Interest Groups (Political Science)

This paper analyses the role of educational interest groups in the context of current educational policy in Spain. The paper focuses on the historical and structural factors that are the basis for understanding the constitution of educa- tional interests. It argues that the historical educational dualism and the political opposition between public and pri- vate education explains not only the emergence and political position of each educational actor, but also the dynamics of interaction between them and their strategies to influence policy making and implementation. The final section of the paper analyses the relationship between interest groups and the State. It argues that the diverse and heterogeneous educational demands lead to a specific form of educational politics and explain the conditioned relative autonomy of the Spanish State in education policy making.

The question of who wins or loses in the policy process lies at the heart of recent research into both interest groups and public policy. However, one of the most difficult challenges when empirically analysing interest groups consists in knowing exactly how to measure their influence: despite the fact that this question has been addressed by political scientists for decades, significant problems remain regarding both the conceptual definition and empirical measurement of influence. In order to develop a better understanding of interest group influence, I recommend as follows: (a) that such influence be conceptualized as a degree of preference attainment; (b) that the degree of generality of the concept be downgraded, by breaking it up on the basis of two fundamental dimensions: the lobbying direction (pro-status quo or anti-status quo) and the policy-making stage (agenda setting; decision making; implementation); (c) to proceed with a manual hand-coding in order to obtain a list of the policy issues around which interest groups lobby; (d) to resort to an expert survey in order to evaluate these issues. This methodological approach is used to empirically measure the influence that Italy’s professional orders had on the liberalization process championed by the second Prodi government in 2006.

Planung und Evaluation im Public-Affairs-Management (PA) erfordern eine strategische Vorstellung von Ziel-Mittel-Relationen sowie Verlaufs- und Ergebnisinformationen über Veränderungen. Der Beitrag gibt in drei Teilen einen Überblick über Probleme und Lösungsideen dieser Aufgabe, die weniger der schematischen Kontrolle als der Strategiekompetenz und Lernkultur dienen sollte. Der erste Abschnitt umreißt die Ambivalenzen und Grenzen der PA-Metrie und legt dar, wie Werttreiber und Wirkungsmodelle einen Planungs- und Evaluationsrahmen für einzelne Messkonzepte bilden. Die zwei folgenden Abschnitte erläutern praktische Anwendungen: Bewertungstechniken für dauerhafte Verbandsmitgliedschaften von Unternehmen und stärker projektbezogen für das Lobbying bei Einzelvorhaben.

L’actualité illustre régulièrement la pression exercée sur les décideurs par des entre- prises dont le chiffre d’affaires dépend de la norme juridique. Nombre d’industries extractives, des entreprises du secteur de la chimie ou des transports, luttent éner- giquement contre les perspectives d’une économie décarbonée ou autres mesures ambi- tieuses, aujourd’hui débattues par les auto- rités publiques à Bruxelles et en Europe. Le phénomène ne se réduit pourtant pas à leurs stratégies.
Quelle est l’importance du lobbying sur les questions d’environnement? Ce phénomène est-il nouveau ? Ceux que l’on désigne par facilité comme des lobbies sont-ils tous équivalents ? Quels sont les modes d’action et stratégies utilisés?
Un court article pour en rendre compte.

This article analysis Governments and interest group’s intermediation of employment interest under neo-corporatism to understand young third-country immigrants’ transition to work in  Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Existing research pointed to neo-corporatism that  emphasize large interest group organization cooperates with each other and with public
authorities in interest intermediation to reconcile competing group’s interest with the public,  but the governance leads to inequality. Although neo-corporatism involves regulatory  weakness, there is still little research in Central Eastern European (CEE) countries explaining  Government and interests’ group intermediation of employment interest under neo-corporatism to understand young third-country immigrants’ transition to work. Based on a  qualitative cross-national case-oriented research approach with fewer-country comparison,  documents, published and unpublished scholastic texts are collected and analysed by a  document and content analysis technique to fill in this gap. The findings show that exchange  interaction, industrial restructuring, and compliance monitoring instruments are a major  perceived influence in neo-corporatism governance with a lack of public value accountability  that may impair the reconciliation of social dispute when looking at issues such as young third-country immigrants and socioeconomically disadvantaged groups in interest  intermediation setting. The study demonstrates certain decentralised multilevel corporatist  governance similarities but dissimilarities from the country’s institutional context. The  outcome points to regulatory administrative devices to manage interest group’s crisis and  young vulnerable people’s employment opportunities. This is relevant to bureaucratic  accountability and deliberate democracy, but the risks to democratic deficit, competitiveness,  political inequality, and inefficiency in the complex policy implementation process may  impair ethnic minority people’s belongings, jeopardize public the trust, and hampered open democratic values.

tCanada is the only Universal Health Insurance country in the OECD without universal insurance for outpa-tient prescription drugs, a situation generally perceived as unfair and inefficient. In June 2018, the federalgovernment launched an Advisory Council on the Implementation of National Pharmacare, to report in2019 on the best strategy to implement a national Pharmacare program that would provide all Canadiansaccess to affordable outpatient prescription drugs. The Council was asked to consider three options: auniversal public plan for all Canadians; a public catastrophic insurance plan that would kick off oncespending on prescription drugs reaches a given threshold; and a more modest patching of existing gaps,providing coverage to those who are not eligible to any form of insurance. Beyond the relative consensusaround the ideas that gaps in coverage should be filled to make drugs affordable to all, and that the costsof drugs are too high in Canada, the Council faces the challenge of addressing three underlying issues:1) what amount of income redistribution will result from each of the three options; 2) how much sav-ings would the implementation of a single payer generate? 3) what role restricting a national formularywould play in achieving those savings, and what would be the political consequences of narrowing theformulary?

This paper focuses on the reasons that Italian interest groups decide to lobby together with like-minded groups ('friends'), or engage in networking activity with groups that have conflicting interests ('foes'), in order to influence public policy. How often do Italian interest groups recur to these lobbying strategies? What favours the construction of a coalition of more or less different interest groups lobbying on a particular issue? What, on the contrary, influences the decision to lobby individually? In order to answer these questions, original data coming from a national survey conducted on 1277 Italian interest groups are provided. Empirical results are interesting: from a descriptive point of view, business groups are more likely to engage in joint lobbying than other group types, whereas the same holds true for unions with respect to networking with rival organizations. From an explanatory point of view, groups that perceive themselves to be threatened by rivals' influence in policymaking, or by environmental challenges, are more likely to work in coalitions and to engage in networking: resources do not matter in 'absolute' and 'objective' terms, but in 'relative' and 'subjective' ones.

There is an increasing involvement of interest groups in Nigeria's housing processes. Prior research has examined their contribution but focusing on the cooperative sector. This study bridge the gap by examining the housing activities of interest groups in a broader perspective. Documentary research method was employed with a view to collecting large volume of data for analysis. The analysis confirmed the existence of multiple interest groups: those operating across the globe, those operating within the continental space of Africa and those that operate within Nigeria. Interestingly, these interest groups have forged partnerships that benefits Nigeria's housing system in respect of funding, policy advocacy and research. These relationships deserve empirical study that would critically examine the variables that influence their outcomes. Secondly, the relationship of international and local interest groups is furthering the integration of the Nigerian housing sub-sector first, into the global economy, and second, into the continental economy of Africa. The benefits and challenges associated with this integration need to be empirically studied.

This paper analyses internet blocking regulations in established liberal democracies. We present evidence about the varying extent to which such regulations have been implemented across 21 countries, differentiate between types of regulations and attempt to explain the variation both of the extent and of the dominant type of regulation across countries. We do so by constructing and analysing a dataset comprising internet content regulation for the years from 2004 to 2012. Focusing on political-institutional variables, we ask which of them are driving or hindering the adoption of internet content regulation in the countries in question. Our results should be seen as a first attempt to bring more evidence and clarity to an area that has seen little work so far rather than as definitive answers to the questions raised. ∗Draft! Please do not cite or quote without authors’ permission. Please address queries to andreas.busch@sowi.uni-goettingen.de

Germany likely employs Europe’s largest national lobby labor force. This article presents a comprehensive study of German lobbyists’ workplaces and employer expectations of competencies. It provides insights into emerging requirements for a qualified workforce in a diversified job market.
Drawing on multiple sources of statistics, surveys and cases, a first section examines staffing and entry routes for the main employer types – associations, corporations and consultancies. The job market offers a broad range of career options. This includes an emerging set of junior training programs. German employers have devised fully-paid apprenticeship models as structured practical learning schemes where rotating workplace assignments alternate with seminar learning. Some employers partner in training alliances. Traineeships are tailor-made and unregulated, but their existence points to a growing employer interest in formally developing a talent base and professionalism.
A second section offers a job market snapshot based on 189 advertisements from 2012 to 2014. Job ads can be assumed to be an objective measure of employers’ articulated intentions and expectations for a quality pool of applicants. The survey tabulates preferences for experience, academic degrees, knowledge areas, personal, social and method competencies, and specific political expert skills. Results demonstrate a complex interplay of qualifications and requirements. Ads also show great variety and ambiguity, suggesting that lobbying lacks standardized job classifications and a stable common vocabulary.
Findings show that organizational settings influence task and competency combinations expressed in job ads. While all employers appear to follow similar recruiting patterns in regard to some qualifications, they also differ. For example, associations and businesses place more emphasis on policy concepts, organizational participation, coordination, administration, and direct representation than do consultancies, while the latter stress advisory roles and strategizing. Corporations get less involved in campaign advocacy. Associations focus on members. Consulting firms tend to recruit younger, less experienced staff, and to less often request domain knowledge. Highlighting commonalities and differences, this paper may help stimulate discussion on explicating employers’ competency-based human capital management and recruiting practices.
The results may help develop guidelines for apprenticeship schemes, continuing education, organized efforts of professional bodies and university curricula.

After decades of public aid, FIAT went into the 2000s without help from the state. While this initially threatened to lead to bankruptcy, it subsequently proved a key factor in the company's transformation from a national into a global player. Its ties with the state, formerly viewed as a means of survival and development, have gradually loosened, and FIAT has begun an autonomous process of expansion which has given it a new structural power to shift investment and production from Italy towards countries offering better conditions and favourable enterprise policies. The present article analyses this process, FIAT's change in strategy with regard to the government, and the possible consequences of a downsizing in Italy of what is now the nation's only multinational manufacturing company.

With a very few exceptions, scholars have devoted little attention to the analysis of the Italian interest system so far. This paper aims to address exactly this lacuna. Following a diachronic perspective, the combination of a population ecology approach with the analysis of interest groups’ access to parliament makes it possible to measure the level of bias characterising a fundamental part of interest group representation in Italy. Empirical findings suggest that—over time—the density of the system increased, and also diversity changed to a great extent. Furthermore, the Italian interest system—at least with regard to parliamentary access—appears less biased in recent years than it was in the 1980s. Among the potential factors that pushed in this direction, this article sheds light on a factor often neglected in the literature: the impact of parties and party systems on interest group representation and bias. More precisely, due to the political and institutional turmoil of early 1990s, parties lost their previous role of policy gatekeepers and this implied that the policymaking process is now more chaotic, as well as open to many more different actors than it was in the past, when only interest groups which were ‘collateral’ to parties could have a role in the policymaking.

Chi sono le più influenti lobby italiane? Come e quanto riescono a incidere sulle decisioni pubbliche? E tutto questo che effetti ha sul funzionamento e la qualità della nostra democrazia? Nel rispondere a tali importanti interrogativi, l’autore mette a confronto i tratti salienti della politica degli interessi così come è andata strutturandosi nel corso della storia repubblicana, con un’attenta e puntuale analisi di come si presenta oggi. Nello specifico, vengono illustrate le caratteristiche distintive del sistema rispetto alla propria densità e differenziazione interna, nonché alle modalità attraverso le quali i gruppi di interesse italiani conducono la propria attività di lobbying, accedono alle diverse sedi istituzionali – nazionali e comunitarie – e incidono sul processo decisionale. Ne emerge un quadro decisamente rinnovato rispetto all’assetto della Prima Repubblica. Da un lato, all’interno del sistema è molto aumentato il grado di pluralismo: sempre più gruppi, rappresentanti una sempre più ampia varietà di interessi organizzati, sono oggi in grado di giocare un ruolo importante nel processo decisionale. Dall’altro lato, il prezzo di questa maggiore apertura risiede in una aumentata frammentazione e instabilità del sistema, principalmente legata al ridimensionamento dei partiti politici quali attori principali del policymaking.

Lobbying regulation refers to the set of rules, norms, and practical frameworks that aim to shape how lobbying is done in a specific political system. Rules include pieces of legislation and regulatory provisions such as laws or ministerial decrees; norms include codes of conduct or ethical standards enforced more or less thoroughly in the various contexts; practical frameworks refer to actual models or platforms (governmental or private) designed and used to enable lobbying and participation, for instance in consultation processes. Such sets of rules, norms and frameworks regard a wide range of topics and domains, relative to policymakers on the one hand and to interest groups and lobbyists on the other. These include lobbying registers (of lobbyists and stakeholders), revolving doors (between public and private offices) and conflicts of interest, political financing, public procurement and anti-corruption, the disclosure of meetings between public officials and representatives of interest groups, the transparency and the general openness of the policymaking processes, and the accountability of policymakers. In this entry, we provide an overview of the above-mentioned areas of lobbying regulation, with a special focus on lobbying registers (the object of most scholars' attention in this field). We set out the reasons that have generally been put forward for the adoption of dedicated lobbying laws and discuss the indexes and the methodological aspects related to comparative research on different lobbying regulations.

In den letzten Jahren ist Lobbyismus von der EU gefördert worden. Dies geschah durch die steigende Zahl von Genehmigungen und die Schaffung des Transparency Registers, in dem alle am Policy-Making Prozess teilnehmende Interessengruppen registriert sein müssen, zwecks die demokratischen Lücke auszufüllen und einen breiteren Teil der Gesellschaft zu vertreten. Ziel des Entscheidungsprozesses soll aber, gerecht und repräsentativ zu bleiben und von seiner Aufgabe des Schutzes des Gemeinwohls nicht abzuweichen.
Während die Herausforderungen im Hinsicht auf dem Klimawandel und der Energiewende immer mehr von Belang werden, nimmt die Herstellung legislativen Normen in diesen Bereichen zu. Jeder Teil der Gesellschaft strebt danach, gehört zu werden und seine Interessen in dieser Übergangsphase zu bewahren.
Unter diesen Umständen kann die folgende Frage gestellt werden: Wie können sich die Machtverhältnisse zwischen umweltbezogenen Interessen- bzw. Zweckgruppen und dem europäischen parlamentarischen System bezeichnen lassen?

The present period of economic globalization originated following World War II. Given the strongly protectionist tendencies prevailing at the time, how did this happen? Structural economic and military causes, along with intervening coalitional and institutional factors, are considered. Trade policy change is examined in the five largest trading economies—Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the United States. Structural economic causes best explain why protectionist tendencies were so strong, and why they were weakest in the United States and the Federal Republic. The liberalizing trend inaugurated in the United States and the Federal Republic was also facilitated by coalitional side payments to agriculture. Cold War–related military interests appear to have been the strongest impetus behind the unilateral form of the liberalization.

Pluralism, in its many  ramifications,  represents  a  particularly broad  line  of  political  and  social  thought  as well as an approach to empirical analysis. The intellectual roots of the concept can be traced back over centuries. In modern political science,  the  term  has  been  mostly  associated with  analyses  of  the  influence  of  interest groups  over  executive  political  decision- making. As a paradigmatic theory and method, the approach was not fully elaborated until the mid  20th  century.  It  then  quickly  developed into a classic, often dominant approach to the study  of  politics  in  the  Western  world. The article approaches the concept and theory of pluralism from a historico-developmental perspective.

Nonostante un processo decisionale sempre più frammentato e mutevole, che sembrerebbe vincolare i governi a rispondere velocemente (e, spesso, unilateralmente) alle sfide poste dalla quotidianità, la maggior parte delle politiche approvate nelle democrazie contemporanee registra il fattivo coinvolgimento dei gruppi di interesse, abili a premere sui decisori pubblici e, per il tramite di ciò, ottenere risultati di policy. Come si spiega questo (apparente) paradosso? E che effetti ha sul funzionamento della democrazia nel suo complesso? Il testo risponde a tali importanti quesiti attraverso la sistematica ricognizione della più recente letteratura sull’argomento – dai concetti fondamentali agli approcci teorici, dalle modalità del lobbying alle relazioni tra gruppi e partiti, dall’accesso alle sedi istituzionali all’influenza sul processo di policy – gettando nuova luce su un tema classico della riflessione politologica.

In this essay we will discuss the question of whether interest groups enhance or undermine democracy. We will begin by defining what interest groups are; thereafter we will present a short definition of democracy, followed by an examination of the arguments for each side.

В статье проанализировано лоббирование корпорациями и некоммерческими организациями общественных и частных интересов в Европейском Союзе. НКО (некоммерческие организации) в сфере частных интересов чаще всего лоббируют потребительские интересы, интересы защиты окружающей среды и многообразных сообществ (например женщин). Корпорации чаще всего лоббируют частные интересы: отраслевые, профессиональные, а также интересы частных компаний. Часто они конкурируют при продвижении своих интересов, что приводит к лоббистским баталиям, например к борьбе вокруг введения новой европейской химической политики (реформа REACH). Европейский Союз финансирует НКО, что делает их независимыми. Независимость приобретается в рамках создания системы сдержек и противовесов при обсуждении и принятии решений. Депутаты Европейского Парламента, а также представители Европейской комиссии, предпочитают иметь дело с НКО, тогда как члены Совета ЕС – с корпорациями. Еще в 2005 г. эффективность НКО и корпораций оценивалась как равноценная, но к 2009 г. ситуация изменилось: корпорации обогнали НКО в эффективности лоббирования по многим направлениям, за исключением сфер потребительских товаров, продуктов питания и напитков, где позиции НКО традиционно сильны. В ряде отраслей, таких как энергетика, медицина и фармацевтика НКО более не способны составлять конкуренцию корпорациям.

The article examines corporations and non-governmental organizations’ lobbying for public and private interests in the European Union. NGOs often lobby for public interests – consumer interests, environmental protection sphere interests, community interests (e.g. women's interests). Corporations prefer to lobby for private interests – industry interests, professional interests, private company interests. It often happens that they compete in lobbying for their interests, which leads to lobbying battles such as confrontation over reform of chemical industry (REACH reform). The European Union funds NGOs, and it helps them to be independent. As a part of ‘checks and balances’ system in the European decision-making process, it creates a competitive environment for lobbying. As a result, deputies of the European Parliament and representatives of the European Commission prefer to deal with NGOs; on the other hand, members of the Council of the European Union prefer to deal with corporations. In 2005, lobbying effectiveness of NGOs and corporations was assessed as equivalent. By 2009, the situation has changed: corporations raised the effectiveness of lobbying, and now they are ahead of NGOs in many areas, with the exclusion of consumer products, food and beverages. Thus, NGOs are no longer able to compete with corporations in several industries such as energy, medicine and pharmaceutical industry.

American Policy Process: Agenda Setting & the Role of Interest Groups " The flaw in the pluralist heave is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent ". –E.E. Schattschneider (1960) The narrative of American inequality breeds dramatic economic and political changes (Hacker & Pierson, 2010) witnessed over the last few decades. Not only has the economy evolved, but also has the political fabric with the emergence of vast financial bids for reelection, lobbying activities by corporations, businesses and professional organizations as interest groups which have drastically drowned the voice of the mass citizenry and public interest. Since, power and influence play a key role in the policy process. In the policy process interest groups influence the policy arena or are the decisions representative of the larger welfare society? To reach the answer, it is necessary to understand the role and influence of these very interest groups in the context of the American policy process, especially during the agenda setting and decision making stages as outlined by scholars. This paper examines valuable insights into the policy process through recognized frameworks in the field; it explores the importance of both the agenda setting and decision making stages in the policy process as stages of problem solving public issues; and it highlights the central role of interest groups in context of the American pluralism. Policy Process In the political sphere, the debate of policy formation must include the role and influence of the mass public, the American citizenry. As a government of democratic ideals, the public is an integral part of public policy process. Democracy, conceptualized, depends on citizens having the means and capacity to form meaningful opinions about acts of governance. This premise is based on the notion that the public not only has access, but also influences in the policy process. In reality, there exists a certain economic inequality in society which leads to certain groups having more influence than others. Even Aristotle wrestled with the question of whether substantial economic inequality was compatible with democracy. In the last decade, even the American Political Science Association concluded that political scientists know very little about the effects of economic and political changes on American democracy. Since it is recognized that economic inequality breeds an advantaged influence within certain groups of society, it is important to understand its implications on public policy (and hence, democracy in general). The policy process is a complex problem solving approach involving relative power and influence of stakeholders. It is the system of logical cycle of events which lead to problem solutions. Charles O. Jones (1984) was the first to integrate policy and political science into a framework of policy analysis for a comprehensive sequence of recurring cycles. According to his framework (which has through the years been both revered and criticized) includes perception and definition of a problem; aggregation in reference to its importance; organization of actors involved; representation as decision makers; agenda setting; formulation of a proposed solution; legitimating and support of the problem; budgeting; implementation; evaluation; and adjustment and termination of the adopted solution. Through policy analysis, decisions by stakeholders are made on adopting solutions. These decisions are methodical and use both qualitative and quantitative methods of defining the problem, evaluation a criterion, identifying and evaluating alternatives, and recommending the Mohyuddin 1

Za kluczową instytucję amerykańskiego systemu polityczno-prawnego można uznać partie polityczne. Nie są one wymienione w Konstytucji, ojcowie-założyciele nie ufali bowiem partiom politycznym, obawiając się głębokich podziałów między nimi. Choć założyciele nie przewidzieli partii politycznych, a nawet byli im przeciwni, okazały się one niezbędnym narzędziem dla realizacji zapisanych w Konstytucji uprawnień. Partie stały się mianowicie mechanizmem, który umożliwia rekrutację, sprawdzanie i nominowanie kandydatów w wybo-rach różnych szczebli. Partie stanowią także organizacje, które przygotowują inicjatywy programowe dla przewidzianych w Konstytucji gałęzi władzy. Politolodzy cenią partie polityczne znacznie wyżej niż ojcowie-założyciele, uznając je za niezbędną instytucję stabilizującą system polityczny. Stany Zjed-noczone są właściwie jedynym rozwiniętym krajem zachodnim, który konse-kwentnie posiada system dwupartyjny, od 1854 r. składający się z Partii De-mokratycznej i Partii Republikańskiej. Siły polityczne dzielą się więc na dwa obozy: ten, który w danym momencie jest u władzy, i jego przeciwników. Ist-nieniu dwóch partii zapewne sprzyja jednomandatowy system wyborczy, w któ-rym z każdego okręgu wyborczego wybierana jest jedynie osoba, która uzyskała najwięcej głosów. Jednocześnie obie partie zbliżają się do siebie programowo, by znaleźć się jak najbardziej w centrum. Towarzyszy też temu zjawisku pewna ogólnikowość programowa, której celem jest objęcie swoim zasięgiem jak największego wycinka

Come è noto, il più o meno stretto rapporto che intercorre, nelle democrazie occidentali capitaliste, tra le maggiori organizzazioni d’interesse e i partiti politici è già stato variamente analizzato ed interpretato nella letteratura politologica. Sia che tale rapporto sia analizzato a livello sistemico (Rose 1974a), sia che venga indagato dal punto di vista delle strategie di lobbying specifiche dei differenti gruppi (Ward 2004; Hall e Deardorff 2006), l’aspetto considerato essenziale riguarda se, come e in che misura i partiti diventino e rimangano dei gatekeepers (Easton 1965) rispetto agli interessi sostenuti dai gruppi (Morlino 1991). Ciò che massimamente conta, in questo senso, è se i partiti riescono a far prevalere il circuito elettorale rappresentativo rispetto a quello definito come funzionale, proprio degli interessi. In altre parole, se la direzione dell’influenza tra tali due attori procede dai partiti verso i gruppi, o dai gruppi verso i partiti.
In questo senso, tali rapporti così definiti identificherebbero quattro possibili categorie di interrelazione: l’occupazione; la simbiosi; l’egemonizzazione; la neutralità (Morlino 1991). Rimandando altrove per la puntuale classificazione analitica di tali categorie idealtipiche, uno degli obiettivi di questo lavoro sarà proprio quello di ipotizzare l’ascrizione del caso italiano degli ultimi quindici anni all’una o all’altra di queste, sulla base dell’osservazione empirica di come i rapporti tra legittimo decisore politico ed interessi socio-economici sono andati sviluppandosi nel periodo preso a riferimento.
Quello dell’interpretazione (e spiegazione) della relazione tra governo e gruppi, tuttavia, non è l’unico quesito al quale si cercherà di dare risposta. Tra gli altri, infatti, si proverà anche a rispondere ad interrogativi di tipo quantitativo, ovvero: quanto i vari governi studiati sono stati in grado di mantenere ferma la propria linea di policy, nel corso dei differenti processi decisionali? Quanto, al contrario, i gruppi sono riusciti ad inserirsi in tale processo, strappando concessioni al legittimo decisore politico? E infine: quale (o quali) tra questi gruppi si è dimostrato più influente, nel suo confrontarsi (o contrapporsi) col governo?
Su queste basi, il focus dell’intero lavoro, piuttosto che sull’evolversi dei processi di policy-making, riguarderà il raffronto tra posizioni di partenza e risultati finali, e ricostruirà, di conseguenza, più i rapporti di forza tra gli attori decisionali che il contenuto delle decisioni effettivamente prese. In altri termini, la prospettiva di politics sarà preponderante rispetto alla prospettiva di policy.

This thesis explores the advocacy strategies and influence of interest groups in EU foreign policy. It examines in particular the impact of institutional factors on the strategies and lobbying outcomes. Conceptually, it contributes to the literature on interest groups and lobbying in the EU and to the study of non-state actor participation in international organisations.

Conceptualising EU foreign policy as multi-level and multi-pillar, the study inquires into the relationship between policy regime (ranging from the Community method to the intergovernmental method, as these predominate in different areas of EU external relations) and the degree and type of interest group influence. To this end the thesis compares three examples of EU foreign policy: visa liberalisation towards the Eastern neighbours; sanctions towards Belarus; and CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine.

The research reveals that interest groups engage in multi-level lobbying even in those policy areas that are ruled by the intergovernmental method. Intergovernmentalism limits formal access to policymakers, but groups and policymakers build channels for informal access. To some extent contrary to the predications of established theories, this allows interest groups to exert some degree of influence even on policy dossiers in which intergovernmental arrangements prevail. In such policy domains, groups opposing change do not always succeed, despite the veto opportunities that intergovernmentalism provides.

While this is a significant finding, the thesis also notes how interest group influence is most commonly exerted upon relatively technical issues and at later stages of the policy cycle. Moreover, the study emphasises that institutional structures are not the only relevant factor in explaining group influence. Group-level characteristics, including material resources, condition groups’ ability to adapt to complex decision-making in EU foreign policy. The thesis concludes that a combination of factors is required to capture the influence of interest groups over EU foreign policy.

Se trata de un estudio sobre el tema de referencia realizado con una muestra de 150 sujetos, cuyos datos han sido aportados por la UNED. Este ejercicio es una práctica de la asignatura de Psicología de los Grupos.

El análisis de los datos sugieren que efectivamente el nivel de fusión de la identidad de los sujetos con el grupo de pertenencia predice de forma significativa la disposición al sacrificio en favor del mismo.

The issue of gun control has come into sharp focus in recent years, prompted primarily by tragedies such as the Sandy Hook school shooting in the U.S., the Dunblane Massacre in the UK and the École Polytechnique Massacre in Canada. In all three countries tension exists between what appear to be polar opposite sectors: those who wish to severely restrict access to guns through tighter gun control, and those who advocate for more liberal access to guns, with a belief that a right to purchase a gun represents an issue of individual freedom. In this paper a comparative analysis is performed of the differences that exist between Canada, the UK and the U.S. on gun control legislation. The genesis of these differences are traced, and interpreted through the following theories: the rational-activist model, the pressure group model, and the veto players theory. A review of existing research would suggest several factors that explain current differences in legislation between the three countries. The first factor explored is the power of public opinion and its influence on gun control policy. In the UK, public opinion has played a major role in influencing gun control policy insofar as a public sentiment for tighter gun control, especially after seminal events such as massacres, has facilitated and promoted the current strict gun control laws. In contrast, in the U.S. several examples point to the fact that public opinion has been a non-facilitating factor in changing legislation. In Canada, public opinion has had a mixed record of influencing legislation. Examples that underscore the complex interaction between public opinion and other influential factors are reviewed. The second factor that will be analyzed is the impact of organized interest groups and collective. Groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) in the U.S. have successfully impacted current legislation through consistent lobbying. Similarly, although in an opposite direction, the Coalition for Gun Control has led to stricter gun control in Canada. Public opinion and interest groups however, are not the only factors affecting gun control legislation; to a large extent these factors operate within existing political frameworks. The third factor will be analyzing the effects that political systems, as well as previous legal statutes have on gun control legislation. Importantly, in the U.S., the political doctrine of separation of powers, coupled with the Second Amendment of the U.S. constitution, have played central roles in the ongoing gun control debate.

This study examines the construction of a new political identity category in the USA during the 1990s, transgender, focusing on three political processes: (1) conflict over meanings associated with the identity category; (2) backlash in the form of stigmatization from other groups that prompted frame transformation; and (3) representation, particularly across political venues where information about the new identity category is disseminated. Using a Historical Discourse Analysis approach to the archived documents of transgender social movement activists, publications, and interest groups from 1990 to 1999, this study shows how activists and leaders shaped what had previously been disparate groups into a unified identity category and associated interest group coalition to represent transgender-identified people. While this new identity category and coalition allowed the projection of unity that is necessary in contemporary interest group politics, this analysis shows that it also obscured important differences within the transgender identity category and helped to produce within-group marginalization and exclusions that endure in contemporary transgender, lesbian, and gay politics.

The article investigates how interest groups influence the Parliament's work. These are directly interested in the legislative process since is the last " stronghold " where can intervene to change legislation in line with the interests they represent. Within the parliamentary committees, where the legislative activity is getting on, the interaction between interest groups and committees' members leads, sometimes, to the modification of legislative process.