OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS CHAPTER 14 Interest Associations Roland Erne Chapter contents Introduction What are interest associations? Interest associations in theory Interest associations in practice Conclusion Reader’s guide 260 260 262 265 271 Interests play an important role in all modern political systems. But the forms in which interests are articulated very much depend on the context of the particular case. Accordingly, this chapter reviews at the outset various definitions of interest associations that have been used by comparativists across the globe. Comparative studies of interest associations have also been inspired by different theories of interest politics. Therefore, the chapter also includes a review of the origins and legacies of competing theoretical traditions in the field, namely republicanism, pluralism, and neo-corporatism. At last, the final sections of the chapter discuss the role of interest associations in practice, distinguishing different types of action that are available to different interest associations, namely direct lobbying, political exchange, contentious politics, and private interest government. OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS 260 ROLAND ERNE Introduction Arthur Bentley captured the focus of interest politics when he argued that it is necessary ‘in considering representative government, or democracy, not only past or present, but future as well, to consider it in terms of the various group pressures that form its substance’ (1908: 452). Therefore, we should not just compare formal institutions and institutional actors, but also assess the role of associations that seek to advance a particular interest in the political process. The term interest association is often used interchangeably with interest group or pressure group; but before reviewing different definitions of the term in the next section of this chapter, I will go back to its origins. It is no coincidence that the study of interest politics can be traced back to the United States of the early twentieth century. The establishment of this academic field is closely related to the socio-economic and political conjunctures of the time. When Bentley published his pioneering The Process of Government in 1908, the interventions of ever larger corporations in US politics caused widespread popular alarm. At the same time, the rise of large-scale industrial capitalism triggered counter reactions, namely industrial conflict and movements that sought to eliminate corruption, improve working conditions, and give citizens more control over the political process. Yet, it would be wrong to associate the origins of comparative interest politics exclusively with the industrial revolution and its economic and political repercussions. The behavioural revolution in the social sciences, which changed the analytical focus from formal institutions to social processes was equally important (see Introduction). The consequent broadening of perspectives made it possible to analyse tensions between pluralistic democratic theory and practice. In post-1945 America, the steady rise of professional lobbyists provided political scientists not only with a new subject area and a new occupational domain for their graduate students, but also with a topic for heated debate (Dahl 1982): can a pluralistic democratic state regulate interest associations without questioning the right of association, especially if this right is perceived as almost as inalienable as the right of personal liberty (Tocqueville 2006a [1835] Chapter 12)? The broader analytical focus, however, also enabled comparativists to capture alternative types of association–state relations, such as neocorporatism, which did not follow the Anglo-American model. Therefore, comparativists started to study institutions again, albeit not as formalities but as factors that help to explain the varieties of interest politics across political systems. Interest associations play important but also different roles in political systems across time and space. Likewise, scholars that have studied interest associations have been inspired by different theoretical traditions. It follows that any assessment of interest associations should not only start with a definition. It should also include a review of the origins and legacies of competing theories of interest politics. Accordingly, the different theoretical traditions are reviewed in the second section of this chapter, whereas the final section reviews the role of interest associations in practice. KEY POINTS ● Comparativists should not only analyse formal institutions and institutional actors but should also uncover and assess interest group pressures that shape the substance of politics and political systems. ● Interest associations play important but also different roles in political systems across time and space, even if the rise of interest politics is closely related to the rise of capitalist modes of production across the globe. What are interest associations? Interest associations are not easy to define. The American pioneers in the field proposed very encompassing definitions: Bentley (1908) and Truman (1971 [1951]) defined interest groups as associations that make claims to other groups in society. But is this definition still useful today? Many contemporary scholars disagree because such a broad definition makes it impossible to distinguish interest associations from political parties (see Chapter 12). Instead, interest groups are usually defined as membership organizations that appeal to government but do not participate in elections (Wilson 1990). However, this definition also raises questions. Whereas parties and interest groups are sharply differentiated in North America, this differentiation is much less evident in other parts of the world where cross-organizational interactions blur the lines between interest groups and political parties. Therefore, Gabriel Almond (1958) did not use formal definitions when he was studying interest groups comparatively. Instead, he focused on the function of interest representation because the institutions by means of which interests are articulated would depend on the context of the particular case. Functionalist approaches Students of interest politics should indeed be cautious of comparisons based on de-contextualized measures. Identical measures, such as trade union density, mean different things in different countries. Given the high number of workers covered by collective agreements and the French unions’ capacity to instigate strike action, French unions are hardly the least influential labour OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS CHAPTER 14 INTEREST ASSOCIATIONS Table 14.1 Trade union density and collective bargaining coverage Country Union Density (%)1 Collective Bargaining Coverage (%)2 1980 2007 2009 Australia 49 18.5 60 Canada 34 29 32 France 18 9 95 Germany 35a 20 63 Italy 50b 33b 80 Japan 31 18 16 South Korea 15 10c 12 Sweden 78 71 92 UK 51d 28 35 USA 22 12 13 Source: OECD (12008, 22009) a: Data concerning former West Germany only; b: Italian density is underestimated, as ‘autonomous’ unions are excluded; c: 2006; d: Excludes Northern Ireland. organizations in the industrialized world. Yet, OECD data show that there is no OECD country where fewer people are union members as a percentage of the entire labour force (see Table 14.1). Obviously, unions must have different power resources in different political systems. In the English-speaking world, union influence is related to membership levels. In other parts of the world however, other factors are as important, such as close party–trade union connections; enshrined co-determination rights of worker representatives in corporate governance; institutionalized access to policymaking; and the ability of union activist to inspire social movements. For this reason, functionalists argue that studying interest associations comparatively may require using different measures for the same concept (or function) in different cases to reflect differences in context across political systems. This approach allows us to widen the comparative analysis of interest politics beyond the boundaries of Anglo-American systems. However, functionalists also face a tricky analytical problem. Is it accurate to assume a universal interest representation function, as suggested by Almond? Or should we distinguish between different types of interest representation, as suggested by scholars who differentiate between private and public interest associations? Private versus public interests Does it make sense to use the same label for associations that seek private profit and associations that advance public goods? This question is not only of academic interest. The definition’s scope also predetermines the scope of laws that regulate the rights and obligations of associations. Be that as it may, most scholars tend not to exclude social movement organizations from their definitions of interest associations (Cigler and Loomis 2007). This view is consistent if one is comparing associations solely with respect to formal properties: namely ‘voluntary membership, a more or less bureaucratic structure of decision making, dependence upon material and motivational resources, efforts to change the respective environments into more favourable ones, and so forth’ (Offe and Wiesenthal 195: 175). This view, however, has not precluded scholars from introducing different subcategories of interest groups. Jeffrey Berry (1977), for instance, proposed to distinguish public and private interest groups on the basis of whether an association pursues public interests or only sectional interests of its members. Similar distinctions have been used by scholars around the world (Young and Wallace 2000; Greenwood 2003; della Porta and Caiani 2009). Yet, however popular this distinction is, it is also analytically problematic, as all interest associations usually present their claims as measures that enhance the public good. Business organizations, for instance, frequently argue, evoking the theories of neo-classical economists, that the pursuit of private profit serves the public good. Claims that an action is consistent or not with the public interest are certainly influential in political debates. Analytically, however, the phrase ‘public interest’ is ‘meaningless if it is taken to refer to an interest so persuasive that everyone in the system is agreed upon it’ (Truman 1971: xiv). Does this mean that there is no way to distinguish between types of interest associations in an analytically meaningful manner? Not necessarily, as we will see in the later section on interest associations in practice where I will discuss Offe and Wiesenthal’s (1985) The Two Logics of Collective Action. Beforehand, however, I review the role of interest associations in theory. KEY POINTS ● Many scholars define interest associations as voluntary membership organizations that appeal to government but do not participate in elections. In a comparative context, however, such a formal definition may be problematic, as the form of interest representation varies across political systems. ● It has also been proposed to distinguish ‘public’ and ‘private interest groups’. Claims that a group’s action is in the ‘public interest’ are certainly influential. Analytically, however, the term ‘public interest’ is problematic as there is hardly a claim that is so persuasive that everyone can agree upon it. 261 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS 262 ROLAND ERNE Interest associations in theory Comparativists usually distinguish between pluralist and neo-corporatist political systems when explaining the role of interest associations in the political process. Accordingly, this section reviews the social bases and historical legacies of pluralist and neo-corporatist theory. However, these two approaches are neither the only nor the first ones to look at the role of interest groups in the political process. As far back as the eighteenth century, republican political theorists, such as JeanJacques Rousseau, expressed clear, but also very critical, views about interest groups that still influence current debates. Republican (unitarist) traditions Although Rousseau recognized that every political body includes interest associations, the Citizen of Geneva perceived interest associations as a threat to democracy. He feared that ‘there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are associations … Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest … there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which prevails is purely particular.’ Therefore, Rousseau argued ‘there should be no partial society in a state and each citizen should express only his own opinion.’ Yet, he also proposed a pragmatic solution to the interest group problem: ‘But if there are partial societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being unequal’ (1973 [1762] Book 2: 204). Nonetheless, the leaders of the French revolution clearly adopted a unitarist view of democracy, according to which interest associations would undermine the general will of the people. Accordingly, the French constitution of 24 June 1793 succinctly stated in its first sentence: ‘The French Republic is one and indivisible.’ This sentence still delineates the republican approach to interest groups today, despite the suspension of the constitution on 10 October 1793 due to the external and internal state of war. Whereas the French revolution established the right to hold popular assemblies and even a constitutional duty to rebel when the government violates the right of the people, the notion of a one and indivisible republic also justified banning associations that assumingly interfered with the general will of the people. Incidentally, the French revolutionaries not only dissolved the estates, guilds, and religious congregations of the Ancien Régime, but also adopted a law that outlawed workers’ associations. In 1791, the French constituent assembly adopted the loi Le Chapelier, which prohibited all journeymen’s organizations until 1884. With this law the assembly responded to reports of alarmed employers: ‘The workers, by an absurd parody of the government, regard their work as their property, the building site as a Republic of which they are jointly the citizens, and believe, as a consequence, that it is for them to name their own bosses, their inspectors and at their discretion to share out work amongst themselves.’ Thus, the Le Chapelier law was designed to ‘put an end to such potential industrial anarchy’ (Magraw 1992: 24f). The fact that employers convinced the constituent assembly to suspend the freedom of association of French workers highlights a contradiction within the unitarist republican tradition of thought. If particular interests aim to become dominant in order to prevail over the rest, as argued by Rousseau, how can one be sure that any restriction of the freedom of association ‘in the name of the general will of the people’ does not simply serve the particular interests of a group that has acquired a dominant position in the political process? As noted by Robert Dahl (1982), democratic republics are facing a major dilemma when dealing with interest associations: on the one hand, the bigger a democratic political system becomes the more likely interest associations are to play an important role in the political process. On the other hand, as with individuals, so with organizations: the ability to act autonomously also includes the ability to do harm. Whereas republicans try to solve the classical dilemma between control and autonomy in political life through the democratization of political power, liberals typically fear a tyranny of the majority and emphasize instead the liberty of individuals to act and to associate freely. Liberal (pluralist) traditions Liberal scholars do not perceive interest associations as a potential threat to the sovereignty of the democratic state, but as an essential source of liberty. This view is pertinently outlined by the French scholar and politician, Alexis de Tocqueville. In 1831, Tocqueville was charged by the constitutional monarchy under King LouisPhilippe to examine the penitentiary system in America. Ironically however, Tocqueville’s travels in America also inspired him to write Democracy in America (2006a [1835], 2006b [1840]), which became a crucial study within the pluralist tradition of interest politics. Tocqueville, as an offspring of an ancient aristocratic dynasty who narrowly escaped the guillotine during the French revolution, had very good reasons to be wary of the general will of the people. In contrast to many of his aristocratic contemporaries however, he was also convinced that democracy was unavoidable. Whereas politics was a privilege of the few in pre-modern times, the changing social conditions caused by modernization of the economy and society would affect more and more people. The scope of politics would increase, which in turn would also require a new source of legitimacy for politics: namely democracy. For this very reason, Tocqueville studied democracy in America in quest of social OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS CHAPTER 14 INTEREST ASSOCIATIONS factors that would prevent it from turning into a tyranny of the majority. Two strands of Tocqueville’s analysis relate to this chapter, namely his observations regarding the role of interests and the role of associations in American politics. In relation to the former, Tocqueville found that Americans were fond of explaining almost all their actions by the ‘principle of interest rightly understood’. In Europe, however, claims were justified in absolute moral terms, even if the principle of interest played a ‘much grosser’ role in Europe than in America (2006b [1840] Chapter VIII). For Tocqueville, the consequences of this distinction were obvious: on the one hand, absolute moral claims represented a danger to liberty, even if they were meant to advance the general will of the people. On the other hand, the mutual acknowledgment of conflicting interests, as observed in the USA of the early nineteenth century, enabled the accommodation of conflict and compromise within democratic procedures. With regard to the role of associations in democratic societies, Tocqueville made the following argument: as the rise of the modern state would make individual citizens weaker, they would need to learn to combine with fellow citizens to defend themselves against the despotic influence of a majority or the aggressions of regal power. Therefore, all kinds of associations, even those formed in civil life without reference to political objects, are important because they cultivate the habits and virtues that are necessary for self-rule: Nothing, in my opinion, is more deserving of our attention than the intellectual and moral associations of America. … In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made. Amongst the laws which rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized, or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased (2006b [1840] Chapter V). This quote highlights Tocqueville’s views: associations represent the lifeblood of civic life. Therefore, the state should guarantee its citizens’ right of association. At the same time, however, it should not interfere with the associative life of its citizens. Nevertheless, contemporary pluralists are not against political regulation of associations. Auxiliary state involvement is even warranted if state regulations facilitate the freedom of association of its citizens (Dahl 1982). This qualification is of particular importance in relation to workers’ rights to organize. Incidentally, important states, including ironically the USA, have so far failed to ratify the core conventions of Table 14.2 Ratification of core ILO ‘freedom of association’ conventions—n. 87 (right to organize) and n. 98 (collective bargaining) Country Freedom of association (year of ratification) Right to organize Collective bargaining Australia 1973 1973 Canada 1972 Not ratified France 1951 1951 Germany 1957 1956 Italy 1958 1958 Japan 1965 1953 South Korea Not ratified Not ratified Sweden 1949 1950 UK 1949 1950 USA Not ratified Not ratified Source: ILO 2010 the International Labour Organization in relation to the freedom of association (see Table 14.2). Tocqueville’s views on interests and associations still influence contemporary beliefs about the role of interest associations in democratic societies, as highlighted by the vast literature that treats interest associations as ‘schools of democracy’ (Sinyai 2006). Certainly, several contemporary studies also deplore a decline in associative practices in the US, such as Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2000) or Theda Skocpol’s Diminishing Democracy (2003), but it is equally noteworthy that these critical accounts of American civic and political life did not trigger a fundamental break with the pluralist paradigm. Whereas the classical pluralist approach to interest politics has repeatedly been criticized for its implicit assumptions—notably the assumption that all people enjoy the same capacity to associate and the resulting claim that interest associations are equally distributed across the entire political spectrum (Connolly 1969; Barach and Baratz 1969; Lowi 1969a, 1969b; Lukes 1974; Offe and Wiesenthal 1985)—most students of democracy, explicitly or tacitly, continued to use the pluralist paradigm as a normative yardstick. There were, however, exceptions, as shown by the growing interest in neo-corporatism that emerged in the late 1970s. Corporatist traditions In the 1970s, European social scientists and American Europeanists became increasingly aware of political systems that did not fit into the pluralist Anglo-American model. Some scholars established the concept of neocorporatism as an alternative to pluralist theory in the 263 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS 264 ROLAND ERNE area of interest politics (Schmitter 1974; Goldthorpe 1984; Katzenstein 1984). Others used concepts like consensus democracy or consociational democracy for political systems in which parties that represent different sections of society share power (Lijphart 2008; Armingeon 2002). Although the discovery of a second tier of government, composed of a complex system of intermediary associations, was nothing new (Rokkan 1966; Gruner 1956), Philippe Schmitter’s (1974) article ‘Still the century of corporatism’ inspired a generation of comparativists: ‘All of a sudden, a research field that to many had seemed hopelessly empiricist and Americancentred, began to open up exciting perspectives on vast landscapes of democratic theory, political sociology and social theory in general’ (Streeck 2006: 10). Schmitter’s concept of neo-corporatism not only enabled comparativists to capture the particular role that the organizations of capital and labour play in many countries, but also challenged republican and pluralist notions of interest politics. Like republicans, neocorporatists perceive the political system as a body politic (Rousseau 1973 [1762] Book 2: 260) and not as an aggregation of particular interests as pluralists would argue. Fittingly, the term corporatism had been derived from corpus (body). Unlike republicans however, neocorporatists argue that the body politic is constituted not only by individual cells, but also by organs that perform different, but complementary, functions. Hence, the life and death of the body politic depends on the organic solidarity (Durkheim 1984 [1893]) between its organs as much as on the vitality of its individual cells. As with human bodies, so with the body politic: the uncontrolled growth of individual cells or organs could threaten the functioning of the entire system. Unlike republicans, neo-corporatists argue that interests and interest associations cannot be excluded from the political process. Contrary to pluralists, however, neo-corporatists question the notion of free competition between different interests. Free competition would simply lead to the strongest interests prevailing over weaker interests. This would challenge governability, undermine social justice, and hamper the economic performance of modern mass democracies. Therefore, the state should not only guarantee freedom of association. Public policies should also include measures that guarantee a balance of power between the opposing social interests, notably between the organizations of capital and labour. Only in this case can the outcome of the policy-making process reflect the best arguments, rather than mere power relations between social interests. The latter point is of particular interest in relation to Western Europe, where both the political left and right agreed on the desirability of institutionalizing social interests. On the left, Social Democrats were direct offspring of the organized labour movement. Moreover, European labour parties favoured shifting the conflict between employers and employees from the market place to the political arena where the number of workers tends to be higher than the number of capitalists. This explains why the European labour movement fought for centuries for the extension of the franchise (Erne 2008: 31). On the right, Christian Democrats were closely related to the Catholic Church which also doubted the ability of liberal individualism to provide social integration (Pope Leo XIII 2010 [1891]). Similarly, Austrian, Italian, Irish, Spanish, and Portuguese fascist movements were intrigued by an authoritarian variant of corporatism: namely the pre-modern Ständestaat (corporate state), where power relied, at least on paper, on functional constituencies (estates). Incidentally, Schmitter introduced the term neo-corporatism in order to distinguish it from the fascist corporate state. Arguably, the post-1945 neocorporatist class compromises have little in common with the authoritarian corporatism of the past. Even so, neo-corporatism has a longer history than its prefix implies. Colin Crouch (1993) showed that neo-corporatism flourished especially in countries where guilds of journeymen or power-sharing arrangements between different religious groups contributed to the making of distinct state traditions. But despite the elective affinity between state traditions, Social, and Christian Democrats, neocorporatist arrangements have always remained controversial. Whereas Marxists criticized neo-corporatist pacts as attempts to contain socialist labour activism (Panitch 1980; Hyman 1975), capitalists were never really enthusiastic about sharing power with trade unions. It is therefore not surprising that many business associations actively supported the trend towards neo-liberal politics in the late 1970s, associated with Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US (Harvey 2005). Neo-corporatism, however, is not only a politically contentious subject; it has also been questioned methodologically. Whereas it is easy to define neo-corporatism in theory, even neo-corporatist scholars have not been able to agree on a set of unambiguous measures of corporatism in practise (Schmitter 1981; Lehmbruch 1984; Traxler et al. 2001). In Sweden and Germany, for example, effective corporatist arrangements, both formal and informal, have been reached between the employers’ associations and unions of a particular sector, whereas the national peak organizations of capital and labour have not engaged with each other in overarching social pacts (see Table 14.3). In contrast, the Maastricht Treaty established the European Social Dialogue between the peak organizations of capital and labour as far back as 1993; but the fact that the European social partners can negotiate legally-binding agreements has not led to a neo-corporatist European Union (Erne 2008). Likewise, the Hong Kong SAR can hardly be described as a neocorporatist political system, even if half of its Legislative Council is composed of interest group representatives selected by functional constituencies, representing, OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS CHAPTER 14 INTEREST ASSOCIATIONS however, predominately business interests (Goodstadt 2005). For this reason, any comparative analysis of interest politics systems, it has to be reiterated, must be very aware of the particular context of the different interest politics systems in place in different regions of the world. Nevertheless, the theoretical divide between pluralist and neo-corporatist systems of interest articulation has been very productive for empirical research, especially in comparisons of Anglo-American and European socioeconomic and political systems. During the last two decades, the neo-corporatism vs. pluralism paradigm has inspired several studies, comparing the legitimacy and performance of the coordinated systems of Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland with the liberal systems of interest politics in the Englishspeaking world (Crouch 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; Pontusson 2005; Block 2007). KEY POINTS ● Republican theorists, such as Rousseau, see in interest associations a danger for democracy, because the more particular interests prevail the less politics would represent the general will of the people. ● In contrast, pluralist scholars, such as Tocqueville, perceive interest associations as an essential source of liberty. This view, however, relies on two debatable assumptions: (1) all people enjoy the same capacity to associate and (2) interest associations are equally distributed across the political spectrum. ● Unlike republicans, neo-corporatists claim that interest associations cannot be excluded from the political process. Contrary to pluralists, neo-corporatists fear that free competition between interest groups would lead to stronger prevailing over weaker interests. Therefore, neo-corporatists favour regulations that ensure a balance of power between opposing social interests, notably between the organizations of capital and labour. Interest associations in practice Interest group formation In 1965, the American economist Mancur Olson published his first book, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965), which challenged the pluralist assumption that group formation was equally available to everybody. Assuming that individual action is determined by individual cost–benefit calculations, Olson’s study concludes that selective incentives motivate rational individuals to join interest groups. According to this logic of rational choice, only associations that provide private benefits will prosper, whereas associations that provide public goods, i.e. general benefits without regard to a person’s membership status, will find it almost impossible to attract members. Why should rational individuals pay union subscriptions when collectively agreed wage increases or improvements in social benefits will be applied to everybody whether they are union members or not? Union organizers might respond by saying that the strength of a union, and therefore its capacity to improve working and living conditions, is directly related to the number of its adherents. But how decisive is this argument? Does the power of a large union really increase if its membership number increases by one individual? From Olson’s perspective, the answer is a clear no, as it would be much more rational for the potential union member to take a free ride, relying on the contributions of the existing union members, than to bear the cost of union membership. Consequently, Olson concluded that the formation of interest associations is biased in favour of those associations that are able to offer special advantages, such as for example automobile clubs that offer insurance cover to their members. At first sight, a comparative assessment of trade union membership figures across countries seems to confirm Olson’s arguments: in almost all countries union membership density figures are considerably lower than in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Belgium (the so-called Ghent-system countries) where union membership includes unemployment insurance cover (see Table 14.1 and Scruggs 2002; see also Chapters 21 and 22). In turn, however, Olson cannot explain why rational people voluntarily join unions in countries where union membership does not include selective benefits. Olson’s (1965) claim to have indentified the logic of collective action has also been proved wrong by the events of 1968, which triggered an unexpected resurgence of civic activism and social movements across the world (see Chapter 16). Whereas Olson’s model can explain why some interest associations have more members than others, it cannot explain the formation of interest associations generally. Olson’s individualistic logic of the homo economicus is not the only logic at play when people decide to join interest associations. Collective experiences and moral concerns can also trigger a feeling of an identity of interests between people, as shown in E. P. Thompson’s seminal history The Making of the English Working Class (1963). Olson’s logic has also been qualified by European social scientists who studied The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968 (Crouch and Pizzorno 1978) and by scholars who emphasized the role of entrepreneurial organizers (Salisbury 1969) or external sponsors in the formation of interest groups. Jeffrey Berry, for instance, emphasized that at least a third of the eighty-three American public interest organizations received at least 50 per cent of their funding from private foundations (1977: 72). Similarly, Justin Greenwood 265 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS 266 ROLAND ERNE highlighted that ‘around two-thirds of EU public interest groups obtained funding’ from the European Commission (2003: 179). But even if external support is somewhat compensating the disadvantages of public interest groups, McLean’s review of Olson’s legacy suggests that associations that offer selective incentives to their members still have an advantage, although this may be declining as insurance companies have started to undercut lobbying organizations, such as the British Automobile Association and the Royal Automobile Club, by offering insurance cover at a lower cost (2000: 656). The pluralist notion of equality between interest associations has also been losing ground among scholars of interest politics who did not follow Olson’s rational choice paradigm. In the 1970s, several studies appeared that suggested that group formation and membership were biased in favour of particular social categories with particular resources, notably wealth and time. And in 1985, Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal even challenged the entire ‘interest group stereotype’ (1985: 175), arguing that it would make little sense to use the same label for business associations and trade unions, given the distinct logics of collective action used in the two cases. Offe and Wiesenthal’s two logics of collective action In their seminal work on these two logics of collective action, Offe and Wiesenthal (1985) assessed the associational practices of labour and capital. The two authors proposed to distinguish between different interests in terms of the ability of an interest association to interfere with the policy-making process and not in terms of whether an interest was public or private in character. Offe and Wiesenthal did not argue that business organizations have an advantage because they tend to spend more money on lobbying than other organizations. Instead, they highlighted the structural dependence of politicians in capitalist societies on the holders of capital. As any individual investment decision has an impact on the economic performance of a territory, politicians must consider the views of capitalists whether they are well organized or not. This simplifies the task of business interest representation enormously. Business associations do not face the difficult collective action problems that labour unions and other organizations face. Whereas investment strikes by capital holders do not require collective organization, the withdrawal of labour requires collective organization and the willingness of workers to act together despite the availability of individual exit options. Certainly, the representation of business interests also requires coordination. At times, business associations fail, for instance due to competition between different firms for government support, such as government contracts, government bailouts, or privatization bids. Accordingly, Traxer, Blaschke, and Kittel have argued that ‘it is problematic to translate the pre-associational power asymmetry between businesses and labour into corresponding differentials in terms of associational capacities.’ (2001: 37). Even so, the collective action problem facing workers is much more difficult to solve than that facing corporations. Trade unions rely on their members’ willingness to act collectively. In contrast, business associations only have to tell policy-makers that individual firms will act in an undesirable way if politicians fail to accommodate their interests. In this vein, even the imminent ruin of an organization can turn out to be an effective political tool, as demonstrated in 2008 when business interests successfully lobbied governments around the world to bail out failing banks (Stiglitz 2010). A new typology of interest associations Offe and Wiesenthal’s analysis allows us to introduce a new typology of interest associations in action which does not distinguish associations on the basis of their subject matter or the private or public nature of the represented interests. Instead, I propose a classification based on two analytical distinctions that relate to two axes of collective action. On the x-axis, I distinguish associations on the basis of the nature of their members’ ability to act: to what degree does an association rely on collective action of its members beyond the simple payment of membership fees? On the y-axis, I distinguish associations on the basis of their relation to the political system: to what degree does an association act autonomously from the political system? In other words, to what degree is an association capable of creating facts outside the political system that political institutions cannot ignore? This leads us to a typology that enables us not only to distinguish business associations and trade unions analytically, but also to distinguish both of them from other non-governmental organizations that do not have the power to interfere with policy-making through autonomous action in the economic sphere, namely through individual investment decisions or collective strike action (see Figure 14.1). Figure 14.1 enables us not only to distinguish business associations, trade unions, and other non-governmental organizations analytically, but also to distinguish different repertoires of action that go beyond the lobbying activities that are, at least in theory, available to all interest associations. Reflecting contributions to the study of interest politics from connate disciplines, namely industrial and labour relations and political sociology, our typology also captures alternative action repertoires that are available only to specific types of interest associations: OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS CHAPTER 14 INTEREST ASSOCIATIONS High Private Interest Government Political Exchanges Contentious Politics Degree of autonomy relative to the political system Direct Lobbying Low Low Degree of necessity of members to act collectively High Figure 14.1 Repertoire of action of interest associations ● The capacity to conclude political exchanges with the government (Pizzorno 1978), available to organizations with a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the political system (e.g. business associations and trade unions). ● The capacity to engage in contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2007), available to organizations with a high capacity to engage in collective action (e.g. trade unions and other social movement organizations). ● The capacity set up private interest government structures (Streeck and Schmitter 1985), available to organizations with a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the political system that are capable of being effective without having to engage in collective action (e.g. business associations). Direct lobbying Although the term was originally used to describe attempts to influence lawmakers in the lobbies of the Houses of Parliament, the lobbying literature usually refers to all activities that aim to influence any branch of government at any level of decision-making. In order to distinguish lobbying from other repertoires of action of interest associations, however, I am reserving the term lobbying for the activities that are based on personal access to decision makers in line with the concept of direct or inside lobbying. The American lobbying literature, which still influences the agenda of lobbying researchers across the world, has been particularly concerned with practical questions: What factors explain the success of lobbyists? Whom to lobby to be effective? Truman (1971 [1951]) and numerous scholars that came after him described and compared the lobbying strategies of interest groups vis-à-vis the branches of government: the executive, the state bureaucracy, the legislature, and even the courts (Cigler and Loomis 2007). Predictably, most scholars concluded that the more an interest group is endowed with resources, such as money, legitimacy, and expertise, the higher is its capacity to influence decision-makers and policy outcomes. Lobbying specialists also came to the conclusion that the accessibility of institutions affects the degree of interest group influence on policy outputs. And finally, there seems to be also a consensus among lobbying specialists that the nature of an issue influences the efficacy of lobbying. In addition, growing popular concerns about the impact of interest group money in US elections triggered not only several studies (Currinder et al. 2007; Rozell et al. 2006) but also political reform. These reforms, however, did not aim to balance the inequalities of power within the interest group system, in line with neocorporatist thought, but rather mirrored a shift from a pluralist to a republican understanding of interest group politics. Fittingly, in 2002 the US Congress passed the bipartisan Mc Cain-Feingold Act, which restricted the ability of corporations—but also trade unions—to advertise on behalf of, or in opposition to, a political candidate. However, on 21 January 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States (2010) ruled that the Mc Cain-Feingold 267 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS 268 ROLAND ERNE Act violated the Constitution, stating that its free-speech provisions should apply to corporations and trade unions as well as to individuals. It goes without saying that the ruling, which was determined by the Supreme Court’s conservative majority, caused widespread dismay among commentators, who argued that elections should be won—not bought (Streisand 2010; The Huffington Post 2010). Incidentally, Schattschneider’s (1975 [1960]) observation—according to which political institutions and the ways in which they incorporate political interests into policy-making constitute a mobilization of bias—seem to apply to courts as well (Caldeira and Wright 1998). Be that as it may, a comparative assessment of European state traditions also suggests that there are alternative ways to contain the influence of corporate money in the political process. Neo-corporatist European states do not limit the free-speech rights of interest groups; they do, however, balance the power of competing interest associations through public policy measures that strengthen weaker interest associations, namely through financial assistance as well as institutionalized consultation, codetermination, and veto rights. Consequently, it seems implausible to suggest converging perspectives on interest group research in Europe and America (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008; Dür 2008). Perhaps the application of American questions and paradigms in European interest politics research can be justified by the apparent power of corporate lobbyists in the EU (Corporate Europe Observatory 2010) or the EU’s mode of multi-level governance, which resembles the American federal system at least to some extent (see Chapter 23). However, any analysis that fails to assess alternative types of interest politics in action must produce inaccurate results, especially if it concerns political systems that do not function according to American paradigms. Certainly, European Union politics is less marked by neo-corporatist state traditions than most of its member states. But the participation of functional interests in EU social regulation and the EU’s accompanying legitimating discourse with its emphasis on social dialogue reflect neo-corporatist patterns of political exchange rather than pluralist notions of lobbying and interest group competition (Smismans 2004; Leonard et al. 2007). Political exchange As shown in Figure 14.1, direct lobbying is not the only mechanism through which interest associations influence political power. Associations that operate in the economic sphere, namely business associations and trade unions, are also able to conclude political exchanges with political leaders (Pizzorno 1978). Governments have frequently traded goods with unions or employers in exchange for social consent. In such cases, political exchange power is paradoxically linked to the (partial) renunciation of economic power, namely the capacity to withdraw capital or labour from the production process. In addition, political institutions are dependent on expert knowledge which might not be available within an increasingly restricted and residual public service (Crouch 2004: 89). Accordingly, even corporate lobbying can be conceptualized as political exchange, namely as an exchange of information that is crucial in the policymaking process as against access to the policy-making process (Bouwen 2002). As capital depends on labour in the production process, and vice versa, the organizations of capital and labour may also decide to seek trilateral agreements with the government in exchange for economic performance and social peace. Trade unions have offered employers their collaboration to persuade workers to use controversial technologies, to respect safety regulations, or to retrain. In addition, unions and employers have made joint submissions in favour of their industries, which political decision makers usually find very hard to deny, especially in times of economic crisis. In 2003, for example, even the Directorate General of Competition of the European Commission did not dare push the French multinational company Alstom into bankruptcy and approved a controversial state aid package in the context of a surprisingly transnational mobilization of Alstom workers. Whereas employers often welcome union mobilizations in favour of their industries because unions usually possess better connections with centre-left politicians, the mobilization of Alstom workers proved to be crucial because it Europeanized the political pressures put on the European Commission. As a result, even the German government supported the Alstom bailout, although the German multinational Siemens would have been one of the major beneficiaries of the collapse of the French multinational (Erne 2008). Unions have shared the burden of legitimizing contested political decisions in exchange for more or less favourable public policies, as for example in the case of past EU Treaty referendums (Hyman 2010). Unions have also accepted wage moderation: in exchange for legislation that strengthened workplace co-determination rights during the 1970s, and more recently, simply to make a country more competitive. Sometimes, exchange power even takes on a symbolic form, in which neither politicians nor unions exchange any material goods but only expertise and legitimacy (Crouch 2000). In this context, interest associations can no longer be perceived as a counter-power to the state. Instead, they become actors within a policy network that also assumes governmental functions. However, given the increasing exit options that neo-liberal politics and the internationalization of the economic provided to capital, even the proponents of neo-corporatism had doubts about whether the political exchanges that characterized neo-corporatism could be sustained (Streeck and Schmitter 1991). OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS CHAPTER 14 INTEREST ASSOCIATIONS But surprisingly, in the 1990s social pacts were even concluded in countries, such as Ireland and Italy (Erne 2008; Molina and Rhodes 2002), where the structural preconditions of neo-corporatism were missing (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). Accordingly, Traxler et al. (2001) used the term lean corporatism with reference to the unexpected reappearance of the corporatist Sisyphus in the 1990s (Schmitter and Grote 1997). But in 2008 and 2009, social partnership collapsed again in Italy and Ireland, whereas the peak associations of capital and labour continue to play a major role in the face of the economic crisis in established neo-corporatist countries (see Table 14.3). The collapse of social pacting in Ireland highlights a particular problem related to ‘competitive corporatism’ (Rhodes 1998). Workers accepted wage moderation— that is a smaller share of the national income—in exchange for an overall higher growth rate that would follow from higher profits of Irish businesses. During the booming Celtic Tiger years, it seemed that capital, labour, and the state found an arrangement that triggered a spectacular period of economic and employment growth (Roche and Cradden 2003). But when growth rates collapsed, the Irish government and employers’ associations abandoned partnership and imposed unilateral wage cuts. Whereas Irish workers accepted a smaller share of the national income when it was growing, they found it very difficult to accept getting a smaller slice of a shrinking cake. It follows that corporatist deals can be very risky, especially for labour. Why should unions support wage moderation in boom years, when they must learn in times of crisis that partnership is not honoured anymore? The major difficulty with the exchange power of a union, however, is its dependence on the capacity to threaten social stability (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985). In contrast to the exchange power of capitalists, labour’s exchange power entirely depends on its collective mobilization power. Hence, exchange power uses—but does not reproduce—mobilization power. The use of exchange power might even cause a decline in union membership that would finally undermine the very capacity to conclude exchanges. This explains why unions that univocally support social partnership need to show occasionally that their consent cannot be taken for granted, as shown by Hyman with regard to the German case (2001). Contentious politics Interest associations also engage at times in contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2007; see Chapter 16)—or Table 14.3 Labour relations systems and social pacts (1985—2009) Social pactsb Typology of labour relation regimesa 1985 Sweden Voluntary coordination Norway Classic corporatism Denmark Lean corporatism Finland Classic corporatism Netherlands Lean corporatism Belgium Statism Germany Lean corporatism 1990–1999 Crisis agreementsc − 2000–2007 0 ++ + + + ++ ++ + + 2008–2009 + ++ 0 + + + ++ − + + ++ − ++ − 0 0 Austria Lean corporatism 0 France Statism 0 Italy Voluntary coordination Spain NAl Portugal NAl Ireland Voluntary coordination ++ UK Neo-liberal 0 + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 0 0 0 0 Source: Adopted from Traxler et al. (2001) and Rehfeldt (2009) a Traxler et al. 2001 (NA1 = the variables used by Traxler et al. do not provide a clear determination of this case). b and c Rehfeldt. 2009 (++ = social pact; + = sectoral agreement; o = no agreement; − = negotiations failed. 269 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS 270 ROLAND ERNE outside lobbying (Schattschneider 1960) in the language of the American lobbying literature. Whereas business associations very rarely see the need to engage in contentious collective action (e.g. public demonstrations or lockouts), strike action is often seen as the constitutive power of labour. In contrast to other social movements, unions engage in contentious politics mainly to compel institutions to compromise. In contrast to Rosa Luxemburg (2008 [1906]), most unions understand contentious politics not as tool to achieve a different society but rather as an action of last resort to remind corporations and governments of labour’s price for cooperation. Ironically, however, the more the unions’ capacity to wage collective action declined, the more difficult it became to defend the achievements of the mid-twentieth century class compromise that led to the formation of the modern welfare state (see Chapter 21). The growing cross-border mobility of capital provides employers with a wider range of possibilities to counter collective action on the part of labour. Ongoing restructuring processes and threats to delocalize enterprises have considerably weakened union power in industrialized countries, even if capital is not as footloose as is often alleged. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that strikes have disappeared in the new world of global capitalism (Silver 2003; Bronfenbrenner 2007; van der Velden et al. 2007). Yet, industrial conflicts often involve relatively small groups of core workers, especially in the public sector, and fail to include the marginalized peripheral workforce. Although the European peak organizations of employers and workers signed a legally binding European Social Dialogue agreement that stated that employees on fixed-term contracts cannot be treated less favourably than permanent staff (European Industrial Relations Dictionary 2010), Hyman (1999) observed a growing polarization between different sections of the working class. This obviously undermines working class solidarity, and, thus, also the capacity of unions to conclude general political exchanges. Although the contemporary orthodoxy that social class no longer exists can be contested with sociological analysis, the increasing difficulty of subordinate groups to unite as a class entails major consequences for interest politics and democracy alike (Crouch 2004: 53): How is it possible to reconcile democracy and interest politics, if the latter seem to be increasingly dominated by a selfconfident global shareholding and business executive class? In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, Crouch gave a pessimistic answer to this question: whereas democratic politics would continue to play a role in some areas, the democratic state would be vacating its ‘former heartland of basic economic strategy’. Instead, economic policy would be shaped by ‘the great corporations, particularly those in the financial sector’ (2009: 398), due to the decline of the manual working class and the failure of new social movements to constitute a new class that stands for a general social interest. Consequently, economic policy would become a private matter of business interests, even if corporations might, at times, be held accountable by public appeals to corporate social responsibility. Private interest government In neo-corporatist systems, the state integrates associations into policy networks. In the case of private interest government however, the state goes even a step further and delegates its authority to make binding decisions to interest groups (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). As far back as the Middle Ages, producer associations established private interest government structures, namely the guilds, in order to police the markets. After the French revolution however, the regulation of markets became a domain of the nation-state, mainly to suit the needs of modern industry. When the working class entered as a compelling social force in politics, it seemed that the days of self-regulation of economic affairs by business would definitely be numbered. Yet, in a particular economic sector, guild-like patterns of private interest government remained crucially important. In the agriculture sector, self-governing producer associations continued to police the production and distribution of goods throughout the twentieth century (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Although agriculture policy became an important pillar of the European common market project, states continued to support the selfgoverning bodies of the sector by public policy and laws. Even in countries with no corporatist traditions, such as the UK, the US, and France, farmers’ associations were co-opted into public policy networks that governed agricultural policy (Smith 1993; Muller 1984). Although state policy was very important in this process, it would be wrong to explain the important self-governing role of farmers’ associations exclusively in terms of state intervention. If that were true, the de-collectivization of agricultural land by the post-socialist state in Romania after 1989 would not have been followed by a remarkable reappearance of voluntary producers’ associations (Stan 2005). Several studies of private interest government arrangements in the Swiss diary industry—where self-governing structures were particularly important— highlighted other enabling conditions, namely the sector’s importance for public welfare, its economic significance, and the seasonal variation and perishableness of its produce (Traxler and Unger 1994). In addition, Peter Farago (1985) stressed the remarkably high group coherence among the people involved in the sector. The selfgoverning capacity of farmers’ associations in agriculture seemed to owe much to the absence of articulated economic conflicts within the sector. Whereas associations in other business sectors are split along class and other economic cleavages, farmers’ associations managed to OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS CHAPTER 14 INTEREST ASSOCIATIONS unite producers irrespective of their economic status. As a result, the fact that farmers’ associations could credibly claim to speak for the entire sector definitely facilitated the self-governing capacity of these associations. But the more the agricultural sector internationalized, the more evident conflicts between local farmers and international agribusiness corporations became. In several countries, small farmers left the once all-encompassing farmers’ associations and founded autonomous farmers’ groups that subsequently played an important role in anti-globalization or global justice movements (della Porta and Caiani 2009). In this context, it is not surprising that it became increasingly difficult, but not impossible, to sustain the private interest governing structures in this sector. Traditional private interest governments such as the Swiss Cheese Union collapsed. In some cases, however, new self-governing private interest government systems also emerged, for instance around Appellations d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC) food certification, production control, and marketing regimes (Wagemann 2004). The shift in policy-making from partisan politics to autonomous agencies has also been the focus of scholars that studied the rise of regulatory governance (Majone 1994). According to Majone, regulatory governance is meant to keep interest groups out of policy-making process by relieving the process of the ‘negative consequences’ of electoral pressures on the quality of regulation. In other words, advocates of regulatory governance aim to reduce interest group influence by the exclusion of elected politicians from the policy-making process. Policy-making would be better if it was left to independent agencies: for example, to independent central banks in relation to monetary policy, or independent competition authorities in relation to competition policy. It goes without saying that the exclusion of interests and democratic interest intermediation from the policy-making process of regulatory agencies is at variance with both pluralist and neo-corporatist paradigms of interest politics. To some extent, the theory of regulatory governance comes closest to the unitarist republican paradigm, without its democratic rhetoric however. But like republican theory, regulatory governance faces a major problem: how can one be sure that regulatory agencies do not serve the interest that was able to capture a dominant position in the agency’s decision-making process? Regulative agencies tend to be shaped by powerful political actors and ideologies, as confirmed by the exclusion of social and labour interests from the frames of references that govern the monetary policy of the European Central Bank and the competition policy of the Directorate General of the European Commission (Erne 2008). For that reason regulatory governance structure ‘often masks ideological choices which are not debated and subject to public scrutiny beyond the immediate interests related to the regulatory management area’ (Weiler, et al. 1995: 33). In this vein, regulatory governance might be more properly understood if it is conceptualized as disguised private interest government. KEY POINTS ● Selective incentives motivate individuals to join interest groups. But collective experiences and moral concerns can also trigger collective action. Finally, organizers or external sponsors may also play a role in the formation of interest groups. ● The power of an interest association depends on its capacity to create facts that governments cannot ignore. In contrast to most other associations, however, business groups usually do not need to engage in collective action, because each individual investment decision has a political impact. ● The various action repertoires of interest associations (direct lobbying, political exchange, contentious politics, and private interest government) reflect the different power sources that are available to different interest associations. Conclusion Whatever their origin or theoretical background, comparativists of interest politics have agreed across time that interest associations play a crucial role in the political process. Our analysis of different schools of thought, however, has also showed that there is no agreement on whether interest associations represent a danger or a ‘school for democracy’ (Sinyai 2006). It is therefore not surprising that the relationship between democracy and interest articulation, which preoccupied political thinkers like Rousseau and Tocqueville centuries ago, still preoccupies contemporary researchers. Whereas some analysts note that technocrats and corporate lobbyists are increasingly determining socio-economic policy (Crouch 2004), others detect twin processes of popular and elite withdrawal from electoral politics (Mair 2006). To this Tocqueville might have responded: ‘the weaker individual citizens become mirroring the rise of post-democratic governance at all levels of policymaking, the more they need to learn to combine with fellow citizens to defend themselves against the despotic influence of regulatory agencies or the aggressions of corporate power.’ Accordingly, many studies ask what contribution interest associations make to the democratic involvement of citizens in the current era (Jordan and Maloney 2007; Cohen and Rogers 1995). This democracy–interest association nexus is also of particular importance in studies that assess the legitimacy of European Union politics (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Erne 2008; Kohler-Koch et al. 2008; Smismans 2006). 271 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS 272 ROLAND ERNE Comparative studies of interest politics are also crucial in order to explain variations in capitalisms and welfare states across the developed world (Hancké 2009). Why did companies in Germany lay off fewer workers in 2009 than corporations in the US although the global economic crisis hit both countries equally? Arguably, the difference can be explained by the different systems of interest intermediation that are in place in the two countries. Whereas the prevailing orthodoxy contrasted a neo-corporatist Europe with its higher level of social security and equality to the higher growth rates of the neoliberal US, the prospect of a jobless recovery in America might trigger analysts to have another look at the coordinated market economies of continental Europe. Given the impact of interest group politics on both democracy and the social and economic well-being of people, it is no exaggeration to claim that the study of politics and society cannot forego the contributions of comparativists in this field. There remains, however, one caveat. Students of interest politics should always remain vigilant for studies that seek to increase the field’s coherence by reducing its scope to the narrowness and parochialism that dominated some sections of the lobbying and pressure group literature in the past. KEY POINTS ● Interest associations play a crucial role in the political process. But there is no agreement on whether interest associations sustain or undermine democracy; especially in the current context of a growing internationalization of interest politics. For this reason, the relationship between democracy and interest politics is of particular importance in studies that assess the democratic legitimacy of supra-national organizations, such as the European Union. ● Interest associations—and the particular rules and regulations that govern them—also affect the socio-economic and political outcomes of a particular country. Comparative studies of interest politics have therefore been crucial in order to explain variations in capitalisms and welfare states across the world. uestions 1. What is an interest association? What is its relation to political parties and social movements? 6. Is there relationship between different models of capitalism and different interest group systems? 2. Why are interest associations so difficult to define in a comparative context? 7. To what extent do business associations have a privileged position in liberal democracies? 3. Does it make sense to distinguish ‘public’ and ‘private interest groups’? 8. Distinguish four action repertoires of interest associations and discuss whether they are equally available to different types of interest associations. 4. Indentify and discuss the underlying assumptions of pluralist theory in relation to interest associations. 5. Describe the three major theoretical traditions for the analysis of interest politics and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each. 9. Which type of interest group action is typical within a neo-corporatist political and socio-economic system? 10. Are we witnessing a convergence of interest politics across the globe? Further reading Cigler, Allan. J., and Loomis, Brudett. A. (eds) (2007) Interest Group Politics. 7th edition (Washington, DC: CQ Press). A contemporary review of US interest politics. Crouch, Colin (1993) Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press). An analysis of state–society relations that explains ongoing differences between national industrial relations systems across Europe. Crouch, Colin and Streeck, Wolfgang. (eds) (2006) The Diversity of Democracy: Corporatism, Social Order and Political Conflict (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). A reassessment of the neo-corporatist argument by major protagonists in the field. Dahl, Robert. A. (1982) Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven and London: Yale University Press). A self-reflective reassessment of the pluralist argument. OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS CHAPTER 14 INTEREST ASSOCIATIONS Erne, Roland (2008) European Unions: Labor’s Quest for a Transnational Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). An analysis of national and EU-level trade union politics that challenges the assertion that no realistic prospect exists for remedying the European Union’s democratic deficit. Olson, Marcur (1965) The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press). A seminal book on interest group formation written from a rational choice perspective. Greenwood, Justin (2007) Interest Representation in the EU. 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan). A study that reviews the activities of various interest associations in European Union politics. Schmitter, Philippe. C., and Lehmbruch, Gerhard. (eds.) (1979) Trends Towards Corporatist Mediation (London: Sage Publications). The classic study on neo-corporatism that includes Schmitter’s chapter ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’ Offe, Claus (1980) Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics, (Cambridge: Polity). This book includes Offe and Wiesenthal’s seminal chapter on ‘Two Logics of Collective Action’. Smismans, Stijn (ed.) (2006) Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) A study that reviews the contribution of interest associations to European Union politics. Web links <http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/284/1/ 97_4.pdf> Schmitter, P. C., and Grote, J.R. (1997) ‘The Corporatist Sisyphus: Past, Present and Future’, European University Institute Working Paper SPS 97/4. <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/r/rousseau/jean_jacques/ r864s/> Rousseau’s The Social Contract: and Discourses as a free EBook. <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/index_en.htm> The ‘Register for Interest Representatives’ has been set up by the European Transparency Initiative of the European Commission. <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/2630> Wagemann, C. (2004) ‘Private Interest Governments are Dead. Long Live Private Interest Governemnts?’ European University Institute Working Paper SPS 2004/13. <http://lobby.la.psu.edu/> Website of a collaborative US research project on lobbying and policy advocacy in the US that has been funded by the National Science Foundation. <http://www.connex-network.org/> Website of a European research network that published several studies on interest associations and EU governance. <http://www.corporateeurope.org/> The Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) is a research and campaign group working to expose and challenge the privileged access and influence enjoyed by corporations and their lobby groups in EU policy making. <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu> The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) is a tripartite EU agency that provides expertise on living and working conditions and industrial relations in Europe. <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/ industrialrelations/dictionary/> The European Industrial Relations Dictionary of Eurofound. <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/htmlfiles/ ef0694.htm> Léonard, E., Erne R., Marginson P., and Smismans S. (2007) New Structures, Forms and Processes of Governance in European Industrial Relations as a free EBook. <http://www.fec.gov/> The Federal Election Commission is an independent regulatory agency set up by the US Congress. Its duties are to disclose campaign finance information, to enforce the provisions of the law such as the limits and prohibitions on contributions, and to oversee the public funding of Presidential elections. <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/815> and < http://www .gutenberg.org/etext/816> Tocqueville’s Democracy in America as a free EBook. <http://www.ilo.org/> The International Labour Organization is the tripartite UN agency that brings together governments, employers and workers of its member states in common action to promote decent work throughout the world. <http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/lobbying> The ‘OECD Recommendation on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying’ adopted in February 2010 is the first international policy instrument to provide guidance for policy-makers on how to promote ‘good governance principles in lobbying’. 273 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF - FIRST-PROOF, 09/16/10 LASERWORDS 274 ROLAND ERNE <www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/research/subjectGuides/ laborUnions.html> ‘Labor Unions and the Internet’. Commented link collection maintained by the Catherwood Library (Cornell University). While this link collection focuses on the US, there are some very useful links to international sites as well. <http://eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/> European Industrial Relations Observatory. Offers news and analysis on European industrial relations. <www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/flt/main.htm> Foreign Labor Trends (ILAB). Website maintained by the US Department of Labor Bureau of International Labor Affairs, with information from about twenty countries around the world. <www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/union> Cyber Picket Line. Comprehensive collection of links to unionrelated matters, including links to (some) unions around the world (World Trade Union Directory). <www.unionstats.com> The Union Membership and Coverage Database. Data resource for the US, providing private and public sector labour union membership, coverage, and density estimates. <www.ilo.org> The International Labour Organization. A UN specialized agency which seeks the promotion of social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights. Contains a wealth of data on union-related matters; see especially <www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/portal/ index.htm>. <http://eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/> Collective Bargaining Europe. ‘The ‘Collective Bargaining Europe’ website from the European Trade Union Institute aims to ensure the supply of information on current bargaining developments related to the coordination of collective bargaining, especially at the European level. The site contains country reports on bargaining developments in the previous year from all EU countries and some of the candidate countries. These country reports are then summarized in the annual report Collective Bargaining in Europe. Various articles on the economic background of collective agreements, as well as good practice examples, are available under the heading ‘Special Features’ (quoted from website). <www.etui-rehs.org/> European Trade Union Institute. Their mission is ‘to become the single best and most respected European knowledge and competence centre in relation to the world of labour’ (from their site). Many links, reports, data, and the like on labourrelated matters. For additional material and resources, please visit the Online Resource Centre at: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/caramani2e/