Banez on Sedevacantism

Banez on Sedevacantism Domingo Banez, O.P., Scholastica Commentaria in Secundam Secundae Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae, (Venice, 1587), Question 1, article 10 [pages 194-196] We are entering into this discussion in medias res. The article asks "whether ordering the symbol of faith pertains to the supreme Pontiff," and the response is affirmative. After a lengthy commentary, Banez brings forword a few doubts (dubitationes). The following passage comes from his response to the second doubt, which asks: "Whether the supreme Pontiff can err in defining matters of faith?" In the course of responding to the question in the negative, he proposes several conclusions that help to understand the conditions of the exercise of papal infallibility. Where our reading begins, Banez has just defended the proposition that it is possible for the pope to personally err in matters of faith and morals. The first three numbered sections give the arguments, and Banez' responses, to the contrary. The third of these feeds into his second conclusion, namely, that the pope does not lose his office even if he is a formal heretic. 1. But now, to some special objections against our conclusion a response ought briefly be given. For they object first: that privilege (which they understand from Lk 22: "I have prayed for thee Peter,") was not only granted to Peter alone, but also to all the successors of Peter; but it is understood that if it is referred to Peter such that neither the personal nor public faith of Peter is able to fail, therefore, it ought to be understood in the same way if it be referred to the successors of Peter. The minor (of the argument) is clear from what was said above. But the major is proven. Since that privilege was not bestowed on Peter insofar as he was an Apostle, otherwise the Apostle Thomas would never have lost faith, but it was given to him (Peter) insofar as he was the Pastor of the universal Church, and from thence a privilege of this sort passes over to the successors of Peter. To this objection it is responded that a privilege of this sort contains two things. One that pertained to the personal excellence of Peter, namely, that his own faith would not fail. The other that pertained to the office of the supreme pontiff and Vicar of Christ, namely, that in proposing a doctrine of the faith to the whole church and in the strengthening of the brethren, the public faith of Peter would not fail. Therefore, we say that the successors of Peter follow him in the latter privilege, insofar as it pertains to the office of the supreme pontiff and the common governance of the Church; but they are not heirs of the former privilege in those things that pertain to the personal dignity of Peter, just as all the Apostles also received from the Lord Christ the universal power of governing the Church everywhere on the earth, and not only each of them in their own diocese, and nevertheless, the Bishop successors of the Apostles did not inherit that first and general power, but only that particular one with respect to their own diocese. 2. Their second objection is that it seems to them, in order to obtain the sweet disposition of God governing the Church, that the supreme pontiff can't be a heretic. For the judge himself ought to be the rule of himself and of the other (obliqui), and any judge advances his opinion by his proper judgment; but it would be violent, as it were, that a heretical supreme pontiff should define something other than he himself believes, therefore (etc.). To this objection we respond that in the same way it would be proven that the supreme pontiff could not be a sinner or an idolater since he must make judgments against sinners and idolaters. It should be said, therefore, that with respect to the sweet disposition and order of the universe it is suitable that water should rise when there is need lest a vacuum come about, even though according to its proper and specific inclination it ought to be borne downward; so also with respect to the sweet disposition and order of the universal Church it is suitable that he who is the Vicar of Christ on earth receive from Christ himself such an influence, when there is need, that in defining a truth of faith, the teaching of Christ follows infallibly even if the pontiff errs elsewhere out of his own malice or ignorance. In which matter the omnipotence of God is shown more when through the mouth of the minister who errs in other things, he brings forth infallible truth. 3. The third objection is: For if we concede (they say) that the Pope can't be a heretic, we escape great difficulties and problems, such as: whether the Pope loses his pontifical office on account of heresy, and by whom is he to be judged?, which questions are resolved with difficulty by theologians. To this objection the reply is given that it is shameful for a man who is a theologian to convey a fractured truth by the difficulty of some question, but rather it befits him to seek out and elucidate the hidden truth. On account of which, there is our second conclusion in the order of this disputation. II. The second conclusion. If the supreme pontiff falls into heresy, he does not at once lose the pontifical office, before he be deposed by the church. This conclusion is against (Juan de) Torquemada (1468), Book 2 of Summa Ecclesiae, chapter 112, against the seventh objection, http://books.google.ca/books?id=w1jdvze2SywC&printsec=frontcover&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false Page 391 where he says that if the Roman pontiff becomes a heretic, by the very fact that he falls from the faith of Peter, the falls from the cathedral and chair of peter, and consequently a judgment made by such a heretic would not be a judgment of the Apostolic see. And in Book 4, part 2, chapters 18-20, Page 583ff. he holds the same opinion. And this opinion is said by Cajetan in Opusc. de aut. Papae et Concilii, chapter 18, to be that of illustrious men. But Cajetan himself holds our conclusion in the same book, chapters 17 and 18. 1. And it is proven first. If other Bishops are heretics, they still retain their Episcopal office until they be deposed. So also the supreme Pontiff. The consequence is proven: because the supreme Pontiff ought not be in a worse condition than other bishops. The antecedent is proven: because the Church or the Pope, to whom the deposition of a heretical bishop pertains, cannot make judgment concerning internal acts, but a bishop can be a heretic by heresy (held) only interiorly; therefore such a bishop still retains his episcopal office. And it is confirmed: because otherwise it would follow that if a mentally heretical bishop, or even the supreme Pontiff, should afterwards return to a better mind, he would be held to betray himself or to give up his own seat of Pontifical office, because he would not be a true prelate unless he be elected anew, which would all be extremely difficult. 2. It is proven second. If a sometime heretical Pontiff afterwards becomes ready to be corrected, he is not to be deposed, as even our adversaries admit; therefore, he does not cease to be pontiff. The consequence is clear; for if he once ceased to be the true pontiff, whether by divine or human law, he would not be able to be put on the chair again except by a new election. 3. It is proven third. It would be dangerous if the governance of the whole church depended on the faith of one man, which faith, no one is able to know whether he has it in his heart, and great inconveniences would follow. First indeed, because this having been granted, all the definitions of the pontiff could be weakened not only by heretics, but even by catholics. For who would be certain whether or not the pontiff has true faith? And then consequently all the laws and statures which should come down from the pontiff would be weakened for a similar reason. And finally, all the inconveniences that follow from the heresy of those alleging that a prelate loses his office through any mortal sin whatsoever follow also from the opinion contrary to our conclusion, such as, for example, that we would have doubtful or unknown pontiffs, and all would roil about in a kind of Babylonian confusion. But against our second and first conclusion, those thinking otherwise object the opposite. For when at first the supreme pontiff falls into heresy, he ceases to be the head of the universal Church and so ceases to be pontiff. The consequent is clear, and the antecedent is proven: since the supreme pontiff immediately ceased to be a member. To this objection we easily reply from the doctrine treated before, when we were explaining the definition of the church. Therefore, we say now that the supreme pontiff is said to be the head of the church, not by reason of his holiness or the faith he has, for it is not in this way that he steals into the other members; but he is said to be the head by reason of his ministerial office to govern the church by defining truth, establishing laws, administrating sacraments, which are all exercised exteriorly according to the visible ecclesiastical hierarchy, and so I would call it palpable. The other, (namely), that the pontiff himself ceases to be a member of Christ on account of heresy because he ceases to receive from Him the spiritual influence ordered to his own holiness, this, I say, does not impede the pontiff from being said to be the most powerful member of the church, namely, the head, with respect to Ecclesiastical governance. In the same way the praetor of the city is also said to be the head of the republic. We noted above that since the notion of member is said metaphorically, there can be a diverse consideration of the metaphor. And according to one consideration the pontiff is not a member of Christ or the church, and according to another he will be a member of Christ and the church.