April 2009 LAURIE NATHAN James Forest and Rebecca Crispin seek to explain a significant problem confronting the newly established United States Unified Command for Africa (AFRICOM): the official purpose of the initiative is to assist Africans to address their security needs but the response of Africans has been largely hostile. Forest and Crispin attribute the negative reaction to weak planning, unrealistic timelines, a failure to consult Africans about AFRICOM, and poor communication about the aims and orientation of the command. The lack of proper consultation and communication led to misperceptions and mistrust among Africans. Forest and Crispin conclude that what is required now is a robust strategic communications effort that includes extensive consultation and public diplomacy. This would help to provide a clear vision of AFRICOM, allay the misgivings and enable the command to transcend its inauspicious debut. Forest and Crispin do not capture adequately the African concerns about AFRICOM.1 If one takes serious account of these concerns, it appears that the authors have misdiagnosed the causes of the problem and that their optimism about AFRICOM’s future prospects is misplaced. The adverse response to the US Department of Defense initiative was not simply due to poor planning, weak communication, and resultant misunderstandings. More fundamentally, it reflects a deep-rooted anti-imperialist posture that is grounded in the historical and contemporary realities of African politics and US foreign policy. It will not be overcome through a communications strategy, no matter how well resourced and sophisticated. The anti-imperialist stance derives from many sources. Chief among them are the liberation struggles against colonialism, Washington’s unsympathetic attitude to the liberation movements, its embrace of dictators in Africa and Latin America during the Cold War, its unwavering support for Israel despite the illegal occupation of Palestine, its exceptionalism in relation to the International Criminal Court, and its long history of unilateralism, aggression, and disdain for international law. Under the Bush administration these trends were reinforced in dramatic fashion by the unlawful invasion of Iraq and the travesty of Guantanamo Bay. The conclusion is that the US has no firm commitment to human rights, pursues its own interests at the expense of others, and is willing to deploy force offensively to advance those interests. The spectre of Empire looms ever large. Forest and Crispin are aware of these dynamics but underestimate their import. The authors note briefly that perceptions of American foreign policy towards Africa are framed by history and actions elsewhere. They point out that from the 1960s through to the 1990s the US provided financial and military aid to corrupt and brutal regimes and that unilateral American interventions in Iraq and other Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.30, No.1 (April 2009), pp.58– 61 ISSN 1352-3260 print/1743-8764 online DOI: 10.1080/13523260902760090 # 2009 Taylor & Francis Downloaded By: [Nathan, Laurie] At: 08:21 6 April 2009 SYMPOSIUM 59 places have raised suspicion of the US throughout the world. Questions about the ‘true’ nature and purpose of AFRICOM were therefore inevitable. In this context, according to Forest and Crispin, AFRICOM ‘[went] public too quickly and with too little consultation with African partners. Indeed, suspicion toward AFRICOM grew among other agencies and international partners in large part because of how this organization was unveiled to the world’. It is naive to imagine that better consultation, planning, and marketing would have substantially improved AFRICOM’s reception on the continent. No communication and consultation could have altered the essence and improved the image of a superpower whose foreign policy is characterized by unilateralism, militarism, and disregard for international law. The formation of a US military command for Africa is a component of this foreign policy and is thus inescapably associated with its features. AFRICOM is consequently considered a threat to the security and independence of African countries. As discussed below, four types of threat are apparent in the concerns raised by the Africans cited in this article. Regional destabilization. AFRICOM was originally meant to be situated physically in Africa but this idea was put on hold because of resistance from African states. The resistance stemmed partly from the fear that locating a US military command in an African country would heighten American leverage, alter the regional balance of power, and be divisive and destabilizing. It would undermine the sovereignty of the host country, the status and influence of the regional power (such as Nigeria in West Africa), and the unity and collective decision-making of the regional organization (such as the Economic Community of West African States). Even a benign superpower would provoke considerable unease if it tried to establish a permanent military presence in Africa. In the case of the US, which is regarded as a bully, the opposition was bound to be intense. Offensive military action. The resistance to locating AFRICOM in Africa was also due to fears that this would give the US a military platform from which to overthrow African governments and launch attacks on countries or organizations deemed a threat to American interests. The adoption by President Bush of a pre-emptive war doctrine in 2002 was a brazen official declaration of a policy long applied by the United States in Central America. The US National Security Strategy contends that ‘the United States can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run’.2 In the name of the ‘war on terror’, the US might also provide weaponry and other forms of military support to prop up repressive governments in Africa. Overriding African interests. The claim by US officials that AFRICOM is primarily intended to further Africa’s security and development has no credibility on the continent. Few people doubt that America is motivated principally by its own interests, which are believed to encompass the following: ensuring a stable supply of oil from the continent; maintaining access to Africa’s natural resources; countering if not rebuffing China’s growing economic and political engagement in Africa; and eliminating Islamic terrorist groups that take root in weak and failed states. The crucial point is not that the US wants to advance its interests but that these interests do Downloaded By: [Nathan, Laurie] At: 08:21 6 April 2009 60 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY not coincide with those of Africa and, more importantly, that the US has the means and disposition to pursue its interests at the expense of African interests. Undermining the African Union. The failure by the US administration to consult the African Union (AU) about AFRICOM was seen not as a communications lapse but as indicative of the superpower’s arrogance, ignorance of African politics, and disregard for the efforts of Africans to enhance their own security. Particularly if it had its headquarters on the continent, AFRICOM might, by virtue of the power it represents and commands, marginalize the AU’s Peace and Security Council and become the de facto locus of major decision-making on African security. Any discussion on the way forward should distinguish between the different aspects of AFRICOM. First, AFRICOM consolidates under a single command the American military activity in Africa that was previously spread among three commands. This organizational restructuring of the US Department of Defense is the least contentious dimension of AFRICOM and should be considered a fait accompli. Second, AFRICOM was conceived as a combatant command based on the continent. This controversial idea has been dismissed so emphatically in Africa that it should be abandoned and not merely postponed. For example, in 2007 the heads of state of the Southern African Development Community, whose members include Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, discussed AFRICOM and concluded dryly ‘that it is better if the United States were involved with Africa from a distance rather than be present on the continent’.3 As noted by the South African Minister of Defence, the majority of African regional organizations have taken a similar position.4 Third, AFRICOM is designed to administer a range of military and civilian programmes on security cooperation, building African capacity, and strengthening democratic institutions in support of peace and security. The crucial question is whether African governments have confidence in this support. In an essay on the American empire, Alan Ryan observes that the US has failed to use non-military forms of influence effectively because it has not taken the trouble to understand the rest of the world; moreover, ‘the professed ideological purity of the United States’ motives – the argument that its foreign policy is aimed at spreading democracy and the rule of law – is doubly disastrous. It strikes half the world as hypocritical; it strikes the other half as threatening’.5 Confidence in AFRICOM’s ‘do good’ programmes is diminished further by the other major aspects of the command, namely its warfighting capabilities and potential for offensive action and its pursuit of US goals at the expense of African interests. In relation to the AFRICOM programmes, the US administration should concentrate on consulting African stakeholders and meeting their requests for support rather than on packaging and selling AFRICOM. While consultation with individual African governments and civil society organizations is necessary, consultation with the governmental decision-making forums of the AU and the regional organizations is more important. Foreign security initiatives that are rejected by these organizations will be forever divisive and mired in controversy. Whatever the concrete outcomes of the consultations, Africans will remain alarmed about the vast power of the US and its willingness to use that power as it 61 SYMPOSIUM sees fit. The unease will not be mitigated by strategic communications and assurances of good intentions regarding AFRICOM. It will only be alleviated if the US adopts a benign foreign policy that respects the values and interests of other states. Many Africans hope that the Obama presidency will usher in that policy but this, of course, remains to be seen. NOTES Downloaded By: [Nathan, Laurie] At: 08:21 6 April 2009 1. In this article I draw on the following sources for governmental and non-governmental African views on AFRICOM: Africa Action, ‘African Voices on AFRICOM’, Pambazuka News, 1 April 2008, retrieved on 26 November 2008 from www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47047; Christopher Isike, Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, and Lysias Gilbert, ‘The United States Africa Command: Enhancing American Security or Fostering African Development?’, African Security Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2008), pp. 20– 38; Samuel Makinda, ‘Why AFRICOM Has Not Won over Africans’, undated, Africa Policy Forum, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, retrieved on 30 November 2008 from http:// forums.csis.org/africa/?p¼72; Mark Malan, ‘AFRICOM: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?’, testimony before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, United States Senate, 1 August 2007, retrieved on 22 November 2008 from http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2007/MalanTestimony070801.pdf; Wafula Okumu, ‘Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of US-Africa Relations?’, testimony given to the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, United States Congress, 2 August 2007, retrieved on 30 November 2008 from www.iss.co.za/ dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/AFRICOMWOKUMU.PDF?link_id¼31&slink_id¼ 4821&link_type¼12&slink_type¼13&tmpl_id¼3; Freedom C. Onuoha, ‘US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Nigeria’s National Security’, Africa Insight, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2008), pp. 173–84; and South African Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Notes Following International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) [Cabinet] Cluster Media Briefing’, 29 August 2007, retrieved on 16 November 2008 from www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07083016151001.htm. 2. Government of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 8, retrieved on 16 November 2008 from www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf. 3. South African Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Notes’. 4. Ibid. 5. Alan Ryan, ‘What Happened to the American Empire?’, New York Review of Books, Vol. 55, No. 16 (23 October 2008), p. 61. View publication stats