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The Oil Platforms Opinion: An elephant in the eye of a needle
Gordon, G.M.
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Amsterdam Law Forum
2009
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Gordon, G. M. (2009). The Oil Platforms Opinion: An elephant in the eye of a needle. Amsterdam Law Forum,
1(2), 133-144. http://www.amsterdamlawforum.org/
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Download date: 25. Nov. 2021
LANDMARKS:
THE OIL PLATFORMS OPINION: AN ELEPHANT IN THE EYE
OF A NEEDLE
Geoff Gordon*
Introduction
The Case Concerning Oil Platforms, known principally for the contribution
therein to the law on use of force and self-defence, is overlooked for the
discussion among its judges of a fundamental question: What is the role of
the International Court of Justice (further: ICJ, or Court) in the international
system?1 The eleven separate opinions attached by the judges to the Court’s
decision suggest the contentiousness of the discussion. Moreover, the case
was deceptively complex: a complaint about freedom of commerce according
to a bilateral Treaty of Amity was really a controversy over the use of force
and self-defence among sworn enemies; and while the record before the
Court was limited to specific incidents from the late 1980’s, the various
judges appear to have drawn substantially, in some cases expressly, on the
public record of world affairs at the beginning of the 21st century. In the
process, the collection of opinions captures strikingly different visions of the
ICJ, its powers and its mandate.
This case note progresses in four brief parts. First, I address the factual
background for the decision. Second, I turn to the jurisprudential
controversy among the various judges. Third, I review the substance of the
Court’s decision on use of force. Finally, I focus on the separate opinion of
Judge Simma and his articulation of Rechtspolitik, as a key to understanding
the competing roles for the ICJ contemplated by the several judges. I
conclude by drawing out the relevance of the dispute among the judges with
reference to a subsequent ICJ case, the Wall Advisory Opinion, and the
ongoing violence in Gaza.
I. Background
The heart of the record before the court pertained to two separate incidents.
First, on 19 Oct., 1987, the United States military struck Iran’s Reshadat oil
installation, damaging platforms connected to that and another complex, the
Resalat. The attack followed an assertion by the United States of the right to
self-defence in the wake of various actions attributed to Iran, particularly a
missile attack on 16 Oct., 1987, destroying a Kuwaiti oil tanker, the Sea Isle
*
Ph.D. candidate, VU University Amsterdam; JD, Columbia Law School.
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 2003
I.C.J. 161. Hereafter, reference will be to Opinion, or to the name of the responsible Judge
in the case of the attached opinions, followed by paragraph or page number.
1
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City, recently reflagged to the United States.2 Second, on 18 April, 1988, as
part of a wider operation, the United States military struck and damaged two
more Iranian oil installations, the Salman and Nasr complexes. The operation
again followed an assertion by the United States of the right to self-defence
pursuant to various actions attributed to Iran, particularly a mine that struck
and damaged the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts on 14 April, 1988, wounding
members of the crew.3
The incidents took place in the wider context of the Iran-Iraq War, between
1980 and 1988. While the history of the Iran-Iraq War is long and sordid, the
record before the Court focused on relatively narrow aspects. The two
incidents at the heart of the case were part of the so-called Tanker War
escalation. As of 1984, both Iran and Iraq began targeting neutral shipping in
the Gulf in an effort to disrupt one another’s trade. The Kuwaiti vessel
involved in the first incident, the Sea Isle City, had for this reason reflagged
under the United States, a protective practice in the region that included
British and Soviet participation. Waters of the Gulf were mined by both Iraq
and Iran, and Iran stood accused, among other things, of using its oil
installations for military purposes, including intelligence and weapons
deployment. Before the ICJ, Iran acknowledged a military presence on its oil
platforms, but insisted the purpose was purely defensive.4
The Court delivered its opinion in the wider context of a different conflict
with Iraq, the 2003 United States invasion. Equally significant was the stillbroader War on Terror following the attacks of 11 Sept., 2001, pursuant to
which the United States had released the 2002 National Security Strategy
(NSS). The NSS announced the Bush Doctrine, asserting an unusually broad,
unilateral right to engage pro-actively in anticipatory self-defence. The
separate opinions exhibit varying degrees of concern for the
contemporaneous legal atmosphere. Judge Rigaux, for instance, concludes
his opinion with critical remarks on the state of U.S. legal scholarship, and
briefly tours “outdated” Hobbesian political philosophy to denounce in its
resurgence the spectre of unbridled violence.5 Judge Simma is at once less
polemical and more comprehensive, calling openly for a Rechtspolitik
statement in support of increasingly marginalised international rules limiting
the use of force. I return to this discussion, below.
The procedural history of the case begins in 1992, when Iran first filed suit
with the ICJ. Though the gravamen of the complaint pertained to the military
actions of the United States as a peripheral actor in the Iran-Iraq War, Iran
brought its suit on other grounds: provisions of the 1955 Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran
(Treaty of Amity, or Treaty). The Treaty of Amity provided for automatic
Opinion, paras. 46-48.
Idem, paras. 65-68.
4 Idem, paras. 23-24, 60, 74-75.
5 Rigaux, paras. 31-33.
2
3
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2009
arbitration before the ICJ – the only international forum available to Iran,
and only available, given the Court’s otherwise-applicable limitation to
consensual jurisdiction, on the terms of the Treaty of Amity. In 1996, by
preliminary judgment, the Court allowed the suit to proceed pursuant to a
single provision of the Treaty of Amity, namely Art. X, paragraph 1,
providing for freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories
of the two contracting parties. Provisions suggesting broader terms for
complaint were rejected as incapable of conferring legitimate grounds for
action.6 In 1998, the Court allowed the United States to proceed with a
counterclaim on the same Art. X (1), based on Iran’s activities during the
Tanker War.7
II. Jurisdictional Controversy
The case thus went forward before the ICJ as a matter concerning alleged
infringement of the freedom of commerce mandated by the Treaty of Amity.
In its defence, the United States raised, among other arguments, Art.
XX(1)(d) of the Treaty, which states that the Treaty would in no event
preclude measures by either party necessary to protect essential security
interests.8 In its 2003 decision on the merits, the Court took that ball and ran
with it. In the reasoning of its Opinion, the Court began with the United
States defence, rather than the complaint itself. The Court explained:
“[I]t appears to the Court that there are particular considerations
militating in favour of an examination of the application of Article XX,
paragraph 1(d), before turning to Article X, paragraph 1. It is clear that
the original dispute between the Parties related to the legality of the
actions of the United States, in the light of international law on the use
of force (...). Furthermore, as the United States itself recognizes in its
Rejoinder, “The self-defence issues presented in this case raise matters
of the highest importance to all members of the international
community”, and both Parties are agreed as to the importance of the
implications of the case in the field of the use of force, even though
they draw opposite conclusions from this observation. The Court
therefore considers that, to the extent that its jurisdiction under Article
XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty authorizes it to examine and rule
on such issues, it should do so.”9
The question, of course, was precisely whether or to what degree the Treaty
of Amity conferred jurisdiction on the Court to pass judgment on the use of
force, despite the otherwise narrow grounds for complaint accorded by the
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803.
7 Opinion, paras. 1-11, 31. The allowance of the United States counterclaim in itself
represented a significant development of the Court’s procedural rules, though I do not
focus on that here. See S.M. Young, Destruction of Property (On an International Scale): The
Recent Oil Platforms Case and the International Court of Justice’s Inconsistent Commentary on the Use of
Force By the United States, 20 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 335, 338 (2004).
8 Opinion, para. 32.
9 Idem, para. 37.
6
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Treaty. Having signalled its intention to effect such judgment, the Court
equated the term “necessary to protect essential security interests” with the
standard for self-defence under customary law and Art. 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations (UN Charter), thereby decoupling its judgment from the
Treaty of Amity. With recourse instead to international law generally, the
Court found the actions of the United States not to qualify as legitimate acts
of self-defence, but inappropriate uses of force. Having thus dismissed the
defence, the Court then turned back to the complaint – and dismissed that as
well. Ultimately, the Court held that the actions of the United States did not
constitute an infringement of commerce between the two countries as
contemplated by the terms of the Treaty of Amity any more than they
constituted legitimate self-defence.
The Court’s decision to review a defence before the substance of the
complaint was telling. Still more provocative, the Court began its dispositif, the
operational portion of its opinion, by repeating its rejection of the United
States’ defence, despite having already signalled in its reasoning that Iran’s
substantive claim was without merit.10 As a matter of operational decision,
logic suggests that a meritless complaint entails no defence. Judge Kooijmans
emphasises the irregularity with a review of Court precedent:
“The operative part does not immediately respond to the claim as
formulated by the Applicant, but starts with a finding not essential to
the Court’s decision on that claim (…). I have checked the operative
parts of all judgments of this Court and its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, in contentious cases and none of them
starts with a finding that is not determinative for the Court’s
disposition of the claim.”11
Following the Rechtspolitik of Judge Simma, however, the decision was not
provocative enough: “the Court has fulfilled what I consider to be its duty
(…) with inappropriate restraint”.12
Judge Simma’s choice of words succinctly suggest the crucial question: what
is the duty of the Court? A question of jurisdiction is a question of the
powers available to a court – and with powers available, duty incumbent –
but the Court misses this line of inquiry by concentrating instead on the
“original dispute”. Judge Ranjeva, sympathetic to the Court’s method,
perhaps unwittingly suggests the dangers of attempting to purport a real or
original dispute independent of the formal pleadings. He applauds
overcoming “artificial” aspects of the case, but concedes that “[d]efining the
‘cause’ of a claim – the underlying reason therefore – is a controversial issue
Idem, Dispositif para. (1).
Kooijmans, para. 3. And see the opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren at para. 13: “the
Court should have considered Article XX, paragraph 1(d), as a defence to be examined
only in the event of its having previously established that the United States had violated
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty”.
12 Simma, p. 325.
10
11
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2009
in doctrine because of the notion’s malleable character and metaphysical
connotations”.13 The somewhat mystical suggestion of divining a complaint
is not helped when he explains that “[i]n thus going directly to the real heart
of the dispute, the Court has complied with its obligation (…) to make a true
interpretation of substantive law”, whatever that means.14
Judge Elaraby also adopts the focus of the Court: “The case, in essence, is
about international responsibility. It evolves around whether it is permissible
for a State to use force against another State outside the boundaries defined
by the Charter of the United Nations”.15 This was indeed the issue Iran
wanted to litigate, as Judge Higgins explained:
“The Court was in 1996 well aware that there was a general dispute
between the Parties in which each claimed unlawful uses of force by
the other. Certainly Iran has been interested in seeking a basis of
jurisdiction that could allow it to proceed with substantive claims
relating to the United States’ uses of force. The emphasis put by Iran,
in the preliminary objections, on Article I of the Treaty was but one
element of many evidencing that its real and only interest lay in the use
of force.”16
As Judge Owada points out, it is in the nature of a court of limited
jurisdiction – rather than a court with plenary authority to rule as it pleases –
that “the dispute before the Court is as defined by the Parties in their
submissions to this Court. The so-called ‘original dispute between the
Parties’ has no direct legal relevance to this dispute before the Court.”17
Moreover, the scope of the dispute before the Court was the subject of the
1996 Judgment, prompting Judge Higgins likewise to observe that
“‘[t]he original dispute’ is of no relevance at the present time and it is
inappropriate that in 2003 the Court should now treat Article X,
paragraph 1, as an afterthought to ‘the original dispute’ over which in
1996 it did not find it had jurisdiction (…). Invocations of the ‘original
dispute’ and ‘importance’ of subject-matter cannot serve to transform a
contingent defence into a subject-matter that is ‘desirable’ to deal with
in the text of the Judgment and in the dispositi.f”.18
In formally purporting to remain within the jurisdiction conferred by the
Treaty of Amity, while nonetheless basing the substance of its opinion
squarely on the use of force as a matter of international law, the Court
effectively outstripped its own institutional capacity. Moreover, by doing so
in a manner ultimately irrelevant to the disposition of the case, the Court
made relatively clear an expansive interest in its own authority.
Ranjeva, para. 6.
Idem, para. 3.
15 Elaraby, para. 1.1.
16 Higgins, para. 19.
17 Owada, para. 12.
18 Higgins, paras. 22-23.
13
14
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The expansive interest attributable to the Court makes up the better part of
the dispute among the judges in the remarkable number of separate opinions
attached to the case. Judges Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Buergenthal and Owada all expressed discomfort or disapproval with the
Court’s principal ruling on the use of force under international law; Judges
Ranjeva and Koroma wrote separately to support the ruling; and Judges AlKhasawneh, Elaraby, Simma and Rigaux all wrote to indicate that the Court
could and should have gone still farther in taking the opportunity to
pronounce on violations of the international legal prohibition on the use of
force. Among the latter four, Judges Elaraby and Simma were most
pronounced in their discontent with the scope of the Court’s ruling, and
between the two, Judge Simma was most comprehensive and visionary in his
statement of the powers available to the Court. His opinion serves as a sort
of key by which to understand the startling different visions among the
various judges of the role and powers of the ICJ and the nature of the
international system generally. Before proceeding to Judge Simma’s opinion,
it is useful to review the substance of the Court’s use of force decision; I turn
to that now.
III. Use of Force
Considered independent of the complex of concerns caught up with
the jurisdictional question, much of the Court’s reasoning on selfdefence is not terribly controversial. Likewise, the first, critical
manoeuvre to draw on international law is not unreasonable:
“[U]nder the general rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, interpretation must
take into account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties” (Art. 31, para. 3(c)). The Court
cannot accept that Article XX, paragraph 1(d), of the Treaty was
intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules of
international law on the use of force, so as to be capable of being
successfully invoked, even in the limited context of a claim for breach
of the Treaty, in relation to an unlawful use of force.”19
The Court proceeds along two principle lines of inquiry. First, the United
States was called on to demonstrate that it was the victim of an armed attack,
requiring a showing of (a) substantial aggressive force, pursuant to which (b)
the attack must have been attributable to Iran, with (c) the specific intent to
strike the United States. Second, the United States was called on to
demonstrate that its actions were (a) necessary and (b) proportionate,
according to which the Court also included inquiry into (c) the nature of the
targets of defensive force.
The armed attacks to which the United States responded must have been “of
such a nature as to be qualified as ‘armed attacks’ within the meaning of that
19
Opinion, para. 41.
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expression in Article 51 [of the UN Charter] (…) and as understood in
customary law on the use of force”.20 The Court emphasised the distinction
between “the most grave forms of the use of force”, qualifying as armed attacks,
and “other less grave forms”, which will not qualify for purposes of Art. 51.
Moreover, as noted, the Court linked the armed attack threshold to a showing of
specific intent on the part of Iran. The Court explains: “the question is whether
[the] attack, either in itself or in combination with the rest of the “series of (…)
attacks” cited by the United States can be categorised as an “armed attack” on
the United States justifying self-defence”. The Court notes first that the Sea Isle
City was in Kuwaiti waters at the time of the attack on it, and that a Silkworm
missile fired from (it is alleged) more than 100 km away could not have been
aimed at the specific vessel, but simply programmed to hit some target in
Kuwaiti waters. Secondly, the Texaco Caribbean, whatever its ownership, was
not flying a United States flag, so that an attack on the vessel is not in itself to be
equated with an attack on that State (…). [And t]here is no evidence that the
minelaying alleged to have been carried out by the Iran Ajr, at a time when Iran
was at war with Iraq, was aimed specifically at the United States; and similarly it
has not been established that the mine struck by the Bridgeton was laid with the
specific intention of harming that ship, or other United States vessels.21
Accordingly, the United States with respect to both incidents failed to establish
that it was the victim of an armed attack under international law sufficient to
allow unilateral action in self-defence.22 The demand for proof of specific
intent on the part of Iran to strike the United States in particular was not
uncontroversial, but holds obvious appeal within the context of the UN
collective security system: the ruling bars self-help and avoids escalation in
the face of generalised violence, presumptively vesting an exclusive
responsive right with the collective apparatus of the UN.
The Court proceeded to the criteria of necessity and proportionality, despite
the failure by the United States to meet the armed attack threshold. The
analysis of both criteria, however, is somewhat thin. Both appear to come
down to the Court’s controversial use of the evidence on the record, and its
equally problematic reliance on the nature of the target of the defensive
force. As regards proportionality, the Court simply states that the 1987
actions might indeed have met proportionality (the point is moot because the
armed attack threshold was not met), but goes on to say of the 1988 incident,
in conclusive fashion, that
Idem, para. 51.
Idem, para. 64.
22 The same conclusion can be put otherwise by unbundling the various elements of the
Art. 51 inquiry, particularly the components of severity and responsibility. Thus, Pieter
Bekker, reviewing the case, writes of the minelaying allegation, “the Court concluded that,
although it fell within the meaning of ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 of the UN Charter and as
understood in customary law on the use of force, the mining of the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts
was insufficient in itself to amount to such an attack by Iran that would justify U.S. action
in self-defense”. Pieter H. F. Bekker, International Decisions, David D. Caron, (ed.), 98 Am. J.
Int’l L. 550, 53 (2004).
20
21
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“[a]s a response to the mining, by an unidentified agency, of a single
United States warship, which was severely damaged but not sunk, and
without loss of life, neither ‘Operation Praying Mantis’ as a whole, nor
even that part of it that destroyed the Salman and Nasr platforms, can
be regarded, in the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of
force in self-defence”.23
As regards necessity, the Court “notes that there is no evidence that the
United States complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms, in
the same way as it complained repeatedly of minelaying and attacks on
neutral shipping, which does not suggest that the targeting of the platforms
was seen as a necessary act”.24
The quoted passage on necessity seems to indicate that the record might
establish necessity with respect to Iran’s minelaying activities and attacks on
neutral shipping – the primary acts complained of in the incidents of April,
1988, and Oct., 1987, respectively – but that necessity was not met with
specific reference to the platforms elected as targets for defensive response.
In part this was due to finding that the United States did not carry a burden
of proof to show that the oil installations were being used for aggressive
military purposes: the Court held, without further defining its evidentiary
standard, that while the United States’ showing was “suggestive”, even
“highly suggestive”, it was not conclusive.25 With respect to the Court’s focus
on the nature of the defensive target, however, the terminology raises a
potentially troubling confusion of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The Court held:
“One aspect of [the criteria of necessity and proportionality] is the nature of
the target of the force used avowedly in self-defence”.26 Proportionality by
any recognised use under the jus ad bellum will inevitably take account of the
contemplated targets, but the term itself is generally reserved for
humanitarian law: confusion between the two effects confusion between the
right to respond in self-defence, and the nature of the activities allowed once
that right is ascertained. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore such
confusion, but I note that the Court’s reasoning shows less than thorough
sensitivity to distinctions across the two fields of law. Accordingly, the
Court’s lack of clarity in its discussion of necessity, proportionality and
targeting standards opened the door to the critical response by William H.
Taft, legal advisor to the United States:
“There is no requirement in international law that a State exercising its
right of self-defence must use the same degree or type of force used by
the attacking State in its most recent attack. Rather, the proportionality
of the measures taken in self-defence is to be judged according to the
nature of the threat being addressed.”.27
Opinion, para. 77.
Idem, para. 76.
25 Idem, paras. 59, 71.
26 Idem, para. 74.
23
24
27
William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 295, 305
(2004).
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To draw this discussion to a close, however, the Court’s opinion in sum –
though achieving less than perfect clarity in all respects – suggests a strong
affirmation of the commonplace ban on reprisals, though the Court does not
use that term. Judge Elaraby likewise states that “the United States military
action against Iran must be considered as military reprisals” and regrets that
the Court was not more explicit on that ground by way of obiter dictum.28
Judge Simma shared similar discontent; I turn to his opinion at last.
IV. Judge Simma’s Opinion
Judge Simma indicates his satisfaction with the Court’s opinion, as well as his
discontent, when he applauds the “confirmation, albeit too hesitant, of the
jus cogens of the United Nations Charter”.29 The overriding consideration, for
Judge Simma, is one of “Rechtspolitik”, according to which the Court has
rightly “taken the opportunity, offered by United States reliance on Article
XX of the 1955 Treaty, to state its view on the legal limits on the use of force
at a moment when these limits find themselves under the greatest stress”.30
The statement is baldly political in nature, and explicitly endorses
opportunism in pursuit of an ends particular to the interests of the Court.
Moreover, given that the moment of decision occurs fifteen years after the
moment of controversy before the Court, Judge Simma’s language suggests
pushing the Court’s review beyond the more or less narrow parameters of
the case at hand, making expedients of the parties and controversy.
Needless to say, Judge Simma’s Opinion represents a radical break from
traditional judicial method. His is a broader interest in policy and politics:
“From the viewpoint of legal policy and political relevance (…) there can be
no doubt that in the present case the emphasis is squarely on the question of
the legality vel non of the use of armed force by the United States against the
oil platforms”.31 By reference to the policy and politics attendant on the
outcome of the Court’s decision, Judge Simma avoids the ontological
distraction of discerning the true or original complaint between the parties.
The distinction is at once subtle and broad: like Judge Ranjeva, Judge Simma
suggests that adjudicating the use of force was more important than
adjudicating the pleadings on their face; Judge Simma, however, is not
confined to justifying his Opinion by reference to the parties or their dispute,
with recourse instead to a policy concerned with matters of “political
relevance”, wholly external to the record. The question, then, is on what
grounds, according to what powers and what policy, does the Court account
for political relevance in its role as tribunal?
28
Elaraby, para. 1.2.
Simma, p. 325.
30
Idem, p. 325.
29
31
Idem, para. 3.
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In answer, Judge Simma falls back on principle and a sense of significance: “I
consider it of utmost importance, and a matter of principle, for the Court to
pronounce itself on questions of the threat or use of force in international
relations whenever it is given the opportunity to do so”.32 Thus:
“We currently find ourselves at the outset of an extremely controversial
debate on the further viability of the limits on unilateral military force
established by the United Nations Charter. In this debate, “supplied”
with a case allowing it to do so, the Court ought to take every
opportunity to secure that the voice of the law of the Charter rise
above the current cacophony.”33
Judge Owada, however, counters that “it is crucial to keep in mind that in the
present case the competence of the Court is limited to the examination of the
claims of the Applicant under Article X, paragraph 1, and does not extend to
the examination of a broader and general problem of self-defence under
general international law as such.”34 Competence, in Judge Owada’s
formulation, is more than a formal constraint: it captures institutional
limitation in actual fact. Thus, he continues,
“while it is of the utmost importance for the Court to pronounce its
authoritative position on this general problem in the proper context, it
should do so in a context where it should be possible for the Court to
deal with problem squarely in a full-fledged manner, with all its
ramifications both in terms of the law and the facts involved.”.35
The Court is at once bound by the contrasting universal and particular
aspects of its adjudication: the power to effect universal rules should call for
restraint in application to a particular problem stated according to a particular
record developed by parties with interests particular to themselves.
Judge Buergenthal, along with Judge Higgins, raises the non ultra petita rule
(roughly translated as ‘not more than asked for’): “the function of the non
ultra petita rule is to ensure that the Court does not exceed the jurisdictional
confines spelled out by the parties in their final submissions”.36 Judge Simma
contemplates a Court tasked with defending the Law, Judge Buergenthal a
Court tasked with administering the law. The former accords the Court an
active pre-eminence; the latter subjugates the Court to a system calibrated
among divergent actors and interests. Judge Buergenthal cites approvingly
from Fitzmaurice: “The non ultra petita rule is not only an inevitable corollary
– indeed, virtually a part of the general principle of consent of the parties as
the basis of international jurisdiction – it is also a necessary rule, for without
Idem, para. 5.
Idem, para. 6.
34 Owada, para. 37.
35 Idem, para. 38.
36 Buergenthal, para. 8.
32
33
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it the consent principle itself could constantly be circumvented”.37 Judge
Simma, for his part, states:
“I find it regrettable that the Court has not mustered the courage of
restating, and thus reconfirming, more fully fundamental principles of
the law of the United Nations as well as customary international law
(principles that in my view are of the nature of jus cogens) on the use of
force, or rather the prohibition on armed force, in a context and at a
time when such a reconfirmation is called for with the greatest
urgency.”38
Judge Higgins, on the other hand, asks “conversely, if the use of force on
armed attack and self-defence is to be judicially examined, is the appropriate
way to do so through the eye of the needle that is the freedom of commerce
clause of a 1955 FCN Treaty?”.39 She answers her own question in the
negative: “These questions are of such a complexity and importance that they
require a different sort of pleading and a different type of case”.40
Dissonance lingers in the twin objections of Judges Higgins and Buergenthal.
The subject matter is too important or the system too carefully calibrated, the
one and the other suggest, to reach beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the
Court. The latter, however, denies the relevance of the former, and vice
versa, such that the one must hold sway to the detriment of the other as a
matter of law. The Court is caught in the middle. In the meantime, Judge
Simma forcefully laments:
“What we cannot but see outside the courtroom is that, more and
more, legal justification of use of force within the system of the United
Nations Charter is discarded even as a fig leaf, while an increasing
number of writers appear to prepare for the outright funeral of
international legal limitations on the use of force.”41
Even here, though, some temperance is in order: the international rules on
the use of force have been reported dead before, and the concern has been
exaggerated, if not always greatly.42
Conclusion
Less than a year after announcing the Oil Platforms decision, the ICJ
announced its advisory opinion concerning ‘Legal Consequences of the
Idem, para. 8, citing Geral Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International
Court of Justice, Vol. II, p. 529 (1986).
38 Simma, para. 6.
39 Higgins, para. 26.
40 Idem, para. 26.
41 Simma, para. 6.
42 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of
Force by States, 64 Am. J. Int’l L. 809, 820-21 (1970); and Louis Henkin, The Reports of the
Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 Am. J. Int’l L. 544 (1971).
37
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Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’.43 Israel
declined to address the case on the merits, suggesting disapproval that the
Court was being used as a political football.44 The precise procedural issues
were different from those of Oil Platforms, but the general controversy over
the propriety of the Court’s review was similar. And the world today is
confronted with the ongoing violence in Gaza: did the Wall Opinion help or
hinder matters? Was the international system served by the Court’s opinion
or undermined by it? There are no clear answers to these questions – it is not
even certain that these are the right questions to be asking, and it is well
beyond the scope of this note to turn to the Wall Opinion now in any
substance. I raise the case in broad outline here as illustration because the
questions put are raised forcefully by the Court and judges in the Oil Platforms
Opinion, alongside differing visions of the international system and the ICJ’s
role in it. They demand engagement, even if they defy resolution.
- The Amsterdam Law Forum is an open access initiative supported by the VU University Library -
43 Legal Consequences of the Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory
Opinion), 43 I.L.M. 1009 (2004) (Wall Opinion).
44 Idem paras. 36, 46.